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ABSTRACT
Public sector industries play a very significant role in the 
economy of Bangladesh. A cordial labour-management relationship as 
a pre-condition to uninterrupted production in such industries is 
therefore highly desirable. In the privatisation policy in early 
industrialisation, pursued during the pre-liberation days, a 
contradiction between private owners and workers was inherent.
Under the policy of massive nationalisation pursued a fter  the 
independence, improved industrial relations in the public sector 
industries could reasonably be expected. But the published sources 
suggest an opposite picture. With this background, the present 
study has been undertaken to examine the general trend, causes and 
methods of handling of industrial disputes in the public sector 
industries and to make some policy recommendations for improving 
future public sector industrial relations based on a review of the 
Government policies and the objective and subjective perspectives of 
the various institutional machineries of dispute resolution.
The study covers a ll aspects of dealing with both individual and 
collective disputes in certain public sector industries selected 
to represent the various sub-sectors of public sector industry.
In addition to using secondary data from various published sources a 
f ie ld  investigation has also been conducted. This f ie ld  study is 
based on two types of data -the f i r s t  comprising interviews with the 
people who are directly involved in resolving the disputes at 
various levels and the second comprising records of the actual 
dispute cases at each level of the dispute resolution process. In 
to ta l,  96 respondents have been interviewed and 614 cases analysed.
By all measures, industrial conflict in the public sector industries 
in Bangladesh shows an increasing trend. As to causes of disputes, 
financial issues and wage scale anomalies seem to be the major 
issues. Real wages of the workers show a decreasing trend upto 1975 
but due to severe political suppression of union ac tiv it ies  during 
this period, the various measures of strikes didnot increase. From 
1976 onwards real wages show an increasing trend at a slow rate;
however such increases were too low compared to workers' needs and 
levels of expectation and as a result man-days lost due to strikes 
increased. Thus, perhaps contrary to general expectation, a positive 
correlation between real wages indices and man-days lost due to 
strikes in public sector industries has existed. Union membership 
strength explains 22%, 32% and 43% respectively of the variation in  
the number of strikes, workers involved in strikes and man-days lost 
due to such strikes in the sample public sector industries.
Although the underlying data suffer from certain basic weaknesses, 
the indications are that real wages and union membership strength 
are the two key independent variables influencing the incidence of 
industrial conflict in the Bangladesh public sector industries.
Disputes arising in the public sector industries are not handled 
effectively. A number of facets contribute to the present 
situation. Workers and their unions in the public sector industries 
have a ll the characteristics of early industrial development, 
including m ultiplicity of unions, serious inter-union r iva lr ies  and 
allegience of workers to different unions. Appropriate managers are 
not placed at appropriate points in procedures. Both unions and 
managements hold adversarial views against each other. No plant has 
any formal grievance procedure. The administrative hierarchy of the 
public sector industries consists of three tiers: the Ministry at 
the top holding major decision-making powers, the corporation 
management at the middle holding a ll administrative and controlling 
powers and the plant management at the bottom having very l i t t l e  
operational freedom due to the policy of excessive centralisation  
being pursued. Authority, responsibility, the issues to be 
resolved at each level, and the methods of negotiation have not been 
clearly spelt out. Many disputes are, therefore, raised at 
inappropriate levels, and negotiations naturally f a i l .  Economic 
conditions of service of the workers in these industries are 
governed by a uniform and standardised wage scale fixed by the 
Government, irrespective of inter-industry and inter-plant diversity  
of situation. Continued change occurs in the cost of l iv ing . All
these act as a deterrent to healthy labour-management relations and 
increased productivity. Under such conditions negotiations and 
conciliation fa i l  to bring any acceptable outcome to the reasonable 
satisfaction of the parties concerned.
The centralised Government control of the wages and fringe benefits 
and the peculiarity of management structure of the public sector 
industries have significantly reduced the scope for institutional 
dispute resolution machineries. The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 
1969, governing industrial relations and dispute resolution in 
Bangladesh, though equally applicable for both public and private 
sectors, is inappropriate for the public sector industries in many 
respects. Plant managements usually do not accept negotiation on 
economic disputes on the plea of a lack of authority. The 
corporations have only limited and ambiguous authority, and are 
overburdened with bureaucratic rules. A very few cases are refered 
to conciliation and s t i l l  fewer ultimately come out successful. 
Labour courts mainly handle "rights" disputes of an individual 
nature. The arbitration machinery exists in law but not in 
practice. Not even a single case from the sample public sector 
industries has been referred to the labour appellate Tribunal since 
1974. The limited scope for settlement of collective issues by the 
formal institutional machineries leaves only one method for settling  
such issues -the direct intervention of the Government in the face 
of a corporation-wide workstoppage by the workers.
Contrary to general assumptions a ll external machineries of dispute 
resolution - conciliation, labour court and labour appellate 
tribunal - are found to be very underloaded. Nevertheless none of 
the machineries except conciliation could adhere to s tatu torily  
provided time lim its in disposing of the disputes referred to i t .  
Labour courts seem to be most negligent in this respect. All 
institutional machineries suffer from certain objective and 
subjective problems which diminish their effectiveness of 
operations. Depending on the varied nature of such problems, 
tentative solutions to them are suggested over short, medium and 
long-term perspectives. Based on the tentative solutions to
problems identified and the applicability of certain Western models, 
three sets of industrial relations are conceptualised -  one at the 
plant level, one at the corporation level and the other at the 
national level. Considering both the present and conceptual 
situations, three contingency path models (one for the plant, one 
for the corporation and the other for the conciliation level 
negotiations) are exemplified. Finally, in view of the three-tier  
organisational structure of the public sector industries and the 
suggested tentative solutions to present problems of the 
institutional methods of resolving disputes, the last Chapter 
suggests a model, consisting of three levels, for improving 
future industrial relations and productivity in these industries. 
Under this suggested model, industrial relations at the three levels 
would be governed mainly by three types of agreement -  the basic 
agreement at the national level, the substantive agreement at the 
corporation level, and the procedural agreement at the plant level.
In a developing country like Bangladesh where prices are rising 
rapidly, the unemployment rate is very high and the workers are 
organisationally very divided and weak, much depends indeed on the 
attitudes and policies of the Government which is the major 
industrial employer and final decision-maker of the policies 
affecting the employment of workers in the public sector industries. 
But i t  is not heartening to note that over the industrial relations 
history of Bangladesh, workers got as many as six labour policies, 
each fu ll of big promises for improving the fate of workers, 
however, due to their non-implementation, a ll of these have turned 
into "Sleeping Beauties" within the four walls of the Labour 
Ministry.
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Bangladesh is basically an agricultural country. About three-
fourths of the total c iv il ia n  labour force of the country are
engaged in a g r ic u l tu r e ,^  while agriculture contributed nearly
50 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1977-82.
The industrial sector contributed around 10.5 per cent only
(large scale industries contributed 6 per cent and the small scale
industries 4.5 per cent) of the total GDP over the same p e r io d .^
The relative insignificance of the extent of industrialisation in
Bangladesh is also evident from the distribution of employment Out
of the 25.3 million employed labour force in 1979-80, those engaged
in industry (of a ll  sizes - large, medium and small) accounted for
only 1.9 million ( i .e .  4.7 per cent of the total employed labour
force). The breakdown of the industrial employment as to the size
of industries showed that only 0.4 million people are engaged in
modern industries, and 0.79 million in small and cottage 
T41industries. Thus on a ll considerations, Bangladesh is indeed 
one of the least industrially developed nations of the world.
But this should not minimise the role of industrialisation in the 
economy of Bangladesh. The world is now entering a new age - the 
age of total industrialisation. Industrialisation is now 
universally accepted as a powerful catalyst for economic growth 
irrespective of the p o lit ic a l,  social and economic systems
F51
prevailing in a country. J This equally applies to Bangladesh 
as well. In fact, in her specific economic and demographic 
contexts, the role of industrialisation in Bangladesh is a ll the 
more important. The strong arguments for industrialisation in 
Bangladesh are: import substitution, domestic ava ilab ility  of raw
materials, higher value added in manufacturing, forward and backward 
linkages, absorption of surplus labour from agriculture and attempts 
to minimise adverse effects arising from instab ility  of 
international demand for primary goods.
Economic history of the industrially developed countries reveals 
that there are many roads to industrialisation - cap ita lis t or
socialist or mixed. The choice of a particular route depends
mainly on the policies and strategies of the industrialising e lites
leading the industrialisation process of a country at a particular
point in time. The policies and strategies of the e li te s , in turn,
are shaped by the interaction of a large number of variables -
T71p o lit ic a l,  economic, social, historical and cultural. J
Irrespective of the political and economic systems, the industrial 
system everywhere has its  managers, its  managed and a pattern of 
interactions between th e m .^  In the process of interactions 
between the two parties - management and workers - industrial 
conflict emerges to be an inevitable component. Having recognised 
the inev itab il ity  of the industrial conflict, the task before us is  
i ts  proper institutionalisation and effective handling.
Although Bangladesh adopted a dual policy of industrialisation - 
industrialisation through public and private sectors - the public 
sector, however, plays a dominant role. The role of public sector 
industries in the economy of Bangladesh w ill be b r ie f ly  described in 
Section 1 of this Chapter. The present state of industrial 
relations in the public sector industries w ill be highlighted, in 
b rie f ,  in Section 2. In the context of the present industrial 
relations pattern, and a few related studies in this regard, the 
significance of the present study on the "Handling of Industrial 
Disputes in the Public Sector Industries in Bangladesh" w ill be 
taken up in Section 3. Section 4 w ill outline the plan of the 
study.
1.1. Role of Public Sector Industries 
in the Bangladesh Economy
1.1.1. Past role
As a point of departure to describing their  role in the Bangladesh 
economy, the evolution of the public sector industries should be 
viewed in terms of a historical perspective. The part of the world 
now constituting Bangladesh was a part of British India up to 1947, 
and of undivided Pakistan up to 1971. The public sector in British
India was largely confined to administrative and regulatory
a c tiv it ie s , devoted primarily to providing limited social goods in
the form of communication, education, health, broadcasting, posts,
telegraph and telephone, roads and railways, a limited banking
fa c i l i ty  and certain defence establishments, largely dictated by the
T91needs of the governing class. J
In 1947, when Bangladesh emerged as a part of the then Pakistan, her 
industrial base was very small. Large scale industries were 
virtua lly  absent, though a large number of small and cottage 
industries were operating in the country. In 1949-50, the 
contribution of the whole industrial sector to the GDP was about 3 
per cent only - the large scale enterprises contributing just over 
half a per c e n t .^ ^  During the Pakistan period, the 
industrialisation was a fundamental goal of the government and i t  
was achieved primarily through private enterprise, and the 
government pursued policies and carried out activ ities  designed to 
develop private entrepreneurs and created a favourable environment 
within which the private sector could undertake industrial 
i n v e s t m e n t . O v e r  the years public enterprises in the then 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) were brought into being on account of
n  2ithe following reasons. J
1. That there was the need to f i l l  up the entrepreneurial vacuum in  
the economy for which the private sector had neither the 
resources nor the technical know-how (v iz . ,  East Pakistan 
Industrial Development Corporation).
2. That there was the need for appropriate agencies to absorb the 
aids for industrial development received from the aid-giving 
countries.
3. That there was the need for an agency which had the fu ll  credit 
of the government to qualify for international credits.
4. That there was the need for a specialised body to carry out the
expensive projects with extensive implications requiring mainly
foreign and partia lly  local investment (v iz . ,  East Pakistan 
Water and Power Development Authority for flood control and
i nfrastructure of power).
5. That there was the need for developmental and promotional 
agencies in essential sectors of the economy like  agriculture, 
where private sector agencies could not operate (v iz . ,  
Agricultural Development Corporation).
6. That there was the need for standard setting in particular
fields (v iz . ,  East Pakistan Road Transport Corporation and East
Pakistan Shipping Corporation).
7. That there was the need for rendering financial and technical 
services where they were needed (v iz . ,  East Pakistan Small 
Industries Corporation, Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, 
Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation e tc .) .
8. That there was the need for nursing some particular business or 
industry (v iz . ,  Film Development Corporation, Forest Industries 
Development Corporation e tc .) .
Thus the goal of the public sector enterprises in Pakistan days was
to supplement the private sector, not to supplant i t .  Indeed with
the direct and indirect government patronisation to the private
capita lists, a rapid rate of industrialisation was achieved. The
rate of industrial growth averaged at 6.6% per annum during 1955-70.
Obviously owing to the new start and small base, the large scale
industry grew at a rate of 14.5%, compared to only 2.5% per annum
for the small scale industry, which was accorded less priority  by
the government. By 1970, the industrial sector contributed about 
ri3l
10% of the GDP. Although industrialisation through private
entrepreneurs was the primary goal of the government during the 
Pakistan period, under the considerations stated above, the public
sector s t i l l  controlled (under the ownership of the East Pakistan 
Industrial Development Corporation) 53 large industrial units 
representing about 34 per cent share of the value of fixed assets 
in the modern industrial sector in 1969-70 (Table 1.1).
TABLE L . l
Relative Position of Private and Public Sector in  Industry 
before and a fte r  Nationalisation- *
Value of Percentage I
I Categories of Units | No. of Fixed Assets Share of (
| Units (in  M illio n  TK) Fixed Assets!
I S ituation before Nationalisation
I '(1969-70J: "
j A. Total No. of units
I (Total Industria l Sector) I 30S1 6137.5 100 |
I B. Relative Position:
I 1. Under EPIDC (public)
| Ownership 1 53 2097.0 34 |
I 2. Under Private
| Non-Bengali Ownership I 725 2885.7 47 |
| 3. Under Private Bengali
1 Ownership 1 2253 1118.8 18 1
| 4. Under Private Foreign
| Ownership I 20 36.0 1 |
( 5. TOTAL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR | 3051 6137.5 100 |
1 Situation a fte r  Nationalisation
| (March 26. 1972):
1 A. Total No. of Units
I TTotal Industria l Sector) I 3051 6137.5 100 |
1 B- Relative Position:
I 1. Units under Former EP10C
I Nationalised 1 53 2097.0 34 |
I 2. Nationalised Abandoned or
I Absentee Units I 263
I 3. Nationalised Foreign 2629.7 43 |
1 Enterprises I 1
I 4. Nationalised Bengali
1 Units 1 75 910.8 15 I
I S. TOTAL NATIONALISED UNITS
I (1 ♦ 2 + 3 ♦ 4) I 392 5637.5 92 |
I 6. Bengali-owned Private
1 Units I 2178 208.0 3 |
I 7. Abandoned Units for
( Disinvestment J 462 256.0 4 1
I 8. Units with Foreign
I P artic ipation 1 13 36.0 1 |
1 9. TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR
I (6 ♦ 7 ♦ 8) | 2659 500.0
fl_ .. (
I 10. TOTAL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
1 (5 + 9) | 3051 6137.5 100 I
* Includes a ll  industries registered under the Factories Act. 
Source: [18]
The Pakistan government's policies of giving direct and indirect 
concessions to the private sector helped to create a f i r s t  
generation of industrial entrepreneurs most of whom were non- 
Bengali. The extremely generous government patronage and 
protection given to these non-Bengali capita lists contributed to
the transfer of resources from Bangladesh to (West) Pakistan to the 
amount of US $6,000 m i l l i o n . sj t uat j on resulted in 
serious income inequality and inequity and consequent social 
tensions, which, combined with other po litical and cultural factors, 
ignited the separatist movement ultimately leading to the birth of 
Bangladesh i n 1971.
1.1.2 Role after the emergence of Bangladesh
There occurred a radical change in the industrialisation policy 
immediately after the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent 
country. The previous privatisation policy adopted by the Pakistan 
government was discontinued particularly in the case of large and 
medium scale industries. The once strong private sector was 
suddenly rendered a very weak partner of industrial progress in 
Bangladesh. The role of the public sector may be examined under 
three broad heads - (a) its  role in the f ie ld  of modern industries, 
(b) i ts  role in the major commercial sectors, and (c) its  role in 
the other semi-commercial sectors.
(a) Public sector in modern industries:
The new government of independent Bangladesh announced its  
nationalisation programme on 26 March 1972. Under this programme, 
a ll jute mills, cotton m ills, sugar mills and a ll  the industrial and 
commercial undertakings abandoned by the Pakistani owners were taken 
over under the direct ownership and control of the government. The 
taking over of the abandoned enterprises was a situational necessity 
for the government. Because they were enemy properties, i t  was the 
government's responsibility to take them over and put them back into 
operation. The nationalisation of the mills owned by the Bengalis 
was made in accordance with the political commitment of the Awami 
League, the f i r s t  political party in power, which also promised a 
gradual transformation of the economy into a socialist one, free 
from exploitation of man by man, and thereby to ensure an equitable
r 16"idistribution of wealth among citizens.
Sobhan and Ahmed estimated the relative position of the public and 
private sectors in the f ie ld  of modern industries before and 
after  the nationalisation programme was brought into effect. They 
found that the share of the public sector increased from 34 per cent 
of the ownership of fixed assets in the modern industrial sector in 
1969-70 to 92 per cent in the post nationalisation period 
(Table (1 .1 ) . [18]
I t  is evident from the Table that out of a total of 3051 modern 
units, 2659 units (87%) remained in the private sector; but a ll  of 
these private sector units together accounted for only 8% of the 
value of fixed assets. Understandably, a ll of these were small 
scale units. I t  is to be noted that, in addition to the units 
registered under the Factories Act, a much larger number of small 
and cottage industries also exist in the private sector, but the 
exact number of such small and cottage industries is not available. 
The fact, however, remains that the private sector enterprises are 
all small and cottage types.
To run the nationalised industrial sector, nine industry-wide sector 
corporations were established. They were:
(1) Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation
(2) Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation
(3) Bangladesh Sugar M ills Corporation
(4) Bangladesh Food and Allied Industries Corporation
(5) Bangladesh Steel Mills Corporation
(6) Bangladesh Engineering and Ship-Building Corporation
(7) Bangladesh Paper and Board Corporation
(8) Bangladesh F e rt i l ize r ,  Chemical and Pharmaceutical Corporation
(9) Bangladesh Tanneries Corporation
Under an administrative reorganisation in 1976, the number of sector 
corporations was reduced to the following five:
(1) Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation (BJMC)
(2) Bangladesh Textile Mills Corporation (BTMC)
(3) Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC)
(4) Bangladesh Steel and Engineering Corporation (BSEC)
(5) Bangladesh Sugar and Food Industries Corporation (BSFIC)
That the public sector industries played a more significant role 
than those in the private sector is also evident from their  
comparative performance during 1973-74 to 1981-82. Figure 1.1 
shows the industrial production indices for a ll  industries, public 
sector industries and private sector industries during 1973-74 to 
1981-82 using 1973-74as the base year. Graph (a) shows the indices 
for a ll  industries, (b) for public and (c) for private sector 
industries. Although the rise in the private sector seems 
substantial, the relative slowness of the public sector should be 
interpreted with caution. Because the private sector is much 
smaller, compared to the public sector, a relatively small change in 
quantity produces a relatively sharp change in the index. The 
close proximity of graphs (a) and (b) clearly indicates that the 
combined performance of both the public and private sectors is 
largely dependent on the performance of the public sector.
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Fig. 1.1 COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
BASE YEAR 1973-74 = 100
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin of Bangladesh,
December 1982, Bureau of S ta tis tics , Dhaka.
(b) Public sector in major commercial f ie ld s :
Banking: Of the Pakistani commercial banks operating in Bangladesh,
10 out of 12 were abandoned enterprises which controlled 1,175 bank 
branches. At the time of nationalisation, the abandoned banks 
controlled 70% of the deposits. The two Bengali commercial banks 
in operation accounted for about 18% of the deposits.
The 1970 Awami League Party Manifesto had committed i ts e l f  to 
nationalisation of banking, and accordingly after liberation, the 
whole banking sector was nationalised. Six commercial banks were 
set up to run the nationalised banking sector. Only three foreign
banks, accounting for only 8.4% of the deposits, survived 
national i sation.
Insura nee: According to the commitment of the Awami League Party 
Manifesto, 1970 for the nationalisation of insurance companies, the 
whole insurance business was also nationalised. Two corporations 
were set up to run the nationalised insurance sector:
(1) Jiban Beina Corporation : for doing a ll l i f e  insurance 
business, and
(2) Sadharan Beina Corporation : for doing all insurance business 
other than l i f e .
Transport: In road transport, there is one public corporation,
Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation, which handles only about 15% 
capacity in passenger service. In the case of inland water 
transport, about 50% of the mechanised cargo carrying capacity is in 
the public s e c t o r . T h e  public sector has 100% monopoly in  
shipping, railway and a ir  transport.
Foreign Trade: Major import items, such as cement, cotton yarn,
cotton goods, iron and steel products, and baby foods have a ll  been 
taken over by the Trading Corporation of Bangladesh (TCB), a public 
corporation. Import of industrial raw materials, such as raw 
cotton, pig iron, steel scrap etc. have been given to the industrial 
corporations. The largest share of imports in Bangladesh is made 
up of food items, including food grains and edible o i l .  These are
handled by the Ministry of Food. Import of petroleum products and
crude oil are a ll  handled by the Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation.
In recent years, however, import of consumer goods are being allowed
[211also to the private sector. J
Following nationalisation, the public sector has acquired an 
overwhelming preponderence in the area of exports. Of Bangladesh's 
main exports, the public sector has now a 100% monopoly of raw ju te ,  
jute goods, newsprint and paper, which cover more than 86% of the 
total exports.
(c) Other semi-commercial public enterprises:
The above is an account of the major public sector industries in
Bangladesh. Apart from these, many other public sector
f 231 T241enterprises and institutions also exist in Bangladesh.
Among other public sector enterprises, the following may be
mentioned:
l i s t  of Semi-Commercial Public Enterprises in Bangladesh
Industry Public Enterprises in  Operation
Agriculture and Fishing 1. Tea Industries Management Committee
2. Bangladesh Fisheries Development
Corporation (BFDC)
Mining and Quarrying 3. Takerhat Limestone Mine
4. Bijoypur Whiteclay Extraction Unit
Wood and Wood Products 
(roanufacturl ng)
5. Bangladesh Forest Industries
Development Corporation (BF1DC)
Mon-metallic minerals 6. Bangladesh Mineral Exploration and 
Development Corporation (BMEDC)
Petroleum and Gas 7. Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation 
(BPC)
E le c tr ic ity , Water and 
Gas
8. Bangladesh Power Development Board
(BPDB)
9. Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA) 
10. T itas  Gas Transmission and
D is tribution  Compaq/
Construction 11. Dhaka Improvement Trust (DIT)
12. Chittagong Development Authority
(CDA)
13. Khulna Development Authority (KDA)
Trade 14. Bangladesh Consumer Supplies
Corporation (BCSC)
15. Bangladesh Jute Trading Corporation
(BJTC)
16. Bangladesh Jute Export Corporation
17. Bangladesh Jute Price S tab ilisa tion
Corporation
Finance and Real Estate 18. Bangladesh Krishi (A gricu ltu ra l)
Bank (BKB)
19. Bangladesh Shllpa Rin (Industria l
C redit) Sangstha (BSRS)
20. Bangladesh Shilpa (In d u s tr ia l) Bank
(BS8)
21. Bangladesh House-Building and Finance
Corporation (BHBFC)
Source: £18], pp.283-85
Contribution to GDP:
One way to assess the importance of public sector in the national 
economy would be to see the contribution of the public sector to the 
GDP. Recent data in this regard are not available. Since
situations have not changed so much after 1973-74, data in
Table 1.2, relating to the position in 1973-74, may give a general
idea about the present situation. Table 1.2 confirms that the
contribution of the public sector agriculture in the GDP is very 
modest. In contrast, in the case of mining and manufacturing, the 
share of the public sector is more significant. For modern 
manufacture, the public sector enterprises account for about 80% of 
the value added. Private sector is predominant in the construction 
sector. On the other hand, there is v irtua lly  no private sector in  
the power and gas sector. Also, in the f ie ld  of banking and 
insurance, the predominance of the public sector is evident. In 
the fie ld  of transport and communication, the share of the public 
sector is more than one-third of the total contribution from the 
sector.
TABLE 1.2
Share of Various Public and Private Sectors 
In  GOP of 1973-74 at 19/2-13 
factor Cost ( in  Percentage)
I Sectors
| Share of 
| Public 
j Enterprises
Share of
Government
Institu tions
Share of
Private
Sector
Sector | 
Total |
| 1. Agricultural J 0.70 8.40 90.90 100 |
1 2. Mining and 
j Manufacturing | 56.40 3.60 40.00 100 |
j (Large Scale | (80.42) (1.80) (17.68) 100 |
| 3. Construction 1 1.05 .40 98.55 100 1
j 4. Power and Gas J 31.39 68.11 - 100 |
| 5. Transport and 
| Communication I 19.80 15.40 64.80 100 |
| 6. Trade | 9.80 2.60 87.60 100 |
| 7. Housing 1 10.50 89.50 100 1
1 8 . Public 
| Administration | 100.00 - 100 |
j 9. Banking and 
| Insurance | . 86.50 8.20 5.30 100 |
j 10. Professional 
| Service | - - 100.00 100 |
I TOTAL | 8.20 8.10 83.70 100 |
Source: p .369.
The to ta l i ty  of the picture shows that the public enterprises 
account for only 8.2% of the GDP, and the public sector, inclusive 
of the government institutions, contributes only 16.3% of the GDP. 
The private sector is s t i l l  predominant with a share of 83.7%.
Savings generation:
Some of the public enterprises have not been able to generate
savings. But on the whole, public enterprises have been able to
generate savings, measured in terms of net p ro fit  a fter tax. The
estimated rate of the national savings, accounted by the public
T251enterprises, is about 10%L J.
Contribution to Government Exchequer:
Public enterprise in Bangladesh is a major contributor to the
government exchequer. In 1973-74, the manufacturing units
contributed 38% of the customs duty, sales tax, excise tax and
business income taxes. I f  public sector trading like  banks,
insurance and transport organisations were also included, the
contribution of the public sector rose to as high as 86% of 
rpfii
revenues. Except for some mi nor changes, this trend s t i l l
holds today.
Employment:
According to 1974 census, about 29% of the total population is in
T271the c iv ilian  labour force, about 75% of whom are employed in
the agricultural sector and the rest in various non-agricultural
s e c to rs .^  Public enterprises employ an estimated 1.75% of the
total c iv il ia n  labour force. I f  government institutions are also
included, i t  may rise to 3%. Thus, the public sector is not the
T281main employer of labour. J
From the above discussion, i t  becomes clear that public enterprises 
in Bangladesh have assumed a significant role in the non- 
agricultural modern sector of the economy, even though this as yet 
accounts for only a minor part of the total economy. The potential 
for surplus generation in the form of savings, fiscal revenues, and 
net foreign exchange earnings is significant. The indirect effects 
of the public sector on growth in the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors are also not less significant. The 
performance of the public sector is thus of greater significance 
than is apparent from i ts  immediate share of the GDP and 
employment.
1.1.3 The present position
During the la ter half of the Awami League regime, the increasing 
role of the private sector was being gradually recognised. After 
the fa l l  of the Awami League Government in 1975, the policies of the 
new e li te  in power moved towards a mixed economic system with more 
emphasis on privatisation. A number of small units other than 
ju te , textiles and sugar were disinvested during the period 1976-81. 
The privatisation policy got highest manifestation in mid-1982, when 
the present Martial Law regime decided to denationalise, among other 
enterprises, some of the jute mills, cotton mills and banks on the 
grounds of continued mismanagement, inefficiency and financial 
losses of the public sector industries. During 1983 and 1984 some 
such enterprises were indeed denationalised. However, even after  
this denationalisation, the dominance of the public sector s t i l l  
continues.^-1 But because the denationalisation measures are 
largely in transition and also because up-to-date data about the 
latest relative position of the public and private sectors are not 
available, the present study relates particularly to the period up 
to 1982.
1.2. The Present State of Industrial Relations 
in the Public Sector Industries
That the public sector industries play a very significant role in  
the national economy of Bangladesh is evident. The e ff ic ie n t  
operation of the industries under the public sector is , therefore, 
highly desirable. One very important prerequisite, among others, 
for the unhindered operation of these industries is the harmonious 
relationship between workers and management which, in turn, depends 
on good industrial relations. This section w ill  attempt to b rie f ly  
review the state of industrial relations now prevailing in these 
industries.
I t  is indeed d i f f ic u lt  to measure the "goodness" of industrial 
relations, because what is good to the management may not be good to 
the workers and vice versa. One way to measure the quality of 
industrial relations may be the extent of conflict between the 
concerned parties. The less the conflict, the better the 
industrial relations and vice versa. But the problem is: there
are many ways of conflict manifestations - low morale, absenteeism, 
overtime ban, non-cooperation, work to rule, formal and informal 
negotiations, strikes etc. - most of which are not directly  
measurable, and where measurable, adequate records are not 
available. Because of the unavailability of required information 
on the other manifestations, strikes, data on which are readily 
available and measurable, may be taken as an indicator of industrial 
conflict and of the state of industrial relations.
As already noted, the industrial sector in former East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh) was owned and managed primarily by private capita lists ,
most of whom were non-Bengali and different from the majority of the
workers in respect of culture, language and mores. Thus the normal
conflict of interest under capitalism between workers and private
owners was sharpened by the ethnic differences between them.
Consequently the entire history of industrial relations during the
Pakistan period was characterised by prolonged strikes, retaliatory
lockouts and picketing which sometimes led to pitched battles.
[30-1
The comprehensive nationalisation, pursued after liberation, was 
reasonably expected to bring a different industrial relations 
setting, as compared with that of the pre-nationalisation period.
I t  was usually thought that the sharp contradictions between workers 
and management of the private enterprise system would not equally 
apply under the public sector, because i f  the profits were s t i l l  to 
be maximised, they were to be maximised on behalf of the state, and 
for a co llec tiv ity . The potential for conflict should thus be 
relatively lessened; the possibility of amicable settlement of 
divergent issues should become more r e a l . ^ ^
But unfortunately, public sector industries did not witness any 
better scene in the f ie ld  of industrial relations. ^ 3  Post­
nationalisation Bangladesh experienced increasing trends of 
antagonism and s tr i fe .  Industrial unrest mounted with a resultant 
loss in man-days. Workers suffered financial losses in terms of 
loss of wages and the economy suffered in terms of loss of 
productiv ity .^3  ^ Bhattachargee et a l . argued that one of the 
factors responsible for low level of labour productivity in some of 
the large scale industries was the upward tendency of labour 
disputes.
Appendix A.l shows data on industrial disputes involving stoppages 
of work in Bangladesh during the period 1947-82. Data up to 1971 
relate to the pre-nationalisation period (Pakistan period) and those
ntn
from 1972, to the post-nationalisation period. J
The number of industrial disputes during 1947-82, shown in Figure
1.2, indicates a clear increasing trend immediately after  
nationalisation (1972-73), then a declining trend during 1974-75, 
and again an increasing trend from 1976. A very small number of
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disputes in 1975 and 1976 was the consequence, perhaps, of a s tr ic t  
strike ban imposed by the national emergency, declared by the Awami
League Government in the la ter  half of 1974, and by the Martial Law 
in mid-1975. The number of disputes reached its  highest peak in 
1980, with 104 strikes being registered, followed by 1979 with 96 
strikes. 1978-81, the period of BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) 
administration, experienced the highest number of strikes over the 
last 36 year period of industrial relations history of Bangladesh. 
Due to the strike ban imposed by the second Martial Law in March, 
1982, frequency of strikes again came down in that year.
The absolute number of disputes depicts only one dimension of 
industrial conflict and does not te l l  the whole story. The number 
of workers involved and man-days lost in the disputes measure other 
dimensions. Workers involved and man-days lost are shown in 
Figures 1-3 and 1.4 respectively. The workers involved graph 
(Figure 1.3) indicates a similar increasing trend after
xos
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nationalisation with only slight variatfons from Figure 1.2. In 
post liberation Bangladesh, whereas the lowest number of disputes 
occurred in 1975, the lowest number of workers were involved in  
1976. Compared to the number of disputes in 1982, workers involved 
were relatively low. 1980 witnessed the highest number of workers 
involved over the las t 36 years.
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The man-days lo s t  graph (Figure 1.4) also ind ica tes  a s im i la r  
increasing trend w ith  only a few va r ia t io n s  from the o the r two 
graphs- During the period a f t e r  n a t io n a l is a t io n ,  the h ighest 
number o f man-days were lo s t  in  1981, fo llowed by 1980. Over the 
la s t  36 years, the h ighest number o f  man-days were, however, lo s t  in  
1964.
All of the three graphs presented in this section are clear 
indicators of the fact that, contrary to the general expectations, 
industrial conflict rose up a fte r  nationalisation. This, in  turn, 
te lls  upon the quality of industrial relations in the public sector 
industries. One lim itation of these graphs should be noted, 
however. Each of these graphs reveals only one distinct aspect of 
industrial conflict and does not give an overall picture. The 
three distinct aspects w ill be examined in some greater depth in  
both composite and multiple forms in Chapter V.
1.3. Significance of the Present Study
That the quality of industrial relations in the Bangladesh public 
sector industries has deteriorated is evident from the increasing 
trend of work stoppages a fter  the emergence of Bangladesh. The 
effect of these work stoppages on the workers in terms of the loss 
of wages and on the economy in terms of the loss of productivity is 
appalling £36] Apart from the direct effect of strikes, i ts  
indirect effects (worsened labour-management relations) are more 
appalling. A dispute could linger on with incalculable damage to 
management-labour relationships and the morale of both. This would 
have its  effect on poor operating performance, slow-down in work and 
increase in wastage, or spoilt work. None of these effects could 
be reflected in figures for number of disputes, workers involved in 
disputes and man-days lost, but would manifest themselves in decline 
in output per man-hour. The loss attributable directly to poor
industrial relations can, unfortunately, not be quantified, so that
the specific impact of deteriorating relations goes unrecorded.
[37]
Industrial conflict, though inherent in the work environment, has 
two aspects - one normal and the other abnormal Whereas abnormal 
conflict is undesirable, normal conflict has a functional 
value.£38] Walton terms this functional aspect as the 
productivity of confrontation. I t  arises from the fact that 
conflict leads to change, change leads to adaptation, and adaptation 
leads to survival.£39] Disputes, i f  properly managed, may even 
have a positive contribution to productivity. But proper
management of disputes presupposes a proper diagnosis of the nature 
of the conflicts, an identification of the practical problems 
standing in the way of their effective settlement - and appropriate 
solutions of the problems so identified.
What factors are responsible for the unpleasant state of industrial 
relations in the Bangladesh public sector industries? What are the 
sources of disagreements and disputes between the workers and 
management of these industries? How are the disputes resolved?
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What are the limitations and problems of the institutional methods 
of dispute resolution? How can their operational effectiveness be 
enhanced? A study covering a ll these topics may be expected to be 
very useful both from the practical and the academic viewpoints.
1.3.1 Past Studies
At this point, a b r ie f review of the studies which have been made on 
the Bangladesh public sector industries in their relation to 
industrial relations and dispute resolution is thought to be 
appropriate. Unfortunately the number of such studies is not many. 
Reza's study on the "Industrial Relations System of Pakistan", ^40] 
based on Dunlop's model of industrial relations, [41] though 
relevant in some respects in explaining the growth and behaviour of 
workers and their organisations, has l i t t l e  or no relevance with 
respect to the role of management in the context of public sector 
industries in Bangladesh.
A comprehensive study on public sector enterprise is that by Sobhan 
and A h m a d . T h e i r  study, concentrated mainly on the 
performance of public enterprises, has been divided into two 
phases - the f i r s t  phase has sought to study public enterprise at th 
macro-level and the second has made a micro-study of a selected 
number of public enterprises. The macro-study has examined the 
overall environment within which public enterprise functions and 
related its role and performance to this environment. They have 
computed the share of public enterprise in terms of such macro­
indicators as GDP, investment, savings, foreign trade and 
employment. At the micro-phase they have made an in-depth study of 
a number of enterprises.to quantitatively relate performance to 
various identified variables. Among other variables, they have also 
identified the problem of labour militancy and the fa ilure of the 
ruling class to define the role of the working class to the public 
sector as constraining performance of industries in that sector.
Ahmad's study on "Labour Management Relations in Bangladesh"[43] 
is oriented towards workers' participation in decision making. I t  
has attempted to bring together a historical perspective of the
labour management relations through i ts  interaction with political 
development in Bangladesh. I t  has also brought into focus the 
social perspective through an analysis of the class character of 
labour, employer/management, labour leader and policy maker. He 
has compared the findings of his study, done in Bangladesh context, 
with an earlier study, made by Hussain and Farouk,^44  ^ done in 
the Pakistan context, with particular respect to the characteristics 
of workers and found no significant differences in many respects. 
Ahmad's study, being concentrated on participation, naturally has 
not examined the specific causes of disputes and their methods of 
resolution.
Quddus et al have also made a study on labour management relations 
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in Bangladesh. This has been an opinion type of survey and
confined to jute and cotton te x t i le  industries. I t  has described 
the general characteristics of workers and management in these two 
public sector industries and concentrated on a broader relationship 
between the parties without identifying the specific reasons for  
disputes between them and methods of settlement of such disputes. 
Another study on the industrial relations system in the jute  
industry has been done by Choudhury. 4^^  His study has 
identified some reasons for dispute between the actors of the 
industrial relations system. His findings were also based on a 
survey of opinions of some workers and management people of the jute  
industry. He did not make any examination of the records of the 
personnel and labour departments of the sample mills in an attempt 
to find the specific causes of industrial disputes, how the disputes 
arose and how they were ultimately settled.
[All
In his paper on industrial relations in Bangladesh, Islam has 
concluded, on the basis of his observations of some secondary 
sources and unsystematic and informal personal talks with some 
labour leaders, that most of the problems at the labour front 
emanated from the government, which is both the law-maker and the 
largest industrial employer in the country. Some o th e rs [4 8 ]  have 
observed that the nature of the working class in Bangladesh was such 
that i t  could not provide its  own leaders because of the mass 
poverty of the workers, their widespread i l l i te ra c y ,  the threat of
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unemployment, the negative attitude of management and so on, so that 
i t  was relatively easy for interested "outsiders" to take positions 
of leadership in the working class organisations. Usually such 
leaders were also active members of po litical parties. Thus the 
trade unions were inevitably drawn into politics from the moment of 
their inception. The molecular divisions among the po litica l  
parties in Bangladesh had its  reflection over similar divisions in 
the trade union movement. The politica l role of the union and the 
interpenetration of political and union structures acted as a factor 
associated with the m ultiplic ity of unions at all levels of the 
public sector management. I t  was thus probably inevitable that the 
severe competition and rivalries among these unions/federations 
stood as a bottleneck in the way of determining representative 
bargaining agents and hence of effective negotiation over actual or 
apprehended disputes between workers and management.
Some economists of the country have made some studies on the 
achievements, problems and prospects of the public sector industries 
and they have attributed poor relationship between labour and 
management as one bottleneck, among many others, in the way of 
achieving higher productivity. But none of them have investigated 
the causes and methods of settlement of disputes between the parties 
concerned.
Choudhury has attempted to analyse the trend of industrial conflict  
in Bangladesh by using published data and found, except for a brie f  
spell in the second half of the 1960s, deteriorating conflict  
situations during the period 1947-75. He has concluded that a wage 
based explanation for the observed magnitude of industrial conflict  
was the most appropriate for the post-liberation period in  
B a n g l a d e s h . D a s  has, however, found, in his attempts to 
analyse the published data during the period 1973-79, an 
insignificant correlation between real wages and dispute indices and 
hinted for the existence of variables other than a mere wage based 
explanation of industrial conflict in Bangladesh.£51] Neither of 
these two studies have made any f ie ld  investigation to substantiate 
the secondary data.
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None of the studies referred to so far were concerned with the 
institutional methods of dispute resolution. Only two studies are
found as being directly involved with the dispute resolution process
P521 T531- one done by Alanr J and the other by Bhattacharjee et a l .
Alam's study is concerned with the f i r s t  institutional method of
dispute resolution (collective bargaining) in the jute industry
only. Thus the study is not representative of the whole public
sector, on the one hand, and does not give a total picture of the
entire dispute resolution process, on the other. The study by
Bhattacharjee et a l ,  on the other hand, describes the legal
framework of dispute settlement in general and examines the
operations of subsequent bodies of the dispute settlement process
(conciliation and labour courts), on the basis of some data
published by the Department of Labour of the Bangladesh government.
They could not examine the b ipartite  negotiation process in the
absence of any enterprise level empirical data. Without doing a
systematic f ie ld  study, they could not examine the practical
F54]
problems of the various dispute settlement machineries. In
the absence of any indication in the published data regarding the 
categorisation between the public and private sector disputes, the ir  
study does not exclusively represent the public sector.
Thus i t  is evident from the above literature review that until now 
no comprehensive study has been undertaken on the handling of 
industrial disputes, particularly in the public sector industries, 
covering the nature and causes of disputes in these industries and 
the structure, working methods, operational effectiveness and 
problems of a ll  the institutional machineries involved in the 
resolution of such disputes. The significance of the present study 
on the handling of industrial disputes in the public sector 
industries in Bangladesh covering a ll these aspects, supported by 
both the primary and secondary data, can thus hardly be over­
emphasised.
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1.3.2 Objectives of the Study
The following are the specific objectives of the present study:
(1) To evaluate the policies of the government towards workers in
the public sector industries.
(2) To examine the general trend and explain the causes of 
industrial disputes in the public sector industries.
(3) To find how the industrial disputes in the public sector 
industries are handled by the existing institutional methods.
(4) To examine the effectiveness of operations of the various 
dispute settlement machineries and in due course to determine 
the factors constraining their  effective operations.
(5) To attempt to develop a contingency model of dispute 
resolution for the Bangladesh public sector industries in the 
light of the identified problems of the institutional 
machineries and their tentative solutions and of a review of 
some Western models of industrial relations and labour 
negotiations.
(6) And f in a l ly ,  to make some policy recommendations based on the 
main findings of the study.
1.4. Plan of the Study
The study consists of ten Chapters. The introductory Chapter 
describes the background and rationale of the study by emphasising 
the role the public sector industries play in the national economy 
of Bangladesh and the deteriorating state of the industrial 
relations now prevailing in these industries, and by briefly  
reviewing the studies so far made in the context of Bangladesh 
public sector industrial relations and dispute resolution. Before 
moving to the specific aspects of the study, the general theories 
and practices of industrial conflict are summarised in Chapter I I .  
Chapter I I I  evaluates the government polices towards labour and 
describes the legal framework of dispute handling with particular 
reference to the public sector industries. Chapter IV presents the
research design and methods of data collection and analysis.
After making a review of the patterns and causes of industrial 
conflict in the public sector industries, some hypotheses about the 
operations and effectiveness of dispute procedures are presented in  
Chapter V. Chapters VI to V I I I  analyse the operation of the 
institutional machineries of the dispute resolution process and 
hence constitute the core of the study. These three Chapters are 
based primarily on the f ie ld  data. Each of these three Chapters 
deals with a specific institutional machinery -Chapter VI with the 
direct negotiation, VII with conciliation and V I I I  with the labour 
courts. A contingency model of dispute resolution for the 
Bangladesh public sector industries, based on the tentative  
solutions to problems identified by analysing the operations of 
institutional machineries and the applicability of certain Western 
models of labour relations in the context of the Bangladesh 
situation, is attempted in Chapter IX. Finally, Chapter X ends the 
study by drawing the main conclusions derived from the previous 
Chapters.
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CHAPTER I I
THEORIES AND PRACTICES IN INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT
The purpose of this chapter is to make a general review of the 
existing conflict lite ra ture  with a view to summarising the various 
theories and practices of industrial conflict. The chapter is 
divided into three sections. The f i r s t  section defines the nature 
and functions of industrial conflict. The second section describes 
the general conflict process in terms of how an industrial conflict  
arises, develops and manifests. The final section, divided into 
three sub-sections, examines the various conflict theories in terms 
of the three elements of conflict -  the f i r s t  sub-section deals with 
the conflict emergence, the second with the conflict manifestation 
and the third with the conflict resolution (outcome).
2.1 The Nature and Functions of Industrial Conflict
2.1.1. The Nature of Industrial Conflict
I t  is generally accepted that, whether one likes i t  or not, 
conflicts continually occur in our social l i f e .  There have always 
been conflicts between the ruler and the ruled; between parents and 
children, between husbands and wives and between employers and 
employees. A conflict exists whenever incompatible ac tiv it ies  
o c c u r .^  This study is concerned not with social or po lit ica l  
conflic t, but with industrial conflict, although much of the 
theories and practices in social or po litica l conflict also apply to 
industrial conflict.
The nature of industrial conflict is complex and d i f f ic u l t  to 
understand. Sometimes i t  remains covert, and sometimes i t  becomes 
overt. At times i t  appears to be quite organised but at other 
times i t  turns out to be very unorganised. At times i t  may be a 
one-to-one situation -  one employee with one management 
representative - at other times the members of a given working group 
or organisational unit may be at odds with management, and s t i l l  at 
other times, the whole class of workers, whether in one plant or an
industry at large may be in conflict with management. Its  forms of 
expression are really many. The strike is , however, the most 
common and visible expression. But conflict between management and 
workers may also take the form of peaceful bargaining and grievance 
handling, of boycotts, of po litica l action, of restriction of
f2loutput, of sabotage, of absenteeism or of personnel turnover.
Lockyer has excellently presented the various expressions of 
industrial conflict in the form of a chart, J which is also 
reproduced here with slight modification in the Bangladesh context 
{Figure 2.1).
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FIG. 2.1 EXPRESSIONS OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT. Source : I 3 . P. L2 ]
Whatever may be its  form and expression, the important point to be 
noted, however, is that i ts  generation is innate to the industrial 
relations system. Data on a l l  forms of conflict are hard to obtain 
and analyse. Only strikes are visible and large amounts of strike  
statistics are available in published form. Modern computer 
processing techniques have greatly fac il ita te d  the analyses and 
measurement of these strike data in  the researchers' frame of 
reference. Because of these reasons, most of the researchers in  
industrial conflict have tended to follow the "Gresham's law" of
social science research, which states that the presence of low-cost 
and readily available data tends to drive out the collection of 
high-cost and hard-to-obtain data. Under this pretext, they have 
relied on strikes as the preferred indicator of industrial 
c o n f l i c t . ^  But i f  one seeks to examine the state of 
industrial relations in a company or industry, one needs to look at 
a ll forms of conflict, not just those which are easiest to measure. 
Some industries have few strikes but high rates of labour turnover 
and absenteeism. Are they more peaceful than those which have the 
reverse? Similarly i f  we seek to understand the industrial 
relations, we must be aware of the influences that lead to 
conflicts, the factors that determine the way in which they are 
expressed and the way they are handled.
2.1.2. Functions of Industrial Conflict
Barbash categorises industrial conflict into two classes - normal 
and abnormal. Normal conflict is the conflict which is essential 
to the maintenance of the industrial relations system and without 
which the system is largely incapable of functioning. Normal 
conflicts are the functional conflicts. Abnormal conflic t, on the 
other hand, is not essential to the maintenance of the-system; i t  
may even be destructive of i t .  Abnormal conflicts are
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dysfunctional. Thus conflicts have both positive and negative 
aspects. Kornhauser et a l . state the following as the main 
positive functions of industrial conflict: ^
1) Conflicts provide s tab il ity  to the parties concerned.
2) A conflict situation helps and often forces the parties to bring 
out the issues of difference into the open. When issues are 
brought into the open, i t  becomes easier to resolve them.
i
3) When an open conflict takes place, the parties involved usually 
get the public limelight.
4} During a situation of conflic t, the parties involved tend to 
bring out a ll the power at their command. Also within a party, 
activ it ies  and decisions hinge mainly on persons or sections who 
wield maximum power. Hence conflict helps in the 
identification of the power centres in and between the 
parties.
5) Tensions among workers are ventilated through certain types of 
conflict which, in turn, help in their la ter adaptation into an 
i ntegrated system.
On the negative side, however, some forms of conflict (e .g . ,  
prolonged and frequent strikes) are obviously dysfunctional for the 
parties concerned and the economy as a whole.
2.2 The General Conflict Process
Industrial conflict does not occur out of a vacuum. The process of
its  origination, manifestation and resolution follow in a sequence.
The general conflict process may be depicted in the form of a chart
(Figure 2.2), prepared on the basis of a general framework developed
by Pondy,^ and later applied by Thomson and Murray in the ir
r o ]
attempt to describe the grievance process. J
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FIG .2.2. PONDY'S MODEL OF CONFLICT PROCESS
Figure 2.2 exhibits two phases. The f i r s t  phase contains three 
dimensions of the conflict process -  conflict emergence, conflict  
manifestation and conflict outcome and the second phase contains 
only two dimensions - manifestation and outcome, assuming that i t  
has already emerged in the f i r s t  phase. The conflict process may 
also involve subsequent phases (as indicated by the broken line at 
the upper right hand corner) but these have not been shown in the 
Figure. Now follows a b rie f discussion on the specific stages of 
the process.
F irs t Phase
Emergence
1. Triggering event: As a potential source of conflic t, a latent
pool of dissatisfactions is always present in industrial
situations. A change, proposed or imposed by management, or
occuring within or outside the plant triggers a latent issue and
[91makes i t  realised by the party.
2. Cognitive imbalance: The triggering event creates a cognitive
imbalance in the mind of the party. He then makes an internal 
evaluation of "What, why and who" of the wrong and thus 
identifies the specific reasons for dissatisfaction and 
perceives the opponent.
Manifestation
3. Party's action: After the party has identified the causes of 
conflict and the opponent, the action phase begins. He may 
choose one or more of the following actions:
a) He may seek the support of the fellow workers around the 
conflict;
b) He may approach a management representative to resolve the 
conflict;
c) I f  the party is a worker, he may approach a union leader to 
act on his behalf to get the conflict resolved.
4. Position c la r if ica tio n : Once the points of dissatisfaction are
expressed to a management representative, a process of mutual- 
probing generally occurs between the parties and this c la r if ie s  
the position of the respective parties.
5. First management decision: Once the management representative 
has got some c la rif ica tion  from the party, several decision 
choices are available to him:
a) He may remain indifferent about the matter;
b) He may handle i t  himself;
c) He may consult with his colleagues about i t ;
d) He may ask for a superior's advice.
e) He may refer i t  upwards to be decided by his superiors.
Outcome
6. Party's reaction: The party's reaction to the f i r s t  managemnt 
decision depends on the nature of the decision. I f  i t  is 
satisfactory to him, an agreement is reached. I f  i t  is 
unsatisfactory, however, he may react in any of the following 
ways:
a) He may decide to accept the unsatisfactory decision of
management and live  with dissatisfaction; or
b) He may decide to pursue the case further, either by himself
or by seeking support from his a ll ies  (other workers). In
this situation, his action choices may be the following:
( i )  Informal persuasion;
( i i )  Formal negotiations (positive or negative);
( i i i )  Punishing actions; and 
( i v) Problem-solving.
Second Phase
Mani festation
7. Second management decision: This step involves a repetition of 
steps 4 and 5 for the management representative receiving the 
party's reaction to the f i r s t  management decision. A second 
managemnt decision is thus reached and communicated to the 
party.
Outcome
8. Reaction to the second management decision: The party's
reaction to the second management decision may be similar to
step 6. The process of repetition of steps 4, 5 and 6 may 
continue to subsequent phases, as is indicated by the broken 
l ine, until f in a lly  an agreement is reached.
After-effect
9. The final agreement, whatever may be i ts  form - a total victory
for one side or a compromise involving some concessions from
both sides or a mutual gain for both sides - w ill also have an 
aftermath. This will affect their future relationship. The 
resolved issue thus again enters into the original latent pool.
2.3 Industrial Conflict Theories and Practices
There have been many studies in the f ie ld  of industrial conflic t, 
and generally speaking, there are about as many theories of 
industrial conflict as there have been studies, each successive 
theory adding a slight new twist to previous arguments.
Thomson and Murray have made an excellent three dimensional 
summarisation of the various conflict th e o r ie s ^ ^  and put them 
into four procrustean beds. These are:
a) General conflict theories, which seek to offer an explanation of
r i2 la ll kinds of conflict;
b) Organisational theories, which seek to explain the overall
structure and climate of behaviour in a ll kinds of formal
• [13]organisations,
c) General theories of industrial relations, which seek to analyse
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and explain the total system of industrial relations; and
d) Specific theories of organisational conflic t, which seek to 
explain the specific subject of vertical conflict between 
superiors and subordinates in organisations.
Their review of these theories unfortunately reveals l i t t l e  of 
direct applicability to the phenomenon of grievances and
r i  fiidisputes. J Basically following the approaches of Thomson and
r i 7 lMurray, and Cronin, ■ the relevant industrial conflict theories 
and practices w ill be examined in the context of the three basic 
elements of conflict process, described in the previous section.
The f i r s t  of the following three sub-sections w ill examine the 
various causes for conflict emergence. The second sub-section w ill  
examine the factors determining the manifestation phase of the 
conflict process. The resolution (outcome) phase w ill be dealt with 
in the thirdsub-section. Figure 2.3 summarises the way this review 
proceeds throughout the three sub-sections.
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2.3.1. Emergence of Industrial Conflict
All industrial conflicts arise from dissatisfactions f e l t  by 
workers. But what are the sources of dissatisfaction? Figure 2.3 
l is ts  the various determinants of dissatisfaction, obtained by 
summarising the relevant li te ra tu re . The theories explaining these 
determinants may now be b r ie f ly  explained as follows:
2 . 3 . 1 . 1 .  M o d e r n i s a t i o n  a p p r o a c h
According to "modernisation theory", industrial conflict is the 
characteristic feature of the in i t ia l  stages of industrialisation, 
in particular. In every case of industrialisation, there are 
numerous points of conflict and of accommodation. In the language 
of Toynbee, there is an encounter between c iv ilisations. There is 
a struggle for dominance between the new industrial order and the 
pre-existing order. "The adjustment of institutions to changing 
economic circumstances may be a painful process. I t  is neither
balanced nor complete  The old and the new are mixed
illo g ic a lly  and in curious proportions, which d iffer  from society to 
society.
The conflict between the traditional society and the new industrial 
society is at a variety of points and levels; for example:
a) Religious and ethical values,
b) Family system,
c) Class alignments,
d) Educational system,
e) Government structure, and
f) Legal system.
Industrialisation fundamentally redesigns and reshapes the pre­
existing society and its  culture and customs. I t  develops new 
industrial c it ies . I t  transplants peasants, farmer and tr iba l  
groups to mines, factories and o f f i c e s . T h e  immediate family 
of the worker is le f t  in the village at least for a short period.
New relationships based upon employment or occupation come to 
replace the larger family and village attachments. New methods of 
communication among city dwellers - newspapers, radio, television  
etc. -  replace those of the village. The security and loyalty of 
the extended family disintegrate, and in their place is imposed the
government of the c ity . The impersonal regulations of the c ity
[21]replace the more personal relations customs of the v illage .
Moreover, the industrialising c it ies  are composed of populations 
with great diversity in their development. They magnify contrasts. 
There are the rich and the poor; the employed and the unemployed;
the settled city-dweller and the new-comer; racia l, language and 
tribal mixtures; the isolated individual and the established 
system; the l i te ra te  and the i l l i t e r a te .  The c ity  shows the mass 
of have-nots what they might have. The diversity and contrasts of 
the industrialising city excite discontent and stimulate
f 221 unrest. J
Thus the transition from the traditional society to the industrial
society involves a number of frustrations, fears, uncertainties,
resentments, aggressions, pressures, new threats and risks, new
problems, demands and expectations upon workers-in-process, th e ir
T231work groups and their families. J
One important aspect of the modernisation approach is that conflic t  
is not the regular norm of industrialisation. Under this approach 
the conflict is seen as "pathological" and transitional. They 
occur primarily during the early periods of industrialisation when 
workers are f it te d  in to the new system. This follows that the 
more the workers become f it te d  and integrated to the new system, the 
lesser is the possibility of conflict. Thus in the extreme, i t  may 
be assumed that under advanced industrialisation, workers w ill  be 
completely suited to the system and there will not be any strike  
then. But this extreme assumption may be far away from re a li ty .
2 .3 .1 .2 . Expectation approach:
Workers' expectations may be of two types - economic and 
psychological.
Economic approach: Economists are mainly concerned with the
determination of wages and price-levels, and only in that connection
they are also concerned with collective bargaining and 
[24]strikes. According to economists, strikes occur mainly when
there arises a breakdown in wage bargaining. They have found that 
strikes are positively correlated with the business cycle. The 
theoretical basis for this positive correlation is that during 
prosperous times unions have more bargaining power due to employers' 
unwillingness to forego sales and profits during strikes and 
therefore can press employers for more favourable terms than during
[ 2 5 ]recessionary periods. In examining the correlation between
real wage changes and strikes, Ashenfelter and Johnson have found
that strikes increase when there are increases in the rate of price
changes and decrease with reduction in real wage changes and
unemployment. 2^^  Several other authors have also showed that
[ 26a 1strike data well f i t  the expectational model.
Economists such as Hicks and Mauro explain the basis of wage
determination and strikes through two intersecting curves - (a) an
"employer concession schedule" (ECS), which indicates the highest
wage an employer w ill be willing to pay rather than endure a strike
of a given duration and (b) a "union resistance curve" (URC), which
indicates the length of time a ment>er w ill be willing to remain on
strike rather than face a lower wage. They assume that i f  both
parties are aware of the two curves - ECS and URC - so solution is
[ 27]determinate and strikes w ill not occur. Why do strikes occur
then? Hicks says that strike is a weapon in the hands of the union
leaders to prove their existence and a b i l i ty .  Weapons grow rusty,
i f  unused. A strike is , therefore, worthwhile to enhance future
bargaining power. Other strikes are the result of faulty
negotiations. Usually these faulty negotiations are due to
inadequate knowledge or poor communication. From this perspective,
disputes must be attributable to misapprehension and ignorance;
with the knowledge of facts workers w ill have no desire to 
[281strike. Adequate knowledge will always make a settlemnt
[291possible.1- J
Whereas economists such as Hicks and Mauro explain strike behaviour 
as a function of imperfect information, misjudgement and irra tional 
behaviour, Ashenfelter and Johnson propose a model where there are 
three parties - management, union leaders and union members. Union 
members w ill have some desired level of wage increase. I f  this is  
met by management no strike w ill occur; i f  this is not met, union 
leaders can accept a lower figure or call a s t r i k e . T h e  
shock of strike w ill reduce union members' expectations, so that 
afte r  a while the leaders can safely settle with management.
Under this perspective, strike is the instrument by which workers' 
expectations are m odified.^2-!
The behavioural assumption of strikes under the economic approach
is, therefore, very simple. I t  is primarily a problem of
estimating how far workers' expectations are out of line with "what
the firm may be prepared to pay" at any given moment. As the gap
between expectation and achievement widens, the probability of a
strike occurring increases. The expectation-achievement gap may
widen in two possible ways - with the increase of expectations or
with the decrease of rewards. The level of expectation is set by
comparison with past rewards and those of other individuals and 
[331groups.1- J As argued by Runciman, a sense of relative
deprivation is the main source of dissatisfaction among
, [34]people.
Psychological approach: The psychological scarcity is another
source of worker dissatisfaction. Once the material needs are
fu l f i l le d ,  other needs - for example, security, affection, esteem
[351and self-actualisation -  appear in a sequence. The Hawthorne
studies of Roethlishberger and his associates have shown that 
workers' contentment does not depend so much upon the physical 
conditions under which they work or the amount of money they earn as 
on the psychological and social relationships they build up with 
fellow workers. Working environment in modern organisations
frustrates many of the basic human needs (e.g. desire for varied and 
interesting work, control over the work done, freedom of social 
interactions, freedom of self-expression etc.) and creates 
di ssati sfacti on.
2 .3 .1 .3 . Industrial sociology approach
The industrial sociology theory gives prime emphasis to the 
differences between various types of workers. According to this  
theory, different types of workers have different strike  
propensities. A relevant question now arises - what are the 
determining factors that distinguish one group of workers from 
another? The determining factors, according to this theory, are 
the following three:
a) The social structure of the communities in which workers l iv e ;
b) The technical nature of their work environment; and
c) Their past background and experience.
The main proponents of this approach are Kerr and Siegel . ^ 8 ]
They have found from an analysis of strike records of eleven 
countries that certain industries appear consistently more strike- 
prone than others. In particular, miners, dockers and seamen show 
the highest propensity to strike, with te x ti le  and lumber workers 
close behind. By contrast, they have also found some manufacturing 
industries to be less strike-prone. They attribute these 
differences in strike propensity to the differences in the 
communities in which they l ive . Living in separate and solid 
community gives the workers both the strength and the willingness to 
strike. By contrast, i f  they have to live  more closely integrated 
with the wider society, they have to associate with people with 
quite different working experiences than their own and to belong to 
associations with heterogeneous membership. In these communities 
their individual grievances are less like ly  to coalesce into a mass
a- +dispute.
Based on the hypotheses developed by Kerr and Siegel, Lockwood has 
developed a three-fold typology of English workers. These are:
a) Traditional proletarians: They seem to be associated with the
industries which tend to concentrate workers together in solid
communities and to isolate them from the influence of the wider 
society (e.g. miners, dockers and ship-builders). They have a 
high degree of job involvement and a strong attachment to 
primary work groups.
b) Deferential trad itio na l: They are found in jobs that ( i )  
involve close and frequent contact with superiors and ( i i )  
discourage the formation of strong attachments to workers in a 
similar market situation. The work situation of deferential 
workers involves a supervised and paternalistic liv ing  
arrangement.
c) Modern privatised workers: They are usually found to work in
modern mass production industries. They get high wages and
live in modern towns. People around them are a ll  strangers.
They have l i t t l e  chance to develop communal solidarity. They 
thus develop a l i fe -s ty le  which is basically individualistic and 
consumption oriented.
The industrial attitudes and behaviour of the modern privatised 
workers, as observed by Lockwood, are almost similar to those of the 
"affluent workers", as observed by Goldthorpe et a l . ^ ^  I t  is 
because one of the characteristics of modern privatised workers is 
that they earn higher wages and are affluent. Goldthorpe et al. 
have found that affluent workers have l i t t l e  interest in their work 
and work-mates other than pecuniary.
The above typology of workers suggests that strikers are the 
traditional proletarians who have strong social solidarity. 
Deferential workers, being under close supervision, cannot 
demonstrate their wish and a b il i ty  to launch strike action.
Affluent and modern privatised workers are all consumption oriented 
and individualistic and thus less concerned about strikes.
2.3 .1 .4 . Socio-Technical approach
Many sociologists have focused on technology as a key determinant of
the texture of relationships in industry. They argue that with the
introduction of modern technology, industrial work becomes
monotonous and dehumanised and such a situation acts as a source of
conflict. Barbash has observed that the technologial features
necessarily generate tensions of command and subordination,
competitiveness, exploitation, physical deprivation at work and
f42leconomic insecurity.1- J
Woodward, in analysing the implications for management of d ifferent  
degrees of technical complexity finds that the attitude and 
behaviour of management and supervisory s ta ff and the tone of 
industrial relations are closely related to technology. In firms 
at the extreme of the scale, relationships are, on the whole better  
than in the middle ranges.
I t  is indisputable that the technology of a firm can have a 
conditioning effect on 1abour-managernent relations. But a theory 
which sees technology as a ll  important is certainly inadequate.
One influential attempt to consider both technology and other 
aspects of work environment has been made by Tris t and his 
associates. They argue that work relations should be viewed as 
structured within a "socio-technical system".
"Any production system requires both a technological 
organisation - equipment and process layout - and a work
organisation Although technology places lim its on the
kind of work organisation possible, i t  does not uniquely
determine its  form A work organisation has social and
psychological properties of i ts  own that are independent 
of technology". [44]
Technology largely determines the size of unit and a large-sized
unit is a potential source of conflict. This is because the
structural complexities of large scale units do not allow the[ 4 5 ]
development of strong communal relationships. The conflict
potential is s t i l l  more in situations of changing technology than i
situations of relatively stable t e c h n o l o g y i t  has further
been argued that where work technology is highly constraining, smal
[471changes in work methods may provoke a much greater outcry. J 
2.3.1.5 Managerial style approach
Workplace dissatisfaction may also arise from the style of 
leadership and management. I f  workers feel that their  management 
is indifferent to their  problems, lacks adequate sk ill and 
authority, does not have a sympathetic attitude towards the workers 
and maintains a low level of interaction, a mutual suspicion and 
mistrust develops between the parties concerned which, in turn, 
creates dissatisfaction and conflict. £48]
2 . 3 . 1 . 6 .  S o c i e t a l  a p p roa c h
Finally , through a review of some American works, Thomson and Murray 
have identified a set of factors concerned with changes in the 
larger society as an explanation of conflict emergence. These are:
a) Increased educational level raises expectations of the workers.
b) Increasing geographical mobility of the workers and increasing 
pervasiveness of mass media makes workers more conscious about 
the ir  reference groups.
c) Increasing affluence resulting from economic growth makes 
workers feel they deserve more.
d) The growth of union movement serves to enhance the ir  power for 
engaging in conflict.
2.3.2. The Manifestation of Conflict
All of the above approaches are concerned with workers' desires and
attitudes for conflict. Though each approach has a d ifferent  
perspective, a common assumption in a ll of them is that the 
attitudes and desires of the workers are automatically translated 
into open conflict (e.g. s trike). But, in fact, this is not the 
case. The manisfestation of conflict depends basically on the
chances of success. When workers feel that there is l i t t l e  or no
chance of success, the emerged conflict is usualy repressed rather 
than manifested. Major approaches to conflict manifestation may be 
brie fly  reviewed as follows:
2.3 .2 .1 . Political-Organisational approach
The major proponents of this approach are Shorter and T i l ly .
They argue that the important factor influencing conflict 
manifestation is the workers' organisational strength. They 
propose a model of strike determination that emphasises po litics  and 
organisation. They see industrial conflict as basically po lit ica l 
and intimately linked with the broader social strategy for power.
At the root of their view of strikes as a political phenomenon is 
the important insight that strikes require organisation and "the
existence of ........  organisation involves workers in the struggle for
political power and makes the strike available as a po lit ica l  
weapon." Thus, according to Shorter and T i l ly ,  the c r it ic a l  
variable mediating between industrial conflict and politics is 
organisation. The translation by workers of exploitation and 
oppression into protest and of grievances into strikes depends 
primarily on workers' organisational s t r e n g t h . B u t  what are 
the factors on which workers' organisational strength depend?
Shorter and T i l ly  see this as determined by two factors:
a) The structure and technologies of the jobs at which people 
w o rk ,£ ^  and
T531b) The type of communities in which they choose to liv e .
By applying their model to French strike patterns, Shorter and T i l ly  
have found that:
a) There is a tendency for disputes to be timed to take advantage 
of political crises.
b) Strikes have been frequently used as political demonstrations.
c) Both sides in conflict attempt to secure government intervention 
in their favour.
d) There is a general link between the major strike movements and 
the oscillating position of labour in the polity.
Shorter and T i l ly ,  therefore, argue that any attempt to construct 
models of strikes in any country must include the influence of 
political and organisational variables (e .g .,  trade union 
membership, violent political conflicts, governmental crises e tc .)  
Regression analyses by researchers such as Skeels and Kaufman made 
on United States' early and current strike data have also shown that 
economic, non-economic, po litical and union organisation factors 
are important in determining the level of strike ac tiv ity .
The theoretical basis of union organisation for conflict  
manifestation may l ie  in the argument that a group conflict is more 
strongly f e l t  and manifested than an individual one.
2 . 3 . 2 . 2 .  H i s t o r i c a l  a p p r o a c h
The historical approach looks at the success record of past conflict  
manifestations. The more the past m ilitant conflict manifestations 
were successful, the more i t  is likely to lead to the ir  repeated use 
both at present and in future and vice-versa. £^6]
2 .3 .2 .3 . Industrial Sociology approach
As already noted, this approach looks at workers' background and 
experience. Like its  emergence, manifestation of conflict also 
depends on the types of workers - the ir  backgrounds and experiences. 
Different types of work groups manifest different types of 
grievances and conflicts.
Kerr and his associates have categorised the workers from the 
viewpoint of ther commitmen to industrial work and characteristic  
forms of protest into four classes, as shown below:
| Stages of Committment I Forms of Protest j
j 1. Uncommitted workers
1 1 
! Turnover | 
j Absenteeism j 
I Fighting I
| Theft and sabotage j 
| 1
J 2. Semi-Committed Workers
I 1 
j Spontaneous stoppages | 
j Demonstrations & guerilla  strikes j
I |
j 3. Committed Workers j Plant & industry strikes I 
j Political protests & a c tiv ity  |
I i
| 4. Specifically Committed 
| Workers
l i
J Grievance machinery, labour | 
j courts and dispute settlement j 
j machinery, largely without j 
j stoppages I 
j Political party & organisational j 
I alliances j
T581Sayles has identified four different types of work groups in 
terms of their behaviour:
a) Apathetic group: This group usually does not possess sufficient
power and hence demonstrates relatively few conflicts.
b) Erratic group: This group behaves irra tiona lly . Sometimes i t
erupts over minor issues, even in violation of formal
procedures, but at other times i t  fa i ls  to support important and
genuine issues of conflict.
c) Strategic group: Workers of this group hold a strategic
position in the technical flow of goods or services of the
organisation. They are more vulnerable than others to shut­
down or stoppage. They usually develop a strong group cohesion 
around the special skill required by the strategic position. 
Because of the ir  strong group solidarity they can usually 
u til is e  planned and sustained pressure tactics.
d) Conservative group: In spite of their being suffic iently
powerful, workers of this group try to solve a ll th e ir  problems
through established procedures and rules.
Why do different work groups develop in an organisation and why do 
their behaviour patterns differ? Sayles has argued that, among 
others, the most important factor is the work technology which 
shapes group cohesiveness and power and which, in turn, is largely  
the basis of a ll work groups.
Typologies of workers made by other writers already referred to 
indicate strikers are traditional proletarians. D ife re n tia l, modern 
privatised and a f f l ie n t  workers are less concrned with open 
conflicts.
The various approaches presented above lay stress on several 
dimensions of the occurrence of industrial conflict and each 
approach has its  own logic. What emerges fromn this iSj that 
industrial conflict is a function, not of a single factor, but 
rather i t  is a function of a multiple of factors.
2 . 3 . 3 .  T h e o r i e s  and P r a c t i c e s  o f  C o n f l i c t  R e s o l u t i o n
2 .3 .3 .1 . Institutional methods of conflict resolution
Although industrial conflict is an inevitable component of the 
industrial relations system, every conflict, however, is followed 
by i ts  resolution. The various institutional methods practised in 
almost all countries of the world, with certain variations to suit 
the particular conditions prevailing in particular countries, may be 
categorised as follows:
A. Internal Methods:
1) Informal methods
2) Grievance procedure
3) Collective bargai ning
B. External methods:
1) Concilition
2) Mediation
3) Committees of enquiry
4) Arbitration
5) Labour courts
A b r ie f  discussion on each of these methods now follows:
A. Internal Methods
Internal methods refer to settlement of industrial conflic t by the 
parties themselves without any intervention from outside.
1) Informal methods: Informal methods are more or less habitual,
o f f ic ia l ly  accepted (though not formally promulgated) patterns for  
the handling of grievances. They are, in effect, l ik e  formal 
procedures in that they represent understandings about how to settle  
grievances; yet they are not offical procedures because such 
understandings are only ta c it ,  rather than exp lic it .
Informal methods are standard practices which sometimes evolve 
informally from past experience or in other times this may be 
presented orally by higher level management as "good general 
guidelines on what to do in the case of a g r i e v a n c e " . I n  
most cases, however, such practices are quite vague and general.
But there are obvious social and economic advantages of informality. 
From a social viewpoint, informal approach helps to maintain a 
cohesive and unitary concept of the organisation. From an economic 
point of view, informality seems to save time and e ffo rt of a ll
rgi 1
concerned.
2) Grievance procedure: The grievance procedure usually deals with 
complaints or grievances which affect one or more individual workers 
and which do not involve major changes in the status quo. The 
formal grievance procedure significantly contributes to effective  
and quick resolution of workers' grievances at the point of origin. 
In some countries, therefore, law makes i t  obligatory on management 
to have clearly written grievance procedures in their respective 
plants.
A grievance procedure is prepared in conformity with existing 
legislation, customs and practices. I t  is aimed, as far as 
possible, to settle grievances within the f i r s t  one to three levels 
of the management hierarchy. Time limits required at d ifferent  
levels are set and the workers know the authorities who are to be 
approached when they have grievances.
3) Collective bargaining: This is a procedure by which an employer
or employers and a group of employees or their union agree upon the 
conditions of work. The procedure is very important for solving 
the problems arising at the plant or industry level. The procedure 
is being practised in all countries, although the contents and scope 
of collective bargaining vary from country to country. However, 
the scope of collective bargaining has been expanding with the 
growth of industrialisation and trade unionism.
Labour legislations in each country regulate the operation of 
collective bargaining. However, legal provisions alone cannot 
ensure the effective operation of the process. Union and 
management have to adhere to certain principles to enhance its  
effectiveness of operation.
B. External Methods
External methods involve third party intervention in the resolution 
of conflict between workers and management. The third party may 
intervene in different capacities e .g ., conciliator, mediator, 
enquiry committee and arbiter.
1) Conciliation: Conciliation may be described as the practice by 
which the services of a neutral third party are used in a dispute as 
a means of helping the disputant parties to reduce the extent of 
their  differences and to arrive at an amicable settlement. I t  is a 
process of rational and orderly discussion of differences between 
the parties to a dispute under the guidance of the conciliator.
The practice of conciliation in industrial disputes has developed 
mainly in connection with disputes arising from the fa ilu re  of 
collective bargaining. Conciliation has thus been described as an 
extension of collective bargaining with th ird party assistance or 
simply as "assisted collective bargaining".
The steps that a conciliator may take to bring out an amicable 
settlement vary from one country to another, but always his function 
is to assist the parties towards a mutually acceptable compromise or 
solution. The conciliator may suggest possible lines of solution, 
but i t  is for the parties to accept or not to accept his suggestions 
or proposals; he cannot impose the terms of settlement upon the 
conflicting parties.
2) Mediation: The approaches of conciliation and mediation
generally overlap. In fact in a particular country only either of 
the two systems may be found to operate. One point of distinction  
between the two systems is sometimes drawn in terms of functional 
powers. A conciliator generally performs a messenger service,
while a mediator may suggest recommendations over the conflicting  
issues, although he cannot impose his judgement upon the parties in  
conflict.
3) Committee of Enquiry: Investigation in industrial dispute is
sometimes conducted by a board or court of enquiry appointed by the 
government of a country. I t  may, however, be voluntary or 
compulsory. I f  investigation is conducted on an application by 
either or both of the parties, i t  is voluntary. But i f ,  on the 
other hand, the government appoints a court of enquiry to 
investigate into a dispute without the consent of the disputant 
parties, i t  is compulsory. These investigations do not aim at 
bringing about the settlement of disputes directly , but by analysing 
and publishing the facts about a dispute, they create public 
opinion, and thus they aim at bringing about the settlement of the 
dispute indirectly in an amicable manner.
4) Arbitration: Arbitration is a means of securing an award on a
conflicting issue by reference to a third party. Unlike a 
conciliator or a mediator an arbiter has the power to determine a 
dispute submitted to him. An arbiter usually conducts a hearing of 
the parties and makes his decision or award afterwards.
Arbitration proceedings do not necessarily follow the formal course 
of judicial proceedings, and arbiters are not often bound by the 
technical rules of evidence observed by ordinary courts.
Arbitration is provided by almost a ll  countries which have provided 
for conciliation. This procedure is usually used when conciliation  
fa i ls .  I t  may be provided in two forms - voluntary and compulsory. 
Arbitration is said to be voluntary when the parties to the dispute 
have the option to submit or not to submit to the decision of an 
arbiter. Conversely, under compulsory arbitration, the disputant 
parties must submit to the decision of the arbiter.
5) Labour courts: The functional basis of arbitration and labour 
courts is basically the same. However, an arbiter is usually a 
single person, while a labour court generally consists of more than 
one person (three in many countries -  one independent person, one 
workers' representative and one employers' representative). Labour 
courts hear the labour disputes and decide them in a summary form.
2 . 3 . 3 . 2 .  C o n t i n g e n t  C o n d i t i o n s  A f f e c t i n g  C o n f l i c t  R e s o l u t i o n
The nature of a ll conflicts is not the same. Each is different  
from others in one or more respects. Accordingly the same methods 
of resolution will not be appropriate in a ll  cases. Modes of 
conflict resolution will depend on certain contingent conditions, as 
brie fly  stated below:
(a) Nature of the issues
The pattern of conflict resolution may depend, to a large extent on 
the agenda items over which the parties are in conflict. Walton 
and McKersie have divided these agenda items into three classes in 
terms of two dimensions of the underlying structure of pay-offs - 
( i )  the total value available to both parties and ( i i )  the share of 
the total value available to each party. These are:
1) Issues: Issues are involved in those situations where total 
value available is a fixed sum and parties' individual shares 
are variable.
2) Problems: Problems are involved in those situations where a 
wide range of possible total values is available and the 
parties' individual shares are either fixed or not th e ir  
immediate concern.
3) Mixed situations: Mixed situations refer to those cases where
both the total value available and the parties' individual
u • [63]shares are variable.
The above characteristics of agenda items w ill determine the 
structure of bargaining appropriate in each case. For example, in  
the case of an issue, where each party to the conflict attempts to 
maximise his own share (total value being fixed), a "distributive  
bargaining" w ill be appropriate. In the case of a problem, on the 
other hand, since the parties attempt to increase the size of the 
jo in t  gain without respect to the division of the pay-offs 
(individual shares being fixed at least temporarily), an 
"integrative bargaining" w ill be more appropriate. A mixed
bargaining process that combines both an attempt to increse the size 
of the jo in t gain and a decision on how to allocate shares between 
the parties, w ill be appropriate in mixed s itu a t io n s '6^  The 
following Figure explains the three agenda items and the bargaining 
structure appropriate to each.
| \  Total 
1 Value
| Indivi-  
| dual Share
Fixed Variable I
Static Problem |
I Fixed Position (Integrative |
(No conflict) Bargaining) I
Issue Mixed Situation |
| Variable (Di stributive (Mixed |
Bargai ni ng) Bargaining) I
Figure 2.4 : Agenda items and bargaining structure
Issues, problems and mixed items have different types of outcomes. 
Issues result in compromise solutions. Problems result in  
cooperative solutions. Mixed items can result in either  
compromising or cooperative outcomes depending on the orientation of 
the parties concerned.
(b) Levels of conflict
Conflict within an organisation may occur a t various levels. For 
example: ( i )  i t  may occur within a particular employee
(intrapersonal); ( i i )  i t  may occur between persons 
(interpersonal); ( i i i )  i t  may occur within a particular group 
(intra-organisational); or (iv ) i t  may also occur between groups
(inter-organisational). The methods of resolution w ill depend upon 
the level at which the conflict has occurred. Individual 
conflicts are easier to resolve than group/collective conflicts. 
Internal methods are more appropriate for in tra - and inter-personal 
conflicts. Intra-organisational conflicts are also resolvable 
internally but certain special strategies and tactics have to be 
used in their r e s o lu t i o n . I n t e r - o r g a n is a t io n a l  conflicts are 
amenable to solution by both internal and external methods, 
depending on the situations of particular cases.
(c) Types of conflict
Different types of conflict demand different forms of resolution.
I t  is imperative, therefore, to identify the nature and type of the 
conflict before attempting to resolve i t .  Deutsch 
differentiates between six types of conflict:
1) “Real" co nflic t: This type of conflict exists objectively and 
is perceived accurately. I t  is d i f f ic u lt  to resolve amicably 
unless there is either sufficient cooperation between the two 
parties or they can agree upon an impartial, jo in tly  accepted 
institutional mechanism for resolving i t .
2) Contingent conflic t: Here the existence of the conflict is
dependent upon readily rearranged circumstances, but this is not 
recognised by the conflicting parties. Contingent conflicts are 
d if f ic u lt  to resolve only when the perspectives of the conflicting  
parties are narrow and rig id .
3) Displaced conflic t: Here the parties in conflict argue about
the wrong thing. In such a situation, there are actually two 
conflicts - one expressed and the other unexpressed. The conflic t  
being expressed is the manifest conflict and the one not being 
directly expressed is the "underlying conflict". This type of 
conflict is also d if f ic u lt  to resolve. The manifest conflic t is  
not resolved unless the underlying conflict is also dealt with.
4) Misattributed conflic t: In this type, the conflict is between
the wrong parties, and as a consequence over wrong issues. "Divide 
and rule" is a well known strategy for weakening a goup by inducing 
internal conflict to obscure the conflict between the group and i ts  
conquerer.
5) Latent co nflic t: This is , in effect, a conflict that should be 
occurring but is not. A triggering event will make the party aware 
of i t .
6) False conflic t: This is the occurrence of a conflict when there 
is no objective basis for i t .  I t  implies a misperception or a 
misunderstanding. This conflict occurs in a competitive-suspicious 
atmosphere. Resolution of such conflicts l ie  in frequent and frank 
discussions between the parties.
(d) Degree of escalation
The pattern of resolution of conflict is also determined by the 
intensity of conflict. A conflict grows and intensifies stage by 
stage. Before using a particular technique for resolving a 
conflict, one has to be sure at what stage the conflict is .  A 
conflict is easier to resolve at the earlie r  stages of i ts  
escalation than at the la ter  stages.
Different writers have developed conflict escalation models of 
T671various stages. J Some symbolise the escalation process as 
climbing up a ladder but others as a boat floating more and more 
quickly down a river from one rapid to another. I t  is easy to 
float down the stream with the current, but i t  requires a tremendous 
effort to row against the stream. This is the kind of energy 
required for conflict resolution. Once a conflict starts, i t  is  
easier to intensify than to stop i t .  However, the internal methods 
can possibly be used effectively in the in i t ia l  stages of a conflic t  
situation and the potential for the use of various external methods 
exist in the later stages.
( e )  R e l a t i o n s h i p  p a t t e r n s
In any particular organisation the parties in conflict always act 
and react in some sort of relationship patterns determined by 
relative power position of the parties, past events, present 
contextual factors, personality factors and social beliefs of the 
negotiators. Different writers have classified the relationship 
patterns in somewhat different ways. £68  ^ But the one developed by 
Derber et a l. £69] seems to be more typical. They have discerned 
five basic patterns of union management relationship, based on three 
basic variables -  ( i )  an overall measure of satisfaction with the 
relationship ( i i )  relative union power and ( i i i )  actions. Thomson 
and Murray have restated these in relation to grievance handling as 
a continuum ranging from the most to least severe. These
patterns are also relevant in relation to conflict resolution.
I t  is evident from Column 4 of Figure 2.5 that conflicts are 
manifested {or repressed) in different ways under different 
relationship patterns; methods of resolution are also accordingly 
di fferent.
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Figure 2.S: Characteristics of the various relationship patterns 
(based on Derber e t  a l .  and Thomson and Murray).
( f ) Assumptions and orientations
Related with the relationship patterns between the parties are their  
assumptions about the conflict and their stake about its  outcome. 
Based on three basic assumptions of the parties about the conflict  
and three attitudinal stakes towards its  outcome, Blake and his 
as so c ia tes '^  discerned nine methods (3 x 3) of intergroup 
conflict resolution, as depicted in Figure 2.6
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UPON PARTIES ASSUMPTION TOWARD CONFLICT  
AND STAKES TOWARDS IT S  OUTCOME.
First assumption: Conflict inevitable, agreement impossible.
Under this assumption i f  the parties have a low stake towards the 
oucome of the conflict, they may turn to the operation of a purely 
mechanical method of decision-making (flipping a coin, for example). 
I f  they have a moderate stake in the outcome, they fee l, on the one 
hand, that resolution is necessary but, on the other hand, they also 
feel that no further interaction can produce a change in the 
disagreement. Thus i t  is from a desire to end the struggle that, 
the parties may appeal to a third party judgement. F inally , when 
the stake in the outcome is very high for both parties, a win-1ose 
power struggle can provide resolution through the direct action of 
one group on the other in a victory-defeat sense.
Second assumption: Conflict not inevitable, yet agreement not
possible. This assumption is not so much approprite for union 
management relationship. Under this assumption, the parties move 
in a direction away from interdependence towards separation and 
independence. The separation may be involuntary (ignorance) or i t  
may be voluntary (isolation or withdrawal). In either case, 
separation reduces contact between the parties and thereby reduces 
the need to achieve agreement in areas of dispute.
Third assumption: Although there is conflict, agreement is
possible. Under this assumption, when the parties have a lower 
stake in the outcome, they may prefer a peaceful co-existence.
Under this situation, the parties play down differences and 
emphasise common interests. The rule is: “Don't fight -  we have
to work and live together, so le t 's  get along." A second approach 
to intergroup conflict, when parties have a moderate stake in the 
outcome, is splitting the difference, for example, compromise, 
bargaining, trading and so forth. Here the mentality is:
"Something is better than nothing." The genuinely sound method of 
resolution is problem-solving, the third approach, when parties have 
a high stake in the outcome. In problem-solving, each party is in  
a position to retain its  autonomy, on the one hand, and each is able 
to make its  fu ll contribution to the goals they share in common, on 
the other.
The conflict handling modes developed by Thomas, though under 
somewhat different assumptions, may also be examined in this  
context. Thomas^2] has developed a two-dimensional model which 
identifies five conflict handling modes, as depicted in Figure 2 . 7 .
Figure 2.7  depicts two independent dimensions of a person's/party' s 
behaviour - (1) "assertiveness" defined as behaviour intended to 
satisfy one's own concerns and (2) "cooperativeness", defined as 
behaviour intended to satisfy the opponent's concerns. Combination 
of these two dimensions of behaviuor results in five conflic t  
handling modes, depending on the attitude of the party involved.
Competing * Collaborating
<
• Compromising
Avoiding •Accommodating
Unco-operative
Co-operativeness
Co-operative
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Thus, i f  a party is neither assertive for his own concern nor 
cooperative for his opponent's concern, an avoiding mode w il l  
result. I f  the party feels a strong desire to win in the conflict  
and feels no empathy for the other's viewpoint, a competitive mode 
will exist, while low assertiveness of the party and his 
cooperative view of the other's position w ill lead to an 
accommodative mode. In a case in which the party feels a strong 
desire to assert his own interest but also feels a willingness to 
satisfy the other's concerns, the most constructive combination of 
collaborative mode will be found. Finally, a compromising mode 
will exist in the intermediacy of both assertiveness and 
co-operativeness.
Before concluding the different contingent conditions affecting  
conflict resolution, one point to be noted is that these conditions 
are not mutually exclusive. In fact, these are related to each
other in one or more ways. For example, fixed sum issues (agenda
items) may be seen more in the aggressive pattern (relationship
patterns) at inter-organisational level (levels of c o n f l ic t ) ; they 
may be more veridical (types of conflict) and may exist with strong 
intensity (levels of escalation) being subject to competitiveness 
and win-lose struggle (parties' orientations and attitudes).
2.4 Relevance of Conflict Theories and Practices to 
Developing Countries
Research literature on industrial conflict shows that most of the 
studies were carried out in the Western developed countries, 
althoughg the industrial scene in the developing countries is by no 
means free from conflict. Although most of the approaches to 
industrial conflict, as described in the previous sections, apply 
more or less to a ll countries irrespective of their stages of 
development, the ways they apply as between the developed and 
developing countries are not the same. An attempt is made in this  
section to examine the relevance of the various conflict theories 
and practices, evolved in Western contexts, to the contexts of 
developing countries with reference to the small amount of empirical 
material now available.
Modernisation approach
Most of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America 
are either in transition from traditional agriculture to 
industrialism or in the in i t ia l  stages of industrialisation. The 
modernisation approach to industrial conflict, being applicable more 
to the early stages of industrialisation, is therefore more relevant 
to developing countries than to Western industrialised societies. 
Almost a ll developing countries being largely agricultural and 
ru ra l, much of the industrial labour force in these countries had to 
be recruited from those displaced from the land. Industrial 
workers in most cases are not prompted by the lure of the c ity  l i f e  
or by any greater ambition.£73] indeed, "few industrial workers 
would remain in industry i f  they could secure sufficient food and 
clothing in the villages. They are pushed, not pulled to the 
c i t y . A s  the UNO experts have observed:
"The forces motivating this movement are to be found, not 
in the inducements of industrial employment, but in  
economic pressures exerted by adverse rural conditions.
As a result, the industrial labour class created in  
underdeveloped areas in this way retains for a considerable 
period of time a ll the characteristics of a floating and 
unsettled rural proletariat. This lack of s tab il ity  
distinguishes the potential workers in most underdeveloped 
countries from his counterpart in developed regions where 
the urban wage earning class is completely divorced from 
the land." [75]
The urban industries in the developing countries, thus, have to 
depend to a considerable extent on rural labour forces that 
generally long to return to the village l i f e  when either the 
necessity or the opportunity of earning a living in the city had 
passed away. In this way, in most developing countries, there has 
been a constant flux of workers between industrial employment in 
towns and traditional agriculture in their  home v il lag es .^ 6 ]  Thus 
in the f i r s t  stage of modernisation, the potential for conflic t is 
created by a lack of commitment of the labour force.
However, at the next stage of modernisation, having abandoned the 
static rural society and its  philosophy of acceptance and patience, 
workers in the developing countries come to expect and are prepared 
for greater changes in their own environment. On seeing around 
them in the industrial c it ies the wealth that has been accumulated 
by others, the workers come to believe that their poverty is not 
inevitable. In addition, the new proletariat lives in a compact 
area which means i t  is susceptible to organisation, within i t s e l f ,  
or by others,^77] a n ( j| thus the potential for conflict is created.
Expectation approach
Unlike the Western industrialised countries where lower order needs 
are well satisfied and employees seek higher order needs, the 
quality of working l i f e  in the Third World is more linked with the 
satisfaction of the basic needs such as food and s h e l te r .^ - !
Workers in the developing countries l iv e  either at marginal or under 
subsistence conditions. A high rate of in flation is usually in  
force in most developing countries to curb the rise in real income 
of the workers. In such a situation they generally give prime
importance to lower level needs of Maslow's model of need-hierarchy. 
Surveys conducted in India reveal that the Indian workers give top 
priority  to such needs as income, security of job and other personal 
benefits.^ 9 ]  Several studies conducted in the context of 
Bangladesh suggest that both the workers and executives in that 
country are mainly concerned with the physiological and safety 
needs, as defined by Maslow.^^ A basic needs-based explanation 
of industrial conflict is thus more appropriate in the case of 
developi ng countries.
Industrial sociology approach
Workers in the small and medium private sector industries in most 
developing countries seem to be "deferential traditional" (according 
to Lockwood's typology), "uncommitted" or "semi-committed" to 
industrial work (as categorised by Kerr et a l)  and "apathetic" or 
"erratic" (as identified by Sayles). Workers in such industries, 
therefore, get l i t t l e  scope to effectively express any feeling of 
conflict. In large private sector industries, and in public sector 
enterprises, which are also generally big in size, "traditional 
proletariats" (as defined by Lockwood) may be found in some sectors. 
Workers in the big modern industries seem to be developing 
relatively more commitment. But here too owing to the ir  poor 
organisational strength, workers in such industries also seem to 
behave "apathetically", or in some cases "erratically" being 
motivated by the trade union leaders who are largely p o li t ic a l .
Technological approach
That modern technology is a source of potential conflict is  perhaps 
generally applicable to a ll societies, whether developed or 
developing. A few investigations have been made on the influence 
of technology on workers' attitudes and behaviour in developing 
countries. One study done by Sharma^^ in the Indian context is  
worth noting here. Of the thirteen dimensions of work technology 
he has experimented with, five have been found to be significantly  
correlated with workers' job satisfaction. Firms ranking higher 
in terms of job satisfaction have been found to be those in  which:
(a) jobs allow workers to use their own ideas;
(b) jobs enable workers to use their own capabilities;
(c) work does not leave the workers too tired at the end of the 
day;
(d) jobs allow workers to change their methods of work when 
desired; and
(e) jobs do not make workers work too fast most of the time.
Under reverse conditions of these dimensions of work technology, job 
satisfaction tends to be low which, in turn, is a potential source 
of conflict.
Managerial style approach
With labour relatively plentiful in most developing countries, 
management, particularly in the private sector, has fa iled in most 
instances to show sympathetic and sustained interest in labour 
problems. Given the labour surpluses, the employers usually follow 
their own economic s e l f - i n t e r e s t . H a b i b u l l a h ' s  finding in the 
context of Bangladesh that the style of supervision practised by 
management is not conducive to good labour-management relations is 
applicable more or less to most of the developing countries:
"The (supervisors) practise 'close' rather than 
general supervision..... They reprimand more
workers a day than they praise  Management
considers discipline not as a means of motivating 
people but as a form of punishment and 'showing
who is boss'..............be lief about workers' laziness,
slow down and cheating habits is deeply ingrained 
in the minds of supervisors." [83]
The top management of private enterprises in most developing 
countries is essentially patrimonial. The earlier dominance of the 
feudal and large land-owners in most developing countries has 
influenced the attitudes and policies of industrialists of those 
countries in dealing with subordinates and workers. Just as the 
agricultural workers were treated as virtual serfs on the landed 
estates, so workers in private industrial enterprises in these 
countries are dealt with by a mixture of authoritarian and 
paternalistic managerial practices. The trend towards a 
professionally oriented management is , however, found in the public 
enterprises, where a managerial bureaucracy is developing.[84]
As o b s e r v e d  by t h e  ILO:
"Many public enterprises (in the developing countries 
of Africa) have not yet fu lly  realised the significance 
of adopting modern (personnel) policies and practices.
Written statements of personnel policy exist only rarely.
Even where there are written personnel policies........
they are drawn up by legal advisers and drafted in
legalis tic  language,  Moreover, they are often
prepared in a language that the workers do not understand
(English or French). In addition, the specialised
personnel services are not given enough importance
and attention." [85]
Obviously under such management and personnel practices, workers are 
more like ly  to get arbitrary treatment from management which might 
serve to be good grounds for many conflict situations.
Political/organisational approach
In developing countries the close links between politica l parties 
and trade unions are as much given factors in the situation as are 
the workers' poverty and social backwardness. In Western 
industrial societies, where a strong trade union movement has 
developed, trade unions are also linked with the po litica l process,
but the link is qualitatively different from that existing in the
developing countries in that while in the Western countries the 
trade unionists largely influence the politic ians, in the developing 
countries, on the other hand, i t  is the politicians who largely  
influence the trade union leaders. Unlike the Western countries 
trade union membership in the developing countries is low, 
particularly in the private sector and the workers have l i t t l e  
economic strength to endure a long strike to seriously affect the 
employers. Because of their  economic weakness trade unions in most 
developing countries can rarely achieve their goals by using Western 
trade union methods.
In the industrially developed countries of the West where education 
is widespread and the concept of social equality is more generally 
accepted, the workers have been able to develop their own leaders. 
But in most developing countries, the working class is less educated 
and even i l l i t e r a te  and the social system is such that the workers
have less self-confidence in meeting employers than in Western 
countries. The inab ility  of the workers in the developing 
countries to organise themselves in their own interest l e f t  a vacuum 
which was f i l le d  by middle class leaders from the outside who 
organised the workers more in the middle class leaders' own 
political or other selfish interests than of the workers.^-8^
Workers of most developing countries, particularly of South-East 
Asia, are more loyal to the leaders than to ideologies or 
principles. This is evident from instances where self-seeking 
union leaders have changed from one trade union federation to 
another, or from one party to another, but kept their following 
constant. Because of this constant support towards such union 
leaders, political parties, whether in power or in opposition, find 
them to be of considerable value, especially during elections, or in 
the case of opposition parties particu larly , when i t  is f e l t  
desirable to embarrass the Government by calling a token strike on 
some issue or another.^-88  ^ One significant feature of trade 
unionism in the developing countries is that in the absence of the 
workers' commitment to some sort of a common ideology, federations 
of unions, whether supporting or opposing the Government, frequently 
manage to secure support from the workers for short-term action.
The unionists supporting the Government can secure such support by 
gaining tangible benefits, particularly for public sector workers. 
The opposition union leaders, on the other hand, secure workers' 
support by demonstrating that they are fighting injustices through 
making angry speeches and even going to prison for some time.
Conflict resolution practices
In most developing countries industrial conflict relating to small 
and cottage industries, which are exclusively in the private sector 
are generally resolved through the autocratic and unilateral 
decisions of the owners/managers who are largely patrimonial as a 
class. There is ,  however, a tendency towards constitutional 
management in the medium and big sized industries in such countries 
due to the interference of Government through labour leg is la tion and 
some other pressures.^-8^
Most of the developing countries of today have gained po litica l
independence from one or other of the West European colonisers a fte r
the Second World War. In many of these countries labour
legislative patterns were not indigenous, but were inherited,
borrowed or transplanted from abroad. Such transplantations have
entailed some d iff ic u lt ie s  of adaptation and s u ita b i l i ty .^ 0 ]
Labour legislation systems that have evolved from and reflected an
economic experience obviously different from that obtaining in
developing countries have been found to be not very relevant. I t
is generally argued that labour legislation systems in most
developing countries are not related to the stage of economic
growth, the position of wage earners within the entire population,
the level of national sk ills  and the institutional development of 
r a n
such countries. J
The industrial relations laws in most developing countries provide 
various avenues for workers' participation in management. At the 
level of the undertaking works councils, jo in t  consultation 
committees, and other systems of workers' participation in decisions 
within undertakings provide the basis for a more active involvement 
of workers in the running of the enterprise with a view to 
developing their personality and making the enterprise more 
e f f ic ie n t .£92] At the national level, the principle of 
tr ipartitism  in making policies affecting labour has been accepted 
in most developing c o u n t r i e s . B u t  such participation schemes 
have largely fa iled to produce the desired outcome. Employers, 
particularly of the private sector, are obviously against such types 
of workers' participation, nor, paradoxically, have the trade unions 
pressed for their introduction or their effective operation i f  
already introduced under legal obligations. The lack of interest 
on the part of workers' organisations may be due to the fact that 
many trade union leaders in the developing countries feel 
technically too weak to assume such responsibilities, or i t  may well 
be because of fear that the traditional trade union functions may be 
undermined in the process of promoting such participation  
schemes. £94]
Although most developing countries do not make distinctions between 
disputes of interests and disputes of rights, a considerable number 
of such countries recognise the advantages of establishing suitable 
grievance procedures as an essential element of sound labour 
management relations. Accordingly, legislation in a number of 
countries^9^  have in one way or another prescribed the 
establishment of grievance procedures. In some countries^98-! 
grievance procedures are spelt out in b ipartite  agreements. In 
other countries s ta ff representatives have been instituted for 
similar purposes.£9^
All developing countries have the practice of collective bargaining. 
But unlike the Western industrialised countries where the parties 
are free to negotiate wages and working conditions, the d iff ic u lt ie s  
of economic development in most developing countries prompted some 
important changes in the tradition of free collective bargaining, 
giving way to more controlled systems where much is determined 
through national legislation or other Government measures. Actors 
of the industrial relations system, particularly the Government, in  
most developing countries stress that prolonged work-stoppages, due 
to a breakdown in collective bargaining, resulting in a substantial 
loss of man hours, is a social luxury which the developing economies 
can i l l  afford on social and economic considerations.£98*^ The 
political dimension of the developing countries is another important 
point in this context. Many of the developing countries either  
have experienced or are s t i l l  under m ilitary rule. Declaration of 
states of emergency, which have at times lasted for lengthy periods 
have also been frequent in these countries. Under such conditions, 
trade union ac tiv it ies , including collective bargaining, have been 
restricted, and even to ta lly  banned in some cases. Moreover, even 
in countries with more liberal regimes, strikes and other forms of 
industrial action in some industries, especially essential services, 
are often outlawed. In such circumstances conflict resolution 
procedures hardly seem relevant.
With this summarisation of the general theories and practices of 
industrial conflict, a review of the government policies towards 
labour with particular reference to the public sector industries in  
Bangladesh is taken up in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER I I I  
GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS LABOUR 
IN BANGLADESHI PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIES
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the attitude of the 
Government towards workers, particularly of the public sector 
industries, in Bangladesh and also towards the various approaches to 
the resolution of labour disputes and workers' grievances. The 
chapter is divided into two main sections - the f i r s t  section looks 
at the Government policies towards labour in terms of its  declared 
policies and legal enactments in general, while the second 
specifically summarises the legal and institutional framework for 
the handling of labour disputes and grievances.
3.1 Government Policies Towards Labour
The Government policies towards labour have been examined in three 
time phases in terms of the p o litica l and social changes occurring 
in the te rrito ry  now constituting Bangladesh - (a) the British  
period (pre-1947), (b) the Pakistan period (1947-70) and (c) the 
independent Bangladesh period (since 1971). In each time phase, 
in the f ir s t  instance, the declared policies of the Government 
concerning labour have been b rie fly  summarised, and in the second, 
an attempt has been made to see the extent to which those declared 
policies have been related with the labour laws for implementation.
3.1 .1 . The British Period
During the British days, there was no formal declared policy with 
regard to labour. The attitude of the Government of B ritish  India 
in respect of labour problems was mainly one of non-interference.
I t  stepped in only for the purpose of maintaining law and order.
Most often officers of the Government were biased towards the 
employers in dealing with industrial disputes. I t  was only when 
industrial disputes developed and created a cris is  situation that 
the Government appointed certain committees or commisions of 
inquiry. Among such commissions, mention may be made of the Royal 
Commission on Labour appointed in July 1929.[1]
In the in it ia l stages of industrialisation in India, the conditions 
of factory workers were very u n sa tis fa c to ry .^  In the absence of 
any clearcut Government policies for ameliorating th e ir conditions, 
the workers, being stimulated by the then nationalist p o litic a l 
leaders, stood up for the ir rights and tried  to resist a ll 
maltreatments and exploitations by the employers. There were 
several clashes between workers and employers, and in the face of 
this large scale agitation the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed 
in 1923. In consonance with the conventions adopted by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Government passed the 
Trade Union Act in 1926 despite strong opposition from the 
employers' s id e .£3] Under this Act, trade unions could be 
registered but there was no binding on the employers to recognise 
the trade unions. To satisfy the growing workers' ag itation, the 
Indian Trade Disputes Act was passed in 1929, which provided for the 
establishment of tribunals to adjudicate in the labour disputes. The 
report of the Royal Commission on Labour brought to lig h t the 
glaring injustices done to labour. For implementing the 
recommendations of the Commission, the Indian Factories Act, 1881 
was amended in 1934 to provide for remarkable improvements in 
working hours and working conditions and for enhanced penalties for 
offences committed by the employers. To stop arbitrary deduction 
from wages by the employers, the Payment of Wages Act, was passed in 
1936. After the Second World War, the Industrial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Act, 1946 was enacted for drawing up standing 
orders governing the terms and conditions of employment of 
industrial workers. To handle the rising industrial disputes 
appearing after the War due mainly to the rising prices of food 
stu ff and other necessities, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was 
also enacted.
Thus although there was no formal labour policy in the B ritish  
period, a number of important labour legislations were enacted 
during the period after the F irs t World War which set the stage for 
further amendments and improvements during the Pakistan and the 
Bangladesh periods.
3 . 1 . 2  The P a k i s t a n  P e r i o d
After the partition of British India in August 1947, Pakistan 
inherited a ll the labour policies, legislations and regulations that 
were in force in undivided India. The whole of Pakistan and 
Bangladesh periods are characterised by more frequently declared 
labour policies but by less of th e ir implementation. Both Pakistan 
and Bangladesh periods have experienced frequent forceful p o litic a l 
changes, and each new regime coming to power declared one new labour 
policy containing sim ilar programmes with only minor differences in 
emphasis, detail and phraseology. This is evident from a summary 
of a ll the labour policies, as shown in F ig .3 . 1 . ^ ]  As many as 
four labour policies were adopted over the 24-year l i f e  (1947-71) of 
Pakistan.
The five year programme of action
The f i r s t  of these policies comprised the five-year programme of 
work in the fie ld  of labour drawn up in India during October 1946 
and subsequently adopted by Pakistan in February 1949 in the F irs t  
Labour Conference composed of the representatives of the Government, 
employers and workers. The actions which were to be taken under 
this programme may be seen in column 2 of F ig .3.1.
The five  year programme adopted in February 1949 was to be completed 
by February 1954. In an attempt to evaluate the progress of the 
programme, Shafi has found that by the end of the plan period 
(February 1954) not even a single item of the programme had been 
completed. By examining the o ffic ia l pronouncements, he has found 
that the progress of the items under the programme varied from 
"under consideration" and "under examination" to "a b i l l  being 
prepared and re-exam ined".^ The words of the two important ILO 
conventions bearing on the labour management relations -  Convention 
No.87 guaranteeing freedom of association and protection of the 
right to organise and Convention No.98 ensuring the right to 
organise and collective bargaining -were, however, ra tif ie d  by 
Pakistan during the period, although th e ir s p ir it  was not 
imp!emented.
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Fig. 3.1 SLM-m CF THE LA30U1 POLICIES IM BAhJGLADCSH^4^
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The F irs t Policy
Having done nothing In respect of the five year programme, the 
Government made a formal announcement of its  labour policy in August 
1 9 5 5 . As shown in column 3 of F ig .3.1 , almost a ll the items of 
the five year programme were included in this policy
The fate of this policy was no better than that of the five  year 
programme. Only the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, which 
provided for increased rates of compensation for accidents, was 
passed by the legislature in March 1957 and amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act, providing for speedy remedy to the 
aggrieved workers in the case of violations of the conditions of 
service, and conciliation of apprehended disputes, was made in the 
middle of 1958. At the time of promulgation of the Martial Law in 
October 1958, the position in the fie ld  of labour stood almost the 
same as on the date of the creation of Pakistan. Other than for a 
few minor and negligible exceptions, not a single important 
legislation was enacted nor any other significant measure or scheme 
launched .^  Industrial disputes began to rise rapidly. With a 
view to stopping the rising trend of industrial disputes, the 
Martial Law authority passed the Essential Services (Second) 
Ordinance, 1958, under which the Government could declare any 
industry or service to be essential whenever any industrial dispute 
occurred or was apprehended. The Act made strikes in essential 
services i l le g a l .^ ]
The Second Policy
In February 1959, the Martial Law Government headed by Ayub Khan 
announced a new labour p o l ic y .^  The main contents of the policy 
have been brie fly  stated in column 4 of F ig .3.1 . This policy, 
compared with the previous ones, did not seem to be any d ifferen t in  
fundamentals.
The Martial Law Government took some leg is la tive  measures as a step 
towards the implementation of its  declared policy. In substitution  
of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, a new Industrial Disputes 
Ordinance was passed in 1959, which provided for the following:
(a) equal representation of the parties in the works committee;
(b) the conciliation o fficer to conciliate in any industrial
dispute, and in the event of a fa ilu re  of conciliatory efforts  
to issue a c e rtifica te  of fa ilu re  within 14 days in public 
u t i l i ty  services and within 28 days in other cases;
(c) the constitution of permanent tr ip a rt ite  industrial courts and 
direct approach by any disputant party to such courts;
(d) punishments for breaches of the terms and conditions of the
b ipartite  agreements.
The Ordinance was amended in 1961 and 1962 providing for the 
employers' right to dismiss a worker for misconduct not connected 
with the dispute pending before the conciliation o ffice r or the 
industrial court and also for a right to appeal to the High Court 
against the awards of the industrial court. -^10-^
The Trade Union Act 1926 was amended for the f ir s t  time in 1960. 
Under the amendments, employers were obliged to recognise unions 
fu lf i l l in g  certain specified conditions. Disputes arising out of 
refusals to union recognition were to be heard by industrial courts. 
Certain unfair practices on the part of both the parties and 
penalties for committing those practices were also specified. A 
further amendment to the Act in 1961 debarred any outsider from 
becoming an o fficer of a trade union.
Before the imposition of a Constitution in 1962, the Ayub Government 
also promulgated some other Ordinances governing the conditions of 
service of industrial and commercial workers, working journalis ts , 
merchant shipping, road transport and plantation workers. Under 
the 1962 Constitution, labour became mainly a provincial subject.
The central labour laws were passed on to the Provincial 
Governments. Following the transfer of this subject to the 
province, the Government of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) enacted 
several Acts by repealing the central Acts and Ordinances.
Important among the enactments by the East Pakistan Provincial 
Legislature were: 1-12]
(1) The East Pakistan Trade Union Act, 1965;
(2) The East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965;
(3) The East Pakistan Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act,
1965;
(4) The East Pakistan Factories Act, 1965;
(5) The East Pakistan Shops and Establishments Act, 1965; and
(6) The East Pakistan Water Transport (Regulation of Employment)
Act, 1965.
In the East Pakistan Trade Union Act, 1965, the Director of Labour 
was made a dominating figure and the employer had hardly any say in  
the matter of trade union recognition. The East Pakistan Labour 
Disputes Act, 1965 provided for collective bargaining but for a ll 
practical purposes, the use of strike was made impossible. Strikes 
were banned in essential and public u t i l i ty  services. Laws were so 
framed that in the name of essential and public u t i l i t y  services, 
most of the major industries were included under these two 
categories. The most unfavourable provision in the Employment of 
Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965 was the termination of employment 
without showing any reason which was against the very s p ir it  of 
collective bargaining. The Factories Act, 1965 incorporated some 
additional provisions with regard to the leave of the workers. 
Sim ilarly, the scope of the Shops and Establishments Act was also 
widened in 1965.
The Third Policy
The trade union leaders were very b itte r  and sarcastic in th e ir  
observations regarding the Government policies. The country faced 
serious mass agitation combined with industrial unrest throughout 
the second half of the sixties which reached its  peak in 1969 and 
Martial Law was imposed for the second time in March 1969. The new 
Martial Law Government, headed by Yahya Khan, showed a sympathetic 
attitude towards workers and declared a new labour policy in July 
1969^14] which frankly recognised that workers had been deprived of 
th e ir genuine rights in the past. The policy was fa r more 
accommodating than those declared previously, and even subsequently 
afte r the independence of Bangladesh. Column 5 of F ig .3.1 contains 
the main features of the policy.
Based on the outline of this labour policy, the East Pakistan Trade 
Union Act, 1965 and the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965 were 
repealed and a new Ordinance, called the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance (hereafter abbreviated as IRO), 1969 was promulgated.
The new Ordinance ensured freedom of association to a ll types of 
workers, public and private, provided the right to strike and 
strengthened the scope of collective bargaining. The Minimum Wages 
(Fixation) Ordinance, 1969, also promulgated for implementing the 
objectives cherished in the new policy, fixed the rates of minimum 
wages for a ll industrial establishments, public or private, having 
50 or more workers.
Thus during the las t part of the Pakistan period, a ll industrial 
workers, both in the public and private sectors, were allowed 
freedom of association and right of collective bargaining, including 
the right to s trike. The minimum wages fixed were applicable to 
both the private and public sector industries. The non-industrial 
public workers employed in the traditional essential and service 
sectors (e.g. posts, telegraph and telephone, e le c tr ic ity  
generation, railways e tc .) were allowed the right of co llective  
bargaining without the right to s trike . Their financial terms and 
conditions of service were also governed by special Government 
regulations applicable to specific sectors.
3 .1 .3 . The Bangladesh Period
The independence of Bangladesh brought a change in the context of 
Government's policy towards labour. Immediately a fter  
independence, the Prime Minister^5-J made a press statement on 9th 
February 1972, which read as under:
"I assure our workers that the basic goal of the so c ia lis t 
economy, which we are committed to achieve, w ill be 
securing the rights of workers and ensuring th e ir welfare.
A plan is being prepared whereby measures of national­
isation would be combined with new arrangements to ensure 
workers' participation in the management of industries." [16]
The Constitution of the country, adopted in 1972, provides as 
follows:
" I t  shall be the fundamental responsibility of the State 
to emancipate the to ilin g  masses -  the peasants and 
workers - and backward sections of the people from a ll 
forms of exploitation." [17]
Immediately a fter its  emergence, Bangladesh experienced serious 
labour indiscipline and inter-union riv a lrie s . Clashes between the 
Sramik League (the supporter of the ruling party) and other opponent 
unions were rampant. In the lig h t of the commitments, as stated 
above, the Government nationalised a ll the major industries 
including banks and insurance^-J and appointed a committee, known 
as the Kamruddin Committee^^, on 19th February 1972 to report on 
workers' participation in the management of industries. The 
Committee intended to discuss this important issue with a ll the 
labour leaders co llective ly . But due mainly to the obstinacy of 
the Sramik League, this was not possible and i t  talked with the 
labour leaders individually, but no concensus could be reached and 
afte r about three months of deliberations the Committee submitted 
its  report to the Government.
The F irs t Policy
Having fa iled  to e l ic i t  any consensus from the workers, the 
Government un ilatera lly  announced a labour policy in July 1972, 
based on the recommendations of the Kamruddin Committee.^21]
Column 6 of F ig .3.1 depicts the main features of the policy. This 
policy differentiated between the private and public sector workers 
in respect of industrial relations. In the private sector 
differences between labour and management were to be settled through 
peaceful means of direct negotiation, conciliation and labour 
courts. Trade unions in the private sector were to achieve 
improved terms and conditions of employment for the workers, 
improved physical environment at the workplace and other welfare 
measures through the process of collective bargaining. The Minimum 
Wage Board was to continue fix ing wages in the private sector 
industries where trade unions were weak.
In relation to the public sector industries, the policy proposed the 
constitution of a five-member Management Board -  two members to 
represent workers, two to represent management and one to represent 
financial institutions -  for each corporation (each corporation 
representing an industry) and a Workers-Management Council with an 
equal number of representatives from management and workers at the 
plant level. Differences between labour and management were to be 
resolved through jo in t consultation in the Management Board and the 
Workers-Management Council. The Government fe lt  that since the 
workers would be d irectly involved in the management of th e ir  
industries, there would be no necesity for collective bargaining and 
strikes. Trade unions in the public sector industries were to be 
there to promote workers' welfare, workplace safety and conditions 
for higher productivity. The policy provided for the formation of 
a National Wage Board to determine and review periodically the wage 
structure and other fringe benefits of the workers employed in the 
nationalised and taken-over industries. Wages in the other public 
sector industries were subject to the recommendations of the 
National Pay Commission (NPC).
The union leaders and workers of the public sector industries, who 
were more organised than those of the private sector industries,^ 2 ]  
were not ready to lose the rights of collective bargaining and 
strike and demonstrated with strong protests and the policy had 
f in a lly  to be withdrawn.
Subsequent Developments
The Government appointed the Industrial Workers Wages Commission 
(IWWC) in June 1973 for the determination of a uniform wage scale 
for public sector industrial workers in the lig h t of changes in cost 
of liv in g , compensation paid to wage earners in other sectors of the 
economy and capacity of the industry to pay. The IWWC recommended 
a minimum wage scale which was 10 per cent higher than the lowest 
category of pay scale in the National Pay Scale (NPS) for salaried  
s ta ff. This was done to add more value to productive work than to 
office work. The Government accepted the IWWC recommendations and 
passed the State Owned Manufacturing Industries Workers (Terms and 
Conditions of Service) Act, 1974 with a view to implementing those
recommendations. But the implementation of the IWWC 
recommendations could not satisfy the workers because at the time of 
implementation, those recommendations could not compensate for the 
escalation in the rate of in fla tio n .t2 3 ] Nothing was done in 
respect of workers' participation in management. Industrial 
disputes continued to rise. The then ruling party also apprehended 
serious po litica l unrest in opposition to its  d ictatorial one party 
system and change in the form of Government (from Parliamentary 
system to Presidential system). A state of national emergency was 
declared in January 1975. All trade union ac tiv itie s , strikes and 
lock-outs were banned by issuing Order Nos. SRO 14, SRO 16 and SRO 
17 under the Emergency Power Rules, 1975.
In the meantime there occurred a m ilitary  coup in the country in 
August 1975. In December 1975 the Martial Law Government led by 
Ziaur Rahman promulgated the Industrial Relations (Regulation) 
Ordinance, 1975. Under this Ordinance, a restriction was put on 
the registration of new trade u n i o n s . P e r s o n s  employed as 
members of the watch and ward or security s ta ff or confidential 
assistants of any establishment were denied the right to be members 
or officers of any trade union.^ 5 ]  Elections for determining the 
collective bargaining agent (CBA) were prohibited and a Consultative 
Committee was required to be constituted, where there was no 
CBA.^26] An industrial disputes were to be settled through 
peaceful means.£273
In 1977, the Industrial Relations Rules were framed which contained 
detailed procedures as to the formation and administration of trade 
unions, determination of CBA, constitution of works councils and 
functions of conciliators and labour courts. In April 1977, the 
Government appointed the Industrial Workers Wages and Productivity 
Commission (IWWPC) to suggest a revised wage scale for the workers 
of the public manufacturing sector, which submitted its  report in 
June 1978. A new National Pay Commission was simultaneously 
appointed for the workers in other public sectors.
The Second Policy
In March 1980 the BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) Government 
announced a new labour policy which has been summarised in column 7 
of Fig. 3.1 . This policy recognised the need for consultation with 
the national level T rip artite  Consultative Committee to be 
constituted with the representatives from the Government, workers 
and employers in matters of policy affecting labour/management 
relations and leg is la tive  changes. As to the fixing of wages, the 
principles enunciated in the f i r s t  policy were to be adhered to.
As to the right of strikes and lock-outs, this policy allowed such 
direct actions only in extreme cases. I t  encouraged workers' 
participation in certain designated functions relating to workplace 
industrial relations. I t  retained the practice of formation of 
executive committees of trade unions at plant level with the 
representatives from among the workers. The non-workers were, 
however, allowed to be elected as office bearers of the trade union 
federations at the industry and national levels.
As outlined in the second labour policy, a further amendment was
made in 1980 to the IRO, 1969. Under this amendment, the Works 
Council was replaced by the Participation Committee which was to be 
constituted with representatives from both management and workers in 
such a proportion that the number of members representing workers 
should not be less than the number representing management. The 
Committee is to deal with the following matters:
(a) application of labour laws;
(b) improvement of working environment and safety;
(c) adoption of welfare programmes for the workers;
(d) reduction of production costs and wastage; and
(e) education and training of workers.
Latest Developments
In March 1982 Martial Law was declared for the second time and 
General Ershad took power. The new Martial Law authority 
promulgated the Industrial Relations (Regulation) Ordinance 1982, 
which again banned a ll trade union a c tiv itie s , strikes and lockouts. 
This ban s t i l l  continues and is expected to continue until the 
Martial Law is relaxed or a c iv il government comes to power.
The above historical analysis of a ll the labour policies declared so 
far reveals a frustrating picture. In undivided India, during the 
period a fter the F irs t World War, several important pieces of labour 
legislation were enacted which formed the basis for further 
modifications and amendments during the Pakistan and Bangladesh 
periods. During the whole Pakistan and Bangladesh era of 36 years, 
there were as many as six labour policies -  each of which was fu ll 
of hopeful pledges to the workers but very few of those pledges were 
in fact implemented. The re la tive ly  progressive and accommodative 
policies and laws which the workers secured at the end of the 
Pakistan era, a fte r a series of b itte r  agitations and struggles, 
were again made restric tive  after the emergence of Bangladesh as a 
sovereign state. In terms of economic benefits and labour welfare 
fa c il it ie s , the position of workers at present is perhaps no better, 
or even worse than that prevailing at the time of adopting the f i r s t  
labour policy. Owing to the ir non-implementation, a ll of the
policies remain in the offices of the Labour Ministry as "sleeping 
beauties" with l i t t l e  vis ib le action on them.
3.2 The Legal Framework of Dispute Resolution 
in the Public Sector Industries
The IRO,69, applicable to both the private and public sector 
industries, provides the basic framework governing the dispute 
resolution system in Bangladesh. However, some other legislations  
are also in force in this respect, particularly for the public 
sector industries. This section attempts to present this legal 
framework in a logical sequence by relating the provisions of a ll
the relevant laws in a consistent form.
The legal procedures to be followed in the resolution of disputes 
have been designed according to the nature of the disputes i . e . ,  
whether the dispute in question is a "right" dispute or an
"interest" dispute, or whether i t  is an individual or a co llective
dispute. I t ,  however, happens that the individual disputes usually 
relate to "right" disputes, while collective disputes to both 
"interest" and "right" disputes. The laws prescribe two d iffe ren t 
channels for the resolution of the two types of disputes. The 
institutions involved in each channel have been shown in Fig. 3.2
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3.2.1 The Resolution Right Disputes
The right disputes relate to conflicts over matters of rights  
resulting from contractual relationship, which may include 
grievances in respect of unfair treatment, denial of entitlements as 
well as unjustified punishments.C29] $uch disputes may be either 
individual or collective but more frequently these are individual 
cases. The following three machineries are available for the 
settlement of right disputes:
(1) Participation Committee
The Participation Committee is to promote mutual trus t, 
understanding and cooperation between management and workers through 
ensuring the application of various labour laws and other prescribed 
measures.^ 0 ]  j^us violations of workers' rights guaranteed under 
various laws and settlements may be amicably settled through the 
Participation Committee in  which workers should have at least equal, 
i f  not more, representatives. But the law does not prescribe any 
procedure as to how th is committee is to be approached and how i t  is  
to dispose of the cases referred to i t .
( 2 )  G r i e v a n c e  P r o c e d u r e
Any individual worker who has a grievance in respect of any matter 
covered by the Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act 1965^13 
may seek redress under the following grievance procedure:[ 32 ]
(a) Within 15 days of the occurrence of the cause of such a 
grievance, the worker concerned is to bring his grievance 
in writing to the notice of the management.
(b) On receipt of such a grievance, the management is to 
enquire into the matter and give the worker concerned an 
opportunity of being heard; its  decision must be 
communicated within 30 days of the receipt of such 
grievance.
The law is s ilent as to the app licab ility  of this grievance 
procedure for the enforcement o f workers' rights under any other 
law, award or settlement. Even i f  i t  does not apply, the workers 
may be reasonably expected to bring their complaint to the notice of 
the management in some way or other.
(3) Labour Courts
I f  the management fa ils  to give its  decision under the above 
grievance procedure, or i f  the worker is dissatisfied with such 
decision, he may make a complaint to the appropriate labour 
court£33] within 30 days from the last date of the grievance 
procedure. On receipt of any such complaint, the labour court is 
to decide the case in such a summary way as i t  deems proper.^-^
The IRO, 1969 also en titles  any CBA or any employer (or management) 
or worker to apply to the labour court for the enforcement of any 
right guaranteed or secured to i t  or him by or under any law or any 
award or settlement.
3 .2 .2 . The Resolution of Interest Disputes
Matters of interest are defined as matters which affect the 
conditions of work of a worker including matters such as the share 
of production which he obtains for his work, the part of his needs 
that can be fu lf i l le d , the congeniality of his place of work etc.
No-one can dispense justice on matters of in terest. These are 
usually to be resolved by the needs and strengths of the parties 
concerned.£36]
The resolution of interest disputes is mainly governed by the IRO, 
1969, as amended up-to-date. In the public sector, however, the 
framework provided by the IRO, 1969 is subject to two other special 
legislations - the State Owned Manufacturing Industries Workers 
(Terms and Conditions of Services) Act, 1974 and the Essential 
Services (Second) Ordinance, 1958. These special laws and certain  
other variations with regard to public sector industries w ill be 
referred to in appropriate places in the course of the following 
discussion.
(1) B ipartite Negotiation
An existing or apprehended dispute involving interest is f i r s t  
required to be settled through b ip artite  negotiation between the 
parties. The law provides for two methods of b ila te ra l 
negotiation:
(a) Participation Committee: The specified functions of the 
Participation Committee as already stated in the f i r s t  section imply 
that the forum is available for settlement of disputes through 
b ila te ra l consultation. But except for prescribing the functions 
of this Committee, the law does not provide for any detailed  
procedure regarding how to u tilis e  this machinery for resolving 
disputes between the parties. The use of this Committee is ,  
however, not compulsory. In fac t, i t  can be by-passed.
(b) Collective Bargaining: In the event of a fa ilu re  to settle  a 
dispute through the Participation Committee or of its  by-passing, 
direct collective bargaining between the parties must occur. For 
collective bargaining purposes, the party affected by the dispute -  
an employer or CBA, as the case may be - is  to communicate in  
w riting, the fact of such a dispute to the other party .^37  ^ I t  is  
to be noted that an industrial dispute can be raised only by an 
employer or a C B A .^ ] In relation to an establishment or industry
run by or under the authority of any Ministry or Division of the 
Government, the authority appointed in this behalf, or where no 
authority is appointed, the Head of the Ministry or Division is 
deemed to be an employer. The employer also includes any person 
responsible for the management, supervision and control of an 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t . i n  relation to an establishment or industry, 
private or public, the CBA means a trade union of workers declared 
by the Registrar of Trade Unions under prescribed procedures to be 
an exclusive bargaining agent for the workers in that establishment 
or industry, as the case may be.Uo-I
The party receiving the communication of a dispute is under an 
obligation to consult and s it  in meetings with the other party for 
collective bargaining on the dispute raised. 4^1-^  Fourteen days are 
allowed with a view to reaching an agreement at this s t a g e . I f  
the parties can reach a settlement on the issues discussed, a 
memorandum of settlement is to be signed by both the parties and a 
copy of i t  is to be forwarded to the appropriate conciliator and the 
Government.
In the public sector industries the plant managements do not have 
adequate authority to negotiate on the disputes raised by th e ir  CBAs 
and frequently refer them to respective corporations which, in  the 
absence of any statutory time lim it, usually take a long time to 
give decisions on them. Another point to be noted here is  that, as 
opposed to the private sector, interest disputes relating to wages 
and fringe benefits are not collectively bargainable in  the public 
sector industries. Section 3 of the State-Owned Manufacturing 
Industries Workers (Terms and Conditions of Service) Act, 1974 
provides that with a view to implementing certain recommendations of 
the Wages Commission, the Government reserves the right to determine 
the wage, bonus, medical allowance, house rent allowance, conveyance 
allowance, night sh ift allowance and leave which shall be payable 
or admissible to any worker employed in any state-owned 
manufacturing industry, whatsoever is contained in the IRO, 1969, or 
in ar\y other law or any rule, regulation, by-law, agreement, award, 
settlement, custom and usage. I t  further provides that no such 
worker shall receive and no person shall allow such worker any wage,
bonus, medical, house rent, night sh ift and conveyance allowances 
and leave in excess of what is fixed by the Government. In the 
non-manufacturing public sector industries such financial terms and 
conditions of service of workers are governed by the National Pay 
Scales, also determined by the Government, in a sim ilar way. The 
scope of collective bargaining in the public sector industries has 
thus been significantly reduced.
(2) Conciliation
I f  a dispute is not settled at the b ipartite  level, the law provides 
for i t  to be settled through conciliation. The practice of 
conciliation is compulsory in Bangladesh in the sense that the 
parties cannot go for direct industrial action without f i r s t  going 
through conciliation. The conciliator, however, cannot impose any 
settlement on the parties. There are three stages of conciliation:
(a) Conciliation before the notice of work stoppage: On the
fa ilu re  of direct negotiation, either of the parties may report to
the conciliator that the negotiations have fa iled  and make a w ritten
request to him to conciliate in the d is p u te ^ ] within 14 days of
the fa ilu re  of direct negotiation.[45] Upon such a request i t
becomes obligatory on the conciliator to start conciliation.
Thirty days are allowed to him to conclude the c o n c ilia tio n .^ 6]
Soon a fter receiving a request for conciliation, the conciliator is
to call a meeting of the parties to the dispute for the purpose of
bringing about a settlement.[47] The parties, are to represent 
before the conciliator by persons authorised to negotiate and enter
into an agreement binding on t h e m . [483 i n the public sector
industries, the representatives of the Ministry or Division
administratively concerned with those industries may also represent
before the c o n c i l i a t o r . [49] Non-appearance of the parties before
the conciliator has been made punishable.[^] The law has given
the conciliator power to call for and inspect any register,
document, c e rtific a te , notice etc. which he has reason to believe to
be relevant to the dispute, and i f  these are not given to him
voluntarily, he may even seize them. He is  also empowered to enter
the premises of an establishment to which the dispute relates and
require any person whom he finds in the establishment to give such
information relating to the dispute as is within his know!edge.
In the conciliation meeting, the conciliator may suggest such 
modifications and concessions to either party as, in  his opinion, 
are lik e ly  to promote an amicable settlement.
(b) Conciliation during the notice of work stoppage: I f  the
conciliator fa ils  to settle  the dispute within 30 days^53  ^ from the 
date of receiving the conciliation request, the CBA or the employer 
may serve on the other party to the dispute 21 days notice of strike  
or lock-out, as the case may b e . £54] i t  has, however, been 
provided that a CBA cannot serve a strike notice unless three- 
fourths of its  members have given their consent to i t  through a 
secret b a l l o t . £55] a copy of the work stoppage notice is required 
to be delivered to the conciliator who, a fter examining the v a lid ity  
of the notice of work stoppage, is to continue to conciliate in  the 
dispute, despite the notice of work stoppage. I f  the work stoppage 
notice does not conform to the provisions of the laws or rules of 
the trade union concerned, such a notice is deemed to have not been 
given and any industrial action on the basis of that notice is taken 
to be i l le g a l . £35]
(c) Extended conciliation: I f  no settlement is arrived at within  
the period of the notice of work stoppage, the conciliation  
proceedings can be continued for such further period as may be 
agreed upon by the parties.£5?3
I f  a fu ll or partial settlement of a dispute is  arrived a t in  the 
course of the conciliation proceedings, a memorandum of settlement 
is to be signed by the parties and the conciliator is to send a 
report about the settlement together with a copy of the agreement to 
the Government.£58] in the event of a fa ilu re  of the conciliatory  
efforts , the conciliator is to issue a "fa ilu re ce rtifica te"  to the
parties .£5^3
After the fa ilu re  of conciliation on a particular dispute, the law 
provides for three alternative methods for its  resolution - 
voluntary arb itra tion , direct industrial action and adjudication 
through labour courts. The adjudication process may be optional in  
some cases but compulsory in others.
( 3 )  V o l u n t a r y  A r b i t r a t i o n
The practice of arb itration in Bangladesh is voluntary in  the sense 
that the parties are not legally obliged to refer th e ir dispute to 
an arb itra tor, but once they agree to refer to him, his decision is  
binding on the parties as f in a l .£50] y^g arb itra tor can be 
appointed in two ways - on the persuasion of the conciliator or on 
their own by the parties themselves. In either case, the parties 
are to make a jo in t request in writing to refer the dispute to a 
mutually agreed arb itra tor, who may be a person on a panel to be 
maintained by the Government, or any other person outside the panel.
The arb itra tor is to give his award within a period of 30 days from
the date of reference or within such an extended period as may be 
agreed upon by the parties. The award of the arb itra tor is to 
remain valid for such period as may be fixed by him and where no 
time is fixed, for a period not exceeding two years.£5*3
(4) Work Stoppage
I f  a fte r the fa ilu re  of conciliation, the parties do not agree to 
refer the dispute to an arb itra to r, the workers may go on s trik e , or 
as the case may be, the employer may declare lock-out in  accordance 
with the notice already given.£52] But striking in the public 
sector industries is not that easy because of the technical
subtleties and discretionary powers of the Government and the labour
courts. In the case of public u t i l i t y  services,£53] the Government 
reserves the right to prohibit a strike or lock-out at any time 
before or a fter the commencement of a strike or lock-out.£54] 
Moreover, the Essential Services (Second) Ordinance, 1958 is also in  
force in Bangladesh to prevent the occurrence or continuance of 
strikes and lock-outs in certain services declared or to be declared 
essential by the Government. This weapon is frequently used by the 
Government whenever any strike is apprehended in any public sector 
industry, irrespective of whether i t  is really essential or no t.£55] 
A labour court or a labour appellate tribunal has also power to 
prohibit the continuance of a strike or lock-out, once such a 
dispute is referred to i t . £553
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(5) Voluntary Adjudication
Instead of commencing or continuing a strike or lock-out, a fter  
passing through the stages of b ipartite  negotiation and 
conciliation, the parties may, at any time, either before or a fte r  
the commencement of a strike or lock-out, but within 21 days of 
fa ilin g  concil iation£673 make a jo in t application to the labour 
court for adjudication of t h e  d i s p u t e . £58] A labour court consists 
of a chairman and two members to advise the chairman, one to 
represent the employers and the other to represent the workers, a ll  
appointed by the Government in prescribed manners. Only a person 
who has been, or is , or is qualified to be a Judge or Additional 
Judge of the High Court, or is a D is tric t Judge or an Additional 
D is tric t Judge, can be appointed as the Chairman of a labour 
court.£5^3 a labour court can enforce the attendance of any person 
and examine him on oath. I t  can compel the production of documents 
and material objects. I t  can also issue Commissions for the 
examination of witnesses and documents.£7°3 After a case is  
referred to the labour court, i t  gives both the parties to the 
dispute an opportunity of being heard and to make such award as i t  
deems f i t  as quickly as possible within a period of 60 days, 
although delay in making an award does not affect its  v a lid ity .£ 7-*-3 
An award of the labour court is to remain valid for not more than
two years.£7 3^
(6) Compulsory Adjudication
I t  is compulsory for a strike or lock-out to be referred to the 
labour court for adjudication when i t  is prohibited by the 
Government in the following circumstances;
(a) I f  a strike or lock-out lasts for more than 30 d a y s ; £ 7 3 3
(b) I f ,  even before the expiry of 30 days, the Government is 
satisfied that the continuance of a strike or lock-out is  
causing serious hardship to the community or is  prejudicial 
to the national in terest;£7^3 and
(c) I f  a strike or lock-out occurs or is lik e ly  to occur in  any
T751public u t i l i ty  service.
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(7) Labour Appellate Tribunal
As is evident from the above presentation, both the in terest and 
right disputes may be referred to the labour court. The verdict of 
a labour court in an interest dispute is termed as an "award", 
while that in a right dispute as a "decision". All decisions of a 
labour court are final and cannot be called in question in any 
manner by or before any other court or authority. An award of a 
labour court is , however, appealable to a labour appellate tribunal 
within 30 days of such an award by a labour court. A tribunal is  
to consist of one member to be appointed by the Government. Only a 
person who is or has been a Judge or an Additional Judge of a High 
Court can be appointed as a member of the tribunal. The tribunal 
can conform, set aside, vary or modify the award of a labour court. 
The tribunal is to give its  decision as expeditiously as possible, 
within a period of 60 days from the date of filin g  an appeal.
The decisions of a tribunal in appeal cases are final.^^-^ The 
tribunal can also award punishment for contempt of its  authority as 
well as of the labour courts, as i f  i t  were a High Court. Any 
person convicted and sentenced by the tribunal for such contempt 
may, however, prefer an appeal to the High Court.[78]
With this summarisation of the Government policies and legal 
framework of dispute handling, this Chapter is concluded to pass on 
to the next, where the methodological aspects of the study are 
described.
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
This chapter looks at the aspects of methodology followed in the 
study. These aspects are discussed under six heads. The f i r s t  
section defines the study and i ts  scope. The sampling design of 
the study is discussed in section two. The various methods of 
collecting data for the study provide the subject matter of section 
three. The methods of subsequent processing and analysis of the 
collected data are taken up in section four. The investigation 
team faced a lo t  of problems during the course of fieldwork, which 
are stated in section five. Finally, the Chapter concludes with 
section six, where certain limitations of the study are mentioned.
4.1 Definition and Scope of the Study
Before discussing other methodological aspects, f i r s t  of a l l , a 
definition of the scope of the study on "Handling of Industrial 
Disputes in the Public Sector Industries in Bangladesh" seems 
logical. Key words of the t i t l e  to be defined are "public sector 
industries", "industrial disputes" and "handling".
Due to lim itation of resources in terms of time and money, the study 
is based on a sample of public sector industries. A public sector 
industry is defined for the purpose of this study as an entity which 
is owned and controlled by the Government or i ts  appointed agencies 
and which produces goods or renders services to the public in return 
for either a normal or subsidised p r i c e . ^  According to this  
definition, a large number of enterprises come under the public 
sector. To make an operationally feasible study on them, these 
industries were f i r s t  classified into three categories - 
manufacturing, essential s e rv ic e s ^  and non-essential services -and 
then based on a purposive sampling, certain industries from each 
of these categories were selected for investigation. Jute being 
the most important as well as the most strike-prone industry, 
Bangladesh Jute M ills Corporation (BJMC) was selected from the 
manufacturing sector. E lectric ity  being the most traditional
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public u t i l i ty  service, Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) 
was selected to represent the essential service sector. From the 
non-essential service sector Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation 
(BRTC) and Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Corporation (BIWTC) 
were selected purposively with a view to examining how the dispute 
resolution process of these industries compares with those in the 
other two categories.
For the purpose of this study anindustrial dispute is defined in a 
broader and more liberal sense than that provided in the law. The 
IRO, 1969 defines an industrial dispute as:
“any dispute or difference between employers and employers 
or between employers and workmen or between workmen and 
workmen, which is connected with the employment or non­
employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of 
work of any person". [3]
The plural form "workmen" has been used in describing what may be 
termed as the party to an industrial dispute. This implies that a 
dispute of an individual worker with his employer is not an 
industrial dispute. In popular language, an industrial dispute is  
one involving a lo t  of workers agitating for their common demands. 
This concept seems erroneous, because, even popularly, the plural 
term "employers" is taken to include a single employer, and hence i t  
seems consistent to extend the same interpretation of the term 
"workmen" to include an individual worker. Thus both collective  
and individual disputes are taken to comprise industrial disputes 
for this study. The legal pre-condition that an industrial dispute 
must be raised by the CBA^ was, however, adhered to at the plant 
level. Conciliation level disputes are, by law, to be in it ia ted  by 
the formal CBAs. But since any aggrieved person or party can apply 
to the labour court, the legal precondition of a dispute to be 
raised by the CBA could not be stuck at the labour court level.
The term "handling" is defined to refer to a ll  aspects of dealing 
with industrial disputes covered by the study from their in it ia t io n  
to the ir  final settlement as they pass through the various stages of 
the dispute resolution process. I t  also includes the problems 
faced by the various machineries in the course of dealing with such 
disputes.
Thus the study covers a ll aspects of dealing with both the 
individual and collective disputes relating to the terms and 
conditions of work and employment of workers in certain public 
sector industries selected as samples to represent the various 
sub-sectors of the public sector productive entities.
4.2 Sampling Design
The study is based on two types of population - the f i r s t  comprises 
the people who are involved with the dispute resolution process and 
the second comprises the specific dispute cases which are analysed 
with a view to examining the nature of public sector disputes and 
the actual process of their resolution. The sampling method 
applied in the study may be termed to be a combination of "multi­
stage", "purposive" and "random" one. The actual sampling design 
may be discussed under the following four heads:
(1) Selection of industries
As already noted in the previous section, the industries to 
constitute the sample for the study - jute, e lec tr ic ity  and road and 
water transports - were chosen under the consideration of ensuring 
representation of the various sub-sectors of the public sector 
i ndustries.
(2) Selection of plants
Time and money being the limiting factors, the f i r s t  criterion for 
the selection of p lants^] was that these must be located in and 
around Dhaka, which was the base of the fieldwork. An in i t ia l  
plan was made to investigate 10 plants - 4 from jute ( i t  being the 
most strike-prone and major industry of Bangladesh) and 2 from each 
of the other three industries. On starting the fieldwork the 
author came to know that the BIWTC had only one plant near Dhaka and 
so i t  was decided to take one more plant from the BJMC, keeping the 
total number of plants fixed at 10.
(a) Selection of BJMC plants: The BJMC authority gave an up-to-date 
l i s t  of 26 public sector jute mills located around Dhaka. The 
Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. being the largest jute mill of the 
country,^] was selected purposively. The remaining 25 mills were 
stra tif ied  into three categories -  large, medium and small -  
according to the criterion of loom-size, used by the former East 
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (E P ID C ).^  The number 
of plants in the medium category were more than those in the other 
categories. Two plants from the medium category and one each from 
the large and small categories were selected at random.^83
(b) Selection of BPDB plants: There were four Dhaka based plants 
under BPDB. Their available generating capacity in 1981-82 was as 
fo l lo w s :^
Plant Capacity in MW
1 120
2 110
3 75
4 54
Total 359
Plants 2 and 3 were selected purposively on the following 
considerations:
( i )  These were nearest to the fieldwork base.
( i i )  These represented about 52% o f  the Dhaka Zone's
generating capacity and about 26% of that of the 
whole country.
( i i i )  These were neither too large nor too small.
(c) Selection of BRTC plants: Of the three plants, almost of
similar size in terms of employees, located in Dhaka, two were 
selected purposively.
(d) Selection of BIWTC plants: There was no choice in selecting
the plant under the BIWTC, because there was only one plant near 
Dhaka, which was included in the sample.
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(3) Selection of Interviewees
Interviewees were selected from a ll stages of the dispute resolution 
process - plant, c o r p o r a t i o n , ^ ^  conciliation and labour courts.
(a) Selection of plant level respondents: Both plant level
managements and workers' representatives comprised plant level 
respondents.
( i )Plant level managements: Originally i t  was planned to have
interviews with three management representatives in each plant -  the 
Plant Manager, the Manager (Administration) and the Labour Officer - 
so that the total number of respondents from management would come 
to 30. On reaching the f ie ld  i t  was found that the planned 
structure worked only in BJMC plants. In plants of the remaining 
three industries only two persons were directly involved - the plant 
manager and the labour o f f i c e r . T h e  labour officer of the 
BIWTC plant could not be contacted. Thus the actual number of 
interviews with plant management came to 24.
( i i )  Plant level CBAs: In i t ia l ly  i t  was planned to interview two
workers' representatives - the President and the General Secretary 
of the CBA - in each of the sample plants. But during the course 
of actual investigation, i t  was found that formal CBAs were present 
in only 4 plants. Due to a ban imposed by the Martial Law 
authority on holding fresh elections and other legal complications, 
formal CBAs were absent in the majority (six) of the sample plants.
The managements of these plants were, however, conducting 
negotiations on labour problems through some sort of a temporary 
committee of workers' representatives taken from each of the 
existing unions. In such plants without formal CBAs, i t  was 
decided to select one representative - either the President or the 
Secretary -from each union included in the negotiation committee.
The total number of actual interviews with workers' representatives 
thus came to 26.
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(b) Selection of corporation level respondents: Due to their  
excessive business, the Chairmen of the Corporations could not be 
interviewed. The leaders of the federations of trade unions, being 
political leaders, were a ll scattered and i t  was very d i f f ic u l t  to 
contact them within the short period of fieldwork. In order to get 
an idea of how the dispute resolution process works at the 
corporation level, the officers entrusted with the responsibility of 
the Employees and Labour Relations Departments of the corporations 
were interviewed. In a ll  8 such officers ^ 2 ]  _ 2 from each 
corporation -  were interviewed.
(c) Selecting conciliation level respondents: 15 conciliators were 
working in the Dhaka Division, including those working in the 
Headquarters of the Labour Directorate, also located in Dhaka. I t  
was intended to interview a ll  of them, but in spite of best efforts, 
two of them could not be contacted and the actual number of 
conciliation level interviews came to 13.
(d) Selection of labour court level respondents: Of the six labour
courts functioning in the country, three are located at Dhaka.
Each court has one permanent chairman and a panel of five workers' 
and five employers' representatives who attend the court in  
rotation. I t  was intended to interview a ll of the 33 court 
members^] failed with 9 of them, because some of them could 
not keep appointments and some others could not be contacted at a l l .  
Total number of interviews with the labour court members thus came 
to 24. Only one Labour Appellate Tribunal, having only one member, 
operates throughout the country. The Tribunal member was also 
interviewed.
Table 4.1 summarises the levels of interview, types of respondents 
interviewed and total number of interviews taken.
Table 4.1 
Summary of Interviews
TEVEESOF'" 
INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS
TOTAL NUMBER" | 
OF INTERVIEWS |
Plant Plant manager, Manager 
(Administration) and Labour 
Officers 24 |
Leaders of the CBAs and 
Temporary Negotiation Committees 26 |
Corporation Officers of Employee Relations, 
Labour Welfare and Personnel 
Departments 8 I
Conciliation Conciliators 13 I
Labour Court Chairmen and Members of the 
Labour Courts 24 |
Labour
Appellate
Tribunal
Member of the Tribunal 1 |
Total 96 1
(4) Selection of Dispute Cases
In addition to collecting information through direct interviews i t  
was thought to be useful to examine specific dispute cases at the 
various stages of the dispute resolution process. Direct 
negotiation, conciliation and adjudication being the three major 
levels for dispute settlement in Bangladesh, i t  was a rb itra r ily  
decided to analyse 200 cases from each of these.level s.
(a) Plant level cases: At the plant level around 20 cases from
each plant were examined; the total coming exactly to 200.
The in i t ia l  plan was to analyse the collective disputes only but i t  
was found that the number of such cases were not many. Then i t  
was decided to take a ll types of disputes - collective or group or 
individual -  passing through formal negotiation. In selecting the 
cases, the investigation started from the most recent one and then 
chronologically moved backward. All plant level disputes thus 
corresponded to 1982 and 1983.
(b) Corporation level cases: At the corporation level the 
author tried to collect as many formal collective bargaining 
agreements as possible. Copies of 16 such agreements were collected 
from the head offices of the three sample industries -  9 from the 
BPDB, 5 from the BJMC and 2 from the BRTC. The BIWTC did not enter 
into any collective bargaining agreement throughout i ts  l i f e .
(c) Conciliation level cases: At the conciliation level the
plan was to analyse 100 successful and 100 unsuccessful cases from 
the sample industries. Accordingly, the examination of such cases 
started from the most recent one and gradually moved back. Very
few of the cases corresponded to 1982-83 and 1 9 8 3 - 8 4 .£14] 
Unsuccessful cases could be collected by moving back to 1978, but 
the investigators could not get more than 90 successful cases even 
by moving back to 1976, beyond which they did not m ove.^^ Thus 
190 cases corresponding to the period 1976-82 were examined in the 
Divisional and Regional conciliation offices of the Dhaka Division.
(d) Labour Court level cases: Of the three labour courts located
at Dhaka, the third one was constituted only in 1982 and for 
industries not within the sample for this study. I t  was 
therefore, decided to concentrate on the cases of the F irs t and the 
Second Labour Courts. 108 cases from the sample industries were 
remaining pending in the two courts during the time of investigation 
and a ll of them were scrutinised. Regarding the decided cases, 
starting from the most recent one and then chronologically moving
backward, 100 cases were investigated. The decided cases 
corresponded to the second half of 1982 and the whole of 1983.
(e) Appellate tribunal leve l, cases: The investigators did not find 
any case relevant for this study in the Labour Appellate Tribunal 
during the period after 1974. A few cases relating to 1972 and
1973 were, however, available. But, on the grounds already stated,
the idea of examining cases at the Tribunal level was dropped.[17]
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The following table summarises the break-up of 614 cases analysed at 
the various stages of the dispute resolution process.
Table 4.2
Summary of Content Analysis of Dispute Cases
1
(Levels of Analysis Number of Cases Examined
1
j l .  Plant 200
|2. Corporation 16
|3. Conciliation 190
j4. Labour Court 208
| Total 614
4.3 Collection of Data
Interviews and data for the study were obtained by a Fieldwork Team 
consisting of three members - the author himself, a Lecturer of the 
University of Dhaka who helped for one day a week and a postgraduate 
student at the University who helped on a fu ll  time basis for the
four months of the fieldwork. The plant and corporation level
managements of the sample industries, the executives of the
Directorate of Labour and the Chairmen of the Labour Courts in
question actively collaborated by giving the investigation team an 
access to documents and f i le s  relating to dispute cases under th e ir  
respective jurisdiction as well as by makiang administrative 
arrangements for interview with the relevant people.
The following were the main sources of data:
(1) Direct interview with people concerned with the dispute 
resolution process;
(2) Content analysis of specific dispute cases; and
(3) Available published records.
A note on how data were collected from each of these sources now 
follows:
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( 1 )  D i r e c t  I n t e r v i e w s
As already indicated in the previous Section, direct interviews were 
conducted at the plant, corporation, conciliation, labour court and 
labour appellate tribunal levels. Under the guidance of the 
Supervisor separate interview schedules were prepared for each 
level.
(a) Plant level schedules: Two schedules were used for collecting
relevant information from the plant level - one for the plant level
management and the other for the plant level CBA leaders. With
slight variations in appropriate cases, the two schedules contained
questions almost on similar points. The points covered in the
schedules included variables like  industry, designation, age, work
experience, academic qualifications, number of unions, operation of
the participation committee and the grievance procedure, issues
frequently negotiated, methods of resolving individual and
collective issues, reasons for the last strike, current problems for
negotiation, problems which management refused to negotiate,
modifications suggested in the legal processes for dispute
settlement, causes for fa il ing  direct negotiation, necessity for
public report on conciliation proceedings, adequacy of the statutory
time limits set for each machinery, viewed effectiveness of dispute
settlement machineries, suggestions as to how the effectiveness of
these machineries could be enhanced, administrative problems of the
unions, and the extent of agreement with certain statements bearing
on the operation of the various dispute settlement machineries.
[18]
(b) Corporation level schedule: The schedule used for interviewing
the corporation level executives contained questions similar to 
those for the plant level management and certain other additional 
questions as to how the trade union federations raised industrial 
disputes, issues frequently negotiated at the corporation level, how 
the disputes were negotiated, what happened after the fa ilu re  of 
negotiations, why negotiations failed and what individual issues 
were usually referred to corporations etc. [ ^
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(c) Conciliation level schedule.; The conciliators were interviewed
through a separate schedule designed for them. This schedule
sought information on such personal aspects as designation, academic
qualifications, previous job background, total job experience and
such work related aspects as their  workload, issues frequently
conciliated in the public sector industries, rate of success in
conciliation, issues relatively harder to conciliate, usual causes
responsible for fa iling  conciliation, adequacy of their powers as
provided by law, extent of actual use of statutory powers, adequacy
of statutory period allowed for concluding conciliation, introducing
public reporting system, attempts to refer fa iling cases to
arbitration, problems faced while conducting conciliation,
suggestions as to how conciliation could be made more effective,
major administrative problems of the conciliation offices etc.
[20]
(d) Labour court level schedule: One schedule was prepared for  
interviewing the labour court members. This schedule also 
contained two sets of questions - the f i r s t  set related to the 
information on the personal background of the members e.g. the ir  
age, educational qualifications, total experience in the labour 
court, other job experiences etc. and the second to the ir  work 
related issues e.g. the parties they represented, hearing procedure 
of the court, issues frequently adjudicated in the public sector 
industries, issues relatively harder to adjudicate, adequacy of the 
legal powers of the court, process of adjudicating financial issues, 
problems faced while conducting adjudication, reasons for delay in  
decisions, measures suggested for quick disposal of cases, workload 
of the labour courts, nature of labour court functions, major 
administrative problems of the courts etc.
(e) Labour appellate tribunal level schedule: To investigate the 
process of adjudicating at the labour appellate tribunal level, the 
tribunal member was also interviewed. With slight changes, as 
appropriate, the interview schedule for labour court members was 
used for the purpose.
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( 2 )  C o n t e n t  A n a l y s i s  o f  C ases
Three separate content analysis sheets were prepared for examining 
the real l i f e  sample dispute cases at the three levels -p lant, 
conciliation and labour court.
(a) Plant level sheet: Each plant level case was analysed in a
plant level content analysis sheet. These cases were analysed as 
to their type, in it ia to r ,  reasons for dispute, outcome of direct 
negotiations, reasons for fa il ing  negotiations, time taken to 
conclude the negotiations and the use of subsequent machineries in 
cases where direct negotiations fa iled. The corporation level 
collective bargaining agreements were examined as to the process of 
negotiations between the federations of trade unions and the 
corporations, subject-matters of negotiations, and the ways of 
reaching at final settlements. ^ 2  J
(b) Conciliation level sheet: Sample cases at this level were
analysed through a separate sheet. Such cases were examined as to
the conciliation office, the industry involved, the applicant for
conciliation, reasons for dispute, reasons for fa iling direct
negotiation at the plant level, time taken to conclude direct
negotiation and conciliation proceedings, outcome of conciliation,
issues on which agreement could not be reached, reasons for fa il in g
conciliation and what happened after the fa ilure of conciliation. 
[23]
(c) Labour court level sheet: Each sample case at the labour court 
level was scrutinised through a separate analysis sheet, as to the 
name of the court, whether the case was decided or not, the industry 
involved, type of the case, in it ia to r  of the case, reasons for the 
case, enforcement sought for, outcome of the case to the in i t ia to r ,  
time taken in deciding the case or for how long a period was the 
case remaining pending, reasons for delay in giving decision on the 
case e tc .[24]
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( 3 )  P u b l is h e d  S o u rc e s
Parts of the information for the study were also available from the 
various published sources. Government publications e.g. the Five 
Year Plans, a few issues of the Monthly Statistical Bulletin, the 
Statistical Year Book, various issues of the Labour Journal, Labour 
Policies, Wage Commission Reports, Constitution of the State etc. 
provided much relevant data and information. Labour News published 
by the Bangladesh Employers' Association and Annual Reports of the 
corporations were used as sources of some information. A lo t of 
reference information was available from the works of academics in  
the f ie ld .
4.4 Data processing and Analysis
The tabulation and analysis of the f ie ld  data involving different 
kinds of respondents and categories of dispute cases, as already 
stated in the previous sections, was a gigantic task. This was 
particularly so, to admit frankly, due to the author's previous 
inexperience of working with computers. The tabulation and 
statistical operations on the data were done mainly by using a 
Glasgow University mainframe terminal. The coding of the interview 
schedules and content analysis sheets was done by the author himself 
on IBM coding sheets. The punching g irls  at the computer terminal 
helped in punching the coded information in the computer discs.
The author himself defined the necessary f i le s  and worked on them in  
consultation with the computing supervisor and others working at the 
termi nal.
The SPSS programme developed by Norman and others^-J has been 
mainly used for processing and analysing the fie ld  data. I t  is to 
be mentioned that most of the variables for this study were measured 
at nominal and ordinal levels and as such sophisticated techniques 
of analysis could not be applied in most cases. The analytical 
techniques extensively used are descriptive statistics , percentage 
frequency distributions, cross-tabulation analysis and significance 
tests, and break-down analysis. The results of these analyses are 
reported mainly in Chapters VI, VII and V I I I .
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The MINITAB programme developed by Ryan and o th e rs ^ ]  ^as a-]so been 
used for analysing the data collected from the published sources. 
Correlation, trend and regression analyses have been done on these 
data and their results are reported mainly in Chapte V.
In addition to using the above computer packages, some of the f ie ld  
data have been handled manually. The interview schedules for 
corporation management and the corporation level collective  
bargaining agreements, being small in number, have been manually 
tabulated and analysed.
4.5 Problems faced During the Fieldwork
A lo t  of problems had to be encountered in the course of the 
fieldwork, which may be brie fly  stated as follows:
(1) Some respondents among the trade union leaders at the plant 
level were i l l i t e r a te  and were not able to respond to some of the 
questions asked. The knowledge about the labour laws of some other 
respondents, though they were l i te ra te ,  was very poor.
(2) Some of the respondents on the management side were deputed 
from the military service and most of them were not very co­
operative with the investigators.They were also not well-conversant 
with labour laws and sometimes gave misleading information.
(3) While some respondents were very busy with their duties and 
could not afford much time for the interview, some others although 
apparently not busy pretended to be always pre-occupied and thereby 
indirectly refused cooperation to the investigators who had to 
hanker after them again and again. Some f e l t  disturbed when the 
investigators sought c larif ica tion  on some relevant points from 
them. A few high-ranking respondents hesitated to talk freely with 
the investigators because to do so was beneath their dignity.
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(4) A few respondents did not realise the objective and usefulness 
of the research work fu lly .  They were afraid of disclosing the ir  
weaknesses and so were reluctant to s it  for an interview and when, 
after repeated persuasion, they agreed to s it  with an investigator 
they hesitated to give the necessary information. On the other 
hand, some respondents particularly among the trade union leaders, 
were emotional. When an investigator sought their response on a 
certain issue, they started talking continuously, most of which was 
irrelevant to that investigator. Some of them preferred citing  
examples to directly making any specific response or comment on 
certain questions.
(5) Some respondents, particularly the trade union leaders, were 
seldom found available in the plant area and they had to be 
contacted with much d iff ic u lty  through the Labour Departments of the 
respective plants. The investigators also faced a lo t of trouble 
in contacting the labour court members. The employers' 
representatives could be contacted in their usual workplaces but the 
workers' representatives had to be contacted in their residences 
where, most often, they were not available even outside normal 
office hours.
(6) Regarding the case studies, i t  was found in a few cases that 
f i le s  were not properly maintained and people entrusted with keeping 
them tried to disown the loop-holes and to sh ift the blame to 
others. In some other cases, the available information was not as 
much as expected.
In addition to facing the above internal problems, the fieldwork 
team also encountered certain external problems. For example, the 
normal investigation work was disturbed, to a large extent, by the 
political demonstrations against the Martial Law regime and sudden 
declaration of Government holidays on political grounds. I t  
happened twice that the investigators were on a day v is it  to plants 
outside Dhaka city but could not come back because curfew was 
suddenly imposed for several days and a ll the normal schedules and 
appointments were upset and had to be rescheduled.
Despite a ll these limitations, however, the investigation team 
worked very hard even during odd hours, and the cooperation from the 
people concerned was in general acceptable for the purpose, and 
given the limited time available, a substantial amount of data were 
collected from a ll  levels of the dispute resolution process.
4.6 Limitations of the Study
The study suffers from the following limitations:
(1) The office bearers of the federations of trade unions who were 
involved at the corporation level collective bargaining could not be 
interviewed due to shortage of time on the one hand and the 
d iff ic u lty  of contacting them on the other. In two cases, of 
course, federation level leaders also happened to be the office  
bearers of the plant level unions interviewed by the team.
(2) The dispute cases analysed at the various stages of the dispute 
resolution process corresponded to different periods of time. This 
should not however, seriously affect the general nature of disputes 
and dispute procedures.
(3) The parties directly involved in the specific dispute cases 
could not be interviewed, particularly at the conciliation and 
labour court levels, due to resource constraints.
(4) The very nature of the fie ld  data, most of which had to be 
measured at nominal and ordinal levels, did not permit the use of 
sophisticated tools of statistical analysis.
Concluding the methodological issues at this point, i t  is approp­
riate now to turn to the next Chapter to examine the patterns 
and causes of industrial disputes in the public sector industries in  
Bangladesh and then to put forward some hypotheses about dispute 
procedures before moving to the empirical examination of the various 
dispute resolution machineries.
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NOTES
1. A somewhat similar definition of a public sector industry was
used by Sobhan, R. and Ahmad, M. Public Enterprise in an
Intermediate Regime, (Dhaka: BIDS, 1980), pp.265-67.
2. The public u t i l i t ie s  included in the Schedule to the IRO, 1969,
as amended up-to-date, have been taken to be essential services.
Such services have been specified in note 63 of Chapter I I I .
3. Clause ( x i i i )  of Section 2 of the IRO, 1969.
4. Section 34, Ibid.
5. The local units of the sample industries do not have a common 
term. These are d ie d  "mills" in ju te , "power stations" in  
e le c tr ic ity , "area office" in water transport and "depots" in  
road transport. The term "plant" w ill be used to mean the 
local units of any of the sample industries.
6. The BJMC authority reported that the Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. had
about 40% of the total looms and spindles operating in a l l  of 
the public sector jute mills located in the Dhaka Division.
7. According to EPIDC's criterion, supplied by the BJMC authority, 
mills having loom-size up to 250 were considered to be small, 
those having 251 to 500 to be medium and those having more than 
500 to be large.
8. The s tra tif ied  position of plants and the number of plant(s) 
selected from each strata is shown below:
Number of Plants 
Strata Number of Plants Selected as Samples
Large 3 1
Medi urn 14 2
Smal1 _8 2
Total 25 4
9. 1981-82 Annual Report of the BPDB.
10. From now on the term "corporation" will be used to mean the Head
Office of any sample industry, although in the case of
e le c tr ic ity , the real term for its  Head Office is "Board".
11. There were some variations, however, in the designation of
these two persons in the three industries.
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12. The designation of these officers varied in the sample 
industries. For example, in the BJMC the officer heading the 
"Employee Relations Department" is known as "Employee Relations 
Manager". In the BPDB the same department is headed by a 
Director of Labour Welfare. In the BRTC and the BIWTC similar 
departments are headed by a Director (Administrtion) and a 
Personnel Manager respectively.
13. Distribution of the total court members of the Dhaka Labour 
Courts:
Number of Number of 
Designation Members Courts Total
Chairman 1 3 3
Workers representative 5 3 15
Employers’ representative 5 3 15
Total 33
14. This might be due to the abnormal political situation prevailing 
in the courtry during the period due to the promulgation of the 
Martial Law for the second time.
15. The logic for not moving back to the period before 1976 was that 
1975 was an abnormal year due to political changeover and during 
the period 1972-74, the industrial relations scenario was quite 
unsettled.
16. The decided cases corresponded to the period in question only in 
terms of awarding decision on them. Most of them were, 
however, f i le d  much earlier.
17. See Note 14 above.
18. Appendices F .l and F. 2.
19. Appendix F.3.
20. Appendix F.4.
21. Appendix F.5.
22. Appendix F.6.
23. Appendix F.7.
24. Appendix F.8.
25. Norman, H.N. et a l . SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975).
26. Ryan, T.A. Jr. et a l . MINITAB Student Handbook, (Boston: PWS 
Publishers, 1976).
CHAPTER V
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES AND DISPUTE PROCEDURES -  
HYPOTHESES IN THE BANGLADESH PUBLIC SECTOR CONTEXT
This Chapter is concerned with two main issues, of which the second 
is the presentation of some hypotheses relating to dispute 
resolution procedures in the Bangladesh public sector context in 
order to provide a background for the three empirical Chapters 
following this. The Chapter however, starts by reviewing 
industrial conflict - its  patterns and causes -  in order to complete 
the presentation of preliminary material prior to moving onto 
dispute resolution. The Chapter is therefore structured in two 
sections.
5.1 A Review of Industrial Disputes
This section is divided into two sub-sections - the f i r s t  dealing 
with the patterns of industrial disputes and the second with the 
actual causes of conflict in the Bangladesh public sector 
industries and some possible explanations of this.
Patterns of Industrial Disputes
The industrial disputes statistics of Bangladesh, measured in terms 
of the three usual dimensions of conflict - number of disputes, 
workers involved in disputes and mandays lost in disputes -  have 
already been discussed and graphically presented in Chapter I .
Each of these dimensions, however, relates to only one aspect of a 
conflict situation and does not portray its  total picture. For 
example, the number of strikes only provides frequency of strikes 
without giving any indication as to the ir  size or duration.
Workers involved in strikes only te l ls  whether strikes are large or 
small, while mandays lost in strikes only indicates whether they are 
long or short.b Moreover, the absolute measures present the various 
dimensions of conflict only in terms of its  to ta li ty , e.g. the 
number of disputes occurred, or workers involved or mandays lost in 
a particular year or over a period of years. They do not give any 
concise idea about the average duration, time loss or size of 
disputes. For the purpose of making a comparative assessment of
the Intensity of industrial conflict between the post- and pre­
liberation periods and also over different years of the post­
liberation period, these absolute measures thus seem to be 
inadequate. By using such basic variables, however, some ratio  
measures may be developed in order to make a meaningful analyssis of 
the patterns of industrial c o n f l i c t . ^
Following the basic statistics discussed in Chapter I (data in 
Appendix A . l ) ,  Table 5.1 presents them in an abbreviated form in 
terms of certain ratios with a view to giving a snapshot picture of 
the overall trends of industrial conflict before and a fte r  
liberation.
Table 5.1
Summary Measures of Industrial Conflict in Bangladesh
Period
| Ratio Measures Indices
IDuration 
| of 
JDi sputes
Dispute
Coverage
Ratio
Time
Loss
Ratio
Duration
of
Disputes
jDispute 
| Coverage 
I Ratio
Time | 
Loss j 
Ratiol
JPre-1iberation
1
1
| (1947-71) | 4.68 1207 6559 162 | 108 203 I
| (1947-71)* | 3.90I 1163 4653 136 I 104 144 1
|Base Year (1972) | 2.89 1118 3231 100 | 100 100 |
j Post-1iberation
I
1
| (1973-82) | 6.10 2873 14668 211 | 257 454 |
| (1973-82)** | 6.10 
1
1632 7302 211 | 146 226 j
Motes: *  Excluding 1964 * *  Excluding 1975
The description of the ratios used is as follows:
(a) Duration of Disputes (DP): This is the average number of
mandays lost per worker involved in industrial disputes and is  
calculated by dividing the number of mandays lost (L) by the
number of workers involved in industrial disputes (W).
(b) Dispute Coverage Ratio (DCR): This is defined as the average
number of workers involved in industrial disputes per
industrial dispute and is computed by dividing the number of 
workers involved in disputes (W) by the number of disputes (D).
(c) Time Loss Ratio (TLR): This is the average number of mandays
lost per industrial dispute and is calculated by dividing the 
number of mandays lost (L) by the number of disputes (D).
For an easier comprehension of the comparative trends of industrial 
disputes before and after liberation, the ratio measures, as 
computed in the above ways, should be examined in relation to a base 
year. Accordingly, taking 1972, the f i r s t  year after liberation, 
as the base year, indices of these criterion measures are 
calculated. As w ill be indicated in a subsequent paragraph, 1964 
of the pre-1iberation period and 1975 of the post-liberation period 
are two abnormal years, and therefore, the average ratios and 
indices of the two periods are also calculated with the isolation of 
these two abnormal years.
I t  is evident from the average indices of conflict (Table 5.1) that 
the post-liberation period is more intense in industrial conflict  
than the pre-liberation period by a ll of the three criterion  
measures. Compared to the base year, the average duration of 
disputes per worker is found to be higher by 62% in the pre­
liberation period, and by 111% higher in the post-liberation period. 
In the case of DCR, the average pre-liberation index was slightly  
(by 4%) higher than that of the base year, but the post-liberation  
average is higher by 157% (with the exclusion of the abnormal year 
1975, however, i t  is higher by only 46%). The average TLR indices 
are higher than that of the base year in both the pre- and post­
liberation periods, but the post-liberation index is re lative ly  far  
higher than that of the pre-liberation period. This finding is not 
affected so much even i f  the abnormal years, 1964 and 1975, are 
excluded from analysis.
Turning to the examination of the pattern of variations in 
industrial conflict over individual years of the two periods, the 
three criterion measures have been computed on a year-by-year basis 
for the whole period 1947-82 and presented in Appendix A.2. As 
done in examining the average indices of conflict, so also for year 
to year variations, indices of these measures have also been 
computed, taking 1972 as the base, and presented in Appendix A.3.
I t  is obvious from these two Appendices that 1964 in the pre­
liberation period and 1975 in the post-liberation period are two 
abnormal years, showing unusually high OCR and TLR ratios and 
indices. In terms of number of disputes also, these two years seem 
to be very abnormal. The highest number of disputes occurred in 
1964 and the lowest in 1975. The important factor explaining this 
abnormality is most likely to be political -  slackness of Government 
in 1964 and s tr ic t  emergency and martial law in 1975. High OCR and 
TLR indices computed from the highest number of disputes in 1964 is 
easily understandable. But such high ratios from the lowest number 
of strikes in 1975 needs an explanation. In violation of a s tr ic t  
ban on strikes in 1975, two long (measured by mandays lost) and big 
(measured by workers involved) strikes s t i l l  occurred in the jute  
industry. The unusually high figures for workers involved and 
mandays lost, when presented in relation to too low a number of 
strikes, produce abnormal DCR and TLR indices.
From a closer look over the indices of the ratio measures (Appendix 
A.3), gradual increasing trends are evident in terms of a ll  the 
ratio measures in question except DCR, with respect to which neither 
any upward nor downward trend is easily discernible.
The above is a comparative account of the trend of industrial 
disputes in Bangladesh before and after liberation. I t  has already 
been stated in Chapter I that these two periods are characterised by 
two different systems of industrial ownership - the pre-1 iberation 
period by privatisation and the post-liberation period by massive 
nationalisation and a maligned private sector. The published data 
on the basis of which the above trend analysis has been done relate  
to both the public and private sector industries, although 
industrial private sector is very insignificant in the la t te r  
period. The sector-wise published data not being available, by 
assuming an insignificant influence of the private sector ^  on the 
aggregate data on industrial disputes, i t  may be concluded with 
l i t t l e  reservation that the industrial disputes, in the public 
sector industries in Bangladesh show an increasing trend in 
general.
Although separate data on public sector industrial disputes are not 
available, such data on certain selected industries exclusively 
under public sector can, however, be extracted from aggregate data 
and these may be analysed as a sample. From the industrial 
classification of the aggregate data, seven industries could be 
identified to be exclusively under the public sector. These are: 
(a) ju te , (b) cotton, (c) chemical, (d) sugar, (e) e le c tr ic ity ,
( f )  o i l ,  gas and petroleum and (g) banks and insurance. These seven 
industries may be taken to be reasonably representative of the 
industries under the whole public sector.E3] Data on the three 
basic dimensions of industrial disputes - number of disputes, 
workers involved and man days lost - relating to these sample 
industries are shown in Table 5.2 (columns 2-4). Basing on the 
data on basic variables, three criterion measures - DD, DCR and TLR 
have also been computed and presented in columns 5-7 of Table 5.2.
Table 5.2
Data on Industrial Disputes in Selected Public Sector Industries
in Bangladesh, 1973-82
BASIC VARIABLES
Workers Man-days Duration Dispute Time
Number of involved lost in of Coverage Loss
Disputes in Disputes Disputes Disputes Ratio Ratio
Year (D) (W) (L) (DD) (DCR) (TLR)
(1) (2) ( 37 (4) - 'V T j (6) (7)
1973 16 31886 258404 8.10 1993 16150
1974 13 50682 187047 3.69 3899 14388
1975 2 28327 162000 5.72 14163 81000
1976 2 13457 19721 1.47 6728 9860
1977 19 74712 79170 1.06 3932 4167
1978 83 108195 633243 5.85 1303 7629
1979 68 107974 586852 5.44 1588 8630
1980 99 152747 1053116 6.89 1543 10637
1981 39 114167 1146608 10.04 2927 29400
1982 3 19819 216773 10.94 6606 72258
TOTA 344 701966 4342934
CRITERION" MEASURE'S'
Source: Data on the basic variables have been obtained from the 
various issues of the Bangladesh Labour Journal published 
by the Department of Labour, Government of Bangladesh, 
and those on criterion measures have been computed by 
using the formula stated in the text.
For a quicker and clearer grasp, a ll data in Table 5.2 have been 
expressed as indices, taking 1973 as the base y e a r , ^  and shown in 
Table 5.3. The indices of the basic variables have, in turn, been 
depicted in the form of graphs in Figure 5.1, from which the trend 
of such indices can be clearly visualised. Least square linear  
trend lines have also been f i t te d  through these graphs. With the 
exception of 1975-76 and 1982, the original graphs show almost a 
similar pattern, while the trend lines directly show a general 
increasing trend in the intensity of industrial conflict.
Table 5.3
Indices of Industrial Conflict on Various Measures in 
Selected Public Sector Industries in Bangladesh, 1973-82
(1973 = 100)
BASIC VARIABLES CRITERION MEASURES 1
1 Workers Man-days Duration Dispute T i me |
Number of involved lost in of Coverage Loss |
Disputes |in Disputes Di sputes Di sputes Ratio Ratio)
| Year (D) I (W) (L) (DD) (DCR) (TLR)|
1(1) ' (2) ' ' 1 (3) (4 J (S) (6) T T T l
11973
1
100 1 100 100 100 100 100 I
11974 81 I 159 72 46 196 89 |
11975 12 I 89 63 71 710 501 |
11976 12 1 42 8 18 338 61 1
11977 118 I 234 31 13 197 26 |
11978 519 | 339 245 72 65 47 |
11979 425 | 339 227 67 80 53 |
11980 619 | 479 407 85 77 66 |
11981 244 I 358 444 124 147 182 1
11982 19 | 62 84 135 - 331 447 |
Source: Computed from data in Table 5.2.
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FIG. 5 .1 -  INDICES OF THE NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL 
DISPUTES (D ) ,  WORKERS INVOLVED IN 
DISPUTES (W) AND MANDAYS LOST IN 
DISPUTES (L ) IN SELECTED PUBLIC 
SECTOR INDUSTRIES IN BANGLADESH, 
1973-82.
The graphical representation of the indices of criterion measures, 
shown in Figure 5.2, indicates that the average duration of disputes 
per worker (DD) shows a decreasing trend up to 1977 and an 
increasing trend from 1978 onwards. The graphs for the dispute 
coverage ratio (DCR) and time loss ratio (TLR) present almost a 
similar pattern - indicating an increasing trend during 1974-75, 
then a decreasing trend during 1976-77 and then again an increacing 
trend from 1978 onwards. The linear trend lines f it te d  in these 
graphs indicate an increasing trend in terms of all of the measures 
except for the dispute coverage ratio . Thus, with a very l i t t l e  
reservation, an increasing intensity of industrial disputes 
involving stoppage of work is discernible, by a ll measures, in the 
public sector industries in Bangladesh.
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FIG. 5 .2  INDICES OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT ON 
VARIOUS MEASURES IN SELECTED PUBLIC 
SECTOR INDUSTRIES IN BANGLADESH, 
1973-82.
B u t  a l l  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  d i s p u t e s  do n o t  i n v o l v e  s to p p a g e  o f  w o r k .
For a complete understanding of the intensity of disputes, trend of 
non-strike disputes also needs an examination. Published records 
on disputes raised and settled at the plant level are not available. 
But the industry-wide disputes, without any categorisation as to 
public and private sectors, settled amicably at the conciliation  
level are, however, available. From these combined dispute data, 
those relating to four selected industries, exclusively under public 
sector, can be segregated and studied as samples. Table 5.4 
presents a year-wise distribution of these disputes in the four 
selected industries.
Table 5-4
Number of Industrial Disputes not Involving Stoppage of Work 
in Selected Public Sector Industries in Bangladesh, 1973-82
J \  Industry ! 
| Year J
Cotton 1 Jute J Chemical
! 1 
1 1 
{ E le c t r ic i t y !
1 1
To ta l J
| 1973 | 11 1 61 I 14
1 1
86 1
j 1974 I 6 1 6 i 12 j -  j 24 J
I 1975 I 5 1 1 I 2 I - j 8 !
I 1976 I 23 J 49 I 6 j - [ 78 J
I 1977 I 20 I 29 I 9 1 - 1 58 J
I 1978 1 14 J 26 I 6 1 - 1 46 |
I 1979 1 31 J 33 1 10 1 - j 74 J
I 1980 I 69 I 13 1 19 1 1 I 102 J
I 1981 | 63 J 32 1 31 1 1 ! 127 1
1 1982 1 22 1 8 1 34 1 4 ! 68 J
1 Total ^ 264 I 258 1 143 1 6 1 
1 1
671 1
Source: Extracted from the aggregate data on in d u s tr ia l  d isputes
ava ilab le  in the various issues o f  the Bangladesh Labour 
Journal published by the Department o f Labour, Government 
o f Bangladesh.
The graphic representation o f such disputes (Figure 5.3) a lso  
ind ica tes an overa ll increasing trend.
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flG.S.3 NUMBER Of- NON-STRIKE I  NOUS TRIAL OISPUTES IN SELECTED PU8LIC SECTOR 
INOUSmiES IN OANGLAOESH, 1973-82.
Causes of Industrial Disputes
Causes of strike data specifically relating to the public sector 
industries are not readily available. Table 5.5 (overleaf) 
presents cause-wise aggregate strike disputes, both public and 
private sectors combined, which have occurred in Bangladesh during 
the period 1973-82.
From the industrial classification of these disputes, seven 
industries could be identified to be exclusively under the public 
sector, to be studied as samples. The position of these sample 
industries in relation to total strike data over a 10-year period is 
clearly visible from the following summary Table (Table 5 .6 ).
Table 5.6
Relative Position of the Selected Public Sector Industries 
in Relation to Total Stirke Data in Bangladesh, 1973-82
Number of 
Disputes
Workers
Involved
Mandays J 
Lost |
Number| % Number | % Number j % J
1(a) * All industries, 
public and 
private
1
1
1
543 |
i
100.0
1
1
1
742,2411100.0i
1 1 
1 1
4 ,6 9 3 ,7 0 1 |1 0 0 .0  |
i i
|(b) ** Sample public
sector
industries
1
1
1
344 | 63.4
1
1
701,9661 94.6I
1 I
1 1 
4 ,342,9341  92.5  |I |
| (c=a-b) Other public .and 
private sector 
industries
I
1
I
199 | 
1
36.6
1
1
1
40,275|  5 .4
I 1 
1 1 
1 1 
350 ,767 |  7 .5  |
! 1
* Taken from Table 5.5 ** Taken from Table 5 .2
I t  is clear from the above Table that the sample industries 
exclusively under the public sector represent 63% of the total 
number of strikes, 95% o f  the workers involved and 92% of the man 
days lost in industrial disputes. The remaining 37% of the strikes 
involving only 5% o f  the workers involved and about 8% o f  the total 
man-days lost relate to both the public and private sectors. The 
relative insignificance of the influence of private sector strikes 
on the total strike data is evident. Thus cause-wise aggregate 
strike data presented in Table 5.5 may quite reasonably be taken to 
be representative of the public sector industries.
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The following Table (Table 5 .7 ), based on the data in Table 5.5, 
summarises the various issues for industrial disputes in Bangladesh,
which relate mainly to the public sector industries.
Table 5.7
Summary of the Total Strike Data by Causes
in Bangladesh during 1973^52
| Causes
Number of 
Disputes
Workers
Involved
Man-days I 
Lost |
j 1. Wages 57.8 64.9 62.2 |
| 2. Bonuses 5.5 2.9 1.1 1
| 3. Various allowances 0.7 4.7 9.7 |
| 4. National pay scales and 
j grades 15.6 9.9 14.1 I
| 5. Leaves and holidays 8.6 3.2 4.8 |
| 6. Personnel matters 3.1 3.4 2.2 1
| 7. Miscellaneous issues 8.5 10.9 5.7 |
| Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 |
Source: Table 5.5
Financial matters seem to be the major issues for industrial 
disputes in Bangladesh public sector industries. Such issues 
involved 64% of all the strikes that occurred during 1973-82 decade, 
and 73% of the workers involved and man days lost in those strikes. 
This seems to be in conformity with a very low level of real wages 
of Bangladeshi industrial w o r k e r s . T h e  inflation rate in 
Bangladesh is one of the highest in the world^] anc| this demands 
frequent revision of scales of pay and wages. During the decade in 
question, wage scales of industrial workers have been revised twice, 
and with each revision they have alleged anomalies and inadequacies 
of that revision. About 16% of the total number of strikes, 
involving about 10% of the total number of workers involved and 14% 
of the man-days lost related to national grades and scales of pay. 
Non-financial matters like leaves, holidays and personnel matters 
(e.g. discharges, dismissals, promotions, transfers etc .) were 
involved in about 12% of the total number of strikes, involving 
about 7% of the workers involved and man-days lost. The rest of the 
strikes happened on miscellaneous grounds.
Possible explanation of strike causation: After making the above
review of the actual causes of strikes in the Bangladesh public 
sector industries, the study has made a modest experiment with some 
econometric analyses of strike causation. In this attempt, the 
three absolute measures of industrial disputes pertaining to the 
selected number of public sector industries (Table 5.2) were taken 
as dependent variables. Turning to the independent variables, as 
suggested by the existing lite ra tu re , many economic, social and 
political factors are like ly  to operate in explaining the incidence 
of conflic t, but in the Bangladesh case, data on many of such 
variables are not available, and as such only two explanatory 
variables - union membership strength and real wages (data in 
Appendix A.4) -  were examined in this context. However, i t  is 
s t i l l  to be noted that due to inevitable political infancy of 
Bangladesh, the number of observations available were very few and 
this basic limitation of the data prevents any clear conclusions 
being drawn from this analysis.
I t  has been found that none of the explanatory variables were 
correlated with any of the dependent variables at 1% level of 
significance. A positive correlation, significant at 5% level, was 
however found between the union membership strength and each of the 
three measures of disputes. The coefficients of determination 
(R^), found through regression analysis, revealed that the 
membership strength explained 30.6% (21.9%, adjusted for degrees of 
freedom) of the number of disputes, 39.7% (32.2%, adjusted for 
degrees of freedom) of the workers involved and 49% (42.6%, adjusted 
for degrees of freedom) of the man-days lost in such disputes.
The other explanatory variable, real wages, was found to be 
correlated at 5% level of significance only with the man-days lost,  
but not with the other two dependent variables. The power of real 
wages to explain man-days lost in disputes, as determined through 
the R ,^ was found to be 41.4% (34.1%, adjusted for degrees of 
freedom). One significant aspect to be noted about the 
relationship between real wages and man-days lost was that, contrary 
to the nature of relationship as expected, the actual relationship 
between them was found to be positive, instead of negative.
How can this positive relation between the variables in question be 
explained? Two possible arguments may be put forward in this 
context. F irs t ly , as can be seen from Appendix A.4, real wages of 
the workers were under the 1973 level up to 1977, but disputes could 
not increase during the period probably due to the suppression of 
unions and union activ ities  under the state of National Emergency in 
the f i r s t  instance and s tr ic t  Martial Law administration in the 
second. From 1978 onwards, real wages began to rise slowly; but 
industrial disputes also began to rise concomitantly due probably to 
political slackness and increasing unionisation. Secondly, 
although real wages show a slow and steady increasing trend after  
1977, these increases were too meagre compared to the workers' needs 
and expectations. Workers got the highest real wages in 1982, and 
its  index was only 81.6, compared to 100 of 1969. Even though 
workers were not satisfied with the wage level of 1969,^  they 
s t i l l  compared their wages with that level. Thus the meagre 
increases in real wages could not divert the increasing trend of 
industrial disputes, measured in terms of man-days lost.
Thus keeping provisions for the basic weakness of the underlying 
data, the indications were that real wages and union membership were 
the two key independent variables influencing the incidence of 
industrial conflict in the Bangladesh public sector industries.
5.2 Hypotheses Relating to Effectiveness of 
Dispute Resolution Procedures
Now that the various background factors, the litera ture  on 
industrial conflict, conflict resolution, the legal framework 
governing the industrial relations system in Bangladesh, the 
particular patterns and causes of conflict in the Bangladesh public 
sector have been examined, i t  is an appropriate stage to put forward 
some hypotheses about the operations and effectiveness of dispute 
resolution procedures before turning to the empirical examination of 
the various dispute resolution machineries. But the statement of 
hypotheses relating to the effectiveness of dispute procedures, 
raises, of course, the question of what is meant by effectiveness".
138
For the purpose of this study, and drawing in part on Thomson and 
M u rra y ,^  the dispute procedures will be considered effective i f :
(a) each step of the dispute resolution procedures is meaningful 
in the sense that those concerned in the various stages of the 
dispute resolution process have the appropriate authority to 
deal with the disputes raised before them;
(b) each level of the dispute resolution process is able to dispose 
expeditiously of those disputes referred to i t  which are 
appropriate for the authority of the parties at that level;
(c) the dispute procedures are acceptable to and respected by the 
parties involved;
(d) the procedures are not too rigid and formal to reject the scope 
for some degree of informality in their operation;
(e) the procedures are not too complex to prevent an easy
understanding by those concerned; and
( f )  the procedures aim at striking at a reasonable balance of 
interests of all concerned.
Having defined the effectiveness of dispute procedures as above, 
some hypothesis about i t  may now be stated as follows:
1. Free Negotiation
Effective dispute resolution pre-supposes a free interplay between 
the parties in disputes provided they can meet and negotiate with 
each other on an equal balance of power, both economic and social. 
But due to a lack of these conditions in Bangladesh, as in many 
other developing countries, the dispute resolution machineries have
been made highly restricted and leg a lis tic , particularly for the
pulic sector. Whereas under the objective conditions prevailing in 
Bangladesh, some degree of legalism may be desirable at the social 
interest, under a too much restric tive  and highly legalis tic
approach to dispute resolution, however, the parties, particularly  
the workers, may fa i l  to develop self-confidence and feel tempted to 
prefer legal machineries to voluntary methods of resolution, 
provided the parties accept this legalis tic  approach and find  
benefits in going for i t .  I f  however, either or both of the 
parties cannot or fa i l  to see merits of resolution by legal methods, 
they may be inclined to ignore or even violate such restric tive  
laws. The voluntary methods of resolving conflicts are generally 
regarded as the most desirable methods from the viewpoint of a 
long-term cooperative relationship between the parties concerned. 
Analogically, i t  is perhaps rightly said that no law of marriage can 
make the marriage stable and happy unless the partners in marriage 
work out a satisfactory relationship pattern by themselves. 
Similarly, in the context of industrial relations, the law has only 
a limited role to play in making the day-to-day relationship 
cooperative and smooth. As indicated in Chapter I I I ,  the basic 
financial terms and conditions of service of workers in the public 
sector industries are fixed by the Government, and the parties and 
the various appointed agencies for dispute resolution are not 
allowed to bring any basic change in them over and above what the 
Government has fixed. Under this situation, i t  may be hypothesised 
that such restrictions on the scope of collective bargaining and 
other institutional machineries of dispute settlement are l ike ly  to 
reduce the effectiveness of dispute resolution.
2. Attitude of the Parties
Based on the sociological studies on the factory workers in 
Bangladesh, referred to in Chapters I and I I ,  i t  may be reasonably 
assumed that most of the workers in the public sector industries are 
rural in their background having either no work experience or only 
agricultural experience. Given l i t t l e  industrial experience of the 
workers due to the nascent stage of Bangladesh's industrialisation  
and accordingly of the relevance of modernisation approach to 
industrial conflict, most workers in the public sector industries 
may be assumed to be largely uncommitted or semi-committed to 
industrial work. As a corollary to this assumption, i t  is very 
l ike ly  that with their relative immaturity of industrial way of l i f e
most of the workers and trade unions in such industries are like ly  
to behave unreasonably and irra tiona lly  in their dealings with 
management. The use of various coercive practices e.g. the use 
of threat, physical assault, practices of gherao etc. are lik e ly  to 
dominate over the democratic and constitutional practices. The 
existing litera ture  also suggests that, as is true for workers, so 
also1 the managements of such industries, mostly drawn from c iv i l  
services, lack experience in industrial management and they 
frequently use authoritarian and unilateral managerial practices 
which are not conducive to healthy industrial relations. Thus i t  
may be hypothesised that both sides are like ly  to have a negative 
attitude towards each other and as such be willing neither to 
resolve disputes between them through direct negotiation nor to 
extend necessary cooperation to the various external machineries in 
the ir  pursuit to resolve such disputes.
3. Parties' Understanding of the Procedures
Due to the prevalence of widespread i l l i te ra c y  or a low level of 
literacy of the workers and plant level union leaders, most of them 
are also like ly  not to have a clear understanding of the dispute 
resolution procedures. The excessively legalistic  procedures and 
ambiguous scope of the related laws are also likely  to add to such 
misunderstandings. Under such conditions, the workers and trade 
unions may frequently raise their dispute at inappropriate levels, 
and sometimes over inappropriate issues. All these factors are 
l ike ly  to lessen the effectiveness of dispute resolution.
4. M u ltip lic ity  of Unions and Union Rivalries
Turning to the approach of workers' organisational and po lit ica l  
strength, the available litera ture  suggests that the trade unions in 
Bangladesh are far from being strong and cohesive. The 
m ultip lic ity  of unions at both plant and corporation levels is a 
very common feature in the industrial relations scene in Bangladesh. 
The rank and f i l e  workers do not directly take part in the decision 
making process of their unions. Leadership in most unions is 
unbreakable. When there is dissatisfaction with the leadership of
a union, the remedy normally taken is not for the dissatisfied group 
to form a faction aiming at taking over the leadership of the union 
in question but for the dissatisfied people to form a new union 
under a new leadership which will similarly maintain i ts e l f  in power 
within its  union for as long as i t  likes. Inter-union riva lries  
are very acute. Under such a divided and weak position of the 
trade unions, managements are like ly  not to bother about them and 
even in cases where managements may be willing to negotiate, 
d iff ic u lty  might arise over the determination of the bargaining 
agents from among the rival unions. Thus i t  may be hypothesised 
that the more the number of unions at the plant level and 
federations of unions at the corporation level with consequent 
riva lries  between them, the less effectively the dispute resolution 
procedures are like ly  to operate.
5. Centralisation of Authority
The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which governs the dispute 
resolution procedures in Bangladesh for both public and private 
sectors does not, however, consider the peculiarity of authority 
structures of public sector industries, as distinguished from those 
of the private sector. Published sources suggest that the public 
sector industries in Bangladesh are managed through a bureaucratic 
chain of authority consisting of three tiers - the Ministry 
concerned at the top holding a ll policy making powers, the 
corporation at the middle having almost a ll administrative and 
controlling powers over a ll plants under the respective corporations 
and the individual plants under each corporation having very l i t t l e  
operational freedom. As could be gathered, these bureaucratic 
controls, however, do not equally apply to a ll public sector 
industries. For example, among the sample industries of this 
study, Government controls are reported to be highest in the 
e lectr ic ity  and relatively less in the jute with the road and water 
transports fa ll ing  in between. For effective settlement of 
disputes arising at a particular level of administration, i t  must 
have adequate authority to negotiate and settle such disputes. I t  
does not make any sense to raise a dispute before the management at  
a particular level which does not have the required authority to
deal with i t  and then to blame that management for not resolving the 
dispute. One hypothesis is thus developed like this: the more the
authority to deal with possible disputes is decentralised from the 
Ministry to the corporation, and from the corporation to the plant 
management, the more is the likelihood of effective dispute 
resolution.
6. Financial Position
I t  has been pointed out in the litera ture  review in Chapter I I  that 
as in other developing countries, so also in Bangladesh, the 
industrial workers are concerned more with wages and other economic 
benefits than with other issues. That the major issues for 
industrial disputes in the Bangladesh public sector industries are 
essentially economic is also evident from the examination of the 
causes of disputes made in the f i r s t  section of the Chapter. For 
effective resolution, the plants/corporations in question must have 
required solvency to meet such demands over economic issues, and 
accordingly, i t  is hypothesised that given adequate authority, the 
better the financial position of the plants/corporations, the more 
effective the resolution of disputes is like ly  to be.
7. Political Factors
Based on Islam's observation referred to in Chapter I ,  i t  may be 
assumed that most labour problems in Bangladesh emanate from 
politica l considerations. The leaders of many unions are often 
politicians and when the trade union movement divides into factions, 
such divisions are based on politica l differences. With a view to 
making an inroad into the labour front the frequently changing new 
e lites  in power may give undue privileges to favoured unions who 
could maintain direct personal communication with the Ministers and 
even with the Head of the Government. The opposition union leaders 
may also secure mass support of the workers on the face of th e ir  
serious economic frustrations. Moreover, the Government also 
restricts the independent operation of the various institutional 
machineries of dispute resolution directly through the imposition of 
legal restrictions, and indirectly through exerting pressure in one
way or the other. Inferring from these arguments, i t  is 
hypothesised that the more independent are those involved in the 
dispute resolution process of the Governmental and other po litica l  
factors, the more effectively the dispute resolution procedures are 
l ike ly  to work.
8. Other Factors
In addition to the above hypotheses generally relating to a ll  
institutional machineries of dispute resolution, some of the 
hypotheses pertaining specifically to the external methods ( i .e .  
conciliation and labour courts) may be put forward as follows:
a. Subjective conditions: The effectiveness of dispute resolution
through external machineries is like ly  to be affected by the 
subjective conditions of those entrusted with such machineries.
The more appropriate they are (considered from the viewpoint of 
their age, academic qualifications, experience etc.) for their jobs, 
the more is the likelihood for their effective performance, 
resulting in effective dispute resolution.
b. Service conditions: To ensure effective performance in any job, 
service conditions of the people working on i t  must be motivating. 
The more attractive the service conditions in the dispute resolution 
machineries are, the more those engaged in such machineries are 
l ike ly  to feel motivated in their  work, and consequently, the more 
effective the dispute resolution like ly  to be.
c. Workload: I t  is generally believed that the external 
machineries of dispute resolution are highly overloaded. Based on 
this general b e lie f ,  i t  is hypothesised that the excessive workload 
of these machineries is one factor reducing their operational 
effectiveness.
d. Working conditions: Basing on the wide acceptance of a positive 
influence of good working conditions on the performance 
effectiveness, i t  is hypothesised that the more adequate the office  
supplies and the physical conditions of offices of the dispute
resolution machineries are, the more i t  is like ly  for the desired 
performance of these machineries, resulting in effective resolution 
of disputes.
e. Centralised structure of conciliation: I t  is generally 
recognised that the independence of conciliators is a precondition 
for effective conciliation. But in the context of Bangladesh, i t  
could be gathered that the structure of the conciliation service is 
very much centralised leaving very l i t t l e  freedom of action at the 
regional and branch levels. Thus i t  is hypothesised that, apart 
from other factors, the centralised structure of the conciliation  
service i ts e l f  is like ly  to affect the effectiveness of conciliation  
at the lower levels.
f .  Adherence to procedural summarisation by labour courts: I t  is 
generally alleged that the labour courts in Bangladesh make 
excessive delays in disposing of the cases f iled  in such courts; 
thus indirectly denying justice to the parties concerned. As to 
the likely causes of such delays, i t  is hypothesised that the non­
adherence by the courts to statutory provisions relating to 
procedural summarisation may largely account for this.
To what extent there is evidence in support of the above hypotheses 
w ill be revealed in the course of empirical examination of the 
various dispute resolution machineries in the next three Chapters.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MACHINERIES -  
DIRECT NEGOTIATION
The present and the following two Chapters are based mainly on the 
fieldwork data. These chapters attempt to examine the working 
process and effectiveness of operations of the various institutional 
machineries available for the settlement of industrial disputes, 
particularly of the public sector industries in Bangladesh. In the 
course of these examinations attempts are made (a) to identify  
certain constraining factors standing in the way of effective  
operations of the dispute settlement machineries and (b) to point 
out certain inadequacies of the existing legal framework of dispute 
settlement, as described in Chapter I I I .  In the light of such 
analyses, some possible measures for enhancing the functional 
effectiveness of the various dispute settlement machineries are also 
suggested.
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The three Chapters are arranged according to the three broad levels 
now working in the dispute settlement process of the country - 
namely direct negotiation (b ipartite negotiation), conciliation  
( t r ip a r t ite  negotiation) and adjudication (arbitration, labour 
courts and labour appellate tribunal). The present Chapter deals 
with direct negotiation between the plant level managements^ and 
the plant level collective bargaining agents (CBAs)t2] or 
worker(s). Negotiations over disputes at the Head Office or 
Corporation^] -iGVei between the corporation managements and the 
federations of trade unions of workers are also covered in this 
Chapter. The operation of the conciliation machinery w ill be taken 
up in Chapter V II .  Chapter V I I I  w ill examine the ajudication 
process in three sections, each consecutively dealing with 
arbitration, labour courts and the labour appellate tribunal.
6.1 Introduction
For the purpose of this study, as stated in Chapter IV, industrial 
dispute is defined in a wider sense than in the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance (IRO), 1969 as adopted in Bangladesh. The s p ir i t  of the 
IRO, 1969 is to settle collective interest disputes through formal
collective bargaining between the management and the CBA, and in 
cases where direct negotiations f a i l ,  through subsequent 
institutional methods like conciliation, labour courts etc. In the 
real l i f e  labour management relations, however, in addition to such 
interest disputes, many other disputes, usually of an individual 
nature and not taken up by the CBA, also arise over the 
administration of many other labour law s.^ ] To get a picture of 
the dispute settlement system, in its  to ta l i ty ,  disputes of both 
individual and collective nature have been investigated in this 
study.
Although the IRO, 1969, provides for only formal collective  
bargaining for the resolution of plant level disputes, the 
investigation for the present study in the sample plants found four 
distinct methods used for the purpose:
(a) Informal discussion;
(b) Grievance procedure;
(c) Participation Committee; and
(d) Formal collective bargaining.
Each of these is now examined in turn. Of all the methods, however, 
the study emphasises mainly on the last one, i .e .  the formal 
collective bargaining.
6.2 Informal Discussion
Extent of Use
The informal discussion is the most frequently used method at the 
plant level for resolving disputes of individual nature. In view of 
more than 80% of the management people and more than 60% of the CBA 
leaders, this method was either always or frequently used in 
redressing individual workers' grievances and complaints.^] On 
the other hand, for the resolution of collective disputes, the use 
of this method was not so frequent. Collective disputes were 
usually of a more or less serious nature and mere informal 
discussion on such issues usually could not bring any effective  
result. S t i l l ,  as a f i r s t  attempt at least informal discussion was 
sometimes held on collective issues also, as reported by 30% of the
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plant management and 33% of the CBA leaders. About 48% of the 
management and 58% of the CBA leaders, however, reported that 
informal discussion was not an effective method for the settlement 
of collective disputes and as such this method was rarely or never 
used in practice.£6]
How does i t  work?
No prescribed rules or procedures were followed for the informal 
discussion. The persons to be involved in the informal discussion 
depended on the type of the dispute - i .e .  whether i t  was an 
individual or a collective dispute. I f  i t  was an individual one, 
the next factor determining the nature of informal discussion was 
with whom the particular individual in question was in conflic t. He 
might be in conflict with one of his co-workers or his immediate 
boss or any other superior bosses. In the case of a conflict with a 
co-worker, he usually took any of the following alternative  
approaches:
(a) He approached any other co-worker whom he thought capable of 
solving his problem.
(b) He approached any office bearer of his trade union to mediate 
in the problem.
(c) He approached his immediate boss to intervene in the problem.
(d) He approached the labour officer of his plant either directly  
or through any of the above channels.
In the case of a conflict with his immediate boss, he usually 
approached his next immediate boss, or a lternative ly, a trade union 
leader. In some cases he also approached the Labour Officer, or 
Personnel Officer or Administrative Officer, as the case might b e , ^  
either directly or through a union representative. In a conflic t  
with any other superior, he usually took the help of a trade union 
leader, or alternatively, of the Labour Officer. The head of the 
plant was also approached in important cases. The informal
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discussion on collective disputes usually occurred between the 
President or the Secretary of the CBA and the head of the plant 
concerned. In some cases, other trade union leaders, or some
influential workers, or other officers or local po litica l leaders 
were also involved depending on the situation of the case.  ^ 3
In most developing countries, some family, kin, community or regional 
factors are generally involved in both formal and informal dispute 
procedures. But in the context of Bangladesh such community factors 
as race, religion and language seem to be rather less important 
insofar as the labour-management relationship is concerned. Almost 
all of both workers and management belong to the same nationality  
(Bangladeshi) and same religion (Muslim), and speak the same language 
(Bengali). Some family, kin or local factors, do play a significant 
role in the operation of the dispute procedures in the private sector 
industries. The typical organisational structure of a Bangladeshi 
private enterprise is highly centralised and personal. Key 
managerial positions in such an enterprise are generally f i l le d ,  for 
the most part, from members of the family and the particular business 
community. Similarly, the workers are also recruited from known 
sources usually hailing from particular lo calit ies . Thus in the 
operation of the dispute procedures in the private enterprises, 
family, kin and regional factors have to be inevitably kept under 
consideration. But the influence of such factors is very rare in 
the public sector industries where the major considerations might be 
largely political and perhaps to some extent regional. One study 
has demonstrated that a large number of workers in the jute industry 
have been given employment merely on politica l grounds. The main 
job of the workers thus employed is not only to work for the 
employing plants but also to act as agents of the ruling party.^93 
Regarding the regional factor, about 75% of a ll workers come from 
only four d istricts - Noakhali, Comilla, Dhaka and Chittagong.
But unfortunately no attempt has yet been made to link the regional 
composition of the workforce in a particular factory or industry with 
the origin of the particular trade union leaders or with the 
operation of the dispute procedures.
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P ro b lem s  o f  In f o r m a l  D is c u s s io n
One precondition for the informal discussion to be effective in 
resolving labour disputes is the mutual trust and confidence and a 
sense of goodwill between the workers and management in understanding 
each other's viewpoints, problems and limitations. But this 
precondition is very much lacking in Bangladeshi industries, 
particularly in the public sector. The usual view of management 
about their CBAs is that they are highly p o lit ic a l,  unreasonable, 
unfair and suffering from serious inter-union r iva lr ies . [11] The
CBAs, on the other hand allege that managements are very s t r ic t  to 
them; they are corrupt, negligent in duties and insincere to 
w o rkers . [12 ]  Public evidence also supports the above allegations 
against both labour and management in the public sector 
in d u s tr ies .[^ ]  Under such an uncongenial working relationship 
between the parties concerned, informal discussion could not 
generally produce any effective result.
Fruitful informal discussion also depends much on the background of 
the people among whom such a discussion is to take place. In the 
public sector industries, the managers have primarily been drawn from 
the various administrative and military services, most of whom are 
well-qua! if ied , i f  not in the appropriate professional management 
f i e ld . [14] i t  has been found that while more than 70% of the 
managerial personnel at the plant level possessed Graduation or 
higher degrees, the rest had education level up to Matriculation or 
In te rm e d ia te .^ ]  The average level of education of the managerial 
personnel was thus high and found to be higher than in the private 
sector, but the level of educational attainment i ts e l f  said l i t t l e  of 
the relevance of this education to the needs of management.^] The 
workers, on the other hand, have been found to have a rural 
o r i g i n ^ ]  with very l i t t l e  or no education at a l l .  t^^] Thus the 
managers and workers in the Bangladesh public sector industries have 
come from completely separate social classes. They represent 
different interest groups, and their behaviour patterns are, for 
obvious reasons, different.
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Another factor affecting informal discussion is the authoritarian 
attitude of the majority of the managers in the public sector. 
Authoritarianism in the labour-management relationship has deeper 
roots in Bangladeshi culture which prevent both managers and workers 
from conceiving of the possibility that both groups should meet as 
equals at the discussion or negotiation table. Managers regard 
themselves as being superior to the workers and the workers also 
reciprocate with a feeling of in fe r io r ity . Thus the worker as an 
individual has been conditioned to obey his superiors, and this makes 
the task of the unions of obtaining the commitment of the work force 
even more d if f ic u lt .
Under the above differences in social background between workers and 
management in the public sector industries and in the absence of a 
reasonable degree of mutual trust and confidence between them neither 
an informal discussion nor any other form of direct negotiation could 
be expected to produce any mutually acceptable solution to workers' 
problems. Nevertheless, informal discussion, as a method of 
resolving disputes at the plant level, was being used, in some cases 
for collective disputes, and quite extensively for individual 
disputes. Had there been mutual trust and confidence between the 
parties concerned, this method could prove to be more effective.
6.3 Grievance Procedure
Use of Grievance Procedure
Individual disputes are rarely taken up by the CBAs. I - B u t  an 
individual dispute is not taken cognisance of as an industrial 
dispute under law, unless i t  is raised by the CBA. Then how to 
resolve disputes which are individual in nature, but not taken up by 
the CBA? One method of dealing with such disputes is the informal 
discussion, as described in the previous section. Another method, 
also extensively used, is the administrative action through the 
"proper channel". The law defines i t  to be a grievance 
procedure.£20]
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The grievance procedure, as prescribed in law, has, however, aimed at 
the redressing of workers' grievances relating to such personnel 
matters as misconduct on the part of workers, lay -o ff, retrenchment, 
suspension, termination, discharge, dismissal etc. Workers, 
however, may have other allegations of injustice to them e .g .,  
anomalies in the pay fixation, .overtime allocation, promotion etc. 
This study showed that the vast majority of the individual 
disputes at the plant level related to personnel and disciplinary  
matters, as covered by the Employment of Labour (S.O.) Act, 1965; 
the next important category being financial m a t t e r s . I f  the 
CBA does not take up such individual disputes, the worker(s) 
concerned then approach their management through the grievance 
procedure in their individual capacity. Three-fourths of the 
management and more than 80% o f  the CBA leaders reported that the 
grievance procedure was frequently used in individual disputes as 
per the provisions of law and other administrative rules imposed by 
the corporations on the pi ants.
How does i t  work?
I t  should be noted that in none of the sample enterprises was there 
any formal grievance procedure of its own.^3] All of the sample 
plants were using the grievance procedure, as provided in l a w ,  ^ 4 ]  
which is in no way specific and about which the vast majority of the 
workers might reasonably be expected to be unaware o f . ^ 5  ^ This 
grievance procedure only provides for bringing any complaint by any 
worker on personnel problems before the notice of management, who 
after making a domestic enquiry is to give a unilateral decision to 
the complainant. I t  does not define the term management or its  
different levels. Investigation into the matter revealed almost a 
similar procedure in all of the sample industries.
The grievance procedure in individual disputes worked in two ways 
according to the nature of the dispute i .e .  whether the dispute in 
question was of the form of an allegation by management of a 
misconduct on the part of a worker or whether i t  was a complaint by 
a worker for the enforcement of a right guaranteed to him by or 
under any law or settlement.
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Alleged misconduct: I f  a worker committed any m i s c o n d u c t , ^ ]  a
charge-sheet containing the specific allegations was issued to the 
worker concerned under the name of the plant manager. In the 
charge-sheet the worker was asked to show causes as to why he should 
not be dismissed from service or punished in some other way, within 
a specified period of time, usually 3 to 4 days. I t  happened that 
in some cases workers frankly admitted the allegations and sought 
excuse from punishment by management, and in most cases they were 
not punished. In cases where allegations were refused and 
explanations from workers were found unsatisfactory, notice of a 
domestic enquiry was issued, which contained the name of the Enquiry 
Officer (who was usually the Labour O fficer), date, time and place 
of enquiry. In the hearing sessions, the worker in question 
usually presented his arguments through a member of the trade union. 
After the hearing was over, the Enquiry Officer submitted his 
enquiry report to the plant manager who, considering the gravity of 
the case and previous records of service of the worker concerned, 
awarded the final punishment or otherwise.
Workers1 comp!aints: When the worker concerned had any grievance
against the punishment given to him, or i f  he had any other 
complaint under any law or agreement, he usually lodged a written 
complaint, addressed to the plant manager, and submitted i t  to the 
labour officer. The labour officer, in consultation with the 
people concerned or through reference to a superior o fficer gave his 
decision within the statutory period of 30 days. I f  management 
failed to give its  decision within the statutory period of time, or 
when the worker concerned was not satisfied with the management's 
decision, he generally f i led  a case in the appropriate labour court 
against management within 30 days of such fa ilure or decision. 
Multi-stage grievance procedure with the right of appeal to top 
level management, as practised in the developed countries such as 
the U.K. and the U . S . A . ,  ^ 7 ]  were not found in practice in 
Bangladesh.
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Grievance procedure for collective disputes: As for the disputes of 
individual nature, so also for collective disputes, some form of an 
informal grievance procedure which may more appropriately be termed 
as "administrative action" was found to be a, more or less, usual 
method of grievance resolution. Under this method whenever the CBA 
of a plant had any complaint over the implementation of the Wage 
Commission recommendations or any other corporation policy or over 
any local problem, i t  sent a representation to the plant manager who 
could rarely get the matter settled through direct discussion with 
the CBA within the limits of the corporation’ s guidelines. He then 
referred the matter to the corporation for an imposed administrative 
decision on the problem. More than 50% of all plant level 
respondents reported that this method was sometimes used, while 
according to about 40%, this was frequently or always used in 
resolving collective disputes. £28 3
One reason explaining why administrative decision was being so 
extensively used in resolving the collective disputes might be that, 
the basic terms and conditions of service of workers in the public 
sector industries were not bargainable under law and any ambiguity 
in the implementation and interpretation of the terms and conditions 
of service were to be settled, usually not at the plant level but 
through reference to, and administrative decision of the corporation 
which is the central controlling body for a ll plants under i t .  
Another possible reason explaining the extensive use of 
administrative decisions might be the lack of operational freedom of 
the plant management who had to work under the s tr ic t  control of the 
corporation. 1-29]
6.4 Participation Committee
The underlying objective behind the legal requirement for the 
constitution of the Participation Committee, as described in Chapter 
I I I ,  seems to be very sound with the idea that management and 
workers w ill have a forum to exchange views and promote 
understanding between them so that differences may be reconciled.
Let us now see how effectively this committee has been working in 
the public sector enterprises in Bangladesh.
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F o r m a t io n  o f  t h e  C o m m itte e
In the national context: Immediately before the fieldwork for this
study, the Department of Labour prepared a statement on the latest 
position with regard to participation committees in certain major 
industries of the country. The Department of Labour ventured to 
prepare this statement in response to the emphasis placed on this 
committee by the Labour Policy, 1980. Letters were f i r s t  issued 
from the Department requiring the managements to comply with the 
legal requirement to constitute this commitee in their respective 
plants. Only about 9% o f  the enterprises responded to the le t te r  
by forming this committee. Reminders were then issued to the 
remaining 91%. 64% of the total enterprises responded to the
reminder and formed this committee. Thus, i t  is evident that more 
than one-fourth of all the enterprises did not or could not 
constitute this committee in their plants. The case of the jute 
industry, taken separately, was more discouraging. 30% of the jute  
mills were without participation committees.^30] j\ considerable 
degree of reluctance in forming the committee is evident from the 
above aggregate picture. The position in the sample industries can 
now be examined.
In the context of the sample industries: When asked to state i f
there was any participation committee in their plants, 62% of the 
management people, as against only 35% of the CBA leaders, gave a 
positive response.^31] j s interesting to note the wide 
divergence between the responses of the two sides. I t  is more 
interesting to see the divergence in reporting among the respondents 
of the same side. For example, the labour officer of plant X 
reported that there was no participation committee in the ir  plant, 
but the administrative officer of the same plant reported that they 
had one. Similarly, the president of the unionin a plant gave a 
positive report on the question, while the general secretary gave a 
negative one.
Differences of opinion between the two sides were also found as to
the method of constitution of such committees and the matters
usually dealt with in such committees. For example, of those who 
admitted that they had participation committees in their plant, 80%
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of management, as against 68% of the CBA leaders, stated that this 
committee was constituted with equal representatives from both 
sides. 22% of the CBA leaders mentioned that representatives of 
the management in this committee was more than those of the workers. 
This statement is in conflict with the legal requirement which 
provides that the number of workers' representatives in this 
committee should be at least equal to that of management, i f  not 
m o r e .  ^ 2 ]  as to the matters dealt with by the participation
committee, the reports of management were more consistent with those 
provided in the law, but the reports of the union leaders were 
inconsistent on some points.
Performance of participation committees
All these differences of opinion between the two sides, and on some 
points, among the respondents of the same side, indicate that the 
participation committees were not properly working in the 
enterprises covered by the study. This is also evident from their  
responses to another relevant question on the extent of 
satisfaction on the performance of such committees. None was very 
satisfied, about one-fifth were reasonably satisfied and more than 
one-fourth of the management and more than half of the CBA leaders 
expressed their dissatisfaction by stating that i t  merely existed on 
paper and was practically inactive.^ 3 ]  jh e inactivity of such 
committees is quite understandable from the following emphatical, 
though humourous, statement of a CBA leader in response to an 
investigator's question on the functions of the participation  
committee in their plant:
“Truly speaking, this committee has nothing to do except 
welcoming visitors like  you (research investigator)."
Problems of effective operation
The present study did not make any in-depth investigation on the 
factors accounting for the ineffective functioning of the 
participation committees. But some of these factors have, however, 
been identified by others. H a s n a t h ^ 4 ]  has ascertained the 
following bottlenecks standing in the way of effective operation of 
such committees:
(a) Vagueness about the area of jurisdiction of the committee;
(b) Unwillingness on the part of management to provide the workers 
with scope for participation beyond mere consultation, the 
policy being "this far and no further";
(c) Lack of adequate authority on the part of officers representing 
the management in the committee;
(d) The trade unions seeing this committee with suspicion that 
management uses i t  as an alternative to unions;
(e) Existence of CBAs with whom all matters may be negotiated;
(f )  Lack of education and training on the part of workers to 
undertake the responsibility of jo in t consultation and 
discussion in the decision making process.
Khan and Ahmad^S] have observed that the presence of outsiders in 
the forefront of the trade union movement in Bangladesh was 
responsible for the fa ilure of workers' participation. Where 
multiple unions exist, one of the most attractive propositions to 
the labour leaders from outside is to continuously concentrate on 
demands for better conditions of service which determine command 
over, support from and popularity among the workers. To work for 
workers' increasing participation in management may not appeal to 
them as this scheme would not involve them likewise, because 
workers' participation, by definition, is not supposed to encourage 
the involvement of non-workers.
I t  is perhaps for the above reasons that participation committees 
were either rarely or never used for resolving plant level disputes, 
as reported by 75% to 80% of the respondents at that le v e l .£36]
Perceived necessity
In about half of the cases without a participation committee, the 
respondents did not even feel the necessity for this committee to be 
constituted.[37] Thus, although all of the laws on industrial 
relations in the country had provisions for a participation  
committee of one form or the other for promoting measures for
securing and preserving amity and good relations between management 
and workers and to resolve differences at the unit level, those 
provisions were hardly implemented, and where implemented, this was 
done only in letters but not in s p ir i t .  The law can provide a 
framework for social behaviour; i t  cannot infuse the s p ir i t  of 
cooperation necessary for a desirable solution to a problem; that 
must spring from a desire to cooperate. As the proverb goes, "you 
can take a horse to water, but you can't make him drink." People 
may be compelled by law to go through the motions but they may lack 
the sp ir it  to carry out that law and such proved to be the case with 
the participation committee.£38] Given the present context of the 
union structure, the very low level of workers' educational 
attainment and the inherent attitude of the parties directly  
involved, the participation committee does not seem to be able to 
achieve the cherished objectives, as prescribed in law.
6.5 Collective Bargaining
The system of collective bargaining differs from one country to 
another depending on the social, economic and cultural environment 
prevailing in each country. ^ 9 ]  Due to variations in the stages of 
development of these various dimensions, each country develops a 
legal and institutional framework, peculiar to its  own, for carrying 
out the process of collective b a r g a i n i n g .  ^ 0 ]  Bangladesh is no 
exception in this respect. In the discussion of her legal and
institutional framework,E41] j t  was found that collective
bargaining, as a practice, in Bangladesh has been recognised and 
granted, in fu l l ,  so far as the private sector is concerned, while
in the public sector, i t  has been allowed only to a very limited
extent. Depending on the management s t ru c tu re ^ ]  0f  the public 
sector industries, collective bargaining is carried out at two 
levels - the plant level and the corporation level. The relevant 
Ministry is also involved in the corporation level bargaining. ;
159
6 . 5 . 1 .  P l a n t  L e v e l  B a r g a i n i n g
Plants being the actual production or service units of the 
respective corporations, collective bargaining, In its  real sense of 
the term, actually starts from this level.
Extent of plant level bargaining
The massive nationalisation scheme undertaken by the Government of 
Bangladesh in 1972 ushered in a new dimension in the f ie ld  of labour 
management relations in general, and in collective bargaining in 
particular, in the public sector industries.^ 3 ]  gp0n 
nationalisation of the major industries, the Government, in order to 
give effect to its constitutional commitment for the establishment 
of a socialist economic system^^ and to ensure equality of 
opportunity,^5-^ introduced uniformity in wage scales and fringe 
benefits payable to public sector industrial workers by appointing 
Wage Commissions and implementing their recommendations. By 
imposing restrictions on bargaining on wage scales and fringe 
benefits particularly at the plant level, the scope of collective  
bargaining has been significantly reduced.
S t i l l ,  of the four methods used at the plant level, collective  
bargaining was reported to be the most widely used one for resolving 
collective disputes.^ 6 ]  In response to a specific question on to 
what extent the institutional machineries were approached for 
dispute resolution, all of the CBAs and about 90% of the managerial 
people at both the plant and corporation levels reported that they 
either always or frequently used the collective bargaining 
process.£47] Thus, i t  is obvious that although Government takes 
care of most of the basic terms and conditions of service, 
collective bargaining is s t i l l  being practised as a preferred method 
of dispute resolution. The next question that naturally arises is: 
what were the issues usually dealt with on the negotiation table?
Is s u e s  f r e q u e n t l y  n e g o t i a t e d
Issues frequently negotiated at the plant level were investigated in 
two ways: (a) by asking responses to a direct qustion in this
regard to those who were practically involved in the negotiations and
(b) by examining the sample of real dispute cases actually 
negotiated between the management and the CBAs.
Responses of the management and the CBA leaders to the direct 
question gave a l i s t  of as many as 13 specific i s s u e s ^ 8 ]  W h i c h  
could be briefly categorised into four types - financial, personnel 
and disciplinary, administrative and labour welfare. Thus 
categorised, i t  was found that only about one-fourth of a l l  
managements' responses and 18% of those of the CBAs related to 
financial matters. The financial matters, however, did not include 
any basic financial terms and conditions, as fixed by the 
Government. These were mainly about the anomalies in the 
interpretation and implementation of the imposed wage structure and 
about certain special allowances for certain special types of jobs. 
"Anomalies" in the operation of the national wages system are a 
very common issue for industrial disputes in the public sector 
industries at all stages of the dispute resolution process. Since 
they are referred to in many places in this and the Chapters that 
follow, a few examples of such anomalies relating to the e le c tr ic ity  
industry may be cited here on an anecdotal basis:
Bangladesh Jatiotabadi Bidyut Sramik Dal, a federation 
a ff i l ia ted  to the labour wing of the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party, then in power, submitted to the Board 
of Management a l i s t  of anomalies in 18 designations of 
the workers and employees of the BPDB (Bangladesh Power 
Development Board), on which a t r ip a r t ite  negotiation 
meeting was held. The meeting recognised the
justif ication of such anomalies and agreed to refer them 
to a high level committee constituted by the Government.
The argument of the federation was that although the NNPS 
(New National Pay Scale), 1977 was based on the RPS of 
1962 and the NPS (National Pay Scale) of 1973, wages 
scales of many designations allowed in the NNPS did not 
match with those in the RPS and NPS, and such anomalies 
should, therefore, be adjusted in accordance with the RPS 
and NPS. Some of such anomalous instances are presented 
in the following statement.*-49j
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Statement showing some Instances o f anomalies In  the implementation o f the Hew National Pay Scale In  BP08
Designation RP57T952 | NPS.197T TmPSTTW
allowed
TJWPS7I97/"
desired
J u s t if ic a t io n
Helper Tk. 85-125 Tk. 225-315 Tk. 240-345 The post Is  a technical one and the Job 
Is 'r is k y .  The RPS Is  higher than the 
lowest possible s ca le . I t  Is  a 
promotion post. The prescribed  
q u a lif ic a t io n  o f an apprentice helper 
Is  S .S .C . and he is  to  undergo a 
p ra c tic a l tra in in g  before he can be 
f in a l ly  appointed as a h e lp er. So the  
helpers should be allowed the NNPS of 
Tk. 240-345.
F i t t e r  ’ B’ /A ttendant ‘ 8 ’ /  
E le c tr ic ia n  *B’ /llneman ’B* 
and id en tic a l posts
Tk. 150-375 V I I I Tk. 32S-610 
and 
Tk. 300-540
Tk. 325-610 Those appointed o r  promoted a f te r  1973 
are ge ttin g  Tk. 300-540 s ca le , whereas 
Incumbents appointed or promoted before  
1973 are g e ttin g  the scale o f Tk. 325- 
610. This d iscrim ination  should not 
remain.
Pump O perator/ 
S ecurity  Supervisor
Tk. 110-210 
and 
Tk. 110-230
IX Tk. 250-362 Tk. 275-480 The post o f IDA (Lower O iv is lon  
A ssistant) having RPS of Tk. 110-240 
has been allowed the NNPS o f Tk. 300- 
540. The posts in  question are  
technical posts having almost the same 
RPS. The proposed scale Is- therefo re  
qu ite  ju s t i  f ie d ._________________________
Security Guard Tk. 85-125 Tk. 225-315 Tk. 240-345 The RPS of S ecurity  Guard is  higher 
than the lowest possible s ca le . The 
work performed by them is very 
important fo r v i t a l  in s ta lla t io n s .
So th is  post should be allowed the 
proposed scale o f Tk. 240-345.________
Foreman, G r .’ C’ Tk. 350-750 VI Tk .470-1135 Tk .625-1315 Other id en tic a l posts ( i . e .  S h ift  
Supervisor/U nit Operators) have been 
allowed the grade of Tk. 625-1315.
So th is  post should also be allowed the 
same grade.____________________ __________
Comp 1 a i nt Supervisor Tk. 200-330 V II Tk. 370-745 Tk. 400-825 This post is  id e n tic a l w ith UDA (Upper 
D ivis ion  A s s is ta n t). The RPS o f UDA 
is Tk. 200-330 and has been allowed 
the NNPS of Tk . 400-825. So, th is  
post is also proposed for allow ing the 
NNPS of UDA.
A ssistant Teacher Tk. 110-240 V II I Tk. 2SO-362 Tk. 300-540 B o t h  RPS and NPS of th is  post are 
id en tica l to those of the post o f LDA 
( L o w e r  D iv is ion  A s s is ta n t). The post 
o f  LDA has been placed in the NNPS of 
Tk. 300-540. The post o f A ssistant 
Teacher should, th e re fo re , be allowed 
the same NNPS fo r the sake o f 
uni f p r m i  ty .____________________ __________
Of the non-financial issues, labour welfare matters were the most 
frequently negotiated issues at the plant level (more than 50% of 
the total responses of both managements and CBAs were related to 
these matters). Other non-financial issues negotiated were 
administrative matters like the fixing of the production target, 
work organisation and allocation, leave matters e tc ., which acounted 
for about 22% of the management responses and about one-fourth of 
those of the CBAs. Following is a summary table of the negotiated 
issues, as categorised above:
Table 6.1
Summary of the issues frequently negotiated at the plant level, 
as reported by the respondents
Management I CBA | "ATT“
1. Financial matters 24.6 1 18.0 1 21.2“
2. Living and working conditions | 1 I
(Labour welfare matters) 29.0 1 26.9 I 27.9
3. Personnel and disciplinary | J |
matters 24.5 I 28.3 | 26.5
4. Administrative matters 21.7 I 24.4 | 23.2
5. Miscellaneous issues - I 2.4 I 1.2
TOTAL 100.0 1100.0 1100.0
Percentage of Responses
Analysis of plant level cases identified as many as 17 reasons for 
disputes that came across the negotiation table.^OJ Placing the 
related issues into the same broad categories, as done above, the 
following summary of the issues for plant level disputes is 
obtai ned:
Table 6.2
Summary of the issues negotiated at the plant level, 
as obtained by analysing the sample cases
| Issues for disputes Percentage
| 1. Financial matters 32.9
| 2. Living and working conditions 15.1
| 3. Personnel and disciplinary matters 29.6
| 4. Administrative matters 22.4
I TOTAL IW.'O
The only difference between the two summary tables, as prepared 
above, is that of a 12% reciprocal compensating difference between 
the financial issues and living and working conditions issues.
This could be so possibly because, while examining the plant level 
cases, some corporation level collective bargaining agreements on 
financial matters, sent by the corporations to respective plants for 
ra tif ica tion  by the individual plant level CBAs, were also taken 
into account.
The cross-tabulation analysis between industry and reasons for 
disputes revealed some significant inter-industry variations, 
however. For example, in the jute industry, financial and liv ing  
conditions matters were more frequent than others, while personnel 
and disciplinary matters were more common in the water transport and 
administrative matters in the road transport. Prevalence of any 
particular type of disputes could not, however, be observed in the 
e lec tr ic ity .
T im e t a k e n  i n  p l a n t  l e v e l  b a r g a i n i n g
To ensure quick settlement of disputes at the plant level, the 
industrial relations laws of the country have fixed the maximum 
length of time within which management w ill have to settle the 
dispute in question through the procedure of a dialogue with the 
CBA. The time so provided was 7 days in the IRO, as originally  
formulated in 1969. This negotiation period was, however, 
gradually raised through subsequent amendments in the said 
Ordinance, as shown in the following table:
Table 6.3
Direct negotiation period provided in the various 
industrial relations laws
Industrial Relations Laws
The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 
The Industrial Relations (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 1970 
The Industrial Relations (Regulation) 
Ordinance, 1975 
The Industrial Relations (Regulation) 
Ordinance, 1982
Negotiation Period
7 days 
10 days 
14 days 
21 days
Thus the direct negotiation period, as applicable at present is 21 
days. But what was happening in this regard in the actual 
negotiations in the public sector enterprises? How far could this
statutory time l im it  be adhered to? Were the gradual increases in 
the negotiation period justified? In an attempt to find answers to 
questions like these, the actual number of days taken in concluding 
direct negotiation on the plant level sample cases were examined; 
and as to the adequacy of the statutory time, views of the 
managements and the CBA leaders were sought.
I t  should be noted that the IRO, 1969, as amended up-to-date, does 
not make any distinction between the private and public sector 
industries and hence does not consider the peculiarity of the 
administrative structure of the public sector industries from that 
of the private sector. In the public sector, the plant management,
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lacking adequate a u th o r i ty ,! -^  hacj to refer a large number of cases 
to the corporation,!-^-! which is the ultimate controlling body of 
the plants. Thus, for the purpose of this study, the direct 
negotiation period for the cases referred to corporation level was 
defined to mean the total time taken from the in it ia t ion  of a 
dispute at the plant level to its  final disposal by the 
corporation.
Surprisingly, the average direct negotiation period of the plant 
level cases was found to be about 70 days with a standard deviation 
of 82 days. This average and standard deviation became high due to 
the influence of some extreme cases (11.5%), which took as many as 
151 to 545 days. Only 12.5%, 23% and 33% of the cases could be 
concluded within 10, 14 and 21 days respect ively. Thus, the 
gradual raising of the direct negotiation period through subsequent 
amendments in the IRO, 1969 seems to be reasonably ju s tif ied  at 
least for public sector industrial disputes.
One important point to be noted is that only one-third of the cases 
could be concluded within the presently applicable statutory period 
of 21 days, more than two-thirds within the average period of 70 
days and the rest one-third took as many as 71 to 545 days. On the 
whole, however, 88.5% of the cases were concluded within a period of 
150 days. This finding is conclusive of the fact that the present 
direct negotiation period, as prescribed in the law could not be 
adhered to in the sample plants, particularly in those cases that 
needed reference to corporations.!-^] The breakdown of the direct 
negotiation period as to the outcome of the cases revealed that 
cases settled locally took 46 days on the average, while those 
needing reference to corporations took 131 days.
When asked to comment on the adequacy of the present statutory 
period for collective bargaining about 80% of the plant management, 
62% of the corporation management and 77% of the CBA leaders 
reported that this was reasonably adequate for local problems within 
the jurisdiction of the plant management.!-^] Only a quarter of 
the total respondents viewing this time to be inadequate, probably
referred to cases needing reference to corporations, because in 
reply to a next question put to them on the extension of time they 
wished for, an overwhelming majority of them stated that extending 
the negotiation period without granting any authority to local 
management would not make any sense.
Inter-industry differences: Some inter-industry differences as to
time taken in concluding the cases are worth noting. Nearly half  
of the cases in the jute industry and 30% of those in road transport 
were concluded within the presently applicable statutory period, 
while the corresponding figures for e lec tr ic ity  and water transport 
were only 16% and 7% respectively. Again, within the average 
negotiation period of 70 days, 80% of the cases in ju te and 85% of 
those in road transport were concluded, whereas the correspond!'ng 
figures for e lec tr ic ity  and water transport were only 60% and 25% 
respectively. All cases in road transport were concluded 
within 150 days, while the corresponding percentages concluded 
during the same period for ju te , e lec tr ic ity  and water transport 
were respectively 94, 88 and 59 only.
The breakdown analysis revealed that although approximately 70 days, 
on average, were needed to conclude the direct negotiation, this  
average was very much affected by the very unusual delays made in  
concluding negotiations in water transport and e lectric ity  
industries. For example, on average, as many as 82 days in  
e lectr ic ity  and 157 days in water transport, were needed to conclude 
direct negotiation, while the correspond!'ng figures for jute and 
road transport were only 46 and 45 respectively (F ig .6 .1). From 
this analysis i t  came out that BRTC (road transport) and BJMC (ju te)  
were relatively more prompt in concluding direct negotiation than 
BPDB (e lectric ity ) and BIWTC (water transport), BIWTC being the 
slowest in this respect.
The size of organisation, degree of centralisation, and worker 
militancy might appropriately explain these differences as to time 
taken in the b ipartite  negotiations. Although organisationally 
largest, managements of the plants under the BJMC seemed to have 
enjoyed relatively more decentralisation in authority. Besides, 
the traditional militancy of the jute workers probably kept
management at a ll levels more a le r t  in settling disputes with them. 
The organisation of the BRTC is the smallest compared to those of 
the other sample corporations. There existed a corporation level 
CBA in the BRTC and a ll  plant level unions were branches of this 
corporation level CBA which could directly deal with the corporation 
management over any matter referred to them. Thus due to constant 
persuasion and follow-ups of the CBA, disputes in BRTC could 
probably be resolved relatively promptly. Union organisations 
(both at the plant and corporation levels) in BPDB were similar to 
those in the BJMC with the exception that e lectric ity  workers seemed 
to be less militant compared to jute workers. One reason for the 
low militancy of e lectric ity  workers is perhaps the declaration in 
law of their service as essential. Authority structures in 
e lectr ic ity  also seemed to be more centralised. Lastly, workers in 
the BIWTC were found to be disorganised and less m ilitant compared 
to those in other sample corporations. Authority was also very 
much centralised in the BIWTC.
No significant variation in time taken in direct negotiation could 
be found as to the various reasons for disputes. Direct 
negotiation period, considered in relation to types of disputes, 
revealed that the individual disputes were being concluded somewhat 
more quickly than the group and collective ones. This general 
pattern was not, however, true for BIWTC, where the individual and 
group cases took the longest time (F ig.6.1).
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Fig. 6.1 BAR DIAGRAMS SHOWING AVERAGE DIRECT NEGOTIATION PERIOD 
(IN DAYS) OF THE THREE TYPES OF DISPUTES IN THE SAMPLE 
PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIES
E f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  p l a n t  l e v e l  b a r g a i n i n g
Methods of investigation: Two methods were used in an attempt to 
examine the effectiveness of plant level bargaining -  f i r s t ly ,  
responses of those who were practically involved in the plant level 
negotiations were sought on their personal views about the 
effectiveness of the process, and secondly, actual result of 
negotiations on the sample plant level cases were examined in order 
to see how far plant level negotiations could resolve the problems 
that arose at that level.
(a) Responses to direct question: Responses to the direct question,
as tabulated in Appendix B.19, show that in the view of 43% of the 
respondents, collective bargaining was either very effective or 
reasonably effective in resolving the plant level disputes. But i t  
is important to note that, in the view of the majority of the 
respondents, this was either somewhat or not effective.
(b) Outcome of cases: Analysis of the outcome of the plant level
cases revealed that only less than one-third (31%) of the cases 
could somehow be resolved on the plant level negotiation table; but 
the vast majority of the cases (69%) could not be settled at the 
plant level and those had to be referred to subsequent channel s .^56] 
This finding, also consistent with the view of the majority of the 
respondents, is reasonably conclusive of the fact that the plant 
level collective bargaining could not be effectively utilised  in  
resolving disputes arising at that level. However, there were 
significant inter-industry variations as to the effectiveness of 
plant level bargaining. For example, against 47% of the cases in  
the jute industry, only 24% of those in e le c tr ic ity , 5% of those in  
road transport and 4% of those in water transport could be resolved 
at their respective plant levels. Thus, although plant level 
bargaining in the public sector industries was, in general, not so 
much effective, this was particularly true for water and road 
transport.
Impediments to plant level bargaining: The next pertinent question
is: Why could the plant level collective bargaining not play an
effective role in the public sector industries? What constraining
factors were responsible for inhibiting the effective operation of 
the process? Investigations were carried out in the following 
ways in order to get an answer to this question:
F irs t ly , the parties concerned were asked to respond to a direct 
question in this regard. Secondly, the plant level cases which 
could not be resolved through plant level negotiations, were further 
scrutinised as to the reasons why they could not be so resolved. 
Thirdly, reasons for the fa ilure of direct negotiation were also 
available in the short recitals of the conciliation level cases 
taken from the in i t ia l  applications for those cases, requesting the 
conciliator to conciliate in them.
(a) Responses to direct question: While both management and CBA
leaders identified some objective reasons standing in the way of 
effective negotations, some other reasons put the blame on each 
other. The two most common reasons identified by both the parties 
were: ( i )  lack of authority to plant management (identified by more
than 80% of management and 60% of the CBA leaders) and ( i i )  poor 
financial position of the enterprises (identified by about 44% of 
management and 40% of the CBA leaders). Unreasonable demands 
beyond the jurisdiction of management was identified to be another 
constraining factor by about 70% of management and only 20% of the 
CBA leaders. One reason for this wide difference in responses 
between the two parties on the issue of unreasonable demands could 
be that what was unreasonable to management might be reasonable to 
the CBAs - management might have considered a demand unreasonable on 
the pleas of legal stipulations, whereas the CBA might have viewed 
i t  quite reasonable in terms of economic necessity. 52% of 
management blamed their CBAs, while as high as 80% of the CBAs 
blamed their managements as adamant and uncompromising at the 
negotiation table, for which direct negotiation could not succeed. 
Inter-union r iva lry , communication gap between the parties, absence 
of an elected CBA and lack of assertion on the part of management 
were also identified, as other constraining factors in the way of 
sensible negotiations, by small percentages of respondents.[57]
(b) Analysis of cases: More or less similar constraining factors 
were also found through the analysis of the plant and conciliation  
level cases. Taking cases at both levels together, i t  was found
that lack of authority at the plant management level was a 
constraint in about 56% of the cases, the next most constraining 
factor identified as being illegal and unreasonable demands of the 
CBAs, which happened in 48% of the cases. In one third of the 
cases examined, managements were firmly fixed in their viewpoints 
and not ready to give any consideration to the CBAs' arguments over 
the disputes in question. The CBAs, on the other hand, exhibited 
their adamant attitude in one-fifth of the cases. That the 
managements had obstinate attitudes in negotiating disputes with 
their CBAs in apparently more cases could be somewhat unreal because 
plant level cases showed that management was adamant in only about 
13% of the cases, while in conciliation level cases, this percentage 
rose to 50%. The adamant attitude of management as a reason for 
fa il ing  direct negotiation in a large number of conciliation level 
cases might be due to the fact that the reasons for the fa ilu re  of 
plant level negotiations in such cases were sorted out from the 
in i t ia l  applications for conciliation generally made by the CBAs, 
who usually blamed management for not conceding to their demands. 
Analysis of the plant level cases indicated that the stubborn 
attitude of the parties over negotiations, in fact, went hand in 
hand.f-^  In 26% of the cases (of both levels), poor financial 
position of the enterprise was a factor limiting effective  
functioning of the collective bargaining. An antagonistic 
relationship between the parties concerned for a long time back also 
stood as a barrier in the way of effective settlement at the plant 
level, at least in about 24% of the cases examined. Two other 
barriers to effective settlement through bargaining, encountered in 
small percentages of cases, were the need to maintain uniformity 
with other enterprises under the same corporation (encountered in 
about 9% of the cases) requiring a centralised policy applicable to 
a ll enterprises, and lack of locus standi of the CBAs (encountered 
in 7% ofT the cases) in the eye of la w .^ ^
One very significant aspect relating to the fa ilure of direct 
negotiation was revealed while analysing the conciliation cases - no 
negotiation meeting was arranged by the plant management in 47% of 
the cases examined on the plea that neither the issues raised by the 
CBAs were bargainable under law nor did they have adequate authority
to go for any negotiation over them. Thus when the CBAs found that 
their local management did not open ar\y dialogue with them on the 
issues raised within the statutory period, they were bound to refer 
such cases to conciliators.
The impediments to effective collective bargaining in the public 
sector industrial enterprises, as identified through the analysis of 
the sample cases, are depicted in the. form of a pie chart as shown 
in Figure 6.2.
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Fig. 6.2 REASONS FOR FAILING DIRECT NEGOTIATION BETWEEN 
PLANT MANAGEMENT AND PLANT LEVEL CBAs 
(Based on Appendix E-7)
Lack of authority of the plant management and illegal and 
unreasonable demands placed by the CBAs were very frequent 
constraints to effective bargaining and were responsible for fa il in g  
direct negotiation in most c a s e s . I t  was found that collective  
bargaining at the plant level was frequently successful on 
disciplinary, administrative and leave matters. Labour welfare 
issues were equally successful and unsuccessful. I t  seems that 
labour welfare issues of minor financial implications, which were 
probably within the jurisdiction of local management could be
successfully settled; but those beyond the authority of the plant 
management probably fa iled . Negotiations on financial benefits - 
were seldom successful. What emerges from the above is that in the 
absence of a well-defined bargaining structure, the CBAs raised a ll  
disputes to plant management, some of which could have been 
reasonably put to the upper level.
I t  should, however, be noted that the consequence of the fa ilure  of 
plant level negotiations was not smooth and peaceful in most cases. 
The unions seldom realised the practical limitations of management 
and often resorted to violence and many undemocratic and 
unconstitutional practices which may be described as forming a part 
of the informal system of dispute resolution. The po lit ic isa tion  
of workers and consequent political pressure from outside the plant 
often aggravated the situation. During the course of interviews 
with them, the plant managements cited many examples of undue 
pressure exercised by the trade unions and local politic ians. The 
extract of a written report (1974) by one Assistant Manager of a 
jute mill to his superior officer is given below as just one piece 
of anecdotal evidence:
"At about 8.30pm I received a telephone call from Mr............
who asked ........  the reasons for non-payment of wages (to
workers)  I explained to him our d i f f i c u l t i e s ........
but he was not convinced .........  and in reply he advised me
to inform my higher authority the following instruction:
'You w ill le t  me (telephone ca ller) know by Sunday
(13.1.74) evening whether you w ill make payment on Monday
(14.1.74) morning. I f  you feel that you w ill not be able 
to make payment, you and a ll your senior officers must 
resign and vacate company's quarters by Sunday evening; 
otherwise I w ill ask my workers to go on strike and close 
down the mills and throw a ll of you in the river. You 
will inform your higher authority and te l l  him that this 
is the instruction of the M .P .'......... "
How to enhance the effectiveness of plant level bargaining 
Notwithstanding, the measures to be taken for improving the 
effectiveness of plant level collective bargaining were very much 
implied in the bottlenecks to effective bargaining, as identified  
above, s t i l l  a direct question was put to management and CBA leaders 
on what measures they could suggest, in the light of the ir  practical 
experiences, to enhance its  effectiveness. The measures they 
suggested may be seen at Appendix B.20.
One important suggestion offered by a large number of respondents 
(59% of the CBA leaders and 39% of management) was that the parties 
involved in the negotiation should be fa ir ,  honest and reasonable in  
dealings. This is perhaps very important in the context of the 
lack of mutual trust and confidence amongst the parties concerned 
and the allegation of adamancy by one against the other. Studies 
of actual negotiations and laboratory experiments suggest that, 
"successful negotiation stems from the character of the personal 
relations established by the negotiators."[61]
More than 60% of management, but none of the CBA leaders, suggested 
that the demands placed on and allegations raised against management 
should be real, reasonable and within the jurisdiction of 
bargaining. The polar differences of view as to the 
"reasonableness" of demands between the parties was there possibly 
because, as stated earlie r , management's view was based on legal 
stipulations, while that of workers was based on bare economic 
necessities.
Although demands raised by workers were i l le g a l ,  they were not 
i llogical in the pragmatic sense, viewed in consideration of the 
fa ilu re  of the assumptions of the Wages Commission to remain 
v a l i d ^ ]  and of the sharply increasing consumer prices in  
Bangladesh. Thus without providing a minimum living wage to 
workers, mere legal restrictions could not stop them from raising 
i l legal demands. Under this situation, a large number of 
respondents (50% of the CBA leaders and about 39% of management) 
wished the law to ensure regular periodic meetings at the plant 
level on local and minor problems and an annual t r ip a r t i te  review 
meeting at the corporation level on major financial terms and 
conditions of service, to make adjustments in them, in view of the 
changes in economic conditions of the country during the last year. 
This arrangement might stop the workers from raising illega l demands 
to local management on the one hand, and effective settlement of 
local problems, on the other.
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Under the present system of management of the public sector 
industries, almost a ll administrative powers rest with the 
corporations concerned, while the Ministries concerned remain as the 
overall controlling authorities. Enterprises, as operational 
units, have very limited authority. As high as 96% o f  the plant 
and corporation level respondents strongly fe l t  that plant mangement 
had very l i t t l e  authority to settle collective industrial 
disputes.[633 Because of the present bureaucratic structure of 
administration, plant management did not take any risk and 
responsibility and frequently referred problems, even t r iv ia l  
ones, to corporations.^-^ Under such a situation, in te r - t ie r  
authority and responsibility needs to be clearly spelt out, with 
more authority being given to plant management.[653 Quick decision 
on matters referred to the upper levels should be ensured. The 
Ministerial officers should change their attitude of detecting 
frauds and mistakes rather than trying to solve the practical 
problems of the corporations and plants. About 55% of the CBA 
leaders and 39% of management held this v i e w - .  [663
M ultip lic ity  of trade unions and the consequent rivalry between them 
acted as a serious bottleneck in the way of sensible negotia­
tions. [673 The average number of registered unions in the plants 
under study was 2.2.^683 Due to workers' allegience to different  
unions, workers were sometimes not willing to abide by the 
agreements which had already been m a d e . [693 D iff icu lt ies  also 
arose over the determination of the CBA. In the absence of a 
properly elected CBA, management found i t  very d i f f ic u lt  as to with 
whom to ta lk . About 39% of the management and 36% of the CBA 
leaders thought that the CBA should be properly determined. In 
this context, one-fourth of a ll  the respondents (management and 
CBAs) advocated for only one union in each plant which should act as 
the permanent CBA, and representatives to which should be elected by 
the workers on the basis of the contesting leaders' personal 
qualifications and c a p a b i l i t i e s . [703 gut  any measure directed 
towards reducing the number of unions in the public sector 
industries may not be so easy because the problem is very much 
linked with the political process of the country. Unlike the
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Western countries, trade unions In Bangladesh are very weak and 
unable to attain their ends by purely trade union methods.
Therefore they require po litical assistance, and the politica l  
parties are only too ready to provide that assistance. All 
political parties thus have their own labour fronts with a f f i l ia te d  
union organisations at a ll levels of management of the public sector 
industries, which are under constant competition between themselves. 
But none of the po litical parties can make the situation more tense 
than the party in power. Forcible changes in Government have been 
observed as a regular phenomenon in the short political history of 
Bangladesh. When a new party gets hold of political power, i t  
wants to capture the union power as well, i f  necessary (in  almost 
a ll cases i t  becomes necessary), by force through the help of police 
and management. In due course less than scrupulous "leaders" are 
recruited from within and outside the plants with the acquiesence of 
plant managements who are asked to do so by the ruling party. This 
is done with the connivance of the local police who refuse to 
entertain complaints from the aggrieved workers and existing union 
leaders. Meanwhile these new "leaders" in the name of the workers, 
occupy the union or CBA office at the plants. This way of 
occupying the role of the CBAs by the ruling regimes in Bangladesh 
has come to be popularly known as "union-hijacking" among workers. 
Some veteran trade union leaders with professional sk ill and a long 
record of service, who stand in the way of forcible occupation of 
the union leadership, eventually lose part of their following 
because the party in Government does not negotiate with and give any 
concession to other unions than the one i t  s u p p o r t s . A n d  since 
the Government supported union can secure some tangible benefits for  
them, a majority of the workers, on the face of their serious 
economic frustrations, directly or indirectly lend support to i t .
The opponent unions, however, carry on their organising a c tiv it ie s ,  
and given the unstable po litical environment, new e lites  come in  
power and which again float new unions. Thus the end result of 
this interpenetration of the po litica l and union structures is the 
m ultip lic ity  of unions at a ll  levels with consequent r iva lries  
between them.
Finally , as stated in an earlie r  section, appropriate managers were
not placed at the proper administrative positions in the public
enterprises. The educational level of some managers was quite
high but their education had l i t t l e  relevance to jobs they were
entrusted with. Labour officers' knowledge of labour laws was
quite shallow. The problem was even more acute with the trade
union leaders, most of whom had very l i t t l e  education. 46% of
management and about 23% of the CBA leaders, therefore, f e l t  an
urgent need for training of both the parties on the labour laws of
the country and also on fa ir  negotiating procedures. I f  both the
parties could be made well aware of the various provisions of the
labour laws and corporation policies, the communication gap between
them might reduce which, in turn, might help in effective settlement 
r7?i
of disputes.1- J
6.5.2. Corporation Level Bargaining
As already stated in Chapter IV, an in-depth investigation into the 
corporation level collective bargaining system could not be 
undertaken. Eight employees and labour relations managers and/or 
officers of the corporations under study, who by virtue of the ir  
positions, had to be involved in the bargaining process, were 
interviewed and some previous collective bargaining agreements, 
signed between the corporations and corporation level workers' 
federations were collected. Whatever information could be 
collected, can reasonably describe the working of the process, 
however. Since only eight officers, two from each corporation, 
were interviewed, statis tica l analyses on their responses were 
considered to be of no practical value. Under the same 
consideration, information available in the small number of 
collective bargaining agreements were not put to any s tatis tica l 
analysis.
Legal basis of bargaining with workers' federations
The law provides that no industrial dispute shall be deemed to exist 
unless i t  has been raised in the prescribed manner by a CBA.E73] 
Investigation into the sample corporations found that there was no 
corporation level CBA in any of them except in BRTC, where one CBA 
existed, but i t  was in a deadlocked position at the time of the 
fieldwork for this study, due to the allegiance of its  office  
bearers to opposing politica l parties. In BRTC and BIWTC, central 
unions at the corporation level had strong organisational ties with 
plant level unions, which were actually branches of the central 
unions. In BIWTC, a CBA could not be determined due to inter-union 
r iva lry . In the case of BJMC and BPDB, there were multiple 
federations of workers, but none of them had links with a ll or the 
majority of the plant level CBAs.^^
In the absence of elected corportion level CBAs, how could 
corporation level workers' federations raise disputes to 
corporations? Corporation managements of the jute and e le c tr ic ity  
industries reported that there was no legal basis in this respect. 
This was just a mutual arrangement. Federations were authorised by 
the plant level CBAs to negotiate with the corporation on the ir  
behalf. In BRTC, plant level unions were the branches of the 
single central union which was a legal CBA. In BIWTC, there were 
three central unions, but because of extreme rivalry between them, 
none of them could be declared as a formal CBA, and as such no 
formal negotiation could occur there; a ll of the central unions 
wrote about workers' problems to corporation management, whenever 
needed, and management took executive action on them unilaterally  
without arranging any formal negotiating meeting. The following 
table depicts the pattern of plant level union organisations and 
the ir  relationship with the corporation level central union/workers' 
federations in the sample industries:
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TABLE 6 . 4
Relationship of the plant level CBAs with the corporation level
central unions/federations
Existence 
of Plant 
Level CBAs
Number of 
Central 
Unions or 
Federations
Corporation
(Industry)
Existence of 
corporation 
level CBA
Relationship of 
plant level 
unions with the 
corporation level 
central union/ 
federation
BJMC
(Jute)
Plant 
level CBAs 
are there
Multiple 
federations 
are there
No corpor­
ation level 
CBA is there
No federation has 
support of the 
majority of the 
basic CBAs
BPDB
1
jPlant Mul t ip le No corpor­ No federation has
(Elec- |level CBAs federations ation level support of the
t r ic i ty ) |are there 
1
are there CBA is there majority of the 
basic CBAs
BRTC
(Road
transport)
No plant 
level CBAs 
are there
Si ngle 
central 
union is 
there
A deadlocked 
CBA is there
Plant level unions 
are branches of 
the central union
BIWTC
(Water
transport)
No plant 
level CBAs 
are there
Multiple 
central 
unions are 
there
No corpor­
ation level 
CBA is there
Plant level unions 
are branches of 
the central unions
Bargaining system at corporation level
Were a ll federations allowed to submit demands and bargain with the 
corporations? As already stated, a formal CBA was there in BRTC, 
and this question was not applicable to them until only recently 
when the leadership crisis created a dedlocked situation. In 
BIWTC, a ll central unions could submit demands, but no formal 
negotiation with them took place. All federations of the BJMC 
were allowed to submit demands and the corporation management talked 
with a l l ,  irrespective of whether they were registered or not, even
though exp lic it  legal provisions are there to the effect that an 
unregistered union or federation shall not function as a trade 
union/federation.^^^ This was a sheer contravention of the law of 
the country. In the case of BPDB, however, a ll federations were 
not allowed to negotiate with the Board. In BPDB, before s itting  
for negotiations with a federation, at least two points about i t  
were examined - (a) i f  the federation submitting the demands was a 
registered one and (b) i f  such a federation had the support of the 
majority of the basic CBAs at the plant level. In practice, 
however, the la tte r  criterion could seldom be stuck to.
In the case of the jute industry (BJMC), the process of corporation 
level bargaining started with the submission of the charter of 
demands by one or more federations. Following the submission of 
demand charters, i f  the BJMC considered that i t  was suffic iently  
competent to pursue negotiations on the demands so placed, formal 
meetings were arranged with the representatives of the federations. 
Alternatively, i f  a ll or some of the demands involved a decision of 
the Government, then i t  arranged to send all those demands to the 
Ministry of Jute for necessary approval. In such cases, formal 
negotiation meetings with the federation representatives were held 
only when the BJMC received instructions from the Ministry. A 
scrutiny of the formal collective agreements so far made indicated 
that, in a ll cases, final agreements were made between the BJMC and 
the various federations of workers only after getting approval of 
the Ministry. In a ll of the five agreements so far made, only the 
federations supporting the political party in power were involved.
In three of the agreements, the Chairman, a ll directors, a ll  zonal 
managers, the Secretary and the Manager (Employee Relations) signed 
on behalf of the corporation and the federation representatives on 
behalf of the federation. The other two agreements were signed 
only by the Secretary and the Manager (Employee Relations) on behalf 
of ;the corporation.
In the case of e le c tr ic ity , the Board framed the following procedure 
for disposing of the charter of demands of different unions or 
federations of unions:
(a) On receipt of a charter of demands from a basic CBA or a
federation, the head of the enterprise concerned was to set 
the particulars of the demands in a proforma prescribed by 
the Board. The proforma has columns for description of the 
demands, comments of the enterprise head (usually a 
Superintendent Engineer), comments of the Chief Engineer 
concerned, comments of the Boards' Directorate of Labour 
Welfare, comments of the Board's Directorate of Personnel, 
comments of the Board's Directorate of Finance, comments of 
the Board's Directorate of Accounts and decision of the Board.
(b) After setting the demands in the proforma, the plant manager
was to submit the same to the next superior officer a fte r
recording his comments in the column meant for him within 3
days of the receipt of such demands.
(c) Each of the next offices was to record its  comments in the 
appropriate column of the proforma and send the same to the 
office mentioned in the column next to i t  within 3 days of 
the receipt the charter.
(d) After getting comments from the Directorates concerned, the 
Board was to decide as to how, with whom and when to s i t  for 
formal negotiations.
By examining the sample collective bargaining agreements between the 
BPDB and the federations of trade unions, two types of settlements 
could be found. F irs t ly , issues within the jurisdiction of the 
Board were settled in the periodical review meetings, usually held 
between the representatives of the federations of workers and the 
Board members. Secondly, issues that could not be settled at the 
review meetings were referred to the Ministry concerned.
Federation leaders also followed their  cases directly with the 
Minister-in-Charge. Issues involving major financial implications 
were thus settled in tr ip a r t i te  meetings between the representatives 
of the Board, federations of workers and the Government. The Board 
was represented by the Chairman, all members, the Secretary and the 
Director of Labour Welfare of the Board; the Government was 
represented by the Minister-in-Charge of Power, Water and Flood 
Control, the Secretary of the said Ministry and the Director of
Labour; and the federation was represented usually by the principal 
office bearers. As in the case of BJMC, so also in BPDB, the 
federations entering into agreements were the supporters of the 
political party in power.
A simple examination of the formal agreements, however, does not 
disclose a true picture of the real l i f e  industrial relations and 
dispute resolution process. The situation of a corporation 
le v e l / t r ip a r t i te  negotiation does not develop easily with a mere 
submission of a charter of demands by a particular federation.
Actual negotiations begin only after protracted struggles undertaken 
by the workers. The following is a typical example which describes 
how an agreement could f in a lly  be reached through a series of formal 
and informal actions on the part of the federation in question:
"The Bangladesh Power Development Board Jatiotabadi Sramik 
Dal submitted a charter of demands to the Board on 24th 
April 1979. But a ll negotiations between the federation 
and the Board failed and no settlement could be reached 
within a reasonable period even after the expiry of the 
statutory negotiation period. The workers and the 
federation leaders held several unlawful assemblies and 
did some mischief to the Board's o ffic ia ls  concerned and 
as an extreme course of action kept the Board's office  
g h e r a o e d L ' f o r  five days (from 10th to 14th December 
1979). Under this deadlocked situation, the Chairman 
of the Board, after having repeated communications with 
the Ministry of Power, Water Resources and Flood Control, 
announced to the workers that the Ministry had agreed to 
s i t  in a t r ip a r t ite  negotiation meeting as quickly as 
possible, and accordingly, a t r ip a r t i te  meeting was held 
on 15th and 16th January 1980 with the State Minister of 
the Ministry concerned in the chair. In the meeting the 
State Minister told that most of the demands raised by the 
federation, being concerned with national policies, were 
under the active consideration of the Government. The 
federation leaders were not satisfied with this statement 
and demanded a specific deadline within which to accept 
their demands. The State Minister then assured the 
workers that the final decision on their demands would be 
given within one month from the date of the meeting; but 
nothing was done by the Government within the fixed time 
l im it .  The Sramik Dal then announced a programme for a 
30-hour hunger strike with effect from 21st March. The 
Minister concerned came again into the scene and requested 
the workers' representatives to call off this strike by 
assuring the fulfilment of their demands, and acordingly 
another t r ip a r t i te  meeting was held on 27th March and a 
final agreement was signed between..the Ministry, the Board 
and the federation in question.*-/ / J
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As another example of the use of coercive Informal practices In 
resolving Industrial disputes In the public sector, the remarkable 
case of the nationalised banks (1981) Is also worth mentioning In 
this context.
"In February 1981, the managements of the various 
nationalised banks, under the undue pressure of the 
Bangladesh Bank Employees Federation, a national level 
union having the blessings of the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party (the then political party in power), were compelled 
to allow illegal promotions and advance increments to a ll  
bank employees without having any prior approval of the
Government On the basis of the recommendations of an
Investigation Committee appointed in this context, the 
Government decided to recover from the employees a ll  
excess monies they had received through reorganisation of 
their service and salary structures, in violation of the 
Government's New National Pay Scales of 1977. All bank 
employees unitedly protested against this Government 
decision and resorted to violent demonstrations and
humiliated managements in many branch and regional offices  
by abuses..... A state of complete indiscipline and
lawlessness prevailed in the banking sector  (Under
the situation), managements were directed to dismiss the 
unruly employees, including the office bearers of the
union  Accordingly, mass dismissals began from 22nd
May 1981. 800 employees - mostly of the Sonali Bank (the
largest commercial bank in the nationalised sector) - from 
different levels were sacked from service on the same day.
  The union leaders became furious at this drastic
action. On 23rd May, the union leaders and the dismissed
.employees gheraoed the head office of the Sonali Bank and
confined the management for several hours without
communication with the outside world  At one stage the
demonstrators became so aggressive that they unitedly 
attacked the offices of the General Manager and the 
Managing Director of..the bank and caused serious physical 
injuries to them.L'°J
The last stage of the corporation level bargaining process was the 
implementation of the agreement. The corporations, after signing 
the agreement arranged to send the copy of the same to the heads
of the plants for implementation. The heads of the plants then got
the agreement ra tif ied  by their respective CBAs. This ra t if ic a t io n
was essential because, as noted earlie r , none of the federations had
the support of a ll  the basic CBAs in the industry concerned.
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Issues bargained at the corporation level
The demands raised and negotiated at the industry level were not 
very different from those raised at the plant level. In fact, 
issues which could not be resolved at the plant level became the 
subject-matter of bargaining at the corporation level. The issues 
negotiated, as obtained from the sample agreements, could be broadly 
divided into two types - financial and non-financial.
The financial issues included were wages, arrear wages, wage 
adjustment, bonus, fringe benefits, arrear fringe benefits, 
deduction of house rent, ration subsidy, norm of efficiency, 
increment, arrear increments, incentive bonus, fringe benefits to 
badli workers, paid holidays, payment for idle hours, cost of 
hospitalisation, benefit for major accidents, reward for good 
attendance, food and canteen subsidy, free ferry service, various 
technical allowances etc.
The non-financial issues, on the other hand, included regular supply 
of materials and spare parts, disci piinary actions, recruitments, 
promotions, transfers, non-paid holidays, mode of payment, effective  
date of agreement, period of agreement etc. One aspect of the 
negotiation on demand charters at the corporation level was that 
most of the non-financial demands received very l i t t l e  attention and 
importance in the negotiation process.
Problems of corporation level bargaining
The corporation managements identified the following specific 
problems in relation to corporation level bargaining with the 
federation representatives:
(1) In the absence of an elected CBA at the corporation level i t  
was very d i f f ic u lt  to talk to and communicate with a ll  the 
federations of unions.
(2) The Wage Commission recommendations could not be contravened.
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(3) The corporations did not have fu ll authority to negotiate; 
Government approval was necessary in many cases.
(4) The federations often placed unreasonable demands (e.g. 100% 
recruitment from withi n).
(5) Some demands of the federations involved heavy finance beyond
the capacity of the corporations.
(6) Some federation representatives were very arrogant and
uncooperative.
The major impediments on the way to effective corporation level 
bargaining, as identified by the corporation managements, were 
reasonably similar to those identified while analysing plant level 
collective bargaining, and similar measures, as were suggested in 
relation thereto might also be suggested to improve the 
effectiveness of corporation level bargaining.
6.6 Relative Use of the Institutional Machineries for Resolving
Plant Level Disputes
Before concluding this Chapter on the direct negotiation, a note on 
the relative use of the institutional dispute resolution 
machineries, in disposing of the plant level cases should perhaps be 
worthwhile. In an earlie r  section, i t  was pointed out that only 
31% of the plant level cases could somehow be resolved at the plant 
level. But what happened to the rest? Appendix B.12 indicated 
that a vast majority (59% of the total cases) were referred to the 
corporations, only 6% were referred to the conciliators and 4% to 
the labour courts.
But what happened to the cases referred to the corporations? Were
they settled at that level? The corporations could settle only 52%
of the cses so referred and the other 48% could not be settled at
T79lthe corporation level. J
The next question which logically came up was: what happened to the
cases that could not be settled at the corporation level? How were 
they resolved? Further examination of those cases revealed that
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about 30% of them were referred to the labour courts, about 25% to 
the relevant Ministries and 11% to the conciliators. Strikes 
occurred in 5% of such cases and the remaining 30% were not 
taken any further.
Thus, cases to conciliation were referred from two levels - (a) some 
directly from the plants and (b) others indirectly via the 
corporations. In an attempt to examine whether cases referred to 
conciliation could be resolved at that level, i t  was found that the 
conciliation machinery could not settle more than 70% of the cases 
referred to them.^-1 The next point of interest was - what 
happened to the cases fa iled at the conciliation level? A large 
number of such cases (about 39%) were referred to labour courts,
23% sent back to corporations and about 8% to special committees 
consisting of workers' representatives, corporation o ff ic ia ls  and 
o ffic ia ls  of the Ministry. The rest were either unsettled or not 
proceeded with any further.
Cases to labour courts were, thus, referred in three ways - (a) some 
directly from the plant leve l, (b) some after fa ilure at the 
corporation level and (c) some after the fa ilure of the conciliatory 
efforts. The Ministries and the labour courts were the ultimate 
destination of industrial disputes in the public sector - the 
Ministries for interest disputes and the labour courts for rights 
di sputes.
For a clearer grasp of the relative use of the institutional dispute 
resolution machineries, the total number of disputes examined at the 
plant level might be taken to be 100%, and the resolutions at each 
particular stage and referrals to subsequent stages might be 
expressed as direct fractions of 100. By using this approach, a 
flow chart (Figure 6.3) clearly shows the percentage of total plant 
level disputes resolved at each level of the whole dispute 
resolution process. I t  is obvious from this Chart that the 
majority of the disputes (42%) were resolved at the corporation 
level, 31% at the plant level, 15% at the labour court leve l, 7.5%
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at the Ministerial level and only 4.5% at the conciliation level.
The corporation level has been the most frequently used, while 
conciliation has been the least used machinery in resolving disputes 
in the public sector industries in Bangladesh.
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NOTES
1. Henceforth the term, "Management" will be used to refer to the 
plant management, unless otherwise specified.
2. Henceforth the term, "collective bargaining agent (CBA)" w ill  
be used to refer to the plant level CBA or the basic CBA, 
unless otherwise stated.
3. Henceforth the term, "corporation" w ill be used to mean the 
Head Office of the industries covered by the study, although in  
the case of e le c tr ic ity  industry, the head office is termed as 
"Board".
4. Important among other labour laws are: the Payment of Wages 
Act, 1936; the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923; the 
Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965; the 
Factories Act, 1965 etc. (a ll adopted in Bangladesh).
5. Appendix B.10.
6. Appendix B . l l .
7. The designation of the officer dealing with labour problems 
varied in the sample industries. In subsequent discussions the 
term "Labour Officer" will be used to refer to this officer in 
any sample industry.
8 . Based on the impressions of the author during the course of 
interviews with plant level respondents. Also see Quddus, M.A. 
et a l. op. c i t .  pp. 56-57.
9. Ahmad and Company, J .U ., Chartered Accountants, A Study of the 
Jute Industry in Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1974, pp.57-61.
10. Khan, A.A. and Choudhury, N.K., A Study on the BJMC Scheme for  
Awards to the Best Workers, (Dhaka : Bureau of Business 
Research, University of Dhaka, 1982), mimeo, p .74.
11. Appendix B.8.
12. Appendix B.9.
13. Martuza, G., "Causes of Weak Trade Union Movement in Bangladesh" 
the Personnel, vol. 2, December, 1982, pp. 78-81; A l i , M., 
"Reluctance to Work: A Search for a Solution to this National 
Problem", the Personnel, vol. 1, December, 1981, pp. 8-13;
Islam, A.K.M.N., "Handling of Disciplinary Cases in Industry", 
the Personnel, vol. 1, December, 1981, p. 38; Imam, A., 
"Industrial Relations - Retrospect and Prospect in Bangladesh", 
the Personnel, vol. 1, December. 1981, p. 42; and Ahmed, I . ,  
"Workers Participation in Management", the Personnel, vol. 2 
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Inspection and Workers Welfare, sponsored by the Ministry of 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MACHINERIES - CONCILIATION
In the world of today, conciliation as a peace-making process is 
most frequently and extensively used in the f ie ld  of industrial 
relations. I t  aims to bring about a speedy settlement of disputes 
between management and workers without resort to work stoppages when 
these have already occurred. The steps that a conciliator may take 
to bring about an amicable settlement may vary from one country to 
another depending on the institutions developed in each country. ^  
But irrespective of the institutional system the function of a 
conciliator is to help .the disputant parties towards a mutually 
acceptable agreement, and hence conciliation is described as an 
"extension of collective bargaining with third party assistance," or 
simply as an "assisted collective b a r g a i n i n g . " ^ ]
The legal framework of the conciliation system in Bangladesh having 
been described in Chapter I I I ,  the purpose of ,the present Chapter is 
to see how this machinery actually operates in practice, 
particularly in relation to the public sector industrial disputes. 
With this end in view, the whole Chapter is divided into seven 
Sections. A brie f description of the structure of the conciliation  
service is f i r s t  given in Section one. Section two examines the 
effectiveness of conciliation in relation to certain goals of the 
industrial relations laws of the country, in dealing with the sample 
public sector industrial disputes examined at the conciliation  
level. The two sets of conditions - objective and subjective - 
affecting the effective operations of the conciliation service in 
general are taken up respectively in Sections three and four. The 
specific factors responsible for fa il ing  conciliation in industrial 
disputes in the public sector industries are analysed in Section 
five. Certain measures for enhancing the effectiveness of 
conciliation suggested by the parties directly involved, have been 
stated, in relation to the problems identified in the earlie r  
sections, in Section six. Finally, Section seven concludes the 
Chapter by making a short note on the role of conciliation in 
dealing with the public sector industrial disputes.
7 . 1  The S t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  C o n c i l i a t i o n  S e r v i c e
In Bangladesh, a permanent Directorate of Labour under the Ministry 
of Labour and Manpower is administered throughout the country to 
look after the labour situation and industrial relations obtaining 
in the country. The Directorate, being located at Dhaka, has four 
Divisional Offices in the four administrative Divisions of the 
country. Within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Offices, there 
are also Regional and Branch Offices located in the in terior c it ies  
of each Division. The administrative structure of the Directorate 
is shown in Figure 7.1.
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FIG. 7.1 Organisation Structure of the Directorate of Labour.
The Directorate headquarters are headed by a Director of Labour (DL) 
and each Divisional office by a Joint Director of Labour (JDL), each 
regional office by an Assistant Director of Labour (ADL) and each 
branch office either by a Labour Officer (LO) or by a Medical 
Officer. The headquarters has also an Additional Director of Labour 
(Add.DL). More than one Deputy Directors of Labour (DDL) and 
Assistant Directors of Labour also work in the headquarters and 
Divisional Offices. Provisions are there for at least one LO in 
each regional office and more than one LOs in each Divisional 
office.
The DL and the Add.DL have been notified to be the conciliators for 
the whole of the country, while the JDLs, DDLs, ADLs and LOs in the 
Divisional, regional and branch offices have been notified by the 
Government to be the conciliators in their respective areas under 
section 27 of the IRO, 1969.^  Thus a ll Officers of the 
Directorate of Labour down to the rank of LO, have been declared to 
be conciliators in Bangladesh, both for the private and public 
sector industries. The total number of officers actually doing the 
work of conciliation, as obtained from the Directorate headquarters, 
was estimated to be 30 (Table 7.1)
Table 7.1
Number of active conciliators in Bangladesh
| Director of Labour
1 I 
1 1 1
j Additional Director of Labour 1 1 1
j Joint Director of Labour 1 4 I
j Deputy Di rector of Labour 1 11 1
1 Assistant Director of Labour 1 22 |
j Labour Officer 1 6 Ii i
| Total number of Officers down to the
1 1 
I 1
j rank of Labour Officer I 45 I
j Less officers involved in functions other 1 !
| than conciliation, e.g. administration, 1 1
j registration of trade unions, etc. I 15 |I |
| Officers actually doing conciliation 1 30 | 
1 1
Before looking at the actual mechanics of the conciliation 
machinery, two given constraints on the operation of the process - 
one relating to the external environment and the other to the 
internal environment - need to be appreciated. F irs tly , under the 
present legal framework, as described in Chapter I I I ,  the 
conciliators at any level have very l i t t l e  to do in resolving 
disputes over the basic terms and conditions of workers in the 
public sector industries. Most unions in these industries are 
aware that the rigid industrial relations laws applicable to the 
public sector have made i t  almost impossibe to secure any concession 
from management either through direct negotiation or through 
conciliation unless the Government agrees or gives approval to such 
concessions. The workers and their unions, particularly those 
supported by the party in power, therefore, find i t  more propitious 
to lean heavily on Government support through political lobbying 
e.g. with the MPs at the local level and with the Minister concerned 
at the corporation or industry level, instead of going through the 
conciliation process. During the course of interviews with them, 
the conciliators cited many cases where the unions, after seeking 
the assistance of conciliators, by-passed them and started direct 
communication with the Minister concerned. In examining the 
possibility of effective conciliation over public sector industrial 
disputes, this environmental constraint should be kept in 
consideration.
Secondly, i t  w ill be demonstrated that the Directorate practises a 
very centralised structure of authority so that the conciliators at 
the branch and regional levels cannot act independently in 
performing their function of conciliation in the disputes referred 
to them from their respective areas of jurisdiction. The function 
of the conciliators at the lower level is mainly to keep a constant 
watch on the industrial relations situation in their respective 
localit ies and to send reports from time to time to the Divisional 
offices. All lower level conciliators report that they could 
conciliate only in minor cases coming largely from the private 
sector. In all important cases, they usually make arrangements for
conciliation meetings to be led by their superior officers from the 
Divisional/Head offices. They cannot prosecute a recalcitrant 
party without the permission of the Joint Director of Labour or the 
Director of Labour. Thus due to the lack of appropriate authority, 
the lower level conciliators could not do their job as effectively  
as they otherwise could.
7.2 Effectiveness of Conciliation
Measuring the effectiveness of conciliation is not an easy task 
because very few have ever attempted this venture and no one has yet 
laid down any method as to how the actual operations of the 
conciliation service can be measured. Mo standards are also 
available against which to examine the actual performance of the 
s e r v ic e .^
To examine the effectiveness of conciliation, particularly in 
relation to public sector industrial disputes, is rather more 
d i f f ic u l t ,  because whatever data are available from the Directorate 
of Labour are a ll aggregate data and not segregated into public and 
private sectors. However, based mainly on the fie ld  data, an 
attempt has been made in this section to see how far certain goals 
of laws could be achieved in the conciliation of public sector 
industrial disputes in Bangladesh.
7.2.1 Quickness in intervention
The law does not specifically provide when the conciliator should 
start intervention after a dispute has been reported to him. The 
law only provides a maximum time l im it  within which the conciliator 
should dispose of the dispute. I t ,  however, states that he should 
call the f i r s t  conciliation meeting "as soon as possible".
While examining the conciliation level cases, number of days within 
which notice of the f i r s t  meeting was issued, were recorded. I t  was 
assumed that the intervention practically started when the 
conciliator, after examining the va lid ity  of the locus standi of the 
applicant, proceeded to issue to the parties a notice of the f i r s t  
meeting. I t  was found that this notice was issued to the parties
within an average period of 6 days with a standard deviation of 
-  4 days. In 96% of the cases, notices were given within 14 
days.^1 Given a normal conciliation period of 30 days in the 
f i r s t  in s ta n c e ,^  with  further provisions for continuing 
conciliation even after the expiry of the normal period^} and the 
formalities involved in verifying the representativeness of the 
applicant, time taken in starting the conciliation as noted above, 
does not seem very unreasonable.
7.2.2 Adherence to time allowed
The normal statutory period for conciliation, as applicable at 
present, is 30 days. I f  the conciliator fa ils  to settle a dispute 
within this normal period, the aggrieved party is to serve a 21 days 
notice of work stoppage on the other party, with a copy of this 
notice being given to the c o n c i l ia to r .^  I t  is to be noted that 
the conciliator is to continue to conciliate in the dispute 
notwithstanding the notice of work s t o p p a g e . 7 ^ 5  -the total 
conciliation period, in fact, comes to 51 days.
The analysis of the conciliation level cases revealed that, on the 
average, 41 days were needed to conclude the conciliations. 64% of 
the cases were concluded within the normal statutory period of 30 
days and 83% of the cases within 50 days (normal period plus work 
stoppage notice period), but the remaining 17% of the cases took as 
many as 51-250 d a y s .^ ^  Some inter-industry differences as to the 
time taken in concluding conciliation should be noted in this 
context. Whereas 96% of the cases in water transport were 
concluded within the normal 30 day statutory period, the 
corresponding percentages for e le c tr ic ity ,  jute and road transport 
were 82, 56 and 48 respectively. Again, whereas a ll of the cases 
in water transport were concluded within 50 days, the percentage of 
cases concluded within the same period in e le c tr ic ity , jute and 
road transport were respectively, 89, 81 and 7 6 . ^ ^  Thus contrary 
to the findings of direct negotiation in this respect, conciliation  
cases in water transport and e le c tr ic ity  were concluded relative ly  
promptly than those in jute and road transport. Inter-industry 
variations in the issues involved in disputes, the result of 
conciliation and the reasons for fa il ing  conciliation largely
explain this variation in the time taken in concluding conciliation. 
As w ill  be demonstrated in subsequent sections, most cases from 
the water transport and e lec tr ic ity  involved "rights issues" which 
were like ly  to be less amenable to conciliation. Regarding the 
outcome of conciliation, most cases from these two industries were 
found to be unsuccessful, probably giving l i t t l e  scope for extended 
conciliation. In the absence of valid CBAs in water transport, 
probably the conciliation process either could not start, or where 
started, did not continue for long.
Thus i t  is evident that although the normal statutory conciliation  
period of 30 days could not be adhered to in more than one-third of 
the cases, only 17% of the cases remained unresolved after the work 
stoppage notice period. Since provision is also there for further 
extension of the conciliation period with the consent of both the 
parties, the goal of law regarding the adherence to time in 
concluding conciliation in the public sector labour disputes seems 
to be reasonably achieved.
The views of the parties and conciliators are worth noting in this 
context. The vast majority of the parties (70%) thought the 
present statutory period to be either adequate or more than 
adequate. All of the conciliators interviewed disapproved any
move for an extension of the presently applicable statutory period 
by arguing that the presently allowed time is quite suffic ient 
(reported by 75%), or that such an extension w ill be frustrating to 
the workers (reported by 42%) or that the present time l im it  could 
be extended, whenever needed, with the consent of the parties
concerned (reported by 3 3 % ) .^ ]
That the present time provided for conciliation was adequate is also 
evident from the annual disposal rate of the total cases 
referred to the conciliators, as presented in Table 7.2. Over a
ten year period from 1973 to 1982, slightly more than 11% of the 
total cases for disposal remained pending. An abnormally high 
number of pending cases were observed in 1974 for reasons not known. 
With the exclusion of this abnormal year almost a ll (more than 99%) 
of the cases for disposal in each year or over the whole decade 
could be disposed of (column 5 of Table 7 .2 ).
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Table 7.2
Year-wise disposal of Conciliation cases 
in Bangladesh, 1973-82
Cases for | Cases dis- | Cases remain- | Disposal rate 1
I Year | disposal | posed of | ing pending | in percentages |
1 (1) I (2 ) 1 (3) 1 (4) 1 (5 )=(3)f(2) |
| 1973 | 1,645
!
| 1,465
1
| 180 1 89.1 |
| 1974 I 883 | 496 I 387 | 56.2 |
| 1975 | 469 | 462 | 7 | 99.9 I
I 1976 | 311 | 296 1 15 | 99.5 |
1 1977 | 276 | 266 1 10 | 99.6 |
| 1978 | 408 | 405 1 3 | 99.9 |
| 1979 | 361 | 346 1 15 | 99.6 |
| 1980 | 570 | 560 1 10 I 99.2 |
| 1981 | 673 1 641 I 32 | 99.5 |
| 1982 j 408 | 392 1 16 | 99.6 |
ITotal 1 6,004 | 5,329 | 675 | 8 8 .8  |
I Total * | 5,121 | 4,833 | 288 | 99.4 |
*  Excluding 1974.
Source:
7.2.3. Use of statutory powers
Whether the granting of statutory powers to conciliators might be 
helpful to effective conciliation is a matter of controversy. 
According to some, conciliation is a voluntary process and nothing
in the way of compulsion should be present,while according to
others, without some sort of legal compulsion, parties may not
cooperate with the conciliators to the fu lles t extent. In this
respect the economic, social and cultural contexts of a country are 
perhaps important. In the industrially developed countries like  
the U.K. and U.S.A., for example, where the parties have developed a 
sound basis of industrial relations and accepted an organised system 
of collective bargaining, the conciliators think that more powers 
would merely hurt their simple and cordial relations with both 
management and labour, who now go to them w i l l in g ly .^ - !  But in a 
developing country like  Bangladesh, where industrialisation is in 
its  nascent stage and where the parties are not yet so much used to 
the collective negotiation system, the law assumes that the granting 
of some statutory powers might fa c i l i ta te  participation of the 
hesitant parties in the conciliation meetings.
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In fact, the industrial relations laws in Bangladesh have made the 
non-appearance of the parties before the conciliator a punishable 
offence and granted certain powers to him, including the powers to 
inspect any books or documents of the enterprise concerned, to enter 
into its  premises and require any person about the dispute in 
question and to make any suggestion or modification in the offers of 
the parties i n v o l v e d . C o n s i d e r i n g  all these powers given to 
the conciliator, the system of conciliation in Bangladesh should 
better be called mediation. Mediation is a broader term than 
conciliation. According to K e r r ,^ ^  mediation occurs at four levels
of intensity: (a) where the mediator convenes the parties and
transmits their offers back and forth; (b) where the mediator makes 
suggestions and raises considerations of his own; (c) when the 
mediator makes possible recommendations; and (d) where the mediator 
tr ies  to manipulate the situation against the wishes of the 
representatives of the parties. The f i r s t  level of mediation is ,  
in general, accepted as conciliation. But in Bangladesh the 
conciliators can go up to the second level of mediation by 
suggesting concessions or modifications to either of the disputant 
parties, in addition to enjoying the powers as stated above.
The laws have conferred the above powers to the conciliators with a
view to enhancing the effectiveness of conciliation. How 
frequently did the conciliators use these powers in conciliating in 
the public sector industrial disputes? Were these powers really  
helpful to the conciliators in enhancing the effectiveness of 
conciliation? In response to a question of how frequently they had 
to use legal powers, slightly more than 77% of the conciliators 
interviewed were equally divided between "either always or 
frequently" and "sometimes" in having used legal powers. Less than 
one-quarter (23%) of the conciliators reported that they used these 
powers only r a r e l y . j n response to another question on whether 
they thought the parties would have cooperated with them in the 
absence of the ir  legal powers, an overwhelming majority (70%) of 
them reported that they would have "never" cooperated.^ 0 ] in 
response to a somewhat related statement, 58% of the plant
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management, 73% of the CBA leaders, 37% of the corporation 
management and a ll of the conciliators either strongly or slightly  
agreed that the compulsory conciliation service had significantly  
reduced the number of strikes in Bangladesh.^ 1 ]
Conciliators in Bangladesh not only thought their present powers to 
be necessary,^but, in fact, a majority of them urged for some more 
powers. More than 60% of the conciliators thought their present 
powers to be inadequate.£2 2 ] what additional powers were they 
wishing for? Slightly more than 62% of the conciliators wishing 
more powers stated that powers should be given to them to directly  
prosecute the recalcitrant party, 50% wished some arbitrary powers 
to bind the parties, slightly more than 37% fe l t  their status to be 
increased so that management feels an obligation to care for them. 
Other extension of powers desired were: ensuring free and unhindered 
entrance of the conciliators into the premises of the plants in 
question (desired by 25%), simplification of the penalty procedures 
(desired by 25%), empowering the local conciliators to take 
independent action in the cases within their te rr i to r ia l  
jurisdiction (desired by 25%), and, requiring the labour courts to 
consider the conciliator's suggestions (desired by 1 2 . 5% ).^ 3 ]
Thus the present powers granted to the conciliators in Bangladesh do 
not seem to have raised any controversy among the conciliators in 
that the majority of them were wishing some more powers, in addition 
to those already given, and some others thought the present powers 
to be quite adequate.
7.2.4 Settlement of financial issues
One important law governing the industrial relations in the public 
sector industries is the State Owned Manufacturing Industries 
Workers (Terms and Conditions of Services) Act, 1974, which provides 
that eight financial terms and conditions of service of the workers 
in the public sector industries w ill  be fixed by the Government and 
that no person should allow any amount on these issues in excess of
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what the Government d e t e r m i n e s . £24] How far was this law adhered 
to? An examination of the issues in disputes and the result of 
conciliation on such issues is necessary to get an answer to this 
question.
Issues in disputes were obtained in two ways - by directly asking 
the conciliators about what matters they usually had to conciliate  
in the public sector industries and by objectively examining the 
sample conciliation cases. The issues in disputes, as reported by 
the conciliators, are categorised according to ILO Practical 
Guide^S] and shown in Table 7.3 which shows that about 42% of the 
issues related to the anomalies in and interpretation and 
implementation of the statutory financial terms and conditions, as 
determined by the Government.
TABLE 7-3
D is tr ib u tio n  of the c o n c ilia to rs *  c la s s if ie d  
according to th e ir  report on the issues frequently  
c o n c ilia te d **  in the pub lic  sector industries
Issues usually  c o n c ilia te d JNumber of 
(Responses
Percent o f)  
Responses (
Statutory fin a n c ia l b en e fits : I 15 41.7 I
Anomalies in the pay and wages structure  
Implementation o f the Governmment/
I 9 25.0 1
corporation c irc u la rs /o rd e rs 1 3 8.3  (
In te rp re ta tio n  o f s ta tu to ry  b en e fits : 1 3 8.4 |
Arrear wages and o ther payments 1 1 2.8  1
Bonuses I 1 2.8 J
Post-service b en efits  (g r a tu ity ) 1 1 2.8 |
Non-statutory fin a n c ia l b en e fits : 1 8 22.4 J
Various allowances (s p e c ia l) 1 2 5.6 |
Payment fo r id le  hours 1 2 5.6 |
Overtime allowances 1 1 2.8 |
Labour w e lfa re  matters 1 2 5.6 |
Liverage f 1 2.8  I
R ight disputes: I 13 36.1 J
Compensation fo r  accidents I 1 2.8  |
D is c ip lin a ry  m atters ( 7 19.4 |
Other personal m atters 1 5 13.9 |
Total ( '"36 1 0 0  i
* Total number of respondents (N) = 13.
**  Multiple answers were permitted.
The non-statutory financial benefits which were, in fact, amenable 
to conciliation comprised only slightly more than 22% of the issues. 
Rights issues, comprising 36%, for which a separate adjudication 
machinery was in operation, s t i l l  came to the conciliators. I t  
appears that the conciliators did not conciliate in illega l demands 
for any basic change in financial terms and conditions fixed by the 
Government.
The issues obtained through the examination of the 190 conciliation  
cases are categorised in a similar way and shown in Table 7.4.
This Table shows that about 40% of the issues related to statutory 
financial benefits, one-quarter of which were about anomalies and 
interpretations and three-quarters were for basic changes in 
financial allowances fixed by the Government. I t  was found that
TABLE 7.4
Percentage d is tr ib u t io n  o f the c o n c ilia t io n  
cases* by reasons fo r  dispute^*
| Reasons fo r dispute Number o f 
Responses
Percent o f| 
Responses 1
1 S tatu tory  fin a n c ia l b en e fits : 398 39.3 1
I Pay anomalies 60 6.7 |
1 Implementation of the Governmment 
I and corporation c irc u la rs 31 3.1 |
1 I l le g a l demands: 299 29.5 |
I Bonus 78 7.7 |
| Fringe benefits 115 11.3 |
| Holidays and leaves 76 7.5 1
1 P ost-serv ice  bene fits  (G ra tu ity ) 30 3.0 1
1 N on-statutory fin a n c ia l b e n e fits : 193 19.1 |
1 Labour w e lfare  matters 94 9 .3  1
1 Special ad-hoc r e l ie fs 32 3.2 |
| Various special allowances 51 5 .0  1
I M iscellaneous arrears 16 1.6 J
| Factory adm in istra tion : 104 10.3 1
| Woric a llo c a tio n  and organ isation 47 4 .6  |
I Workers* representation in  various  
| Committees 12 1.2 1
| A dm inistration and d is tr ib u t io n  o f 
1 common funds 28 2 .8  |
| Prevention o f corruption by management 17 1.7 I
| R ight disputes: 237 23.3 |
| Physical working conditions 38 3-7 l
| D is c ip lin a ry  m atters 76 7.5 l
1 Other personal m atters 123 12.1 |
I U n fa ir  labour practices : 83 8 .2  l
1 I l le g a l  s tr ik e  or th re a t to  i l le g a l  
I s t r ik e 16 1.6 (
I O ther u n fa ir  p ractices  r e la t in g  to  
I trade union a c t iv i t ie s 26 2 .6  (
I M isbehaviour and harrassment by 
I management 41 4 .0  (
I Total 1U15 100.0 (
* Total number of cases (H) « 190.
**  Multiple Issues were Involved In most cases.
203
cases relating to anomalies and interpretations were either  
successful or not proceeded with and demands for basic changes a ll 
turned unsuccessful. The non-statutory financial benefits were 
involved in only 19% of the issues, most of which could be 
successfully conciliated. The non-financial interest disputes, 
mainly related to factory administration, accounted for slightly  
more than 10% of the issues and most of them turned unsuccessful. 
Rights disputes, including unfair labour practices, which were also 
adjudicable through the labour courts of the country, involved in 
slightly more than 31% of the total issues and most of them were 
either successful in conciliation or not proceeded with by the 
in it ia t in g  party.£26] Examination of the industry-wise issues in 
disputes revealed that most of the issues in water transport and 
e lec tr ic ity  were about "rights" as categorised in the Table.
Issues in road transport were mostly on non-statutory financial 
benefits and disciplinary matters. In the jute industry, on the 
other hand, predominance of any particular type of issues were not 
found. ^73
I t  is evident that in the conciliation proceedings in the public 
sector, the conciliators were always guided by the Government 
guidelines. In the non-bargainable interest disputes, the 
conciliators either did not intervene, or where intervened did not 
go beyond Government policies and guide!ines.^ 8 ] 8 q% 0f  the 
management held the view that the conciliators should follow the 
Government policies. Half of the CBA leaders,, on the other hand, 
thought that they should not stick to Government guidel i n e s , ^ ]  an(j 
possibly on that feeling, they raised some illegal demands before 
the conciliators, but almost a ll  of these demands were bound to fa i l  
either because the conciliators did not intervene in them or because 
they did not want to bring any basic change in them.
7.2.5. Success in signed agreements
One implied objective of the law is to encourage voluntary agreement 
not only by transmitting offers back and forth between the parties 
but also by suggesting to either party to the dispute such 
concessions or modifications in its  demands as are, in the opinion
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of the conciliator, l ike ly  to promote an amicable settlement of the 
dispute. I f  a settlement is arrived at, the conciliator is to send 
a report thereof to the Government together with a memorandum of 
settlement signed by the parties to the dispute.
In order to get an idea about the success rate of conciliation in 
the public sector industries, the conciliatdrs were asked to make, 
on the basis of the ir  personal experience, a self evaluation of 
their own success rate in the public sector industrial disputes. 
Gross variations were observed in their reports in this respect. 
Some, on the one hand, evaluated their success rate to be as low as 
less than 20%, while some, on the other hand, reported i t  to be as 
high as more than 80%, the mean reported success rate being about 
57%.£31] -phe content analysis of the conciliation cases, however, 
produced a somewhat contrasting and discouraging picture.
Agreements could be signed in only about 36% of the cases examined, 
about half of them being successful and the remaining half being 
partly successful.[32] Significant inter-industry differences as 
to the success rate may be noted, however. Most.of the cases in 
water transport and e lectr ic ity  were either unsuccessful or not 
proceeded with. The proportions of success and fa ilure were about 
the same in the jute industry. In the road transport industry, on 
the other hand, most of the cases were either partly successful or 
unsuccessful.[33] jhe reasons for such inter-industry differences 
in the success rate of conciliation will be examined in Section 7.5
Analysis of the aggregate dispute cases, which also included private 
sector disputes, published by the Department of Labour, indicated 
that the average success rate[34] 0f  conciliation in non-strike 
cases over a period of eight years was about 50% (Table 7 .5 ), while 
the average success rate in the strike cases over a period of ten 
years was only about 30% (Table 7 .6). This is supportive of the 
fact that a strike has a direct impact on the success of 
conciliation. Remedial conciliation after the strike issues had 
been made public was more d i f f ic u lt  than preventive conciliation  
before a deadlock developed. The mean success rate, considering 
both type of cases together was found to be 45.5%.
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TABLE 7.5
Percentage D is tr ib u tio n  o f the in d u s tria l disputes not Invo lv ing  stoppage 
of work according to re s u lt o f c o n c ilia t io n , Bangladesh, 1973 -  80
Total
Outcome of C o n c ilia tio n  ( in  %)
! Year
Number 
of Cases 
C o ncilia ted
Successful
P a rtly
Successful Unsuccessful
I Not j 
1 Proceeded 1 
I Wi th 1 
1 1
Not
A va ilab le Total |
11973 1465 33.8 22.7 23.8
1 1 
1 19.5 | 
_ | ___________ |
0 .2 100.0 |
11974 496 43.4 15.9 32.5 1 5.6  |
_  i __ _______ i
2 .6 100.0 |
11975 462 56.3 17.3 17.3 1 9.1  | - 100.0 |
11976 296 43.9 0 .3 43.9 I 10.8 1 1 .0 100.0 |
11977 266 34.6 8 .6 51.1 | 5 .6  1 - 100.0 |
11978 405 24.9 3.4 57.3 1 14.3 1 - 100.0 I
11979 346 32.9 2.9 51.7 1 12.4 | - 100.0 |
11980 560 32.9 3 .0 52.3 1 11-7 1 
1 1
- 100.0 |
| TOTAL 4296 37.0 12.9 36.3
I 1 
I 13.3 I 
1 I
0 .4 100.0 1
Source: Bangladesh Labour Journal Volumes 1 -7 , Department of Labour, Government o f
Bangladesh
TABLE 7.6
Percentage D is tr ib u tio n  of the in d u s tria l disputes involv ing stoppage of work 
(s tr ik e s )  c la s s if ie d  according to methods of settlem ent, Bangladesh, 19/3-1982
| Year |
Absolute 
Number of 
Di sputes
Methods of Settlem ent ( in  %)
Di rec t 
Negotiation
Mediation by 
C o nc ilia to rs
1
| Unconditional 
| Return to Work 
1
Others Total |
| 1973 | 58 51.7 22.4
1
I 25.9 - 100,0 |
I 1974 | 32 25.0 28.1 | 46.9 - 100.0 |
1 1975 | 2 50.0 - 1 50.0  
1_________ ___ - 100.0 |
| 1976 | 5 20.0 40 .0 | 40.0 - 100.0 |
1 1977 | 22 9.1 18.2 | 72.7 - 100.0 |
| 1978 | 89 35.9 59.5 I 4 .5 - 100.0 |
| 1979 | 96 20.8 38.5 | 34.4 6 .2 100.0 |
1 1980 | 104 29.3 14.3 1 4.1 52.2 100.0 J
| 1981 | 80 40.0 22.5 | 31.2 6 .2 100.0 |
| 1982 | 55 60.0 21 .8 | 1.8  
1
16.4 100.0 |
| TOTAL | 543 32.8 29.8
1
| 20.8  
1
16.6. 100.0 |
Source: Bangladesh Labour Journal, Volumes 1 - 8 ,  Department o f Labour, Government o f
Bangladesh.
The graphical representation of the success rates of conciliation, 
as depicted in Figure 7.2, reveals that although no discernible 
trend could be ascertained in the success rate of the strike cases, 
definite decreasing trends in the success rate of the non-strike and 
combined (both strike and non-strike) cases are clearly v is ib le .£35]
70--
Strike Cases
Non-Strike Cases60--
AU Cases
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Success ao-- 
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20- -
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Year
NOTE Details of outcome of conciliation cases relating to 1901 and 1982 
were not available.
FIG 7.2 SUCCESS RATE OF CONCILIATION IN BANGLADESH, 1973-1982
7.2.6. Reference to arbitration
Another objective of the industrial relations law in Bangladesh 
governing the conciliation process has been enunciated in Section 31 
of the IR0, 1969 which provides that -
" I f  the conciliation fa i ls ,  the conciliator shall try to 
persuade the parties to agree to refer the dispute to an 
Arbitrator, who may be any person borne on a panel to be 
-maintained by the Government or any other person agreed 
upon by the parties."
To ascertain how far this objective was achieved, the conciliators 
were asked to state i f  they tried to refer the unsuccessful cases to 
an arbitrator. About 54% of them answered the question in the 
affirmative and the rest in the negative. Those who answered in the 
affirmative were, in turn, asked to state how frequently they 
succeeded in such reference attempts. All of them reported that 
they either rarely or never s u c c e e d e d . I n  fact, none of the 
unsuccessful cases examined were referred to the arbitrator. A 
considerable reluctance on the part of both the conciliators and the 
parties is evident. Why they were so reluctant towards this 
provision of law has been taken up in the next Chapter.
Of the various goals of law examined above, the two seem to be 
important -  adherence to statutory time provided and success in 
signed agreement. As to time adherence, the performance of the 
conciliation machinery has been found to be fa ir ly  reasonable. But 
mere adherence to time is not a l l .  For measuring the effectiveness 
of operations of the conciliation service, the most important 
criterion to look at is perhaps its  rate of success in signed 
agreements, in terms of which actual achievement has been found to 
be discouraging. What factors are responsible for this 
unsatisfactory performance of the conciliation machinery? The 
subsequent three sections will be concerned with these aspects. The 
factors generallyaffecting the effective operation of the machinery 
will be taken up f i r s t  and then the specific factors responsible for 
the fa ilu re  of conciliation in the public sector industrial disputes 
will be examined.
7.3 Objective Conditions under which 
Conciliation Machinery Works
The conciliation of industrial disputes in any country is 
generally affected by two sets of conditions. These are, on the one 
hand, the objective conditions - factors external to the 
conciliators - and on the other, the subjective conditions - factors 
which relate to the conciliators themselves and their individual 
performance. The present section handles the objective conditions. 
The subjective dimensions will be looked at in the next section.
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The objective conditions include the aspects like the nature of the 
issues involved in disputes, the system of collective bargaining, 
the importance accorded to conciliation in the national system of 
dispute settlement, the attitude of the parties towards 
conciliation, the conciliators' workload and the administrative 
problems of the conciliation service i ts e l f .  Each of these 
conditions w ill  be examined in the context of Bangladesh, 
particularly insofar as they relate to the public sector industries.
7.3.1. Issues amenable to conciliation
In various countries, the law i ts e l f  distinguishes between various 
types of disputes and provides for different settlement procedures 
on the basis of the nature of issues involved. The ILO has, 
considering the practices of various countries, identified the 
following four distinct types of d isputes:^-!
(a) Interest disputes:E38] These disputes arise over economic 
matters of give and take. There are no definite standards for 
settlement of such disputes and as such any settlement on these 
issues essentially depends on a compromise between the parties. In 
the context of Bangladesh, the IRO, 1969, as amended up-to-date, 
provides for the settlement of these disputes through direct 
negotiation between the parties, and fa iling  direct negotiation, 
through conciliation.
(b) Grievance disputes: £393 These disputes arise from day to day 
workers' grievances or complaints. For the settlement of this type 
of dispute, there are some more or less definite standards, e.g. 
relevant provisions of the collective agreement, employment 
contract, works rule or law, and customs and conventions. In 
Bangladesh, for settling disputes of this type, a separate 
adjudication machinery, the labour courts, is there in operation, 
and as such these are not usually amenable to conciliation.
(c) Disputes over unfair labour practices: This type of dispute 
usually includes attempts by the management of an undertaking to 
discriminate against workers for being trade union members or for 
doing trade union ac tiv ities . Undue and unconstitutional pressure
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by the trade union or management to sign agreements through coercion 
and intimidation are also included in this type of disputes. In 
Bangladesh quite extensive l is ts  of unfair practices on the part of 
both management and workers have been provided in the la w .^ -1  
These disputes are to be settled through the labour courts and are 
not, therefore, within the purview of conciliation machinery in 
Bangladesh.
(d) Recognition disputes: This type of dispute arises when the
management of an undertaking refuses to recognise a trade union. In 
Bangladesh management is legally bound to recognise a registered 
trade union and specific provisions are there in the law regarding 
the requirements for and the process of getting a union 
registered.^41] j f  a n y  dispute arises in this respect, the labour 
adjudication machinery is to handle i t  and such a dispute should not 
normally come before the conciliator in Bangladesh.
Thus, of the four types of dispute identified by the ILO, only the 
f i r s t  category of disputes i .e .  the interest disputes, usually lend 
themselves best to conciliation in Bangladesh. For the other three 
types, i t  is the labour courts which are usually to deal with them. 
I t  should, however, be noted that there is no legal bar to settling  
the adjudicable disputes through bipartite negotiation or t r ip a r t i te  
conciliation.
7.3.2. System of collective bargaining
The collective bargaining practices, which vary from one country to 
another, have an important bearing on the effectiveness of 
conciliation.^ 1 ]  j ^ e collective bargaining system in Bangladesh 
has been taken up in detail in Chapter VI, in which i t  has been 
pointed out that bargaining over economic disputes, also usually 
amenable to conciliation, has been allowed only in the private 
sector. Major financial terms and conditions of service in the 
public sector industries are fixed by the Government and not 
determinable through collective bargaining and/or conciliation. 
Economic issues, i f  any, other than those within the Government's 
jurisdiction, and problems exclusively local to the plant or 
industry concerned are collectively determinable and hence amenable
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to conciliation. Thus, the law has kept a very limited scope for 
conciliation in the Bangladesh public sector industries. One plant 
manager observed:
"After nationalisation, the role of the conciliators has 
been significantly reduced. Over the las t twelve years, 
we have almost forgotten their existence."
7.3.3. Importance given to conciliation
The chance of success in conciliation is greatly affected by the 
importance accorded to i t  and the chances of reference to 
arbitration or adjudication.^ 3 ]  jhe Government of Bangladesh 
accords utmost importance to peaceful settlement of interest 
disputes through direct negotiation and conciliation. In the event 
of fa ilure of direct negotiation, neither of the parties are allowed 
to resort to work stoppage without getting a fa ilure ce rt if ica te  
from the concil ia to r .^ 4 ]  Thus the conciliation, as a method of 
dispute settlement, has been made compulsory on the parties 
concerned, at least to s it  in sessions, i f  not to reach an 
agreement.
I t  is sometimes argued that when compulsory arbitration or 
adjudication is available to the parties, the task of the 
conciliator may become more d i f f ic u lt  because in that case either  
side may think that i t  can obtain more favourable terms under an 
arbitration award and may feel tempted to avoid a settlement by 
concilia tion.^45] j n Bangladesh, although there is a provision in 
the law for the parties to go to the arbitrator or labour court to 
enforce a binding agreement after the fa ilure of c o n c i l ia t io n ^ ]  
this tendency of the parties in the public sector industries is 
d if f ic u lt  to prove because until today not even a single interest 
dispute from the public sector was ever referred to the arbitrator  
or the labour court.
7.3.4. Parties in conciliation
There is l i t t l e  doubt that the two important factors restraining the 
capacity of conciliation to achieve compromise are those relating to 
the nature of the disputants and the pressure under which they work. 
The chance of successful conciliation is l ike ly  to be lessened i f
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the parties lack motivation to negotiate due to a lack of mutual 
trust and confidence on the one hand, and i f  they are under f ire  
within their own organisation or feel bound to compete in militancy 
with rival organisations on the other.^ 7 ]
More than 90% of the CBA leaders and the conciliators either 
strongly or slightly agreed with the statement that management of 
the public sector enterprises were reluctant to attend the 
conciliation meetings.^ 8 ]  cBAs, on the other hand, seem to be
quite w illing to attend such meetings. Only 8% of the plant 
management and one-quarter of the corporation management slightly  
agreed with the CBAs reluctance to attend conciliation proceedings. 
All of the conciliators, however, reported that the CBAs had no 
reluctance to attend conciliation m e e t i n g s . T h e  unwillingness 
of management to appear before the conciliators is also evident from 
the number of notices served on the second party, usually 
management, calling i t  to appear or represent in the conciliation  
proceedings. On the average, 2.2 notices were needed to bring the 
management to the tr ip a r t i te  negotiation table. Only slightly more 
than one-quarter (27%) of the management responded at the f i r s t  
notice and in one-third of the cases, i t  needed 3 or 4 notices.
On the point of parties' unwillingness, about one-quarter of the 
conciliators and labour court members fe l t  that unions usually did 
not try to solve problems through negotiation with management.£51] 
The same allegation was raised against management by about 60% of 
the conciliators and labour court members.^ 2 ]  ype parties' 
unwillingness is also evident from the distribution of the sample 
conciliation cases in terms of the number of meetings held. Due to 
a lack of cooperation on the part of management no meeting could 
be held in about one-quarter of the cases examined; in another one- 
quarter of the cases as many as 3 to 7 meetings were held and the 
rest involved one to two meetings.£53]
Though unions were more enthusiastic than management to attend 
conciliation meetings and to settle disputes through negotiations, 
serious inter-union rivalry usually stood as a bottleneck in the way 
of sensible n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h a t  the parties in the public
sector industries lacked mutual trust and confidence was pointed out 
in the previous Chapter. Under such attitudes and behavioural 
characteristics of the parties, concilatory efforts could hardly be 
expected to achieve any reasonably successful outcome.
7.3.5. Conciliator workload
I t  is likely  that the more over-burdened a conciliator is ,  the less 
effectively can he perform his functions. The number of cases 
handled by a conciliator over a specified period may be one measure 
of his workload. But this measure w ill be an imprecise one, in the 
sense that no two cases are similar and the magnitude of cris is  in 
each case is different from the other. S t i l l  in the absence of any 
other suitable criterion, this very rough measure might give some 
idea about his workload.
But a further problem arose. The number of cases handled by each 
conciliator was not available in the Department of Labour. The 
number of active conciliators and the total number of cases handled 
by them could be collected and an average workload per conciliator  
could be calculated (Table 7. 7) .
TABLE 7.7
Average w orkloads o f  an a c t iv e  c o n c i l ia to r  in  Bangladesh 
o ve r a p e rio d  o f  10 y e a rs . 19/3 -  1982
| Year S tr ik e
Cases
N o n -s tr ik e
Cases
T o ta l
Cases
(2+3)
Number o f  
A c tiv e  I 55-1 
C o n c il ia to rs
Average | 
W orkload | 
(4 S)  1
| 1 2 3 4 5 6 I
I 1973 58 1465 1523 30 50.8 |
1 1974 32 496 528 30 17.6 |
| 1975 2 462 464 30 15.5 |
1 1976 5 296 301 30 10.0 |
I 1977 22 266 288 30 9 .6  1
I 1978 89 405 494 30 16.5 |
I 1979 96 346 442 30 14.7 |
I 1980 104 560 664 30 22.1 |
1 1981 80 80 160 30 5.3 |
1 1982 55 88 143 30 4 .8  |
I TOTAL 543 4464 5007 300 16.7 1
Source: £**6]
The annual average workloads over a period of ten years have been 
depicted in Figure 7,3, which indicates a decreasing trend in 
workload per conciliator. Over a period of ten years, an average 
conciliator handled only 16.7 cases a year and 1.4 cases a month. 
Considering the cases handled by the conciliators in other 
countries, the conciliators in Bangladesh seem to be very 
underloaded. In New Zealand, for example, one mediator handled 
about 100 cases a year.
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FIG. 7.3 THE AVERAGE WORKLOAD PER CONCILIATOR OVER A 
TEN YEAR PERIOD IN BANGLADESH, 1973-82
That the conciliators were, in fact, underloaded was admitted by 
themselves. 46% of the conciliators strongly disagreed that they 
were overloaded. Less than one quarter (23%) of the conciliators 
interviewed, however, strongly agreed that they were overloaded. In 
a search to get an explanation to the ir  contrasting views, i t  was 
found that only the conciliators at the upper level thought 
themselves overloaded, possibly because, on the one hand, they had 
to remain busy with the Ministry and the Martial Law Authority for 
reasons not related to conciliation, and on the other hand, due to ' 
excessive centralisation, they had to work on and dispose of many
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routine f i les  related to administration and other functions of the 
Department of Labour.
The workload of the conciliators did not have any effect on the 
success rate of conciliation. This might be evident i f  one 
considers the workload graph (Figure 7.3) and the success rate 
graphs (Figure 7.2) together. The decreasing trends in a ll  these 
graphs indicate that the decreasing workload could not actually 
increase the chances of success, which, in other words, means that 
the increasing fa ilure rate in conciliation could not be explained 
by the amount of workload of the conciliators, but was to be 
explained by some other factors.
7.3 .6. Administrative problems of the Service
The conciliation machinery in Bangladesh operates under certain 
administrative problems which are very like ly  to have an adverse 
impact on the effectiveness of operations of the Service. All of 
the respondent conciliators reported that they had a shortage of 
trained conciliators and s taff, particularly at the lower level. 
Secondly, the administrative structure of the Service was reported 
(by 54%) to be very much centralised so that the local conciliators 
could not act on their own without the approval of the respective 
Divisional offices and sometimes of the Headquarters. Thirdly, 
slightly more than 46% of the conciliators mentioned that they had a 
shortage of transport for o ff ic ia l purposes. Fourthly, another 46% 
reported that they had to run their offices under very poor 
budgetary allocations. Conciliation proceedings continued for 
hours together, but in many cases, the representatives of the 
parties could not be offered even a cup of tea due to financial 
stringencies. F if th ly ,  conciliation offices were not properly 
equipped and furnished (reported by 38%). Sixthly, there was 
ashortage of office supplies (reported by 38%). Other problems 
mentioned by small percentages of the conciliators interviewed were 
lack of coordination on administrative matters between the officers  
(15%), shortage of space in the conciliators' offices (8%), d irty  
physical conditions of the concilation offices (8%), excessive 
business of the top level officers with the Ministry and the Martial 
Law Authority (8%), and outside interference in the normal work
(8%)J58]
215
7 . 4  S u b j e c t i v e  C o n d i t i o n s  o f  C o n c i l i a t i o n
Regarding the subjective conditions of conciliation in Bangladesh, 
attempts have been made to see the personal qualities of the 
conciliators, their background and professional qualifications in 
relation to those suggested by the specialists in the f ie ld .
7.4.1. Age
In the socio-cultural context of a country like  Bangladesh, other 
qualities remaining the same, the age factor of the conciliators 
might have an impact on the outcome of conciliation. In the social 
system of Bangladesh, parties may usually accept conciliation by a 
relatively older person of wisdom and sagacity. The age 
distribution of the conciliators indicates that about one-quarter 
(23%) of them were aged up to 35 years and the vast majority (77%) 
were aged between 36 and 55 years.^59] Their average age has been 
calculated to be slightly more than 42 years. Thus, by Bangladesh 
standards, most of the conciliators, particularly at the upper 
level were old enough to command respect from the parties.
7.4.2. Level of education
A conciliator, to do his job effective ly, should possess some 
professional qualifications. He should see himself as a repository 
of knowledge and experience. He should be well-versed in many 
branches of knowledge, including Industrial Relations, Personnel 
Management, Economics, Sociology, Employment Practices, etc.^61^
In the conciliation meetings, he should employ a ll his knowledge of 
travel, history, philosophy, art -  everything he commands -  for the 
purpose of i l lustration  or bringing a l i t t l e  variety that w il l  be 
appreciated by a l l . ^62] y0 extent do the educational level of 
the conciliators in Bangladesh meet these standards of knowledge?
46% of the conciliators interviewed were graduates. Some had 
educational level as low as S.S.C. (approximately 8%) and H.S.C. 
(approximately 8%). The postgraduates working in the service were 
only 38.5%. Only 15% had a Law degree and the vast majority had no
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knowledge in the relevant f i e l d s . i t  is to be noted that the 
postgraduates and those having specialisation in Law were a ll  
officers at the lower level (LOs and A D L s ) , ^ 4 ]  who usually had very 
l i t t l e  scope to intervene in the public sector disputes, and even 
where they intervened, they had no authority to act independently on 
their own due to legal re s tr ic t io n s ^ ^  and centralised structure of 
authority. The under-qualified people at the upper level was 
another cause of frustration among the qualified officers at the 
lower level. As one Labour Officer observed,
"I am a B.A.(Hons.), M.A., but have to work under a 
simple Intermediate, who is very much fixed in his 
ideas. I can't work independently; everything must 
go through my boss."
Thus the standards of knowledge and education of the overwhelming 
majority of the conciliators in Bangladesh do not seem to be 
reasonably adequate in view of the demands of the work they had to 
perform.
7.4.3. Previous job experience
I t  is like ly  that a conciliator who begins his career with a certain 
amount of previous training and experience should do better than one 
without such a background. What kind of job experiences or training  
did the conciliators in Bangladesh have before taking up their  
career as conciliators? About one-quarter of the conciliators 
interviewed joined fresh to the Service and had no previous 
experience; about one fourth were the clerical assistants of the 
Directorate, who were la ter  on promoted as conciliators; and the 
remaining half had a variety of experience - teaching, research 
assistance, trade unionism, holding offices in the Directorate or 
other temporary programmes of the Government and other private 
firm s.^ 6 ]  I t  is evident that very few of the conciliators had 
previous experience in the relevant fie lds.
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7 . 4 . 4 .  E x p e r i e n c e  as c o n c i l i a t o r
An experienced conciliator is expected to have handled various types 
of cases and been exposed to a wide variety of situations. In 
dealing with a case, an experienced conciliator can employ 
techniques he found useful in previous cases. Thus the more 
experienced a conciliator is , the better he is expected to do his 
work of conciliation. But what is the position of the Bangladeshi 
conciliators with regard to their experiences?
The law requires the conciliator to do the job of conciliation in a 
manner he deems fi1.1673 immediately on appointment, he is called 
upon to discharge his duties as a conciliator. There is no system 
of training for him either before or after being assigned with his 
new function. He has to depend on his commonsense and on the job 
training. He has mainly to draw on his own experience. The 
distribution of the conciliators interviewed according to their  
experience in the conciliation service shows that the modal class of 
experience (11 to 15 years) held as many as 31% of them, the ir  
average experience being 13.6 years. 30% of the conciliators had 
experience up to 16 to 25 years.^ 8 ]  Thus, in terms of experience 
on the job, the conciliators in Bangladesh seem to be on a 
reasonably good footing.
I t  has been found that officers at the upper level of the Service 
(DL, Add.DL, JDLs and DDLs) were more experienced than those at the 
lower level (ADLs and L0s).E69] This is supportive of the fact that 
the present upper level officers, with relatively fewer 
qualifications, were originally appointed as lower level officers,  
and in the course of time, they were gradually promoted to upper 
level posts. In fact, the present DL and Add.DL, having only simple 
graduation, were originally appointed as Labour Officers some 25 to 
27 years ago. £70]
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7 . 4 . 5 .  I n d e p e n d e n c e  and n e u t r a l i t y
Independence and neutrality are the two attributes which every 
conciliator should possess, regardless of their qualifications and 
experience. A conciliator must be above suspicion. I t  is essential 
that both sides should have confidence in his integrity and 
n e u t r a l i t y . B u t  the neutrality of the conciliators in 
Bangladesh were called in question by a vast majority of the 
parties. For example, about 80% of the plant management, about 85% 
of the CBA leaders and half of the corporation management either 
strongly or slightly agreed that "conciliators are not n e u t r a l . " ^ 2 ]  
In a developing country like  Bangladesh, there are usually 
differences in the social status and prestige of the parties' 
negotiators and in the strength of the organisations they represent, 
and the conciliators could be easily swayed or influenced by these 
factors. As one plant manager observed;
"Before the nationalisation of industries, we had always to 
be a lert about the Labour Directorate. At the end of each 
month, we had to pay bundles of money to them to get their  
kind favour. In some cases, they also took bribes from the 
poor workers. Now, after nationalisation, they have become 
orphan; they can't lead their lives. Now we do not have to 
bother much about their existence."
On the question of neutrality and independence, while management 
alleged that the conciliators took bribes, the conciliators 
themselves attributed some external constraints and pressures for 
not being able to act neutrally. About half of the conciliators 
interviewed agreed with the statement that they could not be neutral 
in the conciliation proceedings due to some undue pressures from 
outside.^ 3 ]  yi^s j n the absence of an unquestionable integrity  
and neutrality, the conciliators possibly could not perform their  
functions as effectively as expected.
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7 . 4 . 6  S t a t u s
A conciliator, to be effective, must be a person of high status with 
extensive experience of industrial r e l a t i o n s . j h e parties w ill 
have respect for and confidence in him because of high status in the 
society. In the developing countries,, particularly of Asia, 
including Bangladesh, Government officers enjoying personal prestige 
and the authority of the office, usually act as conciliators.
As already stated in Section 7.1, a ll officers to the Directorate of 
Labour, down to the rank Labour Officers have been notified to act 
as conciliators in Bangladesh. Officers down to the rank of ADL 
(Assistant Director of Labour) are the f i r s t  class Government 
Officers, while the Labour Officers are the second class Government 
Officers. The status of the conciliators, thus apparently seems to 
be quite high. But the conciliators themselves were not happy with 
their present status and service conditions. During the course of 
interviews with them, the fieldwork team noticed serious 
frustrations among all the responding conciliators with regard to 
their pay and service conditions.£76] feeling of a Labour 
Officer is worth mentioning here.
"Labour Officers are Gazetted officers, but their starting 
pay is only TK. 425 (approximately £11). We cannot manage 
our liv ing with this small pay. No o ffic ia l transport is 
provided to us. We cannot afford to hire a rickshaw 
(tricycle pulled by man) and have to walk on foot. We 
have no social status and always feel an in fer io r ity  
complex. Managerial people earning much more than us 
and liv ing a luxurious l i f e ,  do not see us as officers.
I feel ashamed when managers offer 555 cigarettes (a 
status brand for Bangladeshi rich people, costing about 
TK. 40 per pack) to me, while I myself cannot offer even 
a star cigarette (an ordinary brand, costing only TK. 3 
per pack."
Thus i t  is evident that the present status and service conditions of 
the conciliators in Bangladesh could not give them prestige enough 
to win the respect and confidence of the parties, particularly of 
management.
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7.5 Reasons for Failing Conciliation 
in the Public Sector
The success rate on the cases reported to the conciliators has been 
found to be far from satisfactory. What barriers actually stood in 
the way of successful conciliation of the public sector industrial 
disputes? Some of the factors accounting for the fa ilure  of 
conciliation are evident from the above objective and subjective 
dimension of conciliation. But in order to get a definite idea in 
this respect attempts were made to identify these factors in the ir  
proper perspective.
In the f i r s t  step, the conciliators were asked to state certain 
problems which they faced while conducting conciliation proceedings 
over public sector industrial disputes. The most important problem, 
reported by about 62% of the conciliators, was the ignorance of the 
union leaders about provisions of the law and policies of the 
corporations. Being unaware of the laws and company policies, they 
raised demands but could not produce any justif ication  in support of 
those demands. Secondly, 54% of the conciliators experienced non­
cooperation from management in many respects; for example, they 
usually did not feel any obligation to respond to the conciliators' 
le tters; i f  responded, they used to be absent from the conciliation  
meetings; and when not absent, they used to conceal facts. Thirdly, 
slightly more than 46% of the conciliators f e l t  the superiority 
complex of the management in the conciliation meetings. Fourthly, 
adamant attitude of the parties stood as another barrier on the way 
to successful conciliation. Management was reported to be more 
adamant (reported by 38.5%) than the CBA leaders (reported by 23%). 
F ifth ly , though the law does not en tit le  the parties to be 
represented by a legal p r a c t i t i o n e r ^ ? ]  in the conciliation 
proceedings, veteran lawyers, in fact, represented the management's 
side in the guise of company officers, while the CBA's were 
represented by leaders of the national federations of unions, and 
thus the conciliation proceedings became tougher. 38.5% of the 
conciliators mentioned this problem. Sixthly, about 31% of the 
conciliators identified the undue interference of the union/ 
federation leaders to be one problem. Seventhly, antagonistic
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relationships between the parties and politicisation of the unions 
were reported by an equal number (23%) of the conciliators to be 
another two hindering factors to effective conciliation. F inally , 
certain other problems reported by small percentages of the 
conciliators were: lack of authority on the part of management, by­
passing habit of the union, inter-union r iva lry , ambiguity in the 
orders and instructions of the corporations, shortage of office  
supplies, e tc .^ -1
In the next step, attempts were made to ascertain the actual reasons 
for the fa ilure  of conciliation proceedings in the public sector by 
asking responses to a direct question from the conciliators, in the 
f i r s t  instance, and then by examining the sample unsuccessful cases 
at the conciliation level. Considering the percentage responses of 
the c o n c il ia to rs ^ ^  and summarised records of the unsuccessful 
c a s e s , e i g h t  major factors, in order of rank, could be 
identified, which were responsible for the failure of conciliation  
in the public sector industries:
(a) Placement of "illegal" or "unreasonable" demands by the 
CBA leaders;
(b) Adamant attitude of the management in the conciliation 
meeting;
(c) Financial in ab ility  of the enterprise;
(d) Adamant attitude of the CBA/federation leaders;
(e) Non-cooperation of the management;
( f )  Lack of authority on the part of management;
(g) Weak leadership of the CBAs, which could not ju s tify
their demands; and
(h) Lack of locus-standi of the CBAs in the eye of law.
The causes responsible for fa il ing  conciliation, however, differed  
significantly among the sample industries. Whereas lack of 
authority on the part of management was a common factor to a l l  
industries, as a second reason, however, il legal and unreasonable
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demands was prominent in the jute, poor financial position of the 
enterprise in the road transport, non-cooperation of management in 
the e le c tr ic ity  and lack of CBA's locus standi in the water 
transport. Again as a third reason, adamant attitude of management 
was significant in the ju te, adamancy of the CBA in the road 
transport, weakness of the CBA in the e lectir ic ty  and non­
cooperation of management in the water transport.E81]
From the above review of the structure of the conciliation service, 
the various subjective and objective situations of conciliation and 
the specific reasons for fa il in g  conciliation in the public sector 
industrial disputes, i t  may be deduced that the conciliation process 
in Bangladesh, insofar as i t  relates particularly to the public 
sector, is subject to several environmental constraints which affect 
its  operational effectiveness, but over which the conciliators have 
very l i t t l e  control. F irs t ly , the legal restrictions on the scope 
of negotiations over the basic terms and conditions of service of 
industrial workers in the public sector have le f t  very l i t t l e  scope 
for the conciliators to play. On the one hand, the law has made 
negotiations over interest disputes in the public sector to be 
il legal and provided for the adjudication machinery for the 
settlement rights disputes on the other. Under this objective 
situation, instead of seeking assistance from the conciliators, the 
parties generally prefer lobbying with the Government for their  
interest disputes and to take the shelter of the labour courts for 
their rights disputes. Secondly, the bureaucratic structure of 
controls of the public sector industries has le f t  very l i t t l e  
authority to plant managements, and in some cases to corporation 
managements, to make negotiated settlements with their  
unions/federations either directly or through the intervention of 
the conciliator. Thirdly, compared with the status of the public 
sector managers, the status of the conciliators, particularly at 
the lower levels, has been rendered very poor, so that managements 
of the public industries, being drawn mostly from the c iv i l  service 
and having considerably authoritative orientations, do not generally 
feel any obligation to estend required cooperation in the 
conciliators' pursuits to resolve the disputes referred to them. 
Fourthly, such objective factors as restrictive industrial relations
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laws, m ultip lic ity  of unions and their po litical orientations etc. 
hinder the determination of valid CBAs in most cases at both the 
plant and corporation levels, and this in turn, prevents the 
conciliators from entertaining disputes referred to them or from 
carrying on effective negotiations over such disputes even after  
these have been entertained. F ifth ly , under the centralised 
structure of the conciliation service i ts e l f ,  the conciliators at 
the branch and regional levels do not have appropriate authority to 
handle the disputes referred to them and to exercise the legal 
sanctions against the recalcitrant parties, where necessary.
Finally , the conciliation machinery suffers from certain 
administrative problems e.g. shortage of transport, poor physical 
conditions of offices, outside interference in the normal operation 
of the machinery etc.
In view of the above environmental constraints under which the 
conciliation process in Bangladesh has to operate, with particular  
respect to public sector industrial disputes, i t  is implied that the 
effective operation of the machinery is , to a large extent, beyond 
the control of the conciliators.
7.6 How to Make Conciliation 
more Effective
Despite the fact that the measures to be suggested to make the 
conciliation system more effective are evident in the above 
discussion of the subjective and objective conditions of 
conciliation, the problems faced by the conciliators in the course 
of proceedings and the factors responsible for the fa ilure  of 
conciliation, views of the parties involved in the process, 
including the conciliators themselves, were s t i l l  taken in this 
respect. The reports of the parties are shown in Appendix C.16, 
while those of the conciliators in Appendix C.17.
Since the respondents gave their responses to an openended question 
as to what they could suggest to enhance the effectiveness of the 
conciliation machinery, their emphasis on the same point varied 
considerably. Some gave many responses, others very few. Despite
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these limitations, their views, however, were reasonably in line  
with what emerged from the observations in the previous sections.
One common measure suggested by a considerable number of respondents 
of a ll the three categories (58% of the management, 25% of the CBAs 
and 31% of the conciliators) was the engagement of expert persons in 
the Service. With regard to a specific statement in this context, 
more than three-quarters of the conciliators themselves had either a 
strong or slight feeling that the lack of expert conciliators was 
one of the reasons for fa il ing  conciliation in Bangladesh.^82] j n 
the l ig h t of the observations on the subjective conditions of 
conciliation, this seems to be important.
The second common suggestion offered by the respondents of a ll  
categories (21% of the management, about 80% of the CBAs and about 
31% of the conciliators) was the granting of some more powers to the 
conciliators, with which they could bind or oblige the recalcitrant 
parties. Since the attitude of voluntarism could not yet develop, 
particularly among the management in Bangladesh, and when the 
present powers, in fact, fac ilita ted  the operation of the Service, 
provisions for some arbitrary powers (e.g. the power to directly  
prosecute the recalcitrant party) might be considered.
In the last common suggestion offered by the three categories of 
respondents (26% of the management, one-third of the CBAs and 38.5% 
of the conciliators) was about the increasing of the conciliators' 
status. In view of the observations of the subjective and objective 
conditions and the problems faced by the conciliators in the course 
of their work, this seems to be a ll the more important. I f  the 
status of the conciliators were not increased, parties, particularly  
the management, w ill neither feel i t  obligatory to extend their  
cooperation nor would they shun their superiority complex.
Some suggested measures were common between two categories of 
respondents e.g. between the management and the CBAs or between the 
CBAs and the conciliators, while others were exclusively independent 
suggestions of each category. One common suggestion between the 
management and the CBAs was that the conciliators should be fa i r  and
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impartial (suggested by more than 84% of the management and more 
than 62% of the CBAs). The ILO emphasised the point of neutrality  
in the following words.
"Even a single incidence in which the independence and 
impartiality becomes suspect to one party can adversely 
affect his (conciliator's) reputation for a long time 
afterwards, and indeed, he may never succeed in 
repairing i t . 11L83J
I t  is very unfortunate to note that the conciliators in Bangladesh 
have lost this important quality. This should be seriously taken by 
the conciliators and the Government. As a second common suggestion, 
about 32% of the management and 12.5% of the CBAs mentioned that the 
conciliators should be more active than they are now.
Two suggested measures were common between the CBAs and the 
conciliators. F r is t ly , about 17% of the CBAs and slightly more than 
38% of the conciliators fe l t  that the conciliators should be w ell-  
trained. While very few of the conciliators had relevant 
educational and job background, the usefulness of an arrangement for 
the ir  training should be beyond any controversy. Secondly, about 
30% of the CBAs and slightly more than 15% of the conciliators 
suggested for the improvement of the physicial conditionsof the 
conciliation offices. The effect of working conditions on the 
performance effectiveness is now widely accepted. The ill- furn ished  
and ill-equipped conciliation offices should, therefore, be 
improved.
The conciliators offered a number of exclusive suggestions, of 
which, considering the frequencies two seem to be important.
F irs t ly , 38.5% of the conciliators fe l t  that their service 
conditions hould be improved and they should be given an adequate 
remuneration. This seems important in consideration of the fact 
that in face of serious economic frustrations, one could neither 
expect the existing conciliators to do their role effective ly, nor 
could one expect the e ffic ien t people from outside to feel attracted  
to the service. Considering the underload of the present
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conciliators, i t  may be argued that a few expert and e ff ic ien t  
conciliators, with good pay and status provided to them, may be more 
desirable than a large number of underloaded, ineffic ien t and i l l -  
paid conciliators. Secondly, 31% of the conciliators thought that, 
for conciliation efforts to be effective, the parties must change 
their traditional attitude and be well-aware of the labour laws of 
the country, and to that end, both the management and the CBA 
leaders also needed training on the industrial relations system, the 
dispute settlement procedures and the legal position of the parties 
involved.
I t  should be noted that in offering their views about making the 
conciliation machinery more effective, those involved in the 
conciliation process have assumed the present contexts of public 
sector dispute resolution as given and as such emphasised largely on 
the subjective dimensions of conciliation. But as pointed out in 
the previous Section (Section 7 .5 ), some of the important 
constraints on the process derive from major environmental factors 
and any measures aimed at enhancing its practical effectiveness 
must, therefore, ensue largely from eventual changes in those 
environmental constraints.
7.7 Role of Conciliation in Resolving 
Public Sector Industrial Disputes
Before concluding the Chapter, in relation to the above observations 
on the actual working of the conciliation machinery, a brief note on 
its  role in resolving disputes in the public sector industries seems 
to be worthwhile. I t  has been pointed out in the earlie r  Chapters 
that the scope of collective bargaining in the public sector 
industries has been made very limited by imposing restrictions on 
bargaining on the basic economic terms and conditions of service of 
the workers. Conciliation being defined as an assisted collective  
bargaining, its scope has also been likewise reduced. A very small 
number of cases are therefore reported to conciliation from the 
public sector industries. The fieldwork team for this study found
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i t  very d i f f ic u lt  to find 200 sample conciliation cases relating to 
the four sample industries over the entire period from 1976 to 1983. 
I t  was found that, of the small number of cases referred to 
conciliation from the public sector industries, an overwhelming 
majority came from the manufacturing sector and a very few from the 
service and u t i l i t y  sectors. Of the 190 sample cases examined at 
the conciliation level, slightly more than 73% were from the jute  
and only about 27% from the other three industries, the share of 
water transport and e lec tr ic ity  being very nominal (only 6% to 7%
e a c h ) . ! - ^ ]
In response to a direct question as to how frequently the 
conciliation machinery was approached in resolving disputes between 
them, 84% of the plant management, 87% of the corporation management 
and 77% of the CBA leaders reported that they rarely or never 
approached this machinery.£85] objective analysis of the plant 
level cases also revealed that of the various institutional 
machineries of dispute resolution, the conciliation is the least 
used one in resolving public sector industrial disputes. Only 4.5% 
of the total cases examined at the plant level were somehow settled 
at the conciliation s t a g e . g e n e r a l  feeling of the parties 
about the effectiveness of conciliation in settling public sector 
industrial disputes explains why this service is so infrequently 
used by them. On the average, only about 14% of all the respondents 
involved in the direct negotiation (plant management, corporation 
management and CBAs) fe l t  the Service to be reasonably effective.
The vast majority (65%), however, thought i t  to be only somewhat 
effective and the rest either stated i t  to be to ta lly  ineffective or 
could not te l l  anything because they were not familiar with the 
system.£87]
The objective limitations on the conciliation process derived from 
the environmental factors, the particular contexts of the public 
sector industrial relations and certain weaknesses in the subjective 
dimensions of the conciliators themselves have contributed to create 
a situation where the conciliation machinery cannot play an 
effective role in resolving disputes arising from the public sector 
industries.
Indeed when the plant management and the conciliators always stuck 
to the Government laws and policies, i t  seems to be meaningless to 
raise disputes on the basic economic issues to the plant management 
and then refer them to conciliation. Demands on basic financial 
conditions of service should be directly referred either to the 
relevant Ministry or to the corporation. Issues which are within 
their jurisdiction should be raised before the plant management and 
the conciliators. Under the present context of institutional 
framework, the conciliation indeed has a very small role to play in 
dealing with industrial disputes relating to the public sector 
industries.
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CHAPTER V II I  
THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MACHINERIES -  ADJUDICATION
The voluntary machineries for the resolution of the public sector 
industrial disputes have been examined in the previous two Chapters. 
The present Chapter deals with the compulsory settlement system.
When the voluntary methods of resolution f a i l , the law provides for 
a compulsory settlement binding on the parties concerned. Three 
machineries for binding settlement are available - (a) arbitration  
and (b) labour courts, as alternatives and (c) the labour appellate 
tribunal as a subsequent level after the labour court. Accordingly 
this Chapter is divided into three sections - the f i r s t  dealing with 
arbitration, the second with the labour courts and the third with 
the labour appellate tribunal. Considering the relative  
insignificance of the arbitration and the appellate tribunal in the 
dispute settlement system of Bangladesh, with particular reference 
to the public sector disputes, emphasis is given mainly on the 
functional aspects of the labour courts.
8.1 Arbitrati on
On the fa ilure of conciliatory efforts on an industrial dispute on 
collective issues, the law encourages i t  to be settled through an 
arbitrator who should be a single person agreed upon by the parties 
concerned. But in so far as i t  could be gathered, this s p ir i t  of 
the law has not been realised by the people involved. In reply to a 
direct question as to how frequently they approached the 
arbitration machinery for the resolution of the disputes arising 
between them, 90% of a ll the respondents (plant management, 
corporation management and CBA leaders) reported to have never used 
this machinery; others reporting to have used i t  only r a r e l y . ^
The analysis of the sample cases at thep lan t and conciliation  
levels revealed that not even a single dispute from the public 
sector industries was ever referred to an a r b i t r a t o r .^
Most people involved in industrial disputes in the public sector are 
not familiar with the functional aspects of the arbitration  
machinery. This is evident from the responses of the respondents of 
this study to two direct questions in this regard. 55% of a ll  the 
respondents (plant and corporation managements and CBA leaders) 
could not te l l  anything on the adequacy of the statutory time 
provided for giving the arbitration a w a r d . W h e n  asked to 
comment on the effectiveness of arbitration in the resolution of the 
public sector disputes, about three-fourths of the respondents 
(plant and corporation managements and CBA leaders) gave "don't 
know" responses, because they were not aquainted with the system .^
Even those who had a knowledge of this legal machinery were not 
enthusiastic at a ll in using i t  as an alternative to labour courts. 
The fact of a considerable reluctance on the part of the conciliators 
and the direct parties towards arbitration has been pointed out in 
the previous Chapter. Several factors are responsible for the 
reluctance of the concerned p a r t i e s . ^  F irs t ly , the parties have no
confidence in arbitration. About 70% of the conciliators had this
view. Secondly, since the law has made the arbitration award to be 
final and binding on the parties, they do not want to be bound by the 
award of a single a r b i t r a t o r .^  About 54% of the conciliators held 
this view. Thirdly, 46% of the conciliators mentioned that no forum 
for arbitration was in vogue. The Government, as per law, is to 
maintain a panel who could act as arbitrators. But on enquiry i t  was
found that no such panel was ever maintained by the Government and as
such the system could not become popular. Fourthly, lack of 
distinguished personalities who could act as arbitrators was put 
forward as another factor by about one-fourth (23%) of the 
conciliators. F ifth ly , about another one-fourth of the conciliators 
fe l t  the lack of agreement between the parties in selecting a 
particular arbitrator. For example, one party liked to refer the 
dispute to a D istric t Magistrate, while the other to a Member of 
Parliament. Lastly, about 8% of the conciliators reported that the 
parties were not under compulsion to go to the arbitrator and this  
optional nature of the system also acted as a deterrent to i t .  Thus 
because of the reasons noted above, the provisions of the law 
relating to settlement of industrial disputes through arbitration  
remained practically ineffective in its  to ta l i ty ,  particularly in the 
public sector industries.
8 . 2  L a b o u r  C o u r ts
Of the three adjudication machineries, provided by law, labour 
courts is the one most extensively used in the settlement of the 
public sector industrial disputes usually of an individual nature. 
This is , therefore, examined in some depth. Discussion of the whole 
section proceeds in a sequence of five sub-sections. Sub-section 
one describes the working process of the labour courts in particular  
reference to the public sector industrial disputes. Sub-section two 
examines the effectiveness of labour courts in achieving certain  
goals of law in handling the public sector disputes. The usual 
factors affecting the operations of the labour courts in general are 
explained in sub-section three. The specific reasons for delay in 
deciding cases from the sample public sector industries are analysed 
in sub-section four. Finally, sub-section five concludes the 
section by suggesting certain measures based on the problems 
identified in the earlie r  sub-sections and reports of the people 
involved, for enhancing the future effectivness of operations of the 
labour courts.
8.2.1. Operation of the Labour Courts
Constitution of the Labour Courts: In Bangladesh, as per law, the
labour courts take a t r ip a r t ite  nature, consisting of a Chairman and 
two members, one representing the employees and the other 
representing the workers. All members of a labour court, including 
the Chairman are appointed by the Government but the process is 
varied. The Chairman of a court who acts as a fu ll-tim e chief of 
the court in a ll matters including administration, o ff ic ia l  
correspondence, making the cases ready for hearing and passing 
orders e tc ., is directly appointed by the Government. But the 
members are only part-time appointees of the court and their  
appointment entails the following s te p s :^
(a) The Director of Labour, in the f i r s t  instance, seeks nomination 
of the employers' representatives from the Bangladesh Employers'
' Association and those of the workers' from the various 
registered federations of trade unions.
(b) The Bangladesh Employers* Association, in turn, seeks nominees 
from its  member organisations. From the nominees of the member 
orginisations, i t  renominates certain representatives to the 
Director of Labour. In the same way, the federations of trade 
unions also nominate their respective representatives to the 
Director of Labour.
(c) On receipt of nominees of the employers and workers from the
respective organisations, the.Director of Labour makes a
scrutiny about the representativeness of those nominees and 
recommends a panel of five representatives from each side for 
each labour court to the Ministry of Labour and Manpower.
( d) The Ministry then f in a lly  appoints the nominees recommended by
the Director of Labour as members of the Labour Courts.
The above selection process may be clearly depicted in the form of 
a chart, as shown in Figure 8.1. At present there are six labour 
courts in country - three located in Dhaka city and the other three 
in the other three Divisional Headquarters of Bangladesh.
N o m ination/R enom ination Recommendation Approval of
appointment
Workers*
rep resenta tives
Chairman
Employe rs
Bangladesh 
Employers * 
Association
federations  
of trade
Directorate 
of Labour
FIG. 8.1 CONSTITUTION OF LABOUR COURTS
Types of Labour Court Cases: Almost a ll of the cases f iled  in the
labour courts from the public sector industries are of individual 
nature. As indicated by Appendix D.17, 88% of the cases examined at 
the labour court level involved industrial workers' grievances or 
complaints of one sort or the other. Only about 4% of the total 
cases examined were categorised as "collective" according to i ts
legal d e f in i t io n .^  I t  was found that the collective issues in 
the public sector industries usually involved alleged unfair labour 
practices on the part of management and the Director of Labour, 
rather than economic issues. 8% of the cases were categorised as 
"group cases" but these were also individual cases in the sense that 
they usually involved a group of workers applying individually to 
the labour courts against some alleged unjust treatments done to 
them under certain common allegations by their management.^
In it ia to r  of the Cases: I t  is the individual workers who usually 
f i l e  cases to a labour court. While the CBAs sometimes go to labour 
courts, the management and unions other than CBAs approach such 
courts only r a r e l y . O f  the total cases examined at the labour 
court level about 89% were f iled  by the individual workers (or by 
their wives as their inheritors), slightly more than 5% by the CBAs 
and about 7% by a group of workers punished by management on similar 
grounds. Not even a single individual case was taken up by the 
CBAs.^11^
Extent of Use: The labour court, as a dispute resolution machinery,
is not very frequently used by workers in the public sector 
industries. In reply to a direct question in this context, an 
overwhelming majority of the respondents (plant and corporation 
managements and CBA leaders) stated that they had to use this  
machinery either "rarely" (reported by 43.5%) or "sometimes" 
(reported by 3 9 % ).^ ^  The industrial distribution of the sample 
labour court cases revealed that more than 80% of the cases 
originated from the jute and the road transport. The e lec tr ic ity  
and the water transport accounted for only around 9% of the cases 
each.^-^ The prevalence of a large number of temporary and casual 
workers in the jute and the shrinkage of business in the road 
transport, with their consequent effect on employment relations, in  
contrast to the situations prevailing in the water transport and 
e lectr ic ity  might largely explain these inter-industry variations in  
f i l in g  cases to labour courts.
Maintainabi111y C rite r ia : Do the labour courts entertain and decide
all the cases referred to them? The labour court members mentioned 
three c r ite r ia  to be satisfied before a case could be entertained by 
a labour c o u r t . F i r s t l y ,  the case in question must be covered 
by the law. As per law a non-worker cannot f i l e  a case to a labour 
court and different laws have different coverages as to the 
definition of a worker. Thus before a case can be entertained by a 
labour court, the f i r s t  criterion that is looked for is whether the 
party f i l in g  the case is legally entitled to take the shelter of 
such a court (42.5% of total responses). Secondly, there are 
specific te rr ito r ia l  and functional jurisdiction of the labour 
courts operating in the country. Before entertaining a particular  
case, the court in question examines whether i t  has the appropriate 
te rr ito r ia l and functional jurisdiction to decide i t  (30% of total 
responses). Thirdly, different labour laws prescribe different  
time lim its within which the cases are to be referred to the labour 
c o u r t s . T h e  labour courts do not usually entertain cases which 
are time barred (27.5% of total responses).
Laws involved in the cases: Cases may be f i led  in the labour courts
under various labour laws. However, by summarising the sample 
labour court cases, five broad categories could be identified:
(a) Complaint cases: These are the cases entertained under Section 
25 ( l ) (b )  of the Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act,
1965. This Act provides for the terms and conditions of 
employment of workers. For disci piinery actions, procedures 
have been la id  down in the said Act. Cases coming before the 
labour courts under this law were a ll in it ia ted  by the 
individual workers who had been removed from service in any way 
or otherwise punished by their management. About 59% of a ll the 
cases examined were f i le d  under this law.
(b) Legal rights enforcement cases: These are the cases entertained
under Section 34 of the IRO, 1969 for the enforcement of any 
right guaranteed by any law or award or settlement. These cases 
could be in it ia ted  either by a CBA or a worker against the 
management. Slightly more than 28% of the cases examined were 
f i le d  under this law.
(c) Criminal cases: These cases are entertained under the various
penal provisions of the various labour laws. Maximum penal 
provisions are there in the IRO, 1969 (Sections 54-56). There 
are penalty provisions for breach of settlements, awards or 
decisions; for unfair labour practices on the part of both 
management and workers; for il legal strikes or lockouts and 
other il legal actions. Criminal cases in the sample public 
sector industries accounted for slightly more than 7% of the 
total cases examined.
(d) Cases of cancellation of trade union registration: These cases
are f i le d  under Section 10 of the IRO, 1969 by the aggrieved 
trade unions against the Registrar of trade unions for baseless 
or illog ica l complaints made by him to a labour court requiring 
i t  to pass orders for cancellation of registration of the trade 
union concerned. These cases accounted for slightly more than 
5% of the sample cases.
(e) Industrial dispute cases: These cases are entertained on 
complaints by either of the parties to industrial disputes which 
have fa iled at the conciliation level. This is the outcome of 
Section 32 (1A) of the IRO, 1969 and Section 6 of the IR(R)0, 
1982 which provide the labour courts to be the ultimate 
machinery for peaceful resolution of industrial disputes. But 
this category of disputes, also called as "collective interest 
disputes" or "charter of demand cases" were very rare in the 
public sector industries. In the 208 cases examined, only one 
case was found to be related with charter of demands.
Of the five categories of disputes mentioned above, the f i r s t  four 
may be termed as the rights disputes, while only the last as the 
interest disputes, as per ILO classification of industrial disputes, 
already referred to in the previous chapter. The interest disputes 
having been found to be almost nil in the sample cases examined, i t  
may be concluded without any reservation that the public sector 
labour disputes adjudicated by the labour courts are a ll rights 
disputes.
Selection of cases for hearing: In the absence of any legal
prescription as to the way in which the cases are to be selected 
for hearing, the respondents at the labour court level were asked a 
direct question in this regard. Their responses might be seen in 
Appendix D.8. The vast majority (62%) of the respondents reported 
that the cases were selected for hearing usually on a " f i rs t - in -  
first-out" (FIFO) basis. But the actual working of the process was
best described by one labour court member in the following way:
" I t  is true that cases are started on a FIFO basis but there 
is no basis as to their final disposal. Several factors are 
involved in the final disposal of the cases."
Another member said:
"As soon as a case is f i le d , the peshkar (bench clerk) 
prepares the case; a written statement from the second
party is asked; a hearing date is fixed and the process of
hearing goes on. Some cases are decided fa ir ly  promptly 
depending on the nature of the cases and the willingness of 
the parties, while many others take much longer time to 
f in a lly  decide them."
I t  was assumed that collective cases might get preference to 
individual ones with respect to hearing. But the respondents had 
differing opinions on the issue. Some said that collective issues 
sometimes got preference; others said that they got preference only 
rarely; while s t i l l  others said that there was no hard and fast 
rule in this regard. About 80% of the respondents, however, 
reported that the urgency of the cases, for example, cases of 
essential services, cases referred by the Government, cases for 
interim order etc. sometimes got preference to others.
The most usual basis of selection, as reported by more than 70% of 
the respondents was quite interesting. They said that the bench 
clerk (peshkar) actually determined the cases to be heard. He 
prepared the cases according to the urgency of the parties who 
usually had to offer money (bribes) to him and were to do constant 
"tadbir" (follow-up and running after) of the cases. As one member 
told,
"The peshkar takes money from the parties, takes up cases, 
fixes and refixes dates."
The Registrar of one court remarked,
"The peshkar is a ll  in a ll in this court. He earns more 
than double of what I earn."
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In response to a specific question as to whether urgency of the 
parties in the form of persuasion or offer of bribery was a factor 
in influencing the basis of selection, 42% of the respondents told 
that this was usual, while another 46% told that this was sometimes 
the case.
I t  was assumed that the ex-parte cases where either or both of the 
parties were absent, or criminal cases, on the ground of their  
seriousness, might have been taken up f i r s t  for hearing. But the 
majority of the respondents reported that there was no hard and 
fast rule in these respects. S u itab ility  of the court, considered 
from the view point of total case position, was sometimes a factor, 
as reported by 58% of the respondents.
Thus i t  emerges that no formal procedures are followed in selecting 
the cases to be heard f i r s t .  Whims of the peshkars and persuasions 
by the parties are the usual bases.
Reasons for the cases: Two approaches were used to ascertain reasons 
for the cases that were usually f i le d  from the public sector 
industries - f i r s t ,  the respondents were asked a direct question in 
this respect and second, the sample labour court cases were examined 
as to their reasons.
The summarised responses to the direct question ,^^  showed that 
disciplinary cases like  discharges/dismissals were the most frequent 
cases from the public sector industries (reported by all 
respondents). The next frequent reason was termination for union 
activ ities  (reported by 62%). Other issues in order of frequencies 
were: Charter of demands cases (reported by 37%), implementation of
agreements and previous awards of the labour courts (reported by 
one-third), arrear wages (reported by 17%), cancellation of 
registration of trade unions (reported by 17%), compensation for 
accidents(reported by 12%) and wage anomalies (reported by 4%).
The analysis of the 208 practical cases revealed a different order, 
however. Disciplinary cases like dismissals/discharges
comprised about 31% of a ll the cases. Other disciplinary measures 
l ike  supervision, prevention order on joining, fines, demotion etc. 
comprised the next important category (about 24%). Personnel 
matters other than disciplinary matters comprised the th ird category 
(13%). Thus two-thirds of the cases related to personnel matters as 
a broad category. The issues comprising the rest one-third were: 
pay anomalies (8%), post service benefits (6%), cancellation of 
registration of trade unions (5%), illegal deduction from wages 
(4%), various special allowances (3%) and others (less than 1%).
Outcome of the cases: On an examination of the final result of the
decided cases in relation to whether decisions of the court on such 
cases were favourable or unfavourable to the in it ia to r  of the 
cases,L J  i t  has been found that three-fourths of the total decided 
cases examined were not contested up to the last - 41% were 
dismissed on default, 28% resulted in mutual compromise in the 
course of their hearings and therefore withdrawn from the courts and 
another 5% were not proceeded with by the f i r s t  party. Of the 
remaining one-fourth of the decided cases, which were contested to 
the last, only one-half were successful to the applicant and the 
other half were unsuccessful.
8.2.2. Effectiveness of labour courts in 
achieving certain goals of law
In the absence of ava ilab ility  of any cr ite r ia  for measuring the 
effectiveness of operations of the labour c o u r t s , t h e  purpose of 
this section is to examine their effectiveness in achieving certain 
goals expressed or implied in the labour laws of the country. The 
industrial relations laws, in Bangladesh, do not specifically define 
the objectives of labour courts. Two major objectives in relation  
to the adjudication of public sector industrial disputes, are 
however implied in the two basic laws governing industrial relations 
in the public sector. F irs t ly , that the IRO, 1969 emphasises quick 
settlement of the cases referred to labour courts is implied in the 
fixation of a maximum time l im it  of two months within which the
cases so referred are to be decided. As an exception, however, i t  
provides that the awards or decisions of a labour court should not 
be invalid on the ground of any delay made by i t . ^ - 1  To fa c i l i ta te  
realising this basic objective, the industrial relations laws and 
rules also provide for the following procedural summarisations:
(a) Absence of the court members should not interrupt the normal 
workings (hearing and deciding cases) of the court.
(b) In an unintimated absence of the f i r s t  party to a case, the 
court should dismiss i t  on default. Similarly, when the second 
party absents from hearing without intimation, the case against 
i t  should be decided ex-parte;^^-^
(c) A labour court should follow summary procedures in hearing the 
cases and giving decisions on them; -^ -^  ^ and
(d) The lawyers should be discouraged from representing the parties 
in the hearings of the cases.
Secondly, the State-owned Manufacturing Industries Workers (Terms 
and Conditions of Services) Act, 1974 provides that none should 
allow any financial benefit to public sector workers in excess of 
what the Government determines. This implies that a labour court 
should not decide any collective interest disputes over economic 
issues arising in the public sector industries. How far, in fact 
could the labour courts in Bangladesh adhere to and achieve these 
objectives of laws in dealing with the cases referred the sample 
public sector industries?
(1) Adherence to statutory time: I t  has been found t h a t ^ ^  only 10% 
of the cases of the f i r s t  labour court were decided within the 
statutory time l im it  of two months and the remaining 90% took upto a 
maximum of 54 months. 40% of the decided cases in the f i r s t  court 
took 12 to 18 months. More than three-fourths were decided within 
18 months. The mean time taken by the f i r s t  court in deciding the 
cases has been calculated to be 17.5 months. The situation in the 
second labour court was more aggravating. Not even a single case 
could be decided within the statutory period. The time length of 
the decided cases of the second court ranged from 3 to 72 months.
The modal class of cases (23%) took 36 to 42 months. The average 
time taken to decide the cases by the secondcourt has been found to 
be slightly more than 31 months.
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As to pending cases, i t  has been found t h a t ^ ^  the cases of the 
f i r s t  court were remaining pending for upto a maximum of 54 months; 
the modal group of cases (31%), however, remained pending for 6 to 
12 months. The mean period for the pending cases in the f i r s t  court 
has been found to be 15.7 months. The cases of the second court, on 
the other hand, were remaining pending for up to a maximum of 60 
months. The mean period of the cases pending in the second court 
has been estimated to be slightly more than 24 months.
Thus both the sample courts utterly failed to adhere to the 
statutory time in so far as the disposal of the cases from the 
public sector industries was concerned. One important point to be 
noted, however, is that the second court took relatively more time 
than that taken by the f i r s t  court in both the decided and pending 
cases. The meantime taken by the two courts in both types of cases, 
as shown in Table 8.1, reveals that, overall, the second court took 
74% more time than that of the f i r s t  court. Compared to the f i r s t  
court, the second court took 78% more time on the decided cases and 
54% more on the pending cases. Section 8.2.4 will look at these 
inter-court variations as to the reasons for delay in decisions.
TABLE 8.1
Court-wise Meantime for the Decided and Pending Cases
In Days In Months
All sample cases (both courts) 687 22.9
F irst Labour Court
Decided Cases 524 17.5
Pending Cases 470 15.7
All Cases 487 16.2
Second Labour Court
Decided Cases 932 31.1
Pending Cases 726 24.2
All Cases 852 28.4
Having observed a total fa ilure of the labour courts in adhering to 
the statutory time in disposing of the public sector cases referred 
to them, an attempt is now made to see how far the labour courts 
followed the procedural summarisations, as specified above.
(a) Members' Absence: The role of the members of the court is
merely advisory. The opinions of the members are not binding upon 
the Chairman of the court.£28] ■ i f  any member of the court is 
absent from, or is unable to attend, for any reason whatsoever, in 
any sitting of the court, the proceedings of the court should 
continue, and the decision/award might be given in the absence of 
such a member. But in actual practice, as reported by the majority 
of the respondents at the labour court l e v e l , m e m b e r s  were not 
assiduous in attending the courts and in the absence of either of 
the members, courts did not constitute or s it  in sessions. This 
practice of the court stood as a hindrance to the quick disposal of 
cases. The members absented or delayed in 85% of all the cases 
examined from 1 to 17 times; their average absence per case being 
about 4 times with a standard deviation of 3.06 t i m e s . T h e  
law also provides that i f  a member absents from three consecutive 
meetings, he might be removed from the c o u r t . T h e  sample 
labour court cases could not be examined to the depth as to in how 
many occasions members were absent from the three consecutive 
meetings. But so far i t  could be gathered, not even a single member 
was ever removed on this ground. The liberalism of the court in 
members' absences is quite evident.
(b) Parties' absence: As per law, i f  the f i r s t  party fa i ls  to
represent in the proceedings on a specified date, without 
intimation, the court may dismiss the case in question outright on 
default. In 75% of the labour court cases examined, the f i r s t  party 
absented from 1 to 8 times. On the whole, the average absence of 
the f i r s t  party per case was 2.1 times with a standard deviation of 
1.77 times. The power of dismissal on default was also
frequently exercised by the court.£333 41% of a ll the decided
cases examined were dismissed on d e f a u l t . ^ ]
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In the event of an unintimated absence of the second party to a case 
on a particular date, the court is also empowered to give an e x - : 
parte decision. But, as stated by the majority of the labour court 
menfoers,^^ this power was infrequently used by the court in actual 
p r a c t i c e . I n  44% of the total cases examined at the labour 
court level, the second party absented from the proceedings of the 
court from 1 to 8 times. The mean absence of the second party per 
case was 1.27 times with a standard deviation of 1.78 times. Only 
9% of the sample cases were decided ex-parte. But i t  is curious to 
note that the cases so decided ex-parte were subsequently revived by 
the court.
I t  is also interesting to note that both the parties simultaneously 
absented from the hearing of the court in slightly more than 17% of 
the total cases examined from 1 to 3 t i m e s . D e s p i t e  the 
absence of both the parties, such cases were not dismissed and 
subsequent hearings on them went on. Thus i t  emerges that the 
courts were very liberal in exercising the power given to them by 
law. I t  also appears that the courts were more liberal to 
management than to workers.
(c) Summary procedures: To ensure economic and social justice the
law requires the labour courts to follow, as nearly as possible, 
summary procedures, as provided under the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1898. In actual practice, however, summary procedures 
were not usually used by such courts. In response to a specific 
statement in this context, the respondent labour court members 
became equally divided in reporting "to have" and "not to have" used 
summary p r o c e d u r e s . O n e  experienced member remarked,
"Because of procedures followed by the labour courts, these 
are identical with the c iv il courts. Representation by 
lawyers, examination and cross-examination, shifting of 
hearing dates, presence of witnesses, presentation of 
evidences - a ll are done."
About one-third of the cases examined involved spot enquiry, 
examination and cross-examination of facts from 1 to 8 times.
As to time prayer (asking for delays) by the parties, i t  was found 
that the f i r s t  party (usually workers) prayed time in 78% of the
cases from 1 to 19 times. Modal time prayer by the f i r s t  party was 
2 times and the mean was 4.1 times with a standard deviation o f +3.8 
times. Time prayer by the second party (usually management) was 
s t i l l  more frequent. In 96% of the cases analysed, the second party 
prayed time from 1 to 23 times; the mean being 8.3 times with a 
standard deviation of +5 times. Interestingly, in about 23% of the 
sample cases, both parties jo in tly  prayed time from 1 to 8 times.
The average jo in t time prayer was 0.41 times per case with a 
standard deviation of +0.9 t i m e s . I n  view of such frequent 
prayers for time by the parties, i t  seems that seeking time (by the 
parties) and giving dates (by the courts) has become a historical 
tradition in Bangladesh. The legal requirement for observing 
summary procedures seems to be largely ignored. The practical 
implications of this delay w ill be taken up in a subsequent section.
(d) Representation of the parties: The law requires the parties to
be represented in the hearings by themselves, or by an officer of 
the union/CBA, in the case of a worker and by an authorised Officer, 
in the case of an employer/management. A legal practitioner is not 
allowed to represent a party without the permission of the court.
The sp ir it  of law is to discourage the lawyers from representing the 
parties. But, as reported by the respondent labour court members, 
the actual practice was a considerable deviation from the s p ir i t  of 
the legislature. The legal practitioners were appointed in a ll
cases,. As one member reported,
"The law asks for permission before engaging lawyers, but 
nobody obeys this law."
Another member remarked,
"The lawyers always represent on behalf of the parties. 
Exception of the law has now become the general practice."
This practice of representation of the parties by the lawyers who 
usually try to prolong cases in their professional interest seem to 
be one reason for delay in courts' decisions.
Thus except for dismissal of cases on default of the f i r s t  party, 
other procedural summarisations prescribed by the industrial 
relations laws and rules are not being properly followed by the 
labour courts.
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(2) Settlement of financial issues: On the question of the
settlement of collective economic issues, an overwhelming majority 
(78%) of the labour court members interviewed reported that such 
disputes from public sector industries usually did not come to the 
labour courts. Another 28% stated that when such disputes really  
came to the courts, they adjudicated them acording to the IWWPC 
recommendations and other Government g u i d e l i n e s . A  majority 
(62%) of the direct parties (plant level management and CBA leaders) 
to the cases also f e l t  that the labour courts should not give any 
decision or award outside of the declared policies of the Government.
The content analysis of the labour court cases revealed that 
only one collective interest dispute was f i le d  with the f i r s t  labour 
court by the central CBA of the BRTC, which was lying pending during 
the periodof the fieldwork for this s t u d y . T h u s  the 
restriction of law regarding the settlement of the collective  
financial terms and conditions of service of the public sector 
workers are being effectively adhered to by the labour courts.
8 .2 .3. Factors generally affecting
the operations of labourTourts
From the above analysis of the effectiveness of labour courts, the 
basic objective of ensuring industrial justice through quick 
settlement of cases referred to them, the labour courts seem to have 
to ta lly  fa iled . On the point of subjective effectiveness of 
operations of the labour courts, about two-thirds of the direct 
parties (plant and corporation managements, and CBA leaders) f e l t  
that the labour court decisions were not reasonablyeffective.^-^  
During the course of interview with them some labour court members 
themselves told the author that some labour court decisions were 
wrong and others were right but delayed. This and the next sections 
attempt to identify the factors which might be held responsible for 
such below eexpected effectiveness of operations of the labour 
courts. The factors affecting their operational effectiveness in 
general are taken up in this section and the specific reasons for 
delay in the sample cases w ill be examined in the next section.
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Some of the factors affecting the operations of the labour courts 
are evident in the liberal attitude of the courts in pursuing the 
procedural summarisations, as described above. Certain other 
factors will now be looked at.
(1) Subjective conditions: The personal attributes of the labour
court members might be expected to influence the operational 
effectivness of such courts. Four of their personal 
characteristics, which seem to be important are mentioned here.
(a) Age: The average age of the labour court members (including 
the Chairman) was found to be 46.2 years with a standard deviation 
o f +6.7 years. The members represent!’ ng the parties seemed to be 
neither too young nor too old but, by Bangladesh standards, mature 
enough to deal with the cases coming before them. But a ll Chairmen 
were aged more than 50 years with one aged 6 2 . ^ ^  The retirement 
age in Bangladesh bei ng 57, the Chairman of a ll the labour courts 
were found to be either on the verge of retirement or practically  
retired but appointed on a contractual basis for a term of one or 
two y e a r s . T h i s  was also confirmed by the respondent labour 
court members in the course of interviews with them. As one 
experienced member observed,
"They (Chairmen) can hardly concentrate on their duties.
They prepare more for retirement than for their o ff ic ia l  
jobs." [49]
(b) Academic qualifications: More than 70% of the labour court
members were graduates with specialisation in related fie lds , 12% 
were general graduates and the remaining 17% were non-graduates.
The non-graduates' level of education varied from class VI to 
Intermediate. These non-graduates were a ll workers'
representatives of the courts. As is evident from their
selection process, workers' representatives were a ll federation 
level leaders, and this finding is indicative of the low level of 
education of even the national level trade union leaders in
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Bangladesh. Although the number of members with education below 
graduation were not too many, s t i l l  i t  seems a b i t  surprising as to 
how a person with eduction of class VI or V I I I  could effectively  
advise the Chairman about the in tricate problems of legal 
interpretations and economic and social implications involved in the 
cases before them.
(c) Job background: I t  has been found that the workers' 
representatives of the labour courts were mostly (70%) professional 
trade unionists and others were technicians, clerks and advocates.
I t  should be noted that the federation level professional 
trade unionists in Bangladesh were a ll outsiders having l i t t l e  
direct link with industrial work.^^-^ The employers' 
representastives, however, were mostly high ranking managers dealing 
with employees. The Chairmen of the courts were senior ment>ers of 
the judicial service, who had necessarily devoted the major part of 
their service in the convential c iv il  and criminal c o u r t s . T h e  
adjudication of labour disputes was an entirely new fie ld  to them.
As one experienced labour court member remarked,
"They (Chairmen) know very l i t t l e  about the objectives of 
labour laws and always follow ordinary court procedures and 
prolong the disposal of cases."
Thus the Chairmen of the labour courts and a majority of the members 
representing the workers had very l i t t l e  orientation with industrial 
way of l i f e  and the peculiarities of problems that might arise 
therefrom.
(d) Experience in the labour courts: The average experience in the 
labour courts for the parties' representatives and the Chairmen have 
been found to be 3.5 years and 1 year respectively. The court 
members, including the Chairmen, were usually appointed on a two- 
year contract basis. The term of office of the members, who were 
relatively younger than the Chairman, could be renewed through 
subsequent contract(s). But the Chairman were appointed at the last 
stage of their retirement as Judges. These about-to-retire Judges 
could hardly perform their duties as effectively as expected.
Before they prepared as Chairmen of the courts, they had to prepare 
themselves for retirement or death.
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(2) Workload of the labour cou rts : B ha ttacharjee^-^  argued th a t
the effectiveness o f operations o f the labour courtswere adversely 
a ffected  due to  a heavy workload on them. He could not compare the 
actual workload o f the courts against any standard fo r  d isposal, 
however. In  fa c t, no such pre-determined standard was a c tu a lly  
ava ilab le . However, by considering the past performance o f the 
labour courts over a period o f years and making a best judgement, a 
reasonable standard, though a rb it ra ry , might be derived.
One such annual standard disposable load might be the average o f the 
cases disposed of by a l l  labour courts over a period of e igh t years, 
fo r  which data are ava ilab le  (Table 8 .2 ). This average is  
calculated to be 373 per year. But th is  average is  a ffected by 
extreme in te r-co u rt and in te r-yea r flu c tu a tio n s . For example, in  
1975 the Chittagong labour court disposed o f as high a record number 
of cases as 958, while in  1977, the Rajshahi labour court disposed 
o f as low as only 2 cases (Table 8.2 and Figure 8 .2 ).
TABLE 8.2
Nunbcr of cases disposed of by the various 
L a b o u r  Courts in Bangladesh during the period 1975-82
1975 | 1976 1 1977 1 1978 1 1979 I 1980 1 1981 1 1982 I Total 1 Averagel
1 F irs t Labour Court. Dhaka 554 | 644 1 698 1 422 I 229 1 302 1 391 I <52 1 3692 1 <61 I
I Second Labour Court. Dhaka SS7 I 499 1 533 1 551 I 260 | 207 1 220 1 268 1 3095 I 387 1
| Third Labour Court. Dhaka - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 41 1 615 I 656 1 328 I
( Labour Court, Chittagong 9SC 1 727 1 323 1 406 1 253 1 341 1 148 1 908 1 4064 1 508 1
| Labour Court, Khulna 802 | 179 I 190 I 433 I 279 I 250 1 555 1 180 1 2868 1 358 I
I Labour Court, Uajshahi 1S9 I 1SS 1 2 | 102 1 172 I 109 1 112 1 381 I 1192 1 149 I
| TOTAL 3030 | 2204 I 1746 I 1914 1 1193 1 1209 | 1467 1 2804 I 15567
| AVERAGE 606 | 441 1 349 I 383 I 239 I 242 I 244 1 467 1 373
Source:
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Fig. 8.2 DISPOSAL OF CASES BY THE VARIOUS 
LABOUR COURTS IN BANGLADESH 1975-82.
The number of cases f i le d  in  the various courts were also not 
uniform. The highest number of cases were f i le d  in  the Chittagong 
Court, followed by the Khulna cou rt, the Dhaka f i r s t  court, the 
Dhaka second court and the Rajshahi court (Table 8 .3 ). There ex is ts  
a s ig n if ic a n t pos itive  co rre la tio n  between the cases fo r disposal 
and the cases disposed of which ind icates tha t the pressure o f cases 
might have an influence on th e ir  disposal ra te . In the absence of a 
uniform work pressure on the courts th e ir  average disposal can not 
be taken to  be a good standard. In  fa c t, the average d isposal, as 
noted above, would be a very eas ily  a tta inab le  standard, considering 
the average disposals o f the Chittagong court and the Dhaka f i r s t  
and second courts.
Another standard might be the disposal o f the best performer. But 
how can one determine which court performed well? As argued by 
Bhattacherjee and his c o lle a g u e s ,^ * ! the court w ith the highest 
disposal rate (calculated as the ra t io  o f the cases disposed o f to  
the cases fo r  disposal) is  the best performer. But th is  c r ite r io n  
o f best performance does not also seem to  be a sound one. Because
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TABLE 8 .3
Humber o f cases fo r  d isposal in  the va rious 
L a b o u rT o u rts  in  Bangladesh du ring  the p e rio d , 1975-82
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 T o ta l
F i r s t  Labour C ourt, Dhaka 855
(18 .9)
1077
(26 .6)
982
(24 .3 )
753
(18.8)
536
(16 .3 )
707
(18 .2)
735
(17 .1)
1020
(1 5 .2 )
6655
(1 9 .2 )
Second Labour C ourt, Dhaka 807
(17 .8)
790
(19 .5 )
952
(23 .6)
831
(20.7)
645
(19 .6 )
718
(18.5)
725
(16.9)
783
(1 1 .7 )
6251.
(1 8 .0 )
T h ird  Labour Court,.'Dhaka - - - - - - 206
(4 .8 )
1144
(17 .1 )
1350
(3 .9 )
Labour C ourt, C hittagong 1283
(28 .3)
1014
(25 .0 )
795
(19 .7)
819
(20.4)
734
(22 .3)
1224
(31.6)
1228
(28 .6)
1937
(2 8 .9 )
9034
(26 .0 )
Labour C ourt, Khulna 1394
(30 .8)
929
(22 .9)
1152
(28 .6)
1357
(33.8)
1124
(34 .2)
1017
(26 .2)
902
(21.0)
562
(8 .4 )
8437
(24 .2)
Labour C ourt, Rajshahi 193
(4 .3 )
238
(5 .9 )
151
(3 .7 )
250
(6 .2 )
251
(7 .6 )
210
(5 .4 )
497
(11 .6 )
1258
(18 .8 )
3048
(8 .8 )
Total 4532
(13.0)
4048
(11 .6)
4032
(11 .6)
4010
(11.5)
3290
(9 .5 )
3876
(11.1)
4293
(12 .3)
6704
(19 .3 )
34785
(100.0)
Source: ^58]
Note: F igures in  parentheses in d ic a te  percentages.
TABLE 8.4
Case d isposal ra tes  o f the va rious  Labour Courts 
in  Bangladesh du ring  the pe riod  19/8-82
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 To ta l Average
F ir s t  Labour C ourt, Dhaka 64.8 59.8 71.1 56.0 42.7 42.7 53.2 44.3 434.6 54.3
Second Labour C ourt, Dhaka 69.0 63.2 56.0 66.3 40.3 28.8 30.3 34.2 388.1 48.5
T h ird  Labour C ourt, Dhaka - - - - - - 19.9 53.7 73.6 36.8
Labour C ourt, Chittagong 74.7 71.7 40.6 49.6 34.5 27.9 12.0 46.9 357.9 44.7
Labour C ourt, Khulna 57.5 24.5 16.5 31.9 24.8 24.6 61.5 32.-0 273.3 34.2
Labour C ourt, Rajshahi 82.4 65.1 1.3 40.8 68.5 51.9 ~ 22.5 30.3 362.8 45.3
To ta l 348.8 284.3 185.5 244.6 210.8 175.9 199.4 241.4 1890.3
Average 69.7 56.9 37.1 48.9 42.2 35.2 33.2 40.2 363.4 45.4
Source:
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as shown in Table 8.4, according to this criterion, the Rajshahi 
court dealing with only 9% of the total cases over the eight year 
period (Table 8.3) and disposing of the lowest number of cases 
proves to be a good performer over the Chittagong, Khulna and Dhaka 
f i r s t  courts (Table 8 .2 ). The court which disposed of the highest 
average number of cases should better be taken as the one achieving 
best performance. In terms of this c r ite r ia ,  the Chittagong court 
disposing of ah annual average of 508 cases, performed best (Table 
8 . 2 ).
Before making a final judgement about the standard disposal, 
personal views of the labour court level respondents (Chairmen and 
members of the courts) are considered relevant. A majority (58%) of 
such respondents strongly fe l t  that the labour courts were 
overloaded in the present contexts, although more than one-fifth  
strongly held the opposite v ie w .^ ^  As a step to reducing the 
present workload, only 37.5% of the respondents had a strong or 
slight feeling that more courts should be constituted, while a 
majority (54%) strongly fe l t  that there was no need to constitute 
more c o u r t s . I n  the course of interviews with them, several 
members reported that deciding two or three cases per day was not at 
all d i f f ic u lt  for them.
Thus i f  two cases are taken to be disposed per working day and 300 
working days are assumed per year, the standard disposal comes to 
600 cases per year. Considering the socio-political context of 
Bangladesh, i f  the number of working days are reduced by another 30 
days, the standard annual disposal then comes to 5 4 0 ^ ^  ( i . e .  45 
cases a month). This is somewhat nearer tothe Chittagong court's 
actual average disposal of 508 cases a year or 42.3 cases a month. 
Thus, in view of the respondents' personal feelings and the average 
performance of the best performing court, the estimated standard for 
disposal of 540 cases per year seems to be reasonably attainable.
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What could happen to the cases presently pending in the various 
labour courts in Bangladesh, i f  a ll  of them could dispose of this  
standard number of cases? Table 8.5 shows that in total 3371 cases 
were accumulated over the past few years and pending at the end of 
1982. I f  a ll the courts could achieve the arbitrary standard 
disposal of 540 cases annually, a total of 6,696 more cases could 
have been disposed of, which is far above the actual pending cases 
at the end of 1982. "At this standard, a ll courts other than the 
Chittagong court where an exceptionally large number of cases were 
f iled  could run short of cases. In that situation, the quotation of 
the Chairman of one labour court, as reproduced below, could be 
quite in consonance:
"In fact, we are not overloaded. We can exhaust the pending
cases i f  we really want to. But we don't do that. Because
in that case we shall have no work and the court might be 
el imi nated."
Thus i t  emerges that although the present size of the pending cases 
gives an apparent impression that the labour courts in Bangladesh
are very overloaded, in fact, this is not true for most of the
courts.
TABLE 8 .S
Hypothetical po s itio n  o f pending cases a t the end o f 1982
Courts
Cases fo r 
disposal
Cases
disposed o f
Cases
pending
Arbi tra ry
standard
disposal
Average 
d i sposal
Deviation 
f  rora
standard
to ta l 
D evia tion 
over 8 
years
Total 
pendi ng 
-  to ta l 
dev ia tions
1 2 3 4*(2—3) 5 6 7=(6-5) 8 9*(4-8)
F ir s t  Labour Court, Ohaka 1020 452 568 540 461 - 79 - 632 -  64
Second Labour Court, Ohaka 783 268 515 540 387 -153 -1224 -709
Labour Court, Chittagong 1937 908 1029 540 508 - 32 - 256 +773
Labour Court, Khulna 562 180 382 540 358 -182 -1456 -1074
Labour Court, Rajshahi 1258 381 877 540 149 -391 -3128 -22S1
Total 5560 2189 3371 2700
:
1863 -837 -6696 -3325
Note: Th ird  Labour Court, Ohaka was co n s titu te d  on ly 1n 1981 and hence I t  has 
been excluded from  the present ana lys is .
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(3) Problems faced while conduct!ng adjudication: The effectiveness
of adjudication is also like ly  to depend on the nature of the 
problems faced by the courts in the course of hearing the cases. In 
reply to an open ended question in this context, responses of 
different types were received from the respondents at the labour 
court level, which could be broadly classified into four categories, 
according to the sources which generated these p r o b l e m s .  ^ 4 ]
(a) Problems created by parties: I t  is evident that the parties
themselves and the lawyers as their representatives created most of 
the problems. As to parties, they could not produce documents and 
evidence before the courts in support of their claims and arguments 
( f e l t  by 48% of the respondents); they also resorted to false 
statements ( f e l t  by 17%). Parties' ignorance about the laws was 
another problem as f e l t  by 13% of the respondents. In response to a 
structured question, more than 90% of the respondents, either  
strongly or slightly fe l t  that they (Parties) were not well-aware of 
the legal p r o v i s i o n s . T h e  frequent time prayers ( f e l t  by 13%) 
and the absenting habit ( f e l t  by 9%) of the parties were other
problems, mention about which was already made in an earlier
section.
(b) Problems created by lawyers: All respondents had allegations of
some sort against the lawyers as the parties' representatives.
About half of the respondents alleged that the lawyers used to come 
to the courts without sufficient preparation on their parties' cases 
and pleaded on spot thinking. About 40% alleged that the lawyers 
tried to drag the cases in their professional interest (because the
more time a lawyer got, the more he earned). I t  was also alleged
that they usually made the simple cases distorted ( f e l t  by 9%). The 
frequent absence of the lawyers was another problem ( f e l t  by 4%).
In fact, i t  was gathered that the same group of lawyers represented 
in a ll the three courts in Dhaka c ity . I f  a lawyer was present in  
one court, he obviously had to be absent in another. One labour 
court member observed that the statement l ik e , " le t us stop the 
hearing today. I (lawyer) have another business elsewhere" was very 
common in our labour courts.
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(c) Problems created by Chairman: About 40% of the members (parties' 
representatives) raised an allegation that the Chairmen of the 
courts were too authoritarian to give consideration to the feelings 
of the members about the cases they heard. One member expressed his 
feelings in this respect as follows:
"As a legal requirement, we give our written opinion (W/0) 
on the cases we hear; but I am in a real doubt whether the 
chairman reads i t  or not. He takes our opinion just for 
the sake of taking i t .  He thinks himself to be well-known 
in a ll respects."
Another member remarked,
"W/Os are taken merely for the sake of a legal requirement.
The chairman does not go through them. In some cases W/Os 
are collected after giving the decisions only to keep them 
in f i l e . "
The valid ity  of the members' observations, as above, were, in fact, 
affirmed in the following statement made by the Chairman of a labour 
court:
"While an employer's representative is busy with the employer's 
interest and a worker's representative with the worker's 
interest, I am busy with social justice. I rarely read the 
W/Os of the members."
(d) Other problems: Other problems faced in the course of
adjudication, mentioned by a relatively small number of respondents, 
were lengthy process followed by the court (reported by 17%), 
ambiguity in the definition of a worker legally entitled to f i l e  
cases (reported by 41%), lack of spot verification fa c i l i t ie s  
(reported by 41%) etc.
(4) Administative problems of the labour courts: In addition to the 
various problems faced in the course of adjudication, the labour 
courts in Bangladesh have to operate under certain administrative 
problems which could reasonably be expected to have adversely 
affected the effectiveness of adjudication. The various 
administrative problems, also collected from the labour court level 
respondents through an open-ended question, may be classified into 
four broad categories.
(a) Physical conditions problems: 70% of the respondents stated 
that the courts did not have any separate room or place for the 
members where they could s it  and discuss with the parties, see 
f i le s  and write opinions. Dirty, unhealthy and uncongenial working 
environment was reported to be another problem by more than half of 
the respondents. The author himself observed the deplorable 
conditions of the courts. The courts had neither any adequate space 
for the clients and witnesses (reported by 26%) nor any required 
number of furnitures, fixtures and equipments (reported by 35%).
(b) Problems of office f a c i l i t ie s : The courts did not have any 
transport for o ff ic ia l purposes (reported by 35%); office supplies 
were inadequate (reported by 30%); no office fa c i l i t ie s  were 
available for the members (reported by 30%); and f in a lly ,  the courts 
had to run their offices under very poor budgetary allocations 
(reported by 9%).
(c) Staff Problems: The o ffic ia l s taff of the courts were short in 
number (reported by 43%), ineffic ien t in skill (reported by 13%) and 
corrupted in morality (reported by 9%).
(d) Other Problems: Other problems mentioned by small percentages
of respondents, but nevertheless not unimportant, were:
( i )  In the cases of retirement, resignation or death of the chairman 
of a court, the Government sometimes took a long time to appoint a 
new chairman and in the meantime the court could not work (reported 
by
( i i )  The Government could not provide any fixed venue for the labour 
courts (reported by 9%). I t  was gathered that a ll  the three courts 
of Dhaka city were presently working in the three abandoned (by 
former Pakistanis) houses located at three different places. In 
slightly more than 12% of the cases, hearing dates had to be shifted 
due to shifting of the courts.
( i i i )  F inally , the honorarium given to the members was f e l t  to be 
poor (reported by 4%). I t  is to be noted that the members were 
paid no allowances other than a fixed daily allowance which was only 
TK 100. (equivalent to about £2.5). This might be one reason for 
their frequent absence from the courts.
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8.2 .4 . Reasons for delay in deciding public sector cases:
The factors mentioned in the previous sub-section generally affects 
the adjudication of cases by the labour courts - irrespective of 
whether such cases come from private or public sector industries.
The extent to which each factor affects the effective operations of 
the courts could not be determined. The present sub-section 
specifically examines why the labour courts could not adhere to 
statutory time provisions in adjudicating the sample cases from the 
public sector industries.
The reasons for delay were examined in both subjective and objective 
ways. Subjectively, the reports of the respondents at the labour 
court level, in reponse to an open-ended question, were obtained. 
Such reports could be broadly categorised into s ix .^ -J  F irs t ly ,  
87% of the respondents alleged that the parties themselves were 
responsible for the delay in some way or the other. Frequent time 
prayer by the parties (reported by 67%) and their absenting habit 
stood in the way of quick disposal of the cases. Secondly, 82% of 
the respondents attributed this delay to one or other of certain 
objective conditions like increasing number of cases being f iled  
(reported by 54%), staff shortage (reported by 12%), cases f i le d  on 
t r i f l in g  issues (reported by 12%), cases f i led  at individual 
capacity (reported by 41%) etc. Thirdly, in view of 70% of the 
respondents, negligence or very liberal attitude of the courts 
delayed courts' decisions. Fourthly, members' irregularity  in 
attending the court or in submitting the written opinion to the 
chairman was reported to be other reasons for delay by more than 60% 
of the respondents. F ifth ly , 54% of the respondents alleged that 
the lawyers' delaying attitude in their professional interest 
(reported by 37%) or their late attendance also delayed courts' 
decisions. F inally , lack of interest on the part of the chairman 
(reported by 21%) and their absence from the court (reported by 17%) 
were also responsible for delay in decisions.
Turning to the objective analysis of the sample cases, f i r s t  of 
a l l ,  the number of days taken in serving notice on the second party 
requiring i t  to f i l e  a written statement to the court against the 
allegations made by the f i r s t  party was recorded. I t  was found that 
on the average, 31 days were needed to serve notice on the second
party. This was about 4.5% of the mean length of time taken by the 
cases of both types considered as a whole. The next attempt was to 
examine the factors accounting for the remaining 55.5% of the time 
l e n g t h . D u e  to the complexities involved and the shortage of 
time, i t  was not possible to examine the actual fractions of the 
time length of each particular case by specific factors. The number 
of times hearing dates had to be shifted and the reasons for such 
shifting could, however, be recorded on a case by case basis.
In to ta l,  18 factors explaining the reasons for delay could be 
identified. All these factors were, however, not applicable to a ll 
cases. The frequencies of their occurrence also differed from one 
case to the other. Appendix D.21 summarises the magnitude of and 
the extent to which these factors were involved in the sample 
cases.
Clearly, the means of such factors are not additive. In order to 
better understand the relative significance of each of these 
factors, an attempt to somehow make them additive is made. The sums 
of a ll these factors are f i r s t  calculated and totalled. This total 
is taken to be 95.5% ^^ and the individual sums are expressed as 
fractions of 95.5%. Table 8.6 presents these factors, made additive 
in this way, under similar broader classifications, as done in the 
subjective approach.
Assuming that a somewhat standard time interval was maintained in 
between two hearings, which in fact might not be true though, i t  
appears from Table 8.6 that parties themselves were responsible for  
about half of the total delays (the f i r s t  party for 20% and the 
second party for 30%)-^723 y^gy either prayed for time or fa iled  
to attend the court on the scheduled dates. Members of the court 
were responsible for 14% of the delays. They either physically 
absented or delayed in submitting their written opinions.
Chairmen's absence accounted for more than 5% of the delays.1-73] 
Court procedures and pressure of work on i t  explained more than 22% 
of the total time length. Certain extraneous factors beyond the 
control of the court and certain other miscellaneous factors 
accounted for only 2.5% of the total delays. Missing factors were 
responsible for more than 6% of the total time length.
TABLE 8 .6
Factors accounting fo r delay in  decisions 
c lassified  by courts
j Reasons for Delay
F irs t
Labour
Court
Second
Labour
Court
Both 1 
Courts I
J 1. f i r s t  Party: 20.2 17.9 18.5 I
| Prayed fo r time 11.1 12.9 12.3 |
J Absented 9.1 4.8 6.2 I
( 2 . Second Party: 25.1 30.0 28.3 I
| Prayed fo r time 21.9 25.9 24.5 |
| Absented 3.2 4.1 3.8 |
1 3. Both Parties: 1.7 2.3 2.1 1
| Prayed for time 0.9 1.4 1.2 1
| Absented 0.8 0.9 0.9  I
1 4. Menbers representing the parties: 13.6 14.6 14.2 1
| Absented 11.2 12.0 11.7 |
I Delayed w ritten  opinion 2.4 2.6 2.5 |
I 5. Chairman absented: 6.8 4.9 5.5 1
| 6 . Court: 22.9 21.9 22.5 |
| (a) Procedures: 7.4 5.7 6.5  I
| - Time taken in  serving notice 
1 on the second party 5.7 3.6 4.5 1
| - Enquiry, examination and cross- 
I examination of witnesses 1.7 2.1 2.0  |
I (b) Business: 1S.S 16.2 16.0 1
| - Hearing could not be started 9.1 10.2 9.9 |
I - Hearing started but had to be 
I adjourned 6.4 6.0 6.1 I
I 7. Extraneous factors (sudden Government 
| holiday, court shifted e tc .) 1.8 1.1 1.4 1
1 \
| 8. Miscellaneous (revival of cases, legal 
| complexities, mistakes made by c le r ic a l 
1 staffs  e tc .) 0.8 1.0 1.0 |
I 9. Refixation of hearing dates for 
| unknown reasons 7.1 6.3 6.5 I
1 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 I
Inter-court variations as to reasons for delay: The reasons for
delay in disposing of the cases by the labour courts are evident.
But why did the second court take 74% more time than that of the 
f i r s t  court? Table 8.6 also summarises the court-wise reasons for 
delay. The percentage form of summarisation, as made in that table, 
and the two pie-charts, one for each court, prepared by using those 
percentage data (Figure 8 .3 ) ,  do not disclose any significant 
inter-court variation as to the various reasons accounting for the 
delay in decisions. This means that the pattern of influence of the 
delaying factors were relative ly similar, but in absolute terms 
there must have been some differences between them.
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Fig. 8.3 REASONS FOR DELAY IN DECISIONS IN THE FIRST AND
SECOND LABOUR COURTS, DHAKA
With a view to finding out this pattern of absolute differences, 
court-wise sums of these factors are taken (columns 1 and 2 of Table 
8.7 ). Since the number of cases taken as samples from the two 
courts were not equal, proportionate increases (for the f i r s t  court) 
and decreases (for the second court) are made to make the sums for 
100 cases (columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 .7 ) .  The sums of the second 
court are then expressed as percentages of those of the f i r s t  court 
(column 5). The calculated percentage increases or decreases, 
presented in column 6, show that, except for the two minor factors 
( f i r s t  party’ s absence and sudden Government holidays), a ll  other 
procrastinating factors rigourously prolonged the second court's 
disposal of the cases. For example, compared to the f i r s t  court, 
hearing dates in the second court had to be shifted 53% times more 
due to the f i r s t  party, 108% times more due to the second party and 
133% times more due to both the parties. The absence of members and 
Chairmen in the second court were 88% and 25% times more 
respectively than in the f i r s t  court. The procedures followed and 
the court's business resulted in 86% times more shifting of dates in  
the second court. The unknown factors shifted the second court's 
date by 56% more of the times, as compared to the f i r s t  court.
263
TABLE 8 .7
Variations as to raisons for delay In decisions 
between the firs t and the second labour courts
1st LC 
Suns for 
94 cases 
(1)
2odLC 
Suns for 
114 cases 
(2)
1st 1C 
Suns for 
100 cases 
(3)
2nd LC 
Suns for 
100 cases 
(4)
Suns of| 
2nd LC | 
as a % j 
of 1st | 
(5) |
I  1
Increase) 
(6) t
1 1. First Party: 437 812 465 712 153 1 53 |
1 Prated for tine 240 S91 255 518 203 1 ICO (
| Absented 197 221: 210 194- 92 1 - 8 |
J 2- Second Party: 541 1367 575 1199 208 1 108 1
I Prayed for tine 472 1182 502 1037 207 1 107 |
| Absented 69 185 73 162 221 1 121 I
| 3. Both Parties: 37 104 39 91 233 1 133 I
1 Prayed for tine 19 64 20 56 260 1 160 |
1 Absented 18 40 19 35 184 | 84 |
| 4. Menbers representing 
I the parties: 293 667 311 585 188 1 88 |
I Absented 242 547 257 480 187 | 87 |
I Delayed written opinion 51 120 54 105 194 | 94 |
I 5. Absence of the Chai rrran: 147 222 156 195 12S 1 25 1
| 6. Court: 371 839 394 735 105 i 86 |
| a. Procedjres: Enquiry,
| exami nation and cross- 
| examination 36 96 38 84 221 | 121 |
I b. Business:
I -  Hearing could not be 
J started 196 468 208 410 197 | 97 !
| -  Heari ng had to be 
| adjourned 139 27S 148 241 163 1 63 |
| 7. Extraneous factors: 38 53 40 46 115 1 15 I
| Sudden Coverment holiday 30 35 32 31 97 | - 3 |
I Court shifted 8 18 8 16 200 | 100 |
| 8. Miscellaneous factors: 17 59 18 52 288 | 188 |
I Revival of cases 5 14 5 12 240 | 140 |
I Legal complexities 8 34 8 30 375 | 275 |
| Mistakes nade by clerks 4 11 5 10 200 | ICO |
| 9. Shifting of hearing dates 
| for urkrtvn factors: 1S2 289 162 253 156 | 56 I
Cross-tabulations of the cases by courts and delaying factors also 
reveal significant tendency for the second court to be severely 
affected by these factors. But the basic question s t i l l  remains. 
Why did a ll the delaying factors combine to prolong the second 
court's decisions? Certain possible answers might be as follows:
F irs t ly , the distribution of the decided and pending cases between 
the two sample courts were not uniform. More than 61% of the cases 
examined at the second court were decided and, as already pointed 
out, the decided cases took more time than the pending cases. 
Secondly, a cross-distribution of the cases by courts and 
industries, reveals that the second court dealt with more of the
?cases from the jute industry (x significant at 1% leve l) . Cases in 
the jute industry took relatively more time than those in other
o
industries (x significant at 5% lev e l) .  Thirdly, the cases in the 
second court were mostly complaint and right enforcement cases
p
which, as revealed by breakdown and cross-tabulation (x significant 
at 1% level) analyses, took relatively more time. Fourthly, a 
cross-distribution of the cases by Courts and outcome indicates that 
more cases in the f i r s t  court and less of those in second court were 
"withdrawn" and "not proceeded with" cases. "Compromises" and "not
p
proceeded with" cases took relatively less time [ x  significant at 
1%). F ifth ly , and probably more importantly, the second court was
more liberal in allowing time to the parties and shifting dates and
less serious in disposing of the cases. Lastly, the te rr i to r ia l
jurisdiction of the courts could have some influence on the disposal
of the cases. In addition to some other areas, the Dhaka 
metropolitan city was within the jurisdiction of the f i r s t  court.
The head offices of the PDB (E le c tr ic ity ) ,  BRTC (road transport) and 
BIWTC (water transport) wherefrom the majority of the cases in the 
f i r s t  court were f i le d ,  were located within the metropolitan city  
and as such the affected parties could make easy and frequent 
follow-ups of their cases. But the situation in the second court 
was different in this respect.
Practical implications of delay: From the above findings regarding
their operations, i t  seems that the labour courts have largley 
failed in achieving the purposes for which they were constituted.
The excessive delay made in giving decisions or awards have diverse 
implications to those concerned. The workers especially seem to be 
hurt by long delay in decisions. The workers in Bangladesh are very 
poor in general. Many of them do not dare to f i l e  cases against 
management and then run after the courts due to their financial 
weakness. A few of the aggrieved workers, who take the shelter of 
labour courts feel very frustrated due to frequent changes of 
hearing dates. Some lose interest in their cases and do not follow 
them up to the last. Others fa il  to attend the courts on the 
scheduled dates and find their cases dismissed on default. In the 
cases which are contested to the las t, they get only delayed 
decisions. And as the well-known maxiom goes, "justice delayed is 
justice denied", the workers do not have real confidence in the 
labour courts.
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I t  seems that the present provisions of law regarding the operations 
of labour courts could not ensure adequate justice to workers.
In dismissal cases, a labour court cannot question the quality of a 
domestic enquiry i f  proper procedures are followed by management at 
the plant level. The penalty provisions for non-implementation of 
the labour court decisions seem to be very l ib e r a l ,^ 4 ]  ancj the 
recovery of money due from an employer under a settlement or award 
to be vey c u mb e r s o me , s o  that management does not care to 
implement the decisions of the labour courts in come cases. 7% of 
the cases examined were in respect of violation of courts' orders.
The lingering of the cases seems to bring a favourable effect to 
management in that they automatically win in the cases dismissed on 
default of the workers. The managerial people being more educated 
and conscious about the legal implications, they usually keep the 
labour courts informed of their absence by showing reasonable 
grounds and as such a very few of the cases are decided ex-parte. 
Even when ex-parte decisions are given in exceptional cases, 
managerial people can get their cases revived by exerting pressure 
and influence on the courts. The stronger financial strength of 
managements allows them to keep the cases pending for an unlimited 
period. Practically, however, they also have to spend a lo t in 
terms of time, money and effort in following up the cases for years 
together.
Due to long delays made in giving decisions, cases pile up as 
pending and the courts are a r t i f ic ia l ly  shown to be very overloaded. 
Since the parties are always represented in the court by the labour 
lawyers, long time taken in deciding the cases merely perpetuates 
the income of these unscrupulous lawyers who usually try to drag the 
cases in their professional interest.
Looking at the lengthy process of deciding cases by the labour 
courts, the author is strongly confident that i f  a comparative 
statement could be prepared as to the total cost incurred in getting 
a labour court decision on a case and the outright admission of the 
claim in question (by management) or the acceptance of the status 
quo before f i l in g  a case (by workers), the la t te r  might prove to be
less costly. By making this statement, the author does not, 
however, suggest that the parties should not go to the labour 
courts, but rather emphasises that such courts should be operated as 
effectively as to ensure industrial justice to the parties 
concerned.
8.2.5. Enhancing the effectiveness of labour courts:
But how can the effectiveness of operations of the labour courts be 
ensured? In view of the problems identified in the previous sub­
sections, certain measures may be suggested in this connection:
(1) Chairman of the courts: The Chairman of a labour court being
the final authority and ultimate decision maker of the cases, the 
appointment of appropriate persons as Chairmen will probably enhance 
the effectiveness of such courts to a great extent.
(a) In view of the lack of an interest of the Chairmen due to their  
old age, i t  is strongly f e l t  that the young High Court or 
D istric t Court Judges should be appointed as Chairmen of the 
labour courts for a term of at least five years so that they 
could give more time to their duties without keeping 
themselves busy for retirement.
(b) Labour courts being an entirely new f ie ld  to the Chairmen, they 
should have some exposure to and orientation with industrial 
l i f e .  They should be sent for some short training in 
Economics, Business Admi ni strati on and Industrial Relations.
(c) In removal of their frustration over service conditions, i t  is 
suggested that their present status and service fa c i l i t ie s  
should be increased at least in line with other High Court or 
D is tr ic t Judges.
(2) Court procedures: A streamlining of the court procedures along
the following lines is expected to largely enhance the
effectiveness of labour courts in dispensing industrial justice:
(a) In avoidance of the present liberal attitude, the labour 
courts should be more serious in exercising their present 
powers of procedural summarisations.
( i )  The labour court proceedings should continue with the 
chairman and one member as per existing provision of the 
law.
( i i )  In unintimated absences of the parties, the labour court 
should act s tr ic t ly  as per laws by either dismissing the 
case on default or deciding i t  ex-parte, as the case 
might be. The cases once decided ex-parte should never 
be revived.
( i i i )  A labour court should deem i ts e l f  more as a court of 
arbitration rather than of law, and accordingly, i t  
should follow summary procedures as frequently as 
possible.
(i v ) The legal practitioners should be s tr ic tly  barred from 
representing the parties in the hearing of their cases.
(b) A rea lis tic  standard for monthly case disposals should be set 
out and a monthly return on the actual number of cases disposed 
of should be sent to the Ministry of Labour.
(c) Instead of sitting for only about one and a half hours per 
working day, as they do at present, the courts should s it  for 
the whole day with only a lunch break at noon.
(d) Time for prayers by the parties should not be allowed as a 
general rule. I f  time is allowed in exceptional cases, i t  
should not exceed more than one week.
(e) A rea lis tic  maximum lim it  should be set (say 120 days), which 
the courts should be obliged to adhere to.
( f )  The Chairman of a labour court should be obliged to consult 
with the written opinion of the members and mention such 
opinions in the delivered judgement.
(g) Analogous decisions on similar cases should be given.
(h) As practised in France,!-^  a conciliatory session should 
precede the judgement session in the labour courts.
(3) Court members:
(a) As under Swedish m o d e l b y  doing away with the present 
panel system of their part-time employment, the court 
members should be appointed on a fu ll-tim e basis.
(b) Underqualified persons should not be appointed as labour 
court members. Certain minimum cr ite r ia  should be fu l f i l le d  
before they could be appointed as members.
(c) The members should be provided with certain minimum 
fa c i l i t ie s  (e.g. space for s itt ing , separate f i le s  of the 
cases, typing fa c i l i t ie s  e tc .) .
(4) Other measures:
(a) Regarding the location of the labour courts either of the 
two arrangements might be considered in substitution of the 
present arrangement - i f  the courts are kept Dhaka city  
based, a ll the courts should have the same venue; or 
alternatively, industrial zone-wise labour courts should be 
constituted.
(b) Violation of the labour court decisions should be made a 
more serious offence by amending the present penalty 
l im its.
(c) Physical conditions of the labour courts should be 
gradually improved.
In addition to the above curative measures, recommended above, 
certain preventive measures may also be suggested so that lesser 
number of cases are f i le d  in future than presently being f i le d .
Machineries prior to labour courts (b ipartite  and t r ip a r t i te  
negotiations) should be more effective. Most cases originate from 
the unreasonable actions of the parties and as such much depends on 
the parties themselves to change their  attitudes. The strengthening 
and activising of the present factory inspection machinery!-^ may 
also indirectly help in preventing the origination of some cases by 
ensuring good working conditions within the plants. The elimination 
of the alleged black law, Section 19 of the Employment of Labour 
(Standing Orders) Act, 1965, under which any worker may be 
terminated from service at any time at the discretion of management, 
may satisfy a long f e l t  demand of the workers and prevent some cases 
from originating.
8.3 Labour Appellate Tribunal
There is only one Labour Appellate Tribunal for the whole of 
Bangladesh, located at D h a k a . A s  provided in the Taw, the 
tribunal consisted of only one member who was found to be a retired  
High Court Judge, aged 64, appointed on a one year contract. As 
were the labour court chairmen, so also the tribunal member was 
deprived of many usual service fa c i l i t ie s  which he enjoyed 
throughout his previous service l i f e  as a High Court Judge. For 
example, there was no stenographer attached to his office. He had 
no office car. The authority did not provide him with any house.
The physical conditions of the tribunal were no better than those of 
the labour courts. The tribunal has no administrative control over 
the labour courts.
Cases coming to the tribunal are usually of two types - (a) appeals 
over labour court awards on charter of demands placed by the CBAs 
and (b) appeals over interpretation of any provision of any 
award or s e t t l e m e n t . A s  observed by Bhattacharjee, the number 
of cases f i le d  in the tribunal was insignificant, compared to those 
f i le d  in the labour courts. He also observed an upward trend of 
cases being disposed by the tribunal, which might be due to a lesser 
number of cases being f i l e d . T h e  tribunal member himself 
reported that the tribunal was significantly underloaded.
The tribunal cases mainly related to the private sector industries. 
As already indicated in Chapter IV, a few awards were appealed from 
the sample public sector industries immediately after independence 
when the industrial relations climate was largely unsettled. From 
1974 onwards not even a single appeal case was ever referred to the 
tribunal from any of th sample industries. When asked to report how 
frequently they approached the tribunal for resolving disputes, the 
respondents (plant level managements and CBAs and corporation 
managements) were almost equally divided between "rarely" and 
"never" to have gone to t r i b u n a l . A  majority of the 
respondents reported the statutory time l im it provided for deciding 
cases by the tribunal to be reasonably a d e q u a t e . A  maximum 
number of respondents also thought that the tribunal was efectively  
performing its  functions.^*!
I t  seems that, under the present legal framework, there is very 
l i t t l e  scope for public sector industrial disputes to be referred to 
the tribunal.In  real cases, however, i f  any case is ever referred to 
i t ,  the tribunal handles such a case with reasonable satisfaction of 
the parties concerned.
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CHAPTER IX
TOWARDS A CONTINGENCY MODEL OF EFFECTIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR THE BANGLADESH 
PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIES
Conflict, latent or manifest, is an inevitable component of any 
industrial relations system, regardless of whether i t  is a 
socialist or cap ita lis t system, or whether i t  applies to private or 
public sector industries. But the parties to the dispute are tied  
together on a long term basis and cannot generally break their  
relationship over the disputed is s u e s .^  Given the symbiotic 
nature of the industrial relationship every conflict is followed by 
its  re s o lu t io n .^  Industrial disputes cannot be understood at a ll  
without a frame of reference that also includes resolution of such 
disputes. This is because an industrial dispute is not an end in 
i ts e lf  but a means to an end. I t  is argued that disputes have both 
functional and dysfunctional a s p e c ts .^  Having recognised the 
functional aspects of the disputes, the concerns of the actors of 
the industrial relations system are now to avoid the dysfunctional 
aspects through their  proper rationalisation and institu tional­
isation and bringing them under reasonable rules and procedures.^
The previous chapters have described the various methods of 
resolution of the public sector industrial disputes in Bangladesh. 
The issues generally negotiated at each level and the variables 
affecting the effectiveness of operations of each level of the 
resulution process have been examined. The purpose of the present 
Chapter is to attempt to build a contingency model of effective  
dispute resolution for the Bangladesh public sector industries in 
the ligh t of their peculiar administrative hierarchies, existing 
relationship patterns between the parties, nature of the issues for 
settlement, current problems of the dispute resolution machineries 
and possible future lines of improvement.
No specific model of dispute settlement is available for ready 
reference in the current lite ra tu re . A large number of models on 
industrial relations systems^ and collective bargaining process 
are, however, available. Thomson's and Murray's model on grievance
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procedures,^ Kahn-Freund's static and dynamic models on the 
nature of collective b a rg a in in g ,^  Walton's and McKersie's 
behavioural theory of nego tia t ions ,^  Parker's and Scott's path 
model of workplace industrial r e la t io n s ^  are a ll more or less 
relevant in the various phases of the dispute resolution process in 
the Bangladesh public sector.
The Chapter proceeds as follows. In section one, are summarised the 
major problems of the three levels of the whole dispute resolution 
process in the Bangladesh public sector basically in terms of the 
time perspective of their possible solutions. The issues^-^ in 
dispute for settlement at different levels are summarised in 
section two in terms of the administrative hierarchies under which 
the public sector industries are managed and also in terms of their  
institutional settlement. In the light of the summarisations in 
sections one and two, section three examines the extent of 
applicability of certain industrial relations and collective  
bargaining models, developed by the western writers, referred to 
above, in improving the industrial relations and in enhancing the 
effectivness of dispute resolution in the Bangladesh public sector 
industries. Certain typical path models of dispute resolution at 
the plant, corporation and conciliation levels, developed from ideas 
largely borrowed from Parker and Scott, are presented in section 
four. Section five concludes the Chapter by making a general 
comment on a few pre-conditions to be present at the macro level 
before any structural changes in industrial relations vis-a-vis  
effective dispute resolution could occur.
9.1 Problems of Dispute Resolution Machineries 
and Their Tentative Solutions over Time
9.1.1. Problems of direct negotiation
A large number of problems relating to direct negotiation can be 
identified by summarising Chapter VI. Although many of these 
problems are reasonably interrelated, they may be broadly classified  
into six categories:
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(a) Background of the parties: Managers of the public sector 
industries, in general, lack professionalism and experience. Those 
at the lower level, in particular, are not well-conversant about 
many provisions of the relevant labour laws. The educational level 
of the workers and plant level trade union leaders are very poor and 
hence they are not well-aware of many legal provisions and 
corporation policies applicable to their workplace and working 
relationship. Both unions and management generally lack mutual 
trust and confidence to each other. Each alleges the other to be 
unfair in approaches and dishonest in practices. Management 
recognises unions under legal obligations only but is not ready to 
accept any interference in their managerial prerogatives and as such 
does not appreciate the way the union leaders behave. Due to some 
objective conditions present in the union and bargaining structures, 
the union leaders also maintain an antagonistic relationship with 
the management.
(b) Plant level union structure: Multiple unions exist at the plant
level under legal shelter. All unions are p o lit ic a lly  motivated. 
Each union is a f f i l ia te d  with a national or industrial federation of 
trade unions. The national/industrial federations, in fact, act 
more as labour fronts of the opposing political parties than for 
ideological and economic improvement of the workers. Unions 
generally do not observe democratic norms and values. Obscene 
language, critisisms, sarcasm, provocation, physical violence and 
even murders and k illings are not uncommon. Inter-union riva lries  
have created a deadlock situation over the determination of the 
exclusive CBA in many cases. Under conditions of acute rivalries  
none of the unions can develop and maintain a co-operative 
relationship with management due to a fear of the opponent's 
allegation of being sold to management.
(c) Corporation level union structure: As at the plant level,
multiple federations/central unions also work in most of the 
corporations. A very keen competition and extreme rivalry are 
characteristic features of these federations. As already noted, all 
have political orientations. Leaders of the federations are a ll  
non-workers and actively engaged in national po litics . None of the
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federations has a f f i l ia te d  unions in the majority of the plants. 
There is no corporation level CBA in any case and as a result, 
direct negotiations in some cases are to ta lly  deadlocked, and in 
others such negotiations have to be conducted with more than one 
federation. Problems also arise sometimes over the ra tif ica tion  (by 
plant level CBAs) of agreements negotiated at the corporation level 
with federations of the opponent block.
(d) Management structure and policies: Public sector industries are 
administered through a three t ie r  management hierarchy - the 
Ministerial t ie r ,  the corporation level t ie r  and the plant level 
t ie r .  Authorities and responsibilities at each t ie r  of
administation have not been clearly defined. The policy of 
centralised administration is generally followed. Delegation of 
authority to plant level management is very much restricted. L i t t le  
written policies have been given for the guidance of the plant level 
management. All these factors enable plant management to pass the 
buck to higher level tiers whenever any complication arises at the 
local level. Many t r iv ia l  issues that can be reasonably solved at 
the plant level are referred to corporations. Bureaucratic 
formalities followed at the corporation level delay solution to 
problems in most cases. Neither the ministry nor the corporation 
has clear-cut policiesto be uniformly applied to specific problem 
situations. Whenever a problem arises, a f ire -fighting  measure is 
taken to solve i t  on an ad-hoc basis.
(e) Bargaining structure: Basic financial terms and conditions of 
service of the workers are centrally fixed by the Government and can 
not be increased through collective bargaining. Thus financial 
benefits are to remain fixed irrespective of continual sharp 
increases in the cost of liv ing. No constitutional and peaceful 
method of increasing the size of the wage packet has been prescribed 
by the Government. Industry-wide strikes from time to time compel 
Government intervention, t r ip a r t i te  negotiation and some 
modifications in wage scales. Negotiation levels as to other issues 
(e.g. labour welfare, local problems, rights and obligations etc.) 
have not been clearly delineated. Plant management, therefore, is 
not willing to take any risk of negotiations with the plant level 
CBAs/unions and of any unpleasant decisions affecting their workers.
The scope of bargaining on basic financial issues being 
unavailable, plant level CBAs sometimes place demands on major 
labour welfare programmes of heavy financial implications which seem 
to be beyond the financial a b il i ty  of the plant. Under the above 
lim its of management and bargaining structures for the public sector 
industries, the 21 days time l im it  for concluding direct negotiation 
at the plant level has proven impractical.
( f )  Negotiating behaviours: The parties, with their current
background, operating under the above union, management and 
bargaining structures, frequently exhibit certain negotiating 
behaviours which are incompatible with democratic values and a co­
operative approach to dispute resolution. Each party takes an 
obstinate attitude against the other. Unions place demands which 
management deems to be unreasonable and i l le g a l .  Unions bring 
allegations which managements turn down as being false. Unions take 
resort to irrational and coercive behaviours. Most of the 
collective agreements in the Bangladesh public sector industries 
were indeed signed under duress by following the "Gherao" model 
of Maul ana Bhasani.
9.1.2. Tentative solutions to direct negotiation problems
The above problems of direct negotiation might now be considered in 
terms of their possible solutions. Since most of the problems are 
interrelated, solution of one problem is like ly  to have a positive 
effect on the others. For example, an effective bargaining 
environment, in avoidance of unreasonable, coercive and 
destructive negotiating behaviours lies  in the maturity of the 
parties and a reorganisation of the structural arrangements of 
unions, management hierarchies and collective bargaining.
(a) Maturity of the parties: Maturity of the parties is a function
mainly of education, training and experience. These factors can not 
be changed overnight. These w ill have to be considered in relation  
to the national level literacy and industrial experience. A phased 
comprehensive training programme for trade union leaders and middle 
and lower level managers will probably do a lo t in bringing maturity 
among the direct parties to negotiation over a medium term in time. 
The maturity of the workers, however, can not be expected to come 
about until a fter a long time.
I t  is apparent from the US experience that the mature, strong, 
stable and secure labour unions think and act differently then they 
did in their in i t ia l  years of organisation .^^ Once the parties 
become mature and well established, they can structure the attitudes 
of one another in a positive direction towards mutual dependence, 
respect, trust, legitimacy of needs and objectives and friendliness. 
Mature parties can help one another to be co-operatively orientated 
in their interactions by applying the principles of certain 
psychological theories of attitude c h a n g e . E x p e r i e n c e  in 
Sweden seems to indicate that an organised labour movement can 
largely overcome the stagnating tendencies in the process of 
matturing, by such means as institutional arrangements for frequent 
meetings, extensive educational programmes, widespread participation  
in collective bargaining, reliance on democratic procedures and good 
internal communications, and a progressive s p ir it  among the 
leadership and membership.
(b) Reorganising authority structures: Mudh of the confusion is
like ly  to be avoided by clearly specifying the in te r - t ie r  
authorities and responsibilities, with more operational authority 
being given to plant management, and keeping the parties well- 
informed in these respects. This could possibly be done internally  
and over a short time.
(c) Reorganising union structures: The task of reorganising the 
union structures may be a very d i f f ic u lt  one since i t  is very much 
interrelated with the national political system and the 
international conventions of "right to organise" and "freedom of 
association", ra t if ied  by Bangladesh. The alluvial soil of 
Bangladesh is not only fe r t i le  for the growth of various kinds of 
agricultural products, but seems to be a good ground for producing 
an abundance of parties and politics . Informed sources say that 
there are about 50 to 70 po litica l parties in the country. Any 
foreigner may be amused to learn the fact that there are as many as 
27 communist parties now in Bangladesh.^-! This po litica l party 
grouping has its  reflection on union organisation. On the face of 
current molecular divisions and rivalry among the trade unions two 
approaches - one short term and the other long term - may be
suggested. Over a short term, the Directorate of Labour should be
more active in enforcing the law prohibiting the membership of
workers to more than one union and in removing the negotiation
deadlock through formal declaration of CBAs both at the plant and
corporation levels according to the existing industrial relations
rules of the country. Over a long term, the policy should be such
as to discourage the m ultiplicity of unions both at the plant and
corporation levels. There should not be any bar on the workers to
organise, but they should be organised under one or two unions (at
the plant level) or federations of unions (at the corporation
level) , executives to which should be periodically elected on the
basis of personal qualifications and capabilities of the contesting
candidates. The union or the federation having the maximum
membership should be allowed to work as the single bargaining agent
in the plant or the corporation concerned, as under the US model. 
[16]
(d) In flation proofing and reorganisation of bargaining levels: On
the face of a sharply increasing cost of liv ing , which rises by 
about 40% every year, the statutorily fixed wage components without 
any constitutional provisions for their revision bear no 
justif ication . Either a permanent body, consisting of 
representatives of workers, corporation managements and Government, 
should be appointed to review and reconcile wage scales with 
changing cost of liv ing , as is the practice in the Japanese public 
sector,!-1 -^! or provisions should be made for the tr ip a r t i te  
negotiations between leaders of the federations of unions, 
corporation managements and Ministerial representatives at specific 
intervals of time, say after one or two years. Under either of 
these arrangements, plant level unions may be expected not to submit 
any illegal demands on basic financial terms and conditions of 
service to plant management. As to other financial issues and 
matters of rights and obligations, the in te r - t ie r  bargaining scopes 
should be clearly spelt out and effectively communicated so that the 
unions and federations can place demands to the appropriate levels. 
With authorities and responsibilities at each level concomitantly 
fixed, this measure might reduce the chances of buck passing and 
increase the possibility of effective negotiation at a ll levels.
Arrangements at national level inflation-proofing and a 
reorganisation of the bargaining structure may be done over a short 
period, i f  the authorities concerned so intend.
9.1 .3. Problems of conciliation and their tentative solutions:
The role of conciliation in the resolution of public sector 
industrial disputes is very limited due to the peculiar bargaining 
structure of the industries in this sector. Few cases from the 
public sector are referred to conciliation and s t i l l  fewer of those 
referred ultimately turn successful. A summarisation of Chapter VII 
reveals that conciliation being merely an extended collective  
bargaining, the usual problems of conciliation, as a separate 
dispute resolution machinery do not vary much from those of direct 
negotiation.
(a) Reasons for fa iling  conciliation: Conciliation fa i ls  due to
submission of illegal (unbargainable) demands by the CBA and 
financial constraints (problems related to bargaining structure); 
lack of authority on the part of management (problem related to 
management structure); inter-union riva lry , legal invalid ity  of the 
CBA and political orientation of the unions (problems related to 
union structure); CBA's weakness to ju stify  demands, antagonistic 
relationship between the parties and non-co-operation of management 
in responding to letters or attending to conciliation meetings 
(problems related to background of the parties); adament attitude  
of the parties and false allegations (problems related to 
negotiating behaviours). Mention was made in the previous sub­
section about these problems and their tentative solutions. I f  
union, management and bargaining structures are reorganised in the 
lines suggested, i t  is very lik e ly  that only conciliable issues w ill  
be referred to the conciliators by the valid CBAs.
In addition to the above problems of negotiation, the effectiveness 
of conciliation is also affected by certain other objective and 
subjective conditions of conciliation.
(b) Objective conditions: Due to the centralised structure of the
conciliation service i ts e l f ,  the regional and branch level 
conciliators can not work independently of the divisional 
conciliators. Physical conditions of the conciliation offices are 
poor. Office supplies, transport fa c i l i t ie s  and budgeting 
allocations are very scant.
In view of the better educated people now being employed at the 
lower level of the service, the Directorate may consider granting 
some degree of operational freedom on a long term basis. 
Alternatively, fu ll operational f le x ib i l i ty  may be granted in the 
hands of the expert conciliators, as suggested below in connection 
with the subjective conditions. Resource limitations of the 
Government may not allow drastic improvement of the physical 
conditions of the conciliation offices and of other office  
fa c i l i t ie s ,  but a gradual improvement over a long term basis is 
highly recommended.
( c ) Subjective conditions: The status of the conciliators from the top
to the bottoem levels is regretably inadequate. Their pay and 
service conditions are poor. Due to poor service conditions, both 
in terms of pay and status, public sector managers, who usually 
happen to earn much more than the regional and branch level 
conciliators, feel a superiority complex and do not care much to 
co-operate with the conciliators. Poor pay scales compel some 
conciliators to get corrupted, particularly by private sector 
managers. The educational level of the existing conciliators in 
general is not high enough. Expert persons of wisdom and sagacity 
do not feel attracted to the Service due to poor service conditions.
Keeping in view the fact of a very lig h t workload of the 
conciliators in Bangladesh, i t  may be argued that instead of 
increasing the number of conciliators, more attention should be 
given to their quality and competence even by offering attractive  
pay and service conditions. This may be done merely by reorganising 
the Conciliation Service without much additional cost implications. 
The less capable officers of the Service may be diverted to the
other departments of the Government suffering from staff shortages. 
Better service conditions being offered to those really committed to 
the Service and to a few expert new recruits, i f  needed, may be 
expected to do the task of conciliation more effectively than done 
by the existing conciliators. This reorganisation can be done 
gradually over a long period or radically over a short period 
depending on the intentions of the authorities concerned.
9.1 .4. Problems of labour courts and their tentative solutions:
Excessive delay in decisions is the main problem with the labour 
courts in Bangladesh. In deciding the public sector cases, labour 
courts take more than thirteen times the statutorily allowed period. 
Several factors contribute to this total delay. Parties to the 
cases are themselves responsible for 50% of the delays, court 
members, including the chairman for 20% and court procedures and 
other miscellaneous factors for the rest. In an indirect sense, 
however, i t  is the Chairman who alone is responsible for almost the 
whole of the delays. I t  is because i f  the Chairman s tr ic tly  follows 
the legal sp ir it  and procedures, the effect of all others factors 
contributing to delays may be significantly reduced.
(a) Deviations from procedures: The major points of deviation from
normative and legal procedures are the following:
(1) The court does not follow any basis for selecting the cases to 
be heard f i r s t .  FIFO basis of hearing may be prescribed.
(2) Although the sp ir it  of law is to discourage the representation 
of parties by lawyers during the course of hearing, th is  s p ir i t  
is never realised by the court. The chairman should disallow 
the lawyers to represent the parties.
(3) The law requires the court to give an ex-parte decision in the 
event of the absence of the second party on the hearing date.
But ex-parte decisions are seldom given.
(4) The law provides that cases may be heard and decided in the 
event of the absence of either of the court members. In 
practice, however, the court does not constitute or s i t  in the 
absence of any of the members.
(5) The law treats a labour court as a special court and requires i t  
to decide the cases summarily without following the detailed 
procedures of an ordinary c iv il court. But summary decisions 
are rarely given. Enquiries, examinations and cross- 
examinations - a ll are done. Time is allowed very lib e ra lly  
whenever prayed by either of the parties.
(6) The court sits only for a short time (for 1.5 to 2.0 hours per 
day). Longer sessions may considerably increase the disposal 
rate of cases.
The rejection of the above procedural deviations largely depends 
upon the chairman of the courts who can set them right without much 
d iff icu lty  within a short time. In addition to the above procedural 
digressions, certain objective conditions of the courts and 
subjective characteristics of the court members and the chairmen 
also affect the effectiveness of operations of the labour courts.
(b) Objective conditions: Staff of the labour courts are short in
number, ineffic ien t in quality and s k i l l ,  and corrupted in morality. 
The courts do not have adequate space for clients, visitors and 
court members. Furnitures and fixtures are inadequate. Physical 
conditions are very poor. Environment is very d irty . Office 
supplies are irregular and scarce.
Problems relating to staff are not peculiar to labour courts only 
but are very much common national problems of Bangladesh and no 
short cut solution can be suggested in these respects. Problems of 
physical conditions and space within the courts may be amenable to 
medium term solutions, while that of the office supplies to short­
term solutions.
(c) Subjective conditions: Chairmen of the labour courts are
appointed from the judicial service on the verge of their  
retirement. They frequently absent from courts due to sickness and 
retirement preparations. They do not have any industrial 
orientation and as such do not take so much interest in labour 
matters. They generally have an authoritarian attitude and as such 
do not bother so much to consult with the written opinion of the 
members while giving decisions. The status of the chairman of the 
courts has been degraded from what their status had been as D is tr ic t  
and/or Session Judges. The educational levels of the members 
representing the workers are poor on the average.
Turning to solutions of the problems relating to subjective 
conditions, appointment of young chairmen with adequate status being 
given to them may solve many of the problems. The chairmen and 
members of the labour courts should undergo a training course on 
industrial relations and objectives behind the constitution of the 
labour courts. All these may be done over a relatively short-run. 
The poor educational level of court members representing the 
workers, however, may not be radically changed in view of the 
general low level of educational standard of the workers and trade 
union leaders in Bangladesh. The legal prescription of certain 
minimum qualifications to be possessed by a person before he could 
be appointed as a labour court member and s tr ic t  adherence to such 
pre-determined standards might be a positive short run step in this 
context.
9.2 Issues for Disputes and Their Suggested Channelisation
The specific issues for the public sector industrial disputes 
actually handled by the three dispute resolution machineries are 
summarised in this Section with a view to ascertaining the ir  
distributive and integrative potentials and then to suggesting the 
appropriate levels at which they could be best amenable to 
resolution.
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9 . 2 . 1 .  A c t u a l  i s s u e s  f o r  d i s p u t e s :
Through a review of the Chapters VI to V I I I  is prepared Table 9.1, 
column (1) of which shows a summary l i s t  of the various issues and 
columns (2) to (4) show the involvement of such issues at the 
specified dispute resolution machineries ("yes" indicating 
involvement and "blank" indicating non-involvement).
IA B IE  9 .1
Issues a c tu a lly  handled toy the th re e  d is p u te  
re s o lu t io n  m ach ineries
1 Issu es  d e a lt  
1 (1 )
D ir e c t
N e g o t ia t io n
(2 )
Conci 1 i l io n  
( 3 )
Labour | 
C ourt | 
(»1 1
1 1 . Enhancement o f  wage 
1 s ca les yes yes
1 2 .  Wage anom alies /e s yes yes 1
1 3 . Bonuses yes yes yes | 
(a n o m a lie s ) I
1 a .  f r in g e  b e n e f its yes yes yes I 
(an o m alies ) 1
1 S . H o lio a y s . leaves  and 
1 hours o f  work yes yes yes 1
1 6 . P h y s ic a l w orking  
1 c o n d it io n s yes yes
1 7 . D is c ip l in a r y  m atte rs  
1 (d is c h a rg e s , d is m is s a ls .  
1 suspensions, f in e s  e tc . yes yes yes I
1 8 . O th er personal m atters yes yes |
( 9 . Work orga ni s a t lo n , admtnis 
1 t r a t io n  and a l lo c a t io n yes yes
110. Labour w e lfa re yes yes
111. Supply o f  m a te r ia ls  and 
1 spares yes
112. V ario u s  s p e c ia l a llow ances yes yes yes 1 
(an o m alies ) 1
113■ Im p lem en ta tio n  o f  o rders  
1 and c ir c u la r s  o f the  
1 G overn m en t/co rp o ratio n yes yes
114. A d m in is tra tio n  and d is -  
1 t r ib u t io n  o f common funds yes yes
U S . Post s e rv ic e  b e n e f its yes yes yes I
(1 6 . M isce llan eo u s  a rre a rs yes
117. Ad-hoc r e l i e f  and m inor 
1 payments yes
|18. Misconduct on the part of 
| workers (negligence.
| th e ft ,  p ilfe ra g e , mis- 
| behaviour, in d isc ip lin e  
1 e tc .) yes
119. Misbehaviour and mal-  
1 practices on the p a rt o f 
1 management yes’ yes
120. Workers* representation 
( in  various committees yes yes
(21- Trade union a c t iv i t ie s yes /es
|22. I l le g a l s tr ike /lo cko u t 
j  o r  th re a t to  il le g a l 
j s tr ik e /lo c k o u t yes
123. C ancella tion o f reg is - 
1 t ra t io n  o f trade union . yes 1
A considerable degree of commonness between issues at the direct 
negotiation and the conciliation machineries is evident. This is 
quite expected because concilition is merely an extension of direct 
negotiation. What is important to note is that in the absence of 
any well-defined bargaining and authority structures, many issues 
move through inappropriate channels. I t  is useless to carry on 
direct negotiation and tr ip a r t i te  negotiation (conciliation) over 
issues which are illega l for bargaining or over which plant 
management has no authority to negotiate. Much of the confusions, 
complexities and delays could be avoided through an adequate 
definition of the in te r - t ie r  authority structures in terms of the 
issues that should be placed at specific levels.
Labour court cases of individual nature are concerned with the 
enforcement of legal rights mostly over allegations of unfair 
dismissals and other disciplinary matters, and in some cases over 
wage scale anomalies and other personnel matters. Collective labour 
cases relate mainly to the cancellation of registration of the trade 
unions. A very few of the collective cases concern with interest 
issues.
9.2.2. Suggested channelisation of the issues:
Considering the outcome of the above issues and the present 
administrative and control system of the public sector industries, 
tentative l is ts  of issues lending best to effective resolution at 
specific levels of the dispute resolution process are attempted.
(a) Issues for plant le v e l:
(1) Supply of materials and spares;
(2) Misconduct (negligence, theft, pilferage, indiscipline);
(3) Disciplinary matters;
(4) Work organisation, administration and allocation;
(5) Ad-hoc re lie fs  and minor payments;
(6) Minor changes in physical conditions;
(7) Leaves and holidays (adjustment and administration);
(8) Trade union matters;
(9) Workers representation in various committees;
(10) Labour welfare issues
( b )  I s s u e s  f o r  c o r p o r a t i o n  l e v e l :
(1) Wage scale anomalies (wages and fringe benefits);
(2) Incentive and production bonuses;
(3) Physical working conditions (major changes);
(4) Leaves and holidays;
(5) Various special allowances;
(6) Anomalies in the implementation of orders and circulars;
(7) Adjustment of Ministerial guidelines over basic terms 
and conditions of service.
(c) Issues concurrently for plant and corporation levels:
(1) Personnel matters (policies to corporation and 
implementation to plant);
(2) Administration and distribution of common funds;
(3) Misbehaviour and malpractices by management;
(4) Post service benefits (policies to corporation and 
implementation to plant);
(5) Miscellaneous arrears;
(6) Labour welfare (minor to plant and major to corporation).
(d) Issues for Ministerial level (as broad guidelines):
(1) Wages;
(2) Medical allowances;
(3) House allowances;
(4) Conveyance allowances;
(5) Post service benefits.
No separate l i s t  for conciliation is prepared. I t  is expected that 
i f  the three administrative and control levels function in co­
ordination to each other, the scope for concilition in public sector 
industrial disputes w ill highly diminish. I f  any deadlock s t i l l  
arises only conciliable issues may be reasonably expected to be 
referred to conciliation. With gradual decentralisation in future 
some issues from the Corporation and concurrent l is ts  may be 
expected to move to the plant level l i s t .  Since the scope of labour
courts for intervening in collective public sector interest disputes 
has been restricted in f u l l ,  only rights disputes are being referred 
to labour courts and there is no possibility of any change in this 
trend in future.
I t  is to be noted that most of the issues lis ted for plant and 
corporation levels are of problem types (rights, obligations, plant 
administration etc.) having integrative potential. All issues for 
the Ministerial level are pure issues best amenable to distributive  
bargaining or some sort of periodical adjustments through either of 
the in flation proofing mechanisms already suggested in the previous 
section. These characteristics of the issues will be helpful in 
examining, in the next section, the applicability of certain models 
in the dispute handling process of the public sector industries in 
Bangladesh.
9.3 Applicability of Certain Western Models in the Industrial 
Relations vis-a-vis the Dispute handling Systems
On the basis of the nature of the dispute resolution problems and 
the types of issues for resolution through the various dispute 
resolution machineries, an attempt is made in this section to 
examine the extent to which certain existing models, developed by 
the western specialists, apply to the public sector industrial 
relations and dispute handling systems in Bangladesh.
9.3.1. Relationship patterns and bargaining models
Parties in dispute always work in some sort of a relationship 
pattern. What is the union management relationship pattern in the 
Bangladesh public sector industries? The major components of their  
relationship pattern have been mentioned in Section one. Now an 
attempt is made to blanket them under a specific pattern. Walton 
and McMcKersie^-1 have developed a five point spectrum of the 
relationship patterns between union and management, starting from 
conflict at the le f t  end, passing through containment aggression, 
accommodation, co-operation and ending to collusion at the right. 
They have identified four components of attitude peculiar to each 
of the five relationship patterns -  (a) motivational orientation
and action tendencies, (b) beliefs and legitimacy of other, (c) 
level of trust and (d) degree of friendliness. Peterson and Tracy 
have added "level of respect" as another dimension to the above 
four. The conceptual relationship patterns can thus be summarised 
through a 5 x 5 matrix, as shown in Figure 9.1.
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Fig. 9.1 ATTITUDINAL COMPONENTS OF THE CONCEPTUAL
RELATIONSHIP PATTERNS
The present background of the parties and the structural 
arrangements of unions, management and collective bargaining have 
contributed to develop a general pattern which may aptly be 
designated as "Conflict-cum-Containment-Aggression" pattern in terms 
of the above conceptual models. The bargaining tactics used are 
largely d istributive, although the scope for distributive  
bargaining at the corporation level is limited, and at the plant 
level, i t  is s t i l l  more limited. Under the rationalisation  
of the issues to be settled at the specific levels, as suggested 
above, three distinct sets of industrial relations are l ik e ly  to 
emerge one at the plant level one a t  the corporation level, and the 
other at the national level. Plant level issues, consisting mainly
of rights and obligations, w ill have greater integrative potential 
and thus an accomodative and/or co-operative relationship pattern 
and an integrative bargaining^^ (problem solving) environment is 
more like ly  to evolve at the plant level. At the corporation level 
the bargaining relationship w ill probably vary depending on the 
nature of the issues for resolution. Over financial issues the 
relationship is more like ly  to be conflic tfu l, the parties adopting 
distributive bargaining tactics. Over non-fi nancial and rights and 
obligations issues, on the otherhand, the relationship pattern is 
l ike ly  to be more accomodative and co-operative, the bargaining 
tactics of the parties being largely integrative. The national 
level negotiations are like ly  to be largely conflictful at least 
until some norms are established.
9.3.2. Administrative, Equity and Power Models:
Thomson and Murray^^ have suggested three models of the grievance 
process basically from the viewpoint of management. These are:
(a) administrative model, (b) equity model and (c) power model.
Under the administrative model, the grievance process is essentially 
looked upon as an extension of the administrative process and 
applicable in situations where changes in status quo are not 
normally involved. The goal under this model is to get the best 
answer within the shortest possible time irrespective of whether 
procedural formalities are followed or not. Delegation of authority 
at the lower level of management fa c ilita tes  effective operation of 
this model. Instead of viewing workers and management as 
adversaries of each other, this model views them as integral parts 
of the same administrative system. The essence of the model is the 
informal social relations.
The Equity model may be usefully applied in those situations where 
more or less formal rules exist in the form of law, collective  
agreement, stated management policies, customs and practices etc.
As grievances arise, they are resolved as per pre-determined rules 
or customs applied equitably. Formality is the essence of this  
model, although some degree of informality has to be inevitably  
recogni sed.
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The Power model applies to those situations which involve workers' 
challenges to the status quo. Formal procedures do not cover such 
challenges and hence lower level management are unable to resolve 
them. Irrespective of formal procedures claims type demands are 
resolved at the top level.
Although Thomson and Murray suggested these models in relation to 
grievance procedures, they also have applicability in the resolution 
of disputes more than grievances. Considering the relative  
immaturity of the parties in the Bangladesh public sector industries 
and their greater orientation to laws, rules and policies, a 
combination of administrative and equity models is more l ike ly  to 
work well in the conceptual plant level industrial relations. At 
the corporation and national levels, however, equity and power 
models should prove more effective.
9.3.3. Static and dynamic models
Kahn-Freund's^ static and dynamic models of bargaining also have 
some relevance to the suggested model of dispute resolution for 
Bangladesh public sector industries. Static model is one in which 
parties s it  periodically to negotiate and sign agreements.
Agreements are made for a fixed period (say one or two years). 
Agreements are collective contracts. After the expiry of the 
contract period, the parties s it  for a fresh agreement. Under the 
dynamic model of bargaining, on the other hand, parties create 
permanent jo in t institutions charged with the formulation of 
standards and adopting them to changed circumstances and demands.
I t  is mainly a norm-creating process and may better be called 
"collective administration". Dynamic model characterises the 
British system, while the static , the American and other West 
European countries.
Although the static model applies in Bangladesh also, the scope for 
making plant level periodical agreements in the public sector 
industries is very limited. Under the model suggested for the 
national level, either of the Kahn-Freund's models may be 
alternatively applicable, depending on how wage revisions are
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intended. I f  wage revisions are contemplated to be made through a 
permanent commission, which is not the tradition in Bangladesh 
though, i t  may take a dynamic model. Alternatively, wage revisions 
through tr ip a r t i te  collective agreements between the workers' 
federations, the corporation management and the Ministry, may be 
made as under the static model. Periodical agreements are lik e ly  at 
the corporation level. The plant level union and management being 
concerned mainly with the administrati on of the agreements made at 
the corporation level, some degree of dynamism within the lim its of 
the corporation level agreements is like ly  to occur in the workplace 
relationship between the parties.
Thus in the context of Bangladesh public sector industries, under 
the structural rearrangements, as suggested, three sets of 
industrial relations vis-a-vis dispute resolution processes may be 
conceptualised. At the plant level, a cordial relationship 
(Walton's and McKersie's accomodative and co-operative patterns 
making most use of both the informal social relations and formal 
procedures (Thomson's and Murray's administrative and equity models) 
with some degree of dynamism (Kahn-Freund1 s dynamic model) within 
the broader terms of agreements made at the corporation level is 
conceived of. At the corporation level, on the other hand, a 
relatively conflictful relationship (Walton's and McKersie's 
conflict and containment aggression patterns) making most use of the 
organisational and political strengths (Thomson's and Murray's power 
model) and fin a lly  agreeing to periodical collective agreements 
(Kahn-Freund's static model) is contemplated. At the national 
level, a pattern somewhat similar to that at the corporation level 
is l ike ly .
9.4 Contingency Path Models of Dispute Resolution 
for Bangladesh Public Sector Industries
In this section are depicted some path models^^ of dispute 
resolution, contingent upon the presence or absence of certain  
conditions in the industrial relations climate. These path models 
are expected to serve two purposes. F irs t , they should help to look 
at the existing problems of the dispute resolution machineries, and 
second, they are like ly  to help making specific predictions of
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outcome on the presence or otherwise of certain cr it ica l variables 
in the present structural arrangements or future re-arrangements (in  
the lines suggested) of the industrial relations components relating  
to the public sector industries.
Three path models are presented - one for the plant level, one for 
the corporation level and the other for the conciliation level.
Only the disputes in itia ted  by a CBA or federation of unions are 
exemplified. I f  disputes are in itia ted  by management, however, the 
typical sets of paths, as depicted in the flow charts w ill have to 
be modified in certain respects. Since only the rights issues go to 
labour courts and the decisions of the courts are binding on the 
parties, the outcome of a labour court case seems to be over­
simplified and not affected by so many complications as in other 
resolution machineries. No path model for the labour court level,  
is therefore, attempted.
In the depicted flow charts (Figures 9.2 to 9 .4 ), the block capital 
type represents a change in the state of the system (outcome) and 
the small type represents decision points.
9.4.1. Path model for plant level
Figure 9.2 depicts a path model for plant level negotiations. A 
CBA raises a dispute. The f i r s t  question to ask is whether i t  has
been properly communicated to an appropriate person of the
management. A positive answer to this question w ill follow the next 
question as to the adequacy of the negotiation procedure, which may 
include the bargainability of the issues, adequacy of authority, 
validity of the CBA, willingness of the parties to solve problems 
through negotiation e tc ., while a negative answer may follow the 
next question as to whether the existing industrial relationship 
pattern is good or bad. Even i f  the dispute is not properly
communicated, negotiation may s t i l l  happen provided the industrial
relations climate is good. I f  negotiation procedures are adequate, 
i t  is very like ly  that the resolution will take the upper route.
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Fig. 9.2 A PATH MODEL FOR PLANT LEVEL SETTLEMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES (APPLICABLE FOR LOCAL ISSUES)
The f i r s t  question in the upper route is: is there any disagreement
between the parties over the issues in dispute? An amicable 
settlement is likely  to be made i f  there is n o /l i t t le  disagreement. 
In the case of disagreements, however, the ultimate resolution 
pattern w ill depend on the relative strength of the parties, of 
which there are three possibilities - (a) workers may be stronger 
relative to management, or (b) both sides may be equally strong or
(c) management’ s side may be stronger relative to workers’ . When 
both sides are equally strong, an amicable settlement with i ts  
consequent positive effect on industrial relations is l ike ly  to
f  251occur.L J  But when one party is stronger relative to the other, 
the settlement is very like ly  to be in favour of the stronger party 
with a resultant adverse effect on industrial relations.
Now turning to the lower route, the absence of effective  
communication methods, inadequate negotiation procedures and an 
unfavourable industrial relations climate are like ly  to further 
worsen the relation between the parties with a concomitant 
resistence of one against the other. At this point the route may 
divide in either of the two possible directions: f i r s t ,  the formal
CBA being in a deadlocked position, i f  there is any other militant 
union or an informal leader,and i f  workers are also m ilitant and 
strong in the ir  position, an unofficial strike is very l ike ly  to 
occur. Second, i f  none of the unions is so strong or i f  there is no 
m ilitant informal leader, and the workers are divided and weak in 
their positions, the dispute will not probably proceed any further. 
The broken paths indicate that there are more stories to be told.
An unofficial strike may end in a variety of alternative ways. 
Workers' fa ilure to achieve success may follow subsequent stages of 
resolution, including o ffic ia l strikes and their aftermaths.
At present, in the absence of proper negotiating arrangements most 
of the disputes cannot take the upper route of the Figure. Unions 
and workers being divided and weak, many disputes are not followed 
up. Unofficial strikes sometimes occur, particularly in the 
manufacturing industries, whenever workers and one or more of the 
unions are m ilitant. Under the suggested structural rearrangements, 
i t  is expected that most disputes will go through the upper route 
and with gradual maturity of the parties, most of the disputes w ill 
be settled amicably with its  consequent favourable effect on 
industrial relations.
9.4.2. Path model for corporation level
Figure 9.3 depicts a path model for the corporation levels 
resolution. A federation submits a charter of demands to 
corporation management. The f i r s t  question to ask is whether the 
federation is a registered one. I f  i t  is not, i t  is legally  
disqualified to work as a. federation and hence to enter into 
negotiations. I f  i t  is registered, the next question that may arise 
is: has the federation the support of the majority of the plant
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Fig. 9-3 A PATH MODEL OF CORPORATION LEVEL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
level CBAs? I f  i t  does not, i t  should s t i l l  be lega l ly  d i s q u a l i f i e d  
to enter  in to  negot iat ions w ith  the corpora t ion management. I f  the 
federat ion submitt ing demands has the support of major i ty  CBAs, the 
th i rd  quest ion to ask i s :  has the corporat ion adequate a u th o r i t y  to
negotiate on the demands? I f  i t  does, d i r e c t  negot iat ion w i l l  s ta r t '  
and i f  negot ia t ion is  successful , a b i p a r t i t e  agreement is  l i k e l y  to 
be signeo. I f  the corporat ion does not have adequate a u th o r i t y  to 
negot iate or i f  d i r e c t  negot ia t ion f a i l s ,  demands are l i k e l y  to  be 
re fe rred to the M in is t r y .  I f  these are so re fe r red,  a t r i p a r t i t e  
negot ia t ion  w i l l  probably occur and t h i s  may re s u l t  in  the 
fo rmulat ion of a t r i p a r t i t e  agreement provided the negot ia t ion  is 
successful.  When t r i p a r t i t e  negot ia tors  turn unsuccessful o r  when 
demands are not re fer red to  the Ministry, i l l e g a l  s t r i ke  may occur.
Broken lines indicate that stories have not ended. Though legally  
disqualified, federations without registration s t i l l  work in the 
Bangladesh public sector usually under the shelter of the po lit ic a l  
party in power. Federations without the support of the majority 
CBAs, s t i l l  carry negotiations with corporation management. I l le g a l  
strikes occur and are resolved in some way or other- Under the
suggested structural rearrangements, i t  is expected that the demands 
will be raised by the authoritative federations and will move 
through appropriate routes resulting in effective bipartite  and 
t r ip a r t i te  agreements with less chance of i l leg a l and unofficial 
strikes.
9.4.3. Path model for resolution through conciliation
Figure 9.4 describes a path model for dispute resolution through the 
concilition machinery. A CBA applies to a conciliator to conciliate 
in a particular industrial dispute. A consecutive series of 
questions are l ike ly  to be confronted, positive answers to which 
should lead to an effective concilition:
(1) Is CBA valid? I f ,  on scrutiny, i t  is found that the CBA suffers 
from legal invalid ity , the question of any negotiation with i t  
does not arise. Many of the conciliatory attempts can not be 
successful due to a lack of locus-standi of the CBA. The second 
question arises only when the CBA is valid.
(2) Is management co-operative? Co-operativeness here refers to the 
tendency of management to respond to letters  from the 
conciliator and to attend to conciliation meetings called by 
him. I t  has been observed that very many conciliation attempts 
fa iled due to non-co-operation of management with the 
conciliator. The third question arises only when management is 
co-operative.
(3) Are issues bargainable? I t  is of no use to s it  in conciliation 
meetings over issues which are not bargainable under law. I f  
issues are bargainable, then a fourth question arises.
(4) Does management have authority? Although the issues are 
bargainable, under the centralised system of administration, the 
plant management may not have adequate authority to negotiate 
any agreement over the issues in question. In that case, the 
concilition is bound to f a i l .  I f  the plant management does have 
adequate authority, the success of conciliation is like ly  to 
depend on the positive answers to the following and some other 
questi ons.
(5) Is the relationship pattern between the parties co-operative?
Is the conciliator adequately sk illfu l?  Does the plant have 
adequate financial authority?
I f  these and some other related questions are answered in the 
affirmative, there is a strong likelihood of successful 
conciliation. Negative answers to a ll or most of these 
questions are very likely  to develop a deadlocked situation  
resulting in the ultimate fa ilure  of the concilition.
The fa ilure of conciliation does not end the story. Broken lines 
suggest something more to happen after the fa ilure (e.g. reference 
to corporation or Ministry, o ff ic ia l or unofficial strikes e tc .) .
Under the structural rearrangements suggested only the valid CBAs 
are like ly  to refer only the conciliable issues (bargainable under 
law and management having authority) to the conciliator with greater 
chances of success.
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9.5 Concluding Remarks
Central to the understanding of and suggesting any measure for 
improvement in the industrial relations and dispute resolution 
system of a country are its  socio-political and economic contexts. 
Each country develops a system in relation to its  own historical, 
p o lit ic a l,  social and economic c o n t e x t s . A l t h o u g h  a country 
may have something to benefit from the experiences of the other 
countries, transplantation of foreign model may not operate well in 
the country of its  importation having contexts different from those 
under which i t  was originally developed.!-^
No country finds managing public sector industrial relations an easy 
t a s k .^ ^  This seems to be more d i f f ic u lt  in the Bangladesh 
context. This is because public sector industries in Bangladesh 
cover a wide range of ac tiv it ies  and are governed by a mix of market 
and bureaucratic rules. The objectives which the public sector 
managers are to achieve are very much flu id , which generates a lo t  
of confusions and problems concerning a ll functional aspects, 
including the management of industrial relations. The structural 
re-arrangements suggested in this Chapter as preconditions to 
effective dispute resolution pre-supposes a clear and stable 
assignment of the specific objectives the public sector industries 
and their managers are to achieve. A long term perspective with 
regard to the public sector industries and a po litical commitment 
to that end are the essential pre-conditions before any structural 
change could be made. Under a situation of frequent political  
changes, with each new e li te  coming to power having a different way 
of thinking about the future of the public sector industries, the 
present practices of ad-hoc and fire -figh ting  arrangements can not 
be expected to be substituted by any stable structural re­
arrangements in the right direction.
ou^
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CHAPTER X
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The objectives which the study aimed a t, as set out in the 
introductory Chapter, are expected by now to have, in some manner, 
been achieved. The purpose of this last Chapter is to draw some 
conclusions based on the major observations made in the earlie r  
Chapters, which the policy makers may consider in ensuring 
industrial peace in the public sector industries through effective  
settlement of disputes between management and labour and thereby 
enhancing productivity in such industries.
(1) As in many other developing c o u n tr ie s ,^  so also in Bangladesh 
public sector industries play a very significant role in her 
economy. Industrial peace, as a precondition to increased 
productivity, in such industries should be emphasised by a l l .
(2) Contrary to general expectations, post-liberation Bangladesh,
characterised by massive nationalisation of industries seems to have
experienced more intense industrial conflict than in the pre­
liberation period, characterised mainly by privatisation policy of 
industrialisation.
(3) The linear trend lines f i t te d  to the strike data relating to 
certain selected public sector industries indicate an increasing 
trend in terms of a ll the measures of conflic t, except for the 
dispute coverage ratio . Disputes not involving stoppage of work 
( i .e .  those successfully settled at the conciliation level) also 
indicate an increasing trend.
(4) Contrary to the general b e lie f ,  there exists a positive 
correlation between real wages and man days lost in disputes, which 
is indicative of two causative situations -  (a) due to po litical 
suppression of union ac tiv it ies , strikes can not increase during 
periods of fa ll ing  real wages, and (b) compared to workers' needs 
and expectations, too meagre increases in real wages can not divert 
the increasing trend of disputes in the public sector industries.
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(5) Financial issues and wage scale anomalies, involving about 80% 
of a ll strikes in the public sector industries, 82% of workers 
involved and 87% of man days lost in such strikes during the decade 
1972-82, seem to be the major issues for industrial disputes in  
Bangladesh public sector industries.
(6) The economic and political-organisational T h eo ries^  of 
industrial conflic t best describe the strike behaviour in Bangladesh 
public sector industries - disputes emerging out of economic issues 
and the ir manifestation depending on the workers' po litica l and 
organisational strength. The union membership strength as a single 
independent factor explains 22% of the variation in the number of 
disputes, 32% of that of the workers involved in such disputes and 
43% of that of the man-days lost due to such strikes in certain  
selected public sector industries.
(7) Other factors remaining the same, b ip artite  negotiation, 
whatever may be its  form - informal discussion or grievance
procedure or participation committee or collective bargaining - and
tr ip a rt ite  negotiation (conciliation) presuppose a congenial working 
relationship between the parties concerned, which is very much 
lacking in the Bangladesh public sector industries. The workers and 
managers of these industries come from completely d ifferent social 
background and hold quite opposing views against each other. Before 
any direct or assisted negotiation could be effective, the parties  
must agree, in the language of Stagner and R osen ,^  to some sort of 
a "psychological contract" over certain desirable norms and codes
of behaviour on the part of both sides. A phased comprehensive 
training programme has a significant role to play in this context.
(8) The m ultip lic ity  of unions at the plant level and federations 
of unions at the corporation leve l, and consequent rivalry  between
them acts as a serious bottleneck in the way of sensible
negotiations both at b ipartite  and tr ip a r t ite  levels. Under a 
situation of frequent po litica l changes, d ifferent unions/ 
federations become in fluentia l under the patronage of the party 
controlling the Government. Due to workers' allegiance to d ifferen t 
unions, they are sometimes not w illing to abide by the agreements
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which were already made by some other opponent unions/federations. 
Deadlocks arise over the determination of CBA and management finds 
i t  d if f ic u lt  as to whom to consult and negotiate. An immediate step 
is due tobe taken to determine the CBA for each plant and 
corporation through direct election. A union or federation securing 
the maximum number of votes should be declared as the CBA. On a 
long term basis, however, policies should be so taken as to organise 
the workers in each plant or corporation under as minimum a number 
of unions or federations as possible.
(9) At the plant leve l, disputes of individual nature are usually 
settled through informal discussion and administative decisions.
None of the public sector industries has any multi-stage formal 
grievance procedure, as practised in the developed countries. The 
legal grievance procedure generally used in a ll plants over such 
punitive matters as dismissals, discharges, termination etc. has 
been found to be very imprecise and undefined. Although a ll 
industrial relations laws of the country emphasise the formation and 
operation of the participation committee to resolve differences at 
the unit leve l, neither of the parties has realised this s p ir it  of 
laws.
(10) Under the present system of management of the public sector 
industries, a ll policy making powers rest with the Ministry 
concerned and major administrative and controlling powers with the 
respective corporations. The plants as operational units have very 
lim ited authority. Inter-hierarchical authorities and 
responsibilities have not been clearly spelt-out. Under such a 
situation, plant managements do not take any risk and 
responsibi1ity  and frequently refer problems, even tr iv ia l ones, to 
higher authorities who usually follow bureaucratic rules and thereby 
make unusual delays in fin a lly  disposing of the cases so referred, 
causing serious frustration among the workers affected.
(11) The issues to be negotiated or bargained at each level of the 
administrative hierarchies of the public sector industries, or to be 
settled by the institutional dispute resolution machineries
are fuzzy and ambiguous. Plant level unions, therefore, raise many 
issues at inappropriate levels, negotiations over which naturally
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f a i l .  Under such a situation, fix ing of authority and 
accountability at various levels and a demarcation of the issues to 
be negotiated or settled at each level might do a lo t in the 
institu tionalisation  and effective resolution of public sector 
industrial disputes.
(12) An average conciliator has been found to be underqualified, 
but fa ir ly  aged and experienced, lacking relevant eductional and job 
backgrounds and devoid of adequate status and prestige. His 
neutrality is not out of question. His workload is very lig h t, 
particularly at the branch and regional levels. His office suffers 
from certain acute physical conditions and administrative problems. 
Compared to direct negotiation and labour courts, the conciliators 
could reasonably adhere to statutorily  provided time in disposing of 
the disputes referred to them. But the ir success in signed 
agreements show a decreasing trend.
Of the three major institutional machineries - direct negotiation, 
conciliation and labour courts - conciliation has been found as 
being the least used method of dispute resolution in the public 
sector. A very few of the disputes from public sector industries 
are referred to conciliation, and s t i l l  fewer of them ultimately 
turn out as successful. Conciliation being defined as an assisted 
collective bargaining, the reasons for fa ilin g  conciliation have 
been found to be similar to those for fa ilin g  direct negotiation, in 
addition to most managements being non-co-operative and unobliged 
with the conciliators. For commanding respect, confidence and co­
operation from the parties and effective settlement of disputes, 
expert, w ell-qualified  and experienced conciliators should be 
engaged into the Service by providing good service conditions and 
pay. This might be done, without any significant cost implications, 
merely by reorganising the Service i ts e lf .  Under the present 
contexts of centralised, uniform and standardised service conditions 
of public sector workers, conciliation, however, has a very lim ited  
role to play in the dispute settlement process.
(13) On fa ilin g  conciliation, although the Taw emphasises 
resolution of disputes through arb itra tion , a considerable 
reluctance on the part of a ll concerned towards th is machinery has 
been observed. As for conciliation and labour courts, so also for 
arb itra tion , the scope for settlement of public sector collective  
disputes seems to be very lim ited in the peculiar contexts under 
which such industries are to operate.
(14) Public sector disputes dealt by the labour courts are 
generally of an individual nature. The courts do not follow any 
formal procedure in selecting the cases for hearing. Whims of the 
peshkars and persuasion of the parties (even by offering bribes) are 
the usual bases of hearing cases. Although the law emphasises 
ensuring industrial justice through quick settlement of the cases 
referred to them, the labour courts have been found to be very 
negligent in making procedural summarisations in hearing and 
deciding the cases. Lack of seriousness on the part of the courts' 
chairmen who are usually retired or about-to-retire senior members 
of the judicia l service, necessarily spending th e ir whole l i f e  in  
the traditional c iv il and session courts, and having very l i t t l e  
orientation with industrial way of l i f e ,  seems to be the main reason 
for the court's negligence in pursuing summary procedures.
Due to non-adherence to summary procedures and short sittings per 
working day, cases p ile  up as pending and the courts are 
a r t i f ic ia l ly  shown to be very loaded. As against a statu torily  
allowed period of 2 months for giving decision on a case by a labour 
court, the average time taken for deciding public sector cases is  
found to be 17 months for the f i r s t  and 31 months for the second 
labour courts. Regarding the specific reasons for delay, i t  is 
found that the parties themselves are responsible for half of the 
total delays - the f i r s t  party (usually workers) for 20% and the 
second party (usually management) for 30%. They either pray for  
time or absent from the hearing on the scheduled dates. Court 
procedures and pressure of work explain more than 22% of the total 
delays. The members and chairmen of the courts d irectly account for 
14% and 5% of the delays respectively. Although there are in te r­
court differences as to the reasons for delay in absolute terms, the 
patterns of influence of the delaying factors are re la tive ly  sim ilar 
in between the courts.
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(15) The present legal framework of dispute settlement, provided by 
the IRO, 1969, which was orig ianlly framed in  the pre-liberation  
context, characterised with privatisation policy, seems incompatible 
for public sector industries in the following respects:
(a) 21 day direct negotiation period allowed to the plant 
management, without granting any authority to i t  to negotiate 
on the disputes raised, seems meaningless.
(b) The IRO, 1969 does not consider the peculiarity of the 
administrative structure of the public sector industries. Most 
issues for disputes are referred to corporations which take 
unusually long time in disposing of the cases so referred. The 
IRO should have a provision for a maximum time lim it within  
which a corporation is to dispose of the cases referred to i t .
(c) The provisions of the IRO, 1969 and the State-owned 
Manufacturing Workers (Terms and Conditions of Services) Act, 
1974 appear to be contradictory in that the former provides the 
strike right to workers a fter the fa ilu re  of direct negotiation 
and conciliation over any industrial dispute irrespective of 
whether i t  relates to private or public sector industries, but 
the la tte r  Act prohibits this right over the basic financial 
terms and conditions of service. In line with the restrictions  
imposed by the la tte r  Act, the IRO should specifically provide 
that collective interest disputes over such economic issues 
should not be raised before any plant management or conciliator 
or labour court.
(d) Public sector disputes relating only to rights issues are 
handled by the labour courts and since judgements on rights 
issues always take the form of "decisions",-the chance of such 
issues going to the labour appellate tribunal is very rare.
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(16) Under a situation of acute unemployment and weaknesses in the 
organisation of workers, they can not bargain at equal terms with 
managements of public sector industries, who practically represent 
the Government of the country. Much, therefore, depends on the 
attitudes and policies of the Government towards public sector 
industries and workers working therein. I t  is  disappointing to 
note that over a 36 year period of the industrial relations history 
of Bangladesh, as many as six labour policies were adopted by the 
Government, with a view to improving the lo t of workers, but none of 
them were fa ith fu lly  implemented, and the economic position of the 
workers in 1982 seems to be no better or even worse than what their 
position was before adopting the f i r s t  policy.
(17) Although Government takes care of the financial terms and 
conditions of service of the workers in the public sector industries 
by fixing uniform and standardised wages and pay scales and s tr ic tly  
prohibits changing or revising these issues, disputes on such issues 
s t i l l  arise at both plant and corporation levels. Uniformity and 
standardisation of wages and fringe benefits without respect to the 
cost of liv in g , the amount and quality of work done and the in te r- 
industry and in ter-p lant diversities seem to work as a deterrent to 
sound labour-management relations and increased productivity of the 
public sector industries. While i t  is essential to have a national 
wages system for the public sector industries, there should also be 
room for adjustments to be negotiated at the corporation and plant 
levels necessitated by local circumstances.
(18) F inally , with respect to a possible model for improving the 
future public sector industrial relations, i t  may be worthwhile to 
keep in mind that although any country may have something to gain 
from the attractive features of the industrial relations experiences 
of some other countries, they cannot be imported and incorporated 
directly into another system. Rejection of such transplants is 
almost sure to follow, because they cannot flourish in a society
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which is bound to be alien in so many ways to the one that gave them 
l i f e .  The dispute settlement machinery in any country should 
develop out of and be conditioned by a wide variety of factors - 
h isto rica l, economic and socia l.^ 3  Keeping the th ree -tie r  
administrative structure of the Bangladesh public sector industries 
in view and considering the tentative solutions to present problems 
of the institutional machineries a model of industrial relations 
consisting of three levels -  national leve l, corporation level and 
plant level - may be suggested, as depicted in Figure 10.1.
At the national leve l, instead of the present practice of unilateral 
fixation of wages and fringe benefits by the Government, such 
benefits may be determined according to the principle of tripartism , 
under which representatives of the various corporation managements, 
national level leaders of federations of trade unions, and 
Government may form either a permanent body to make a continuous 
review, or they may s it periodically to make a periodical review of 
the overall changes in the economy and reach basic agreement as to 
the minimum wages and fringe benefits for the public sector 
workers.
The corporation level industrial relations may be governed by 
substantive periodical agreements to be made in consideration of the 
basic agreements made at the national level and to adjust for the 
peculiarities of the corporation concerned.
At the plant leve l, managements of individual plants and th e ir  
respective plant level CBAs may make procedural agreements within  
the broader scope of the substantive agreements made at the 
corporation level to suit for the diverse operating efficiency of 
the plants concerned and workers thereof.
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LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS NATURE OF AGREEMENT
BASIC AGREEMENT
on mini mum wages and 
fr in g e  b en e fits
SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT 
in  consideration o f the 
basic agreement to 
ad just fo r  p e c u lia r it ie s  
of sp e c ific  corporations
PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT 
w ith in  the broader scope 
of the substantive  
agreement to s u it fo r  
operating e ff ic ie n c y  of 
p a r t ic u la r  p lan ts .
CORPORATION LEVEL 
B ip a rt ite  negotiation  between 
managements o f the ind iv idual 
corporations and th e ir  respective  
corporation leve l CBAs.
PLANT LEVEL
B ip a rt ite  negotiation  between 
managements of the ind iv idual p lants  
and th e ir  respective p lan t level 
CBAs.
NATIONAL LEVEL
T r ip a r t ite  Wages Commission or 
Permanent B o a rd /T r ip a rtite  
negotiation  between representatives  
o f corporation managements, feder­
ations o f trade unions and 
Government.
F ig . 10.1 A SUGGESTED MODEL OF PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN BANGLADESH
Evidently  the working o f th is  suggested model pre-supposes the 
fo l lo w in g  as major contingent fa c to rs :
(a) A long term perspective o f the Government towards pu b lic  sector 
i  n d u s tr ie s ;
(b) Assignment of specific objectives (including industrial 
relations) such industries are to achieve;
(c) Committment of management to achieve the assigned objectives;
(d) Well structured organisation of workers at a ll levels -  plant, 
corporation and national; and
(e) Change of attitudes of the direct parties towards a unitary 
concept of public sector industries.
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Under this suggested model, most issues (both interest and rights) 
arising at the plant and corporation levels are expected to be 
effectively settled by the concerned parties themselves. The 
potential for conciliation, arb itra tion  and labour appellate 
tribunal is lik e ly  to either terminate or significantly reduce. 
Labour courts w ill continue to deal with only rights issues not 
resolved through direct negotiation. Proper manning of the labour 
courts and arrangements for training of the court members, including 
the chairmen, on the industrial relations laws and policies w ill 
hasten quick disposal of the cases to the reasonable satisfaction of 
the parties concerned.
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A P P E N D I  C E S
APPENDIX A : GENERAL TABLES BASED ON OFFICIAL STATISTICS
APPENDIX A .l !
Number of industrial disputes, workers involved and man-days lost in
Bangladesh, 1947-82.
| • YEAR I
NUMBER OF 
DISPUTES 
(D)
WORKERS
INVOLVED
(W)
I MAN-DAYS I 
1 LOST I 
1 (L) I
I 1947 | 26 12091
1 I 
I 18963 I
| 1948 I 48 28224 I 112163 |
I 1949 | 54 29839 I 82839 |
| 1950 I 20 7972 I 40381 I
| 1951 I 23 11628 I 35792 I
| 1952 | 55 21174 I 75624 I
| 1953 j 55 34006 | 116080 j
| 1954 I 31 19738 I 90556 1
| 1955 | 25 16221 ! 38940 I
I 1956 j 64 82261 | 273632 |
| 1957 | 71 115249 I 693167 j
| 1958 | 51 45903 j 152351 |
| 1959 | 7 22488 | 35482 |
I 1960 j 12 6086 I 17947 I
I 1961 I 10 4464 I 5486 I
| 1962 | 31 16949 | 85248 |
| 1963 | 54 102198 I 938093 I
I 1964 j 72 158614 | 3787357 |
| 1965 | 55 63707 I 236805 |
I 1966 I 60 78278 I 241100 I
| 1967 | 48 66391 I 605222 |
I 1968 | 30 56309 | 154840 I
I 1969 I 55 113190 | 561870 |
j 1970 J 52 77680 | 366900 |
| 1971 | 9 35324 | 70333 I
| 1972 J 39 43615 | 126000 I
I 1973 I 58 35027 | 285177 |
| 1974 I 32 57387 | 231736 !
| 1975 j 2 28327 I 162000 1
| 1976 | 5 14517 | 25618 |
I 1977 | 22 76675 | 81715 |
| 1978 | 89 113209 1 662332 |
I 1979 I 96 114248 | 647629 1
I 1980 -  I 104 164032 | 1160436 1
| 1981 j 80 117031 | 1198460 |
| 1982 | 
1 1
55 21788 1 238658 | 
1 1
Source: Data for the years 1947-1960 were obtained from
Ahmad K ., Labour Movement in Bangladesh, (Dhaka: 
Inside Library, 1968), and those for 1961-82 from 
the various issues of the Bangladesh Labour Journal 
published by the Department of Labour, Government of 
Bangladesh.
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APPENDIX A . 2
Duration of dispute (DD), dispute coverage ratio  (DCR), 
and time loss loss ratio  (TLR) of industrial disputes 
involving work stoppages, Bangladesh, 1947-82.
| YEAR 
1 (1)
DD
(2)
DCR
(3)
I TLR 1 
I (4) I
| 1947 1.57 465 | 729 |
| 1948 3.97 588 | 2337 |
| 1949 2.78 553 1 1534 I
| 1950 5.06 399 I 2019 |
| 1951 3.08 506 | 1556 I
I 1952 3.57 385 | 1375 |
| 1953 3.41 618 | 2110 |
1 1954 4.59 637 | 2921 I
| 1955 2.40 649 [ 1558 j
I 1956 3.33 1285 | 4275 I
I 1957 6.01 1623 | 9763 I
! 1958 3.32 900 | 2987 I
| 1959 1.58 3213 I 5069 |
1 1960 2.94 507 | 1496 I
| 1961 1.23 446 J 549 I
| 1962 5.03 547 j 2750 j
I 1963 9.18 1893 | 17372 |
| 1964 23.88 2203 | 52602 I
| 1965 3.72 1158 I 4305 |
| 1966 3.08 1305 I 4018 I
| 1967 9.12 1383 | 12609 I
I 1968 2.75 1877 | 5161 I
| 1969 4.96 2058 I 10216 I
| 1970 4.72 1494 I 7056 |
| 1971 1.99 3925 | 7815 |
| 1972 2.89 1118 | 3231 J
| 1973 8.14 604 | 4917 1
| 1974 4.04 1793 | 7242 I
I 1975 5.72 14163 I 81000 I
I 1976 1.76 2903 I 5124 !
| 1977 1.07 3485 | 3714 j
I 1978 5.85 1272 j 7442 |
I 1979 5.67 1190 | 6746 |
| 1980 7.07 1577 | 11158 I
| 1981 10.24 1463 1 14981 |
| 1982 10.95 396 | 4339 |
Source: Based on Appendix A .l
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APPENDIX A . 3
Indices of industrial disputes in criterion  
measures, Bangladesh, 1947-82.
1 YEAR I 
1 (1) 1
1 DD" '  
(2)
| OCR 
! (3)
TLR 1 
(4) |
I 1947 | 54 | 42 23 |
| 1948 | 137 | 53 72 I
| 1949 | 96 I 49 47 |
| 1950 j 175 I 36 62 1
1 1951 | 107 | 45 48 |
| 1952 I 123 | 34 43 |
| 1953 | 118 | 55 65 I
I 1954 | 159 1 57 90 |
| 1955 | 83 I 58 48 !
I 1956 ! 115 I 115 132 |
1 1957 | 207 1 145 302 j
I 1958 | 115 I 80 92 J
| 1959 I 55 I 287 157 |
I 1960 j 102 | 45 46 |
| 1961 j 43 ! 40 17 I
| 1962 | 174 J 49 85 I
| 1963 I 318 I 169 538 J
j 1964 j 826 I 197 1628 I
| 1965 j 129 I 104 133 |
| 1966 I 107 I 117 124 |
| 1967 | 316 I 124 390 I
| 1968 | 95 | 168 160 |
| 1969 | 172 | 184 316 |
| 1970 | 163 | 134 218 I
I 1971 | 69 | 351 242 I
| 1972 | 100 | 100 100 |
I 1973 | 282 I 54 152 j
I 1974 j 140 J 160 224 I
| 1975 I 198 | 1267 2507 |
| 1976 | 61 | 260 159 |
| 1977 | 37 I 318 115 |
I 1978 j 202 | 114 230 I
I 1979 j 196 | 106 209 |
I 1980 I 245 | 141 345 I
| 1981 ! 354 I 131 464 |
| 1982 I 379 I 35 134 |
Source: Based on Appendix A.2
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APPENDIX A . 4
Data on (a) union membership strength in selected public sector 
industries and (b) indices of real wages for industrial workers 
in Bangladesh, 1973-^82.
| Year Union Membership Real wages indices I 
(1969 = 100) I
I 1973 230,142 60.95 |
I 1974 234,968 43.67 1
| 1975 226,094 56.71 |
| 1976 219,978 63.02 |
1 1977 297,246 59.94 |
| 1978 332,925 69.56 I
1 1979 329,519 74.10 |
| 1980 360,085 79.61 |
| 1981 377,724 78.56 I
| 1982 382,864 81.63 |
Sources: (a) Union membership: relates to selected public
sector industries (ju te , cotton, chemical, 
sugar, e le c tr ic ity , o i l ,  gas and petroleum, 
banks and insurance) and obtained through 
segregation of the aggregate data available 
in the various issues of the Bangladesh 
Labour Journal published by the Department of 
Labour, Government of Bangladesh.
(b) Real wages indices: S ta tis tica l Yearbook of 
Bangladesh, 1982, BBS, Dhaka, p .510.
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APPENDIX B : TABLES RELATING TO DIRECT NEGOTIATION
APPENDIX B .l ‘
Percentage distribution of plant management classified  
according to th e ir educational level.
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL PERCENTAGE
CUMULATIVE
PERCENTAGE
1 1. Matriculate (S.S.C.) 4.2
I 2. Intermediate (H.S.C.) 16.7 20.9
1 3. Intermediate with specialised 
technical training 8.3 29.2
1 4. Bachelor (Graduate) 41.7 70.9
1 5. Bachelor with specialised 
technical training 4.2 75.1
1 6. Masters 16.7 91.8
1 7. Masters with Diploma In 
Personnel Management 8.3 100.0
TOTAL 100.0
Total number of respondents 24
APPENDIX B.2 
Percentage responses as to the existence of
Participation Committees
   “ | MANAGEMENT 1 ZM
Yes I 62.5 I 34.6
No I 37.5 I 57.7
Not aware of ' j -  j 7.7
TOTAL | IU O  | 100.0
Total number of respondents I “24 j 26
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APPENDIX B .3
Percentage responses as to how Participation Committee
was constituted
1 MANAGEMENT I CBA I
With equal representatives from 
workers and management
1 1 
I 50.0 I
i i
23.1 J
With workers' representatives 
being more
1 1 
1 I 
I 12.5 1I i
3.8 j
With managements' representatives 
being more
1 1 
1 1
i i
7.7 |
Not applicable I 37.5 | 
1 1
65.4 J
TOTAL I lOO.U | 
1 I
100.0 |
Total number of respondents I 24 | 
1 1
26 [
APPENDIX B.4
Percentage responses* as to matters dealt with 
by Participation Committees
| MANAGEMENT | CBA 1
Productivity
1 1 
1 17.6 |i i
1
13.3 I
I
Improvement of mutual relations
1 1 
I 26.5 |
i i
13.3 | 
1
Labour welfare fa c ilit ie s
1 1 
I 38.2 1
i i
40.0 |
t
Vocational training
1 1 
I 2.9 |
i i
1
1
Application of Labour Laws
1 1 
1 8.8 | 6.7 Il
Fostering a sense of discipline 1 5.9 | 
1 1
6.7 I 
1
Disciplinary matters
1 1
13.3 | 
1
Leave and holidays
1 1 
1 1
6.7 |
TOTAL I 10O.O | lOO.O I
Total number of valid cases 1 15 1 3 1 
1
Total number of responses 1 34 I 15 I 
1
*  Multiple responses permitted.
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APPENDIX B .5
Percentage responses* as to the extent of satisfaction  
with the performance of the Participation Committees
I MANAGEMENT | CBA I
Very satisfied
1
t
1 1 
I 1
Reasonably satisfied | 20.0 I 22.2 |
t I
Somewhat satisfied | 53.3
i
I 22.2 | 
1 |
Not satisfied /inactive I 26.7
I
[ 55.6 |
t I
TOTAL I 100.0 
1
I 1O0.0 | 
1 1
Total number of respondents
1
i rs
I 1 
1 9 I
*  Based on the responses of those respondents who reported 
that they had Participation Committees in their plants.
APPENDIX B.6
Percentage responses* as to the necessity for constituting  
the Participation Committees
I MANAGEMENT I CBA |
Yes
1 1 
I 44.4 I1 i 56.2 J
No I 44.4 |l |
31.2 |
Can't say I 11.1 I 12.5 |
TOTAL I 100.0 | 100.0 I
Total number of respondents
1 I 
! 9 | 
1 1
16 |
*  Based on the responses of those respondents who reported 
that they had no Participation Committees on the ir plants.
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APPENDIX B .8
Distribution of plant management classified according to 
their views about the bad points of th e ir CBAs.
Number of 
responses*
Percent of I 
responses 1
j 1. They are highly po litic ised 16 23.2 |
1 2. They do not value the organisational 
| in terest, nor even the general 
j in terest of the workers 9 13.0 |
j 3. Their attitude is very adamant 5 7.2 |
j 4. They suffer from serious in te r- and 
j intra-union riva lries 12 17.4 I
j 5. They don't have any sense of 
j discipline 7 10.1 I
j 6. They always blame officers of the 
j management 2 2.9 1
j 7. They are unreasonable in the ir  
| dealings 9 13.0 I
j 8. They are unfair and dishonest 7 10.1 I
| 9. They usually in terfere in the normal 
| work of management 2 2.9 I
| TOTAL 69 1O0.0 I
J Total number of respondents 24
* Multiple answers permitted.
328
APPENDIX B .9
D istribution of CBA leaders classified according to 
the ir views about the bad points of management.
Number of 
responses*
Percent of | 
responses |
1 1- They are usually adamant in th e ir  | 
attitude j
1 1.4 |
1 2. They are insincere to workers j 9 13.0 |
1 3. They are corrupt people j 16 23.2 |
1 4. They are very slow in action and j 
always refer problems to corporation;! 
they do not take any decision | 9 13.0 |
1 5. They are very s tr ic t to workers j 9 13.0 |
1 6. They w ilfu lly  violate the accepted j 
facts j 4 5.8 |
1 7. They are afraid of head office and | 
always f la t te r  head office o ffic ia ls  I 3 4.3 j
1 8. They do not take care of health and | 
hygiene of workers I 3 4.3 |
1 9. They are negligent in duties | 7 10.1 |
|10. They do not give any tim e-off for j 
trade union ac tiv ities  j 2 2.9 |
111. They misbehave with workers j 2 2.9 |
|12. Others j 4 5.8 1
TOTAL | 69 100.0 |
Total number of valid respondents | 24
*  Multiple answers permitted.
APPENDIX B .1 0
Extent of using the plant level methods of resolving individual 
disputes as viewed by plant level management (Mgt.) and CBAs.*
(Frequencies in percentage)
j Extent 
I of use
Methods of Resolution
Informal
Discussion
Grievance | 
Procedure | 
1
Participation  
Commi ttee
Collective | 
Bargaining J
Mgt. 1 CBA Mgt. | CBA | 
1 I
Mgt. | CBA Mgt. CBA |
| Always 37.5 126.9 16.7
1 1 
150.0 I
j Frequently 45.8 |34.6 58.3
f 1 
133.7 I 11.1 8.3 19.2 |
j Sometimes 16.7 |34.6 16.7
1 1 
116.7 | 20.0 | 11.1 41.7 26.9 I
j Rarely | 3.8 8.3
1 1 
1 I 13.3 I 33.3 37.5 50.0 1
j Never
1 1 
I 1 66.7 I 44.4 12.5 3.8 |
| TOTAL 100 1100 100
1 1 
1100 |
1 1
100 | 100 100 100 |
*  Note: Total number of respondents = Management 24, and CBAs 26
APPENDIX B .l l
Extent of using the plant level methods of resolving collective  
disputes as viewed by plant level management (Mgt.) and CBAs.*
(Frequencies in percentage)
j Extent 
j of use
Methods of Resolution
Informal
Discussion
Grievance | 
Procedure j 
1
Participation
Committee
Collective | 
Bargaining |
Mgt. | CBA 
1
Mgt. I CBA | 
1 1
Mgt. j CBA Mgt. 1 CBA | 
I !
j Always 17.4
1
115.4 16.7
1 I 
111.5 I 6.7 | 30.4
1 1 
|11.5 |
j Frequently 13.0
1
| 7.7 20.8
1 1 
130.8 j 11.1 17.4
1 I 
123.1 I
j Sometimes 21.7
1
119.2 54.2
1 I 
|50.0 I 20.0 | 11.1 47.8
1 1 
134.6 |
| Rarely 30.4
1
134.6 8.3
1 1 
I 8.8 I 13.3 I 33.3 4.3
1 I 
130.8 I
j Never 17.4
I
123.1
1 1 
1 1 60.0 | 44.4 12.5
1 1 
1 3.8 I
| TOTAL 100 |100
1
100
1 1 
|100 |
1 1
100 | 100 100 |100 I 
1 1
*  Note: Total number of respondents = Management 24, and CBAs 26.-
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APPENDIX B .1 2
Distribution of plant level management and CBA people 
according to their views on the issues frequently negotiated
at the plant level.
Issues Negotiated
I Management CBA
JNumber of 
{responses* %
Number of 
responses* % j
1 1. Payment for id le hours
1
I 4i
5.8 3 3.8 I
1 2. Fixation of production target
1
1 2 i
2.9 5 6.4 I
1 3. Work allocation, organisation 
and administration
1
I
I 5 1 7.2 7
9.0 I
1 4. Labour welfare issues I 20 29.0 21 26.9 I
1 5. Pay scale anomalies
1
I 9i
13.0 6 7.7 I
1 6. Disciplinary matters 1 ioi
14.5 16 20.6 j
I 7. Personnel matters
1
I 7
i
10.1 6 7.7 |
1 8. Leave matters
1
1 8 i 11.6 6
7.7 j
1 9. Compensation for accidents
1
I 4 5.8 1 1.3 J
|10. Arrear wages
1
Ii
2 2.6 I
111. Incentive bonus and special 
financial benefits
1
1
Ii
2 2.6 I
|12. Job security
1
Ii
1 1.3 |
(13. Miscellaneous issues
1
I
I
2 2.6 I
TOTAL I 65 
I
100 "sj 00 »-*
 
. o
 
o
Total number of respondents I ' 24 
I
26
*Note: Respondents could give more than one response.
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APPENDIX B .1 3
Percentage distribution of the plant level cases 
classified according to the result of plant level 
direct negotiation.
1 1. Successful | I 18.5 |
1 2.
I
Partly successful: I
i1
(a) Not proceeded further I
i
9.0
(b) Referred to Corporation j
l
18.5
(c) Referred to Labour Court j 3.0 I 30.5 |
1 3. Unsuccessful: |
(a) Not proceeded further J
1
3.5
(bj Referred to Corporation j
I 40.5I
(c) Referred to Conciliation | 6.0
I
(d) Referred to Labour Court | 1.0 I 51.0 j
1 4.
I
Pending I
1
j -  j
TOTAL |
i
| 100.0 1
1
Total number of cases I
1
I 200 1
APPENDIX B.14
Percentage distribution of plant level cases referred to 
Corporations classified according to whether they were 
settled at the Corporation level.
| Yes
I
1i
51.7 |
| No 1 48.3 |
TOTAL |i " "T0070' ' ' |
I Total
1
number of valid cases I
1
"""118" 'I
APPENDIX B .1 5
Percentage distribution of the plant level cases referred to but fa iled  
at the Corporation level classified according to how they were settled
afte r they fa iled  at that level.
1 1. Referred to the Ministry
I I 
I 24.6 I1 i
1 2. Referred to the Conciliator | 10.6 I 
1 1
I 3. Referred to the Labour Court I 29.8 |
I  1
1 4. Strike occurred I 5.3 | j |
1 5. Not proceeded further I 29.8 |
TOTAL
I i
| 100.0 1 
I  I
Total number of valid cases
I I 
1 57 1 
1 1
APPENDIX B.16
Percentage distribution of the plant level cases referred to 
Conciliators (e ither d irectly or via Corporations) classified  
according to whether they could be settled there.
| Yes
1 1 
1 27.8 |
I  I
| No 1 72.2 I 
1 |
TOTAL ! ''100.0 | 
t I
| Total number of valid cases 1 18 * 
1 1
APPENDIX B.17
Percentage distribution of the plant level cases referred to but fa iled  
at the Conciliationlevel classified according to how they were settled
after they fa iled  at that level.
1. Referred to the Labour Court
2. Referred (back) to Corporations
3. Referred to Special Committee 
consisting of workers' 
representatives, Corporation 
o ffic ia ls  and o ffic ia ls  of the 
Ministry
4. S t i l l  unsettled (pending)
5. Not proceeded further
TOTAL
Total number of valid cases
38.5
23.1
7.7 
23.1
7.7
100.0
13
APPENDIX B .1 8
Distribution of plant level management and CBA according to th e ir views 
on the reasons for fa ilin g  direct negotiation between them.
Reasons for Failure
Management | CBA
Number ot 
responses* %
jNumber of 
I responses* % |
1 1. Lack of authority to plant 
management 19 27.9 1 15 21.1 |
1 2. Heavy financial involvement 10 14.7 1 10 14.1 I
! 3. Unreasonable and ille g a l demands 
i .e .  demands beyond the ju risdiction  
of bargaining 16 23.5 1 5 7.0 |
1 4. Uncompromising attitude of the unions 8 11.8 I 2 2.8 |
1 5. Unions fa il to understand the 
organisational interest 4 5.9
1 6. Irra tional behaviour around the 
negotiation table (e.g. disorder, 
chaos, disruptive a c tiv itie s , 
violation of prescribed rules etc .) 6 8.8 1 2 2.8 |
1 7. Inter-and-intra-union riva lry 3 4.4 1 2 2.8 |
1 8. Communication gap between the parties 2 2.9 1 1 1.4 I
1 9. Adamant attitude and lack of sincerity  
on the part of management I 20 28.2 |
|10. Management lacks technical knowledge 
of the work 1 2 2.8 I
111. Refusal by management to negotiate on 
the plea of legal provisions which 
favour management | 7 9.9 |
|12. Absence of elected CBA 1 2 2.8 1
|13. Management is not assertive; 
they cannot present problems before 
the authorities concerned 1 3 4.2 1
TOTAL 68
oorH | 71 100 |
Total number of valid respondents 23 | 25
*  NOTE: Respondents could make more than one response.
APPENDIX B .1 9
Distribution of plant level management and CBA according to 
th e ir views on how to improve the effectiveness of collective bargaining
between them.
Suggested Measures
Management | CBA
Number of 
responses* %
[Number of 
[responses* % I
11* The law should ensure only one 
registered trade union in each 
plant; election should be held on the 
basis of leaders' qualifications 3 7.7 I 6 10.3 J
|2. Demands placed should be reasonable, 
based on facts and within the 
ju risd iction  of bargaining 8 20.5
13. Regular periodical meetings and 
annual review meetings should be 
ensured 5 12.8 1 11 19.0 |
14. Both parties should be fa ir ,  honest 
and reasonable in dealings 5 12.8 1 13 22.4 |
15. Unions should be free from external 
influences and outside po litics 2 5.1
16. Bureaucratic tendency should be 
reduced; more authority should be 
given to the plant management 5 12.8 1 I 2 20.7 |
17. Both parties should be aware of legal 
provisions; both need training 6 15.4 1 5 8.6 |
|8. CBA should be properly determined 5 12.8 1 8 13.8 |
|9. Unions and workers should be kept 
well-informed about the plant and 
corporation policies 1 3 5.2 |
TOTAL .... -------------- 100 | 58 ' 100 j
Total number of valid respondents 13 | 22
*  NOTE: Respondents could make more than one response.
APPENDIX B.20
D is tr ib u t io n  of p lant level cases c la s s i f ie d  according to reasons* fo r dispute
Responses Number of I 
responses*| % 1
1 1. Anomalies in pay f ix a t io n ,  increment, a rrear wages 
etc. 56 1 9.5 1
1 2. Bonuses ( incentive  bonus, e f f ic ie n c y  bonus, 
attendance bonus e tc . ) 26 1 4.4 1
! 3. Fringe benefits (housing allowances, g ra tu ity  
payments, provident fund contributions e tc . ) 66 | 11.1 I
I 4. Physical working conditions (problems with  
moisture, v e n t i la t io n ,  humidity, dust e tc . ) 16 1 2.7 I
1 5. Holidays, leave, hours of work and other timing 
issues 55 | 9.3 1
1 6. D isc ip l inary  matters ( f in e s ,  charge-sheets, 
suspensions, discharges, terminations,  
reinstatements, e tc . ) 56 1 9.5 !
1 7. Work a llocatio n /o rgan isa tio n  (ambiguity in  
organisational set-up, work procedures, 
administrative r i g i d i t i e s ,  complexities and 
d isun iform ities , e tc . ) 35 1 5.9 |
I 8. Labour welfare and amenities ( r e l i e f s ,  f a c i l i t i e s  
to union o f f ic e s ,  physical f a c i l i t i e s  in the 
colonies, rationing f a c i l i t i e s ,  transport 
f a c i l i t i e s ,  canteen subsidies, l iverages etc. 55 | 9.3 1
I 9. Other personnel matters (recruitm ents, transfers, 
promotions, retirements, la y -o f fs ,  retrenchments, 
e t c . ) 61 1 10.3 1
|10. Issues re la t in g  to trade union a c t iv i t ie s  (r ig h t  
to association, CBA determination, u n fa ir  labour 
practices , e tc . ) 32 | 5.4 1
111. Supply of materials and spare parts 3 | 0.5 I
|12. Misconduct on the part of workers (negligence, 
th e f t ,  misbehaviour, p i l fe ra g e s , factory  
in d is c ip l in e ,  e tc . ) 25 1 4.2 1
|13. Various special allowances ( techn ica l ,  s h i f t ,  
power-house, sa line , overtime, washing, essential 
service, recreation, e tc . ) 30 I 5.1 1
|14. Implementation of agreements, government’ s and 
corporation's orders, and c irc u la rs  and legal 
rights 14 I 2 .4 I
|15. Administration of common funds ( p r o f i t -  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  fund, group insurance, e tc . ) 24 J 4.1 1
|16. Misbehaviour and malpractices on the part of 
management 22 ( 3.7 |
|17. Workers' representation on various committees 16 | • 2.7 |
TOTAL 592 ....... | 100 |
Total number of cases 200 |
*  More than one reason was involved in many of the disputes.
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APPENDIX B .2 1
Percentage distribution of plant level cases classified 
according to time required to conclude negotiations on them.
j Time Taken
1
I Percentage
I Cumulative | 
j Percentage J
1 o - 10 days
I
1 12.5I
1 1 
I 12.5 || I
1 11 - 14 " | 10.5 1 | 23.0 !
1 15 - 21 " I 10.0 1 | 33.0 || t
| 22 - 50 " I 24.5I I 57.5 II 1
1 51 - 70 " I 10.5 1 | 68.0 | 1 1
1 71 - 100 ” I 8.0 
|
| 76.0 I
|  i
| 101 - 150 " | 12.5 | I 88.5 | 1 1
| 151 - 200 " I 5.0 | 93.5 J | 1
| 201 - 250 " | 2.0 l
| 95.5 1 
1 »
| 251 - 300 " I 2.0 1
I 97.5 I
| 301 - 350 " | 0.5 j I 98.0 |j I
| 350 - 400 " I 1.0 1
I 99.0 |
| 401 and Above I 1.0 1 I 100.0 Jf I
Total i too: o'' ■
I I 
I 11 I
| Total number of cases I 200 
1
1 I 
1 I
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APPENDIX C : TABLES RELATING TO CONCILIATION
APPENDIX C .l
Percentage distribution of the conciliators 
classified according to th e ir age.
I Age 1 
j (in  years) j
Absolute
Percentage
Cumulative 1 
Percentage j
| Up to 30 | 15.4 15.4 j
I 31 -  35 1 7.7 23.1 |
| 36 -  40 | 23.1 46.2 |
| 41 -  45 I 15.4 61.5 I
| 46 - 50 | 15.4 76.9 |
| 51 - 55 | 23.1 100.0 |
| TOTAL 1 10O.O
| Total no. of respondents! .........13' '
APPENDIX C.2
Percentage distribution of the conciliators  
classified according to the ir educational level.
| Educational Level j
Absolute
Percentage
Cumulative I 
Percentage j
| 1. Matriculate/S.S.C. j 7.7 7.7 i
| 2. Intermediate/H.S.C. j 7.7 15.4 J
| 3. B.A./B.Sc. j 46.2 61.5 |
| 4. M.A.(General),M.Sc. j 23.1 84.6 I
| 5. M.A. with LL.B. | 15.4 100.0 |
| TOTAL I 1O0.O
| Total no. of respondents! 13
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APPENDIX C .3
Percentage distribution of the conciliators 
classified according to the ir previous jobs.
| Previous Job
Absolute
Percentage
Cumulative | 
Percentage |
| 1. O fficer in the Directorate/Ministry 15.4 15.4 |
1 2. Upper Division Assistant (clerk)
| in the Directorate 23.1 38.5 I
| 3. Malaria Eradication Administrative
| Officer 7.7 46.2 |
| 4. Lecturer in a College 7.7 53.9 |
| 5. Labour O fficer in a Jute M ill 7.7 61.6 |
| 6. Research Assistant 7.7 69.3 I
| 7. Trade Unionist 7.7 77.0 I
| 8. Not applicable (had no experience) 23.1 100.0 |
| TOTAL 100.0
| Total number of respondents 13
APPENDIX C.4
Percentage distribution of the conciliators c lassified  
according to their experience in the conciliation service.
| Experience 
| (in years)
Absolute
Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage
| Up to 5 23.1 23.1
| 6 - 1 0 15.4 38.5
| 1 1 - 1 5 30.8 69.2
| 16 - 20 7.7 76.9
| 2 1 - 2 5 15.4 92.3
| Above 25 7.7 100.0
| TOTAL 100.0
ITotal no. of respondents 13
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APPENDIX C . 5
Percentage distribution of the conciliators 
classified according to th e ir reported rate 
of success in the conciliation proceedings in 
the public sector industries.
| Success Rate 
| (in  percentage)
| Absolute 
| Percentage
Cumulative | 
Percentage J
| Up to 20%
1
I 7.7 7.7 |
| 21% -  40% I 15.4 23.1 |
| 41% - 60% | 46.2 69.2 |
I 61% - 80% | 23.1 92.3 |
| Above 80% I 7.7 100.0 |
| TOTAL. | 100.0
ITotal no. of respondents I 13 
1
APPENDIX C.6
Percentage distribution of the conciliators 
classified according to whether they thought 
their powers under the law to be adequate.
| I f  Powers Were Adequate Percentage I
| Yes 38.5 |
| No 61.5 I
| TOTAL 100.0 j
| Total no. of respondents 13 I
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APPENDIX C .7
Distribution of the conciliators 
who thought the ir present powers to be inadequate 
classified according to extension of powers wished by them.
Extension of Powers Wished
Number of 
Responses*
Percent of I 
Responses |
1 1. Some ju d ic ia l/a rb itra ry  powers 
should be given to the conciliators  
to bind the parties 4 21.1 |
1 2. The law should ensure a free and 
unhindered entrance of the 
conciliators into the premises of 
the factories in question 2 10.5 I
1 3. Power should be given to the 
conciliators for direct prosecution 
of the disobedient party 5 26.3 |
1 4. Penalty system should be more 
simplified 2 10.5 |
1 5. Conciliators at the regional 
offices should be allowed to take 
independent decision in the cases 
within the ir jurisdiction 2 10.5 I
1 6. The labour courts should consider 
the concilia to r’ s suggestions 1 5.3 |
1 7. The status of the conciliators 
should be increased so that 
management feels obligation to 
take notice of them 3 15.8 I
TOTAL 19 100.0 I
Total number of valid respondents 8
*  Multiple answers permitted.
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APPENDIX C . 8
Percentage distribution of the conciliators  
classified according to the ir report on how 
frequently they had to use th e ir legal powers
| Extent of Use
I Absolute 
Percentage
Cumulative I 
Percentage I
| Always 15.4 15.4 |
| Frequently 23.1 38.5 |
| Sometimes 38.5 76.9 I
| Rarely 23.1 100.0 |
I Never -
| TOTAL 100.0
| Total no. of respondents 13
APPENDIX C.9
Percentage distribution of the conciliators classified  
according to their view as to how frequently the parties 
would have cooperated with them in the absence of th e ir  
(conciliator's) legal powers.
| Extent of Cooperation
Absolute
Percentage
Cumulative I 
Percentage |
| Always 7.7 7.7 !
| Frequently 7.7 15.4 |
| Sometimes 15.4 30.8 |
I Rarely - 30.8 |
| Never 69.2 100.0 |
| TOTAL 100.0
| Total no. of respondents 13
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APPENDIX C .1 0
Distribution of the conciliators 
classified according to why they did not wish 
the statutory conciliation period to be extended.
Number of 
Responses*
Percentage | 
of Responses j
j 1. The present statutory period 
j is quite suffic ient 9 47.4 |
| 2. Extension of the present 
j time w ill frustrate the 
j workers 5 26.3 I
j 3. The present time lim it may 
j be extended, whenever 
j needed, with the consent of 
j the parties 4 21.1 J
j 4. The adamant party w ill 
j always be adamant; extension 
I of time w ill not solve the 
j problem 1 5.3 |
| TOTAL 19 100.0 |
j Total no. of valid respondents 12
* Multiple answers permitted
APPENDIX C.11
Percentage distribution of the conciliators classified  
according to the ir report as to how financial issues in 
the public sector industries are conciliated.
| Method of Conciliation | Percentage |
j Do not intervene in financial issues j 23.1 |
| As per Government guidelines I 61.5 I
j Four party meetings (corporation j
| o ffic ia ls , o ffic ia ls  from the Ministry |
| concerned, workers' representatives |
| and conciliators) I 15.4 |
1UU.U |
| Total number of valid respondents | 13 |
APPENDIX C .1 2
Distribution of the conciliators 
classified according to the major administrative 
problems, as reported by them.
Reported Administrative Problems
Number of 
Responses*
Percentage | 
of Responses j
1 1. The administrative structure is 
very much centralised 7 13.4 |
1 2. Shortage of trained conciliators/ 
s ta ff at the lower level (in  a ll 
offices of the Directorate) 13 25.0 |
1 3. Frustration among officers and 
s ta ff of the service due to low 
pay, poor status and lack of 
opportunity for promotion 4 7.6 |
1 4. Conciliation offices are badly 
furnished 5 9.6 |
1 5. Shortage of transport for 
o ffic ia l purposes 6 11.5 |
1 6. Shortage of office supplies 5 9.6 |
1 7. Poor budgetary allocation (no 
allowance for entertainment 
during the conciliation  
proceedings) 6 11.5 |
1 8. Lack of coordination on 
administrative problems between 
officers 2 3.8 |
1 9. Shortage of space in the 
conciliator's office 1 1.9 I
|10. Dirty physical conditions of the 
conciliator's offices 1 1.9 |
111. L it t le  time for normal office  work 
due to frequent meetings with the 
Ministry and the Martial Law 
Authority 1 1.9 |
|12. Outside interference in the normal 
office work 1 1.9 |
TOTAL 52 100.0 |
Total number of respondents '"13
*  Multiple answers permitted
APPENDIX C .1 3
D istribution of the conciliators 
classified according to the reported problems faced 
while conducting conciliation proceedings.
Problems Faced j
Number of 
Responses*
Percentage I 
of Responses j
1 1. Undue interference in the normal j 
work by the union/federation j 
leaders j 4 7.8 |
1 2. Lack of fa ith  and confidence j 
between the parties due to an j 
antagonistic relationship | 3 5.9 |
1 3. Adamant attitude of the CBA j 3 5.9 |
I 4. Adamant attitude of the management| 5 9.8 |
1 5. Ignorance of the union leaders j 
about legal provisions and j 
corporation policies and th e ir j 
inexperience in justify ing  th e ir j 
points j 8 15.7 |
1 6. Non-cooperation of the management j 
(absenting habit, non-response to j 
le tte rs , concealing facts e tc .) | 7 13.8 |
1 7. Superiority complex of the I 
management (management's d is like j 
of the conciliator's intervention)! 6 11.8 I
I 8. Representation of management by | 
veteran advocates and of unions j 
by federation leaders j 5 9.8 j
1 9* P o litica l motivation of the unionsj 3 5.9 |
|10. Lack of authority on the part of j 
management j 2 3.9 |
111. By-passing habit of the union j 
leaders (union leaders take the j 
help of the Minister or the MPA j 
in the course of the conciliation | 
proceedings) j 2 3.9 |
|12. Inter-union riva lry  j 1 2.0 |
113. Ambiguous orders/instructions j 
from the corporations | 1 2.0 |
|14. Shortage of o ffice supplies | 1 2.0 |
TOTAL | 51 100.0 I
Total number of respondents I 1'3
*  Multiple answers permitted.
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APPENDIX C .1 4
Distribution of the conciliators 
classified according to th e ir reported reasons fo r  
fa ilin g  conciliation in the public sector industries.
Reasons for Failure |
Number of 
Responses*
Percentage J 
of Responses j
1 1. Adamant attitude of the management! 11 22.4 J
1 2. Adamant attitude of the union/ | 
federation j 8 16.3 J
1 3. Illeg a l demands of the workers j 
i .e .  unbargainable demands j 8 16.3 I
1 4. Unreasonable (considering | 
financial implications) demands j 
of the workers J 8 16.3 J
1 5. Lack of locus-standi of the CBA | 3 6.1 |
1 6. Non-cooperation of the management | 
(fa ilu re  to attend meetings, | 
non-response to le tters  e tc .) j 4 8.2 J
1 7. Antagonistic relationship between j 
the parties and lack of | 
understanding between them j 3 6.1 J
1 8. Weak leadership of the union j 
representatives. They fa i l  to j 
ju s tify  the ir demands J 2 4.1 !
1 9. Management tries  to maintain j 
uniformity with sim ilar industries! 1 2.0 J
|10. Inexperience and in a b ility  of the j 
conciliators j 1 2.0 !
TOTAL I 49 100.0 J
Total number of respondents | 13
*  Multiple answers permitted.
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APPENDIX C .1 5
D istribution of the conciliators classified according to th e ir  
reports as to whether they attempted to refer the unsuccessful cases 
to arb itra tion , and i f  so, how frequently such attempts came out
successful.
I f  reference 
v,\ t o  arbitration  
attemptedE x te n t^ \  
of success 
in reference
Yes Total
Rarely
(42.9) (23.1)
Never
(57.1) (30.7)
Not applicable
(100. 0 ) (46.1)
Total
(53.8) (46.2) (100)
Note: Figures in brackets indicate percentages.
Inner percentages are column percentages and 
outer percentages indicate percentages of to ta l.
APPENDIX C .1 6
D istribution of the plant management 
and CBA leaders classified according to the measures* they 
suggested to improve the effectiveness of conciliation.
j Measures Suggested
Plant Management I CBA 
1
Leaders j
Number of 
Responses* %
INumber of 
IResponses* % 1
j 1. Conciliators should be given more 
j power to oblige the adamant party 4 8.5
1
1
I 19i
29.2 |
j 2. Conciliators should be fa ir  and 
j impartial 16 34.1
1
1 15 23.1 |
| 3. The conciliation system should be 
j popularised 1 2.1
1
1i
|
| 4. E ffic ien t people should be 
j attracted into the service 11 23.4
I
1
1 6 i
9.2 |
| 5. Conciliators have no role to play 
j in financial issues 4 8.5
1
i
Ii
j
j 6. Their status should be increased 5 10.6
1
1 8 i
12.3 I
| 7. They should be more active 6 12.8
1
J 3 4.6 |
| 8. Physical conditions of the 
j conciliation offices should be 
j improved _
1
| 7
I
10.8 |
j 9. Conciliators need training - I 4i
6.2 |
j 10. Conciliators should have power to 
| modify wage commission 
| recommendations -
1
1
1
1 3 4.6 |
| TOTAL 47 100.0 | 65 
1
100.0 |
| Total no. of valid respondents 19 | 24
*  Multiple answers permitted.
APPENDIX C.17
D is tr ib u t io n  o f the c o n c i l ia to rs  c la s s i f ie d  according to the measures 
they suggested to make the c o n c i l ia t io n  machinery more e f fe c t iv e .
Measures Suggested
Number of 
Responses*
Percentage | 
of Responses j
! 1. E f f ic ie n t  and distinguished  
personalit ies  o f wisdom and 
sagacity should be a t t ra c te d  to  
the service 4 10.3 J
1 2. Good remuneration and f a c i l i t i e s  
should be given to the 
conc il ia to rs 5 12.8 |
I 3. Status of the c o n c i l ia to rs  should 
be increased 5 12.8 |
I 4. Both the management and the unions 
should be given t ra in in g  in  
in d u str ia l  re la t io ns  and labour 
laws 4 10.3 |
! 5. Concil ia tors  need t ra in in g  on the 
theory and practices o f labour 
laws and c o n c i l ia t io n  techniques 5 12.8 |
1 6. Physical f a c i l i t i e s  w ith in  the 
co n c i l ia t io n  o f f ic e  should be 
increased and improved 2 5.1 |
1 7. Some binding power should be given 
to the conc il ia to rs 4 10.3 |
1 8. Promotion policy of the 
D irectorate  should be relaxed and 
quick promotion should be given 
to the co nc il ia to rs 1 2.6 |
1 9- Ban on trade union a c t i v i t i e s  
should be withdrawn and the CBAs 
should be properly determined 2 5.1 |
|10. The co nc il ia to rs  should be given 
the r ig h t  to inspect the books and 
re levant documents during the 
course of the proceedings 1 2.6 I
111. The trade union leaders should be 
more prac tica l in th e i r  approach .1 2 .6  1
112. Assistant D irectors (c o n c il ia to rs  
of the regional o f f ic e s )  should be 
given power to take spot decisions 
with in  th e ir  ju r is d ic t io n 1 2.6 I
|13. The co n c i l ia to rs  should be made 
free  from the external constraints  
and pressures 1 2 .6  |
|14. Attendance of the part ies  in the 
c o n c i l ia t io n  meetings should be 
made compulsory 1 2.6  1
|15. Both management and unions should 
have mutual t ru s t  and fa i th 1 2.6 |
|16. M u lt ip le  unions should be stopped 1 2.6  |
TOTAL 39 100.0 |
Total number o f  respondents 13
*  M u lt ip le  answers permitted
APPENDIX C .1 8
Percentage distribution of the plant management, 
CBA leaders and corporation management classified  
according to the extent of th e ir agreement with the 
statement that "the conciliators are not neutral".
| Extent of 
j Agreement
| Plant | 
IManagementj CBA
|Corporation| 
JManagement j
All
j Agree strongly
1 1 
| 37.5 |
i i
34.6
i"  i
| 25.0 | 
1 1
34.5
| Agree slightly
I 1 
1 41.7 |
i i
50.0
1 1 
1 25.0 |i i
43.1
j Neutral
1 1 
1 12.5 Ji i
7.7
1 1
I 37.5 I 1 1 13.8
I Disagree slightly
1 1 
i i
7.7
I I 
1 12.5 |
i i
5.2
j Disagree strongly
1 1 
1 8.3 | -
1 1
3.4
| TOTAL
1 1 
| 100.0 I
1 1
100.0
1 1 
| 100.0 |
1 1
100.0
j Total number of 
j respondents
1 I 
I 24 | 26 1 8 | 
1 1
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APPENDIX C.19
Percentage distribution of the conciliators* classified  
according to the extent of th e ir agreement with certain statements
Agree 1 Agree 
Strongly |SI ightly Neutral
Disagree 
SIightly
Di sagree 
Strongly Total I
j We are overloaded
1
23.1 | 15.4
i
7.7 7.7 46.2 100.01
j We cannot work 
j neutrally due to 
j certain external 
| pressures
1
1
1
I
23.1 I 23.1
I
23.1 30.8 100.01
j Lack of expert 
j conciliators is 
j one of the reasons 
| for fa ilin g  
j conciliation
1
1
1
1
1
38.5 | 38.5 
1 •
. 23.1 100.01
*  NOTE: Total number of respondents = 13.
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APPENDIX C .2 0
Percentage distribution of the CBA leaders and 
conciliators classified according to the extent of th e ir  
agreement with the statement that, "management is usually 
reluctant to attend conciliation meetings".
I Extent of 
j Agreement CBA
1 1 
JConciliatorsJ All I
| Agree strongly 69.2
I 1 
1 23.1 j 
1 |
53.8 J
j Agree s lightly 23.1 I 69.2 |
i i
38.5 |
j Neutral -
I 1
■ i j
| Disagree slightly 7.7
i 1 
1 7.7 I
i i
7.7 I
j Disagree strongly -  .
1 1
|
| TOTAL 100.0
! 1 
| 100.0 I
1 1
100.0 1
j Total number of 
j respondents 26 I 13 | 
1 I
39 |
APPENDIX C.21
Percentage distribution of the plant management, corporation management, 
and conciliators classified according to the extent of their agreement 
with the statement that "the CBAs are usually reluctant to attend 
conciliation meetings".
| Extent of 
1 Agreement
| Plant 
[Management
Corporation
Management
I
Conciliators!
All
| Agree strongly
1
1 - -
| Agree slightly
1
| 8.3 25.0
i
i
8.9
| Neutral
1
I 29.2 37.5
I
1 22.2
| Disagree slightly
|
| 12.5 12.5 15.4 | 
1
13.3
| Disagree strongly
1
| 50.0 
1
25.0 84.6 | 
1
55.5
| TOTAL I 100.0 
1
100.0 100.0 I 
1
100.0
| Total number of 
j respondents
1
1 24 
1
8 13 | 
1
45
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APPENDIX C .2 2
Percentage distribution of the plant management, corporation management, 
CBA leaders and conciliators classified according to the extent of th e ir  
agreement with the statement that "the compulsory conciliation has 
significantly reduced the number of strikes in the country".
| Extent of 
j Agreement
Plant
Mgt.
|Corp‘ n.| 
1 Mgt. | CBA
|Concil-| 
jiators | All |
j Agree strongly 20.8 | 25.0 | 23.1 1 76.9 | 32.4 |
j Agree slightly 37.5 1 12.5 | 50.0 1 23.1 | 36.6 |
| Neutral 4.2 | 25.0 | 3.8 i -  i 5.6 |
j Disagree slightly 12.5 | 25.0 | 19.2 i - i 14.1 |
| Disagree strongly 25.0 1 12.5 I 3.8 i - i 11.3 |
I TOTAL 100.0 | 100.001 100.0 | 100.0 1 100.0 |
| Total number of 
| respondents 24 1 8 | 26 1 13 | 71 1
APPENDIX C.23
Percentage distribution of the conciliation cases 
classified according to industry.
j Industry
Absol ute 
Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage
j 1. Jute 73.2 73.2
j 2. Road Transport 13.2 86.3
| 3. Water Transport 7.4 93.7
j 4. E lec tric ity 6.3 100.0
| TOTAL 10O.O
I Total number of 
j cases 190
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APPENDIX C .2 4
Percentage distribution of the conciliation cases classified  
according to the number of days within which conciliation started*
| Conciliation Started Within
Absolute
Percentage
I Cumulative 1 
I Percentage J
1 o - 2 days 13.2
1 1 
I 13.2 J
I 3 - 5 it 43.2 | 56.3 |
1 6 - 8 H 23.2 1 79.5 |
I 9 - 11 n 10.5 | 90.0 |
1 12 - 14 n 5.8 | 95.8 |
1 15 - 17 n 2.6 I 98.4 j
| 18 - 20 H 1.1 I 99.5 j
1 21 - 23 it 0.5 I 100.0 |
TOTAL 100.0 ! 1
I Total number of cases 190 1 1
APPENDIX C.25
Percentage distribution of the conciliation cases classified  
according to number of notices served on the second party to attend
the conciliation meetings.
| Times Notices Served
I Absolute 
| Percentage
| Cumulative I 
I Percentage |
1 o
1
| 0.5
1 1 
1 0.5 J
1 1 | 27.4 1 27.9 j
| " 2 | 37.4 I 65.3 I
1 3 | 22.6 I 87.9 I
1 4 I 10.5 | 98.4 I
I 5 I 0.5 | 98.9 I
1 5 I 1.1 | 100.0 I
| TOTAL I 100.0 I 1
| Total number of cases J 190
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APPENDIX C .2 6
Percentage distribution of the conciliation cases classified  
according to number of meetings held.
I No. of Meetings Held
I Absolute 
I Percentage
i Cumulative J 
I Percentage |
1 o
1
| 24.7
1 I 
1 24.7 |
I 1 I 25.8 | 50.5 I
I 2 I 24.2 1 74.7 j
I 3 I 14.2 I 88.9 |
1 4 I 7.4 | 96.3 I
1 5 I 2.6 I 98.9 |
I 6 I 0.5 | 99.5 |
I 7 | 0.5 I 100.0 |
| Total | 100.0 1 I
| Total number of cases I 190 1 1
APPENDIX C.27
Percentage distribution of the conciliation cases classified  
according to the outcome of conciliation.
| Outcome
| Absolute 
| Percentage
I Cumulative | 
I Percentage |
I 1. Successful
1
| 17.4 1 17.4 |
| 2. Partly Successful | 18.4 I 35.8 |
| 3. Unsuccessful I 54.2 I 90.0 |
I 4. No Proceeded With I 10.0 ! 100.0 |
| Total | 100.0
| Total number of cases I 190
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APPENDIX C .2 8
Distribution of the partly successful 
and unsuccessful conciliation cases classified  
according to the reasons for fa ilin g  conciliation*
1 Reasons for fa ilin g  conciliation Number of j Responses*!
Percent ofj 
Responses j
| 1. Lack of evidence in support of 
I the allegations 64 | 15.9 |
j 2. The second party (usually management) 
j was either absent in  the fina l meeting 
j or did not come at a ll on repeated 
I calls 41 | 10.2 |
j 3. Antagonistic relationship between the 
| parties over a long period of time 8 1 2.0 |
j 4. Financial in ab ility  of the management 43 | 10.7 |
| 5. Lack of authority on the part of the 
j management 67 | 16.7 |
| 6. Management wrote that the in it ia to r  
| had no competence and va lid ity  to 
j raise disputes 23 | 5.7 |
| 7. Adament (and lingering) attitude of the 
| management 43 I 10.7 |
| 8. Adament attitude of the union 20 | 5.0 |
| 9. Contravention of laws (regarding 
| dismissal, registration of trade union, 
| pre-conditions for application to 
j conciliation e tc .) . 17 | 4.2 |
j 10. Illegal and unreasonable demands, i .e .  
| demands beyond the scope of bargaining 76 I 18.9 |
| TOTAL 402 | 100.0 I
j Total number of valid cases 138..' |
*  Multiple answers permitted
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APPENDIX C .2 9
Percentage distribution of the conciliation cases classified  
according to the number of days taken to conclude the
conciliation.
| Conciliation Concluded 
| Within
I Absolute 
I Percentage
1 Cumulative | 
I Percentage |
30 days I 64.2 | 64.2 I
1 31 -  40 I 14.2 1 78.4 I
1 41 -  50 1 4.7 I 83.2 I
1 51 -  100 | 12.6 I 95.8 I
| 101 -  150 | 3.2 | 98.9 |
| 151 -  200 1 0.5 I 99.5 |
| 201 -  250 | 0.5 | 100.0 I
TOTAL I 100.0 1 1
| Total number of cases | 190 J 1
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APPENDIX D : TABLES RELATING TO ADJUDICATION
APPENDIX D .l
Distribution of the conciliators  
classified according to th e ir report as to why 
people are very reluctant to refer cases to arb itration
Reasons for reluctance [Number of [Responses* 
1
Percentage j 
of Responses!
1 1. People have no confidence in 
arbitration
1
1
1
I 9 
1
28.1 |
1 2. People are not used to the system
1
I 3 9.4 I
1 3. The arb itra tor's  decision being final 
and binding on the parties
1
1
I 7 21.9 |
1 4. Lack of distinguished personalities
1
1 3 
1
9.4 |
I 5. No forum is there in vogue
1
I 6 
1
18.7 |
I 6. Lack of agreement between the parties 
in selecting the arb itrator
1
I
I 3 
I
9.4 J
1 7. The use of the machinery being optional | 1 
1
3.1 I
TOTAL
1
| 32i 100.0 |
Total number of respondents
1
| 13 
1
*  Multiple answers permitted.
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APPENDIX D .2
Percentage distribution of the Labour Court 
members by th e ir  designation
j Designation
1 I 
I Percentage |
j Members I 87.5 | | 1
j Chairmen I 12.5 I 
1 1
TOTAL
1 1 
| 100.0 | 
| I
j Total number of respondents 1 24 I 
I 1
APPENDIX D.3
Percentage distribution of the Labour Court 
Members by the parties they represented
I I
1 1 
1 I
Absolute j 
Percentage |
Adjusted
Percentage
1 I 
| Workers II I 41.7 | 47.61 1 
| Employers/Management |
i i
45.8 1 52.4
| Not applicable (Chairmen of the Courts)| 12.5 | -
1 1 
| TOTAL | 100.0 | 100.0
I Total number of respondents I 24 j
3 5 8
APPENDIX D .4
Percentage distribution of the Labour Court 
members by th e ir level of education
I Absolute 
j Percentage
Cumulative I 
Percentage j
I Class VI
1
| 4.2 1 4.2 |
i Class V II I I 4.2 1 8.3 |
| Matriculate ! 4.2 12.5 |
j Intermediate | 4.2 1 16.7 |
j General Graduate | 8.3 | 25.0 |
j Graduate with specialisation I 41.7
I 66.7 j
j General Masters I 4.2 1 70.8 I
j Masters with specialisation 
| TOTAL 
j Total number of respondents
I 29.2 
| 100.0 
, " 
1
100.0 |
APPENDIX D.5
Distribution of the Labour Court 
members by the ir present and previous job experiences
1 Job Experiences | Number of 
j Responses*
I Percentage J 
jof Responses!
| 1. Professional trade unionist
I
I 7 >
| 20.0 |
j 2. Technician
1
I 1 1 2.9 |
| 3. Conciliation o fficer
1
I 2i I 5.7 |
j 4. Accounts cleric
1
| 4
I 1 11.4 |
j 5. Advocate 1 1 1 1 2.9 I
| 6. Personnel o fficer 1 9 1 25.7 I
j 7. Administrative O fficer
1
I 6i 1 17.1 I
| 8. Army Officer (Lt. Col.)
1
1 2 i
1 5.7 |
| 9. Munsif and D is tric t Judge
1
1 3 1 3.6 |
| TOTAL |......... 35" " | " “'10070" — |
| Total number of respondents | 24
*  Multiple answers permitted.
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APPENDIX D .6
Distribution of the Labour Court members 
by the ir report as to how the enterta inab ility  
of cases was determined
C rite ria  for M aintainability INumber of |responses*
Percentage 
of Responses
j The case must not be time barred I 11 27.5
| The case must be within the 
j te r r ito r ia l jurisdiction of the Court I 12 30.0
| The case must be covered by the law 1 17 42.5
| TOTAL | 40 100.0
j Total number of respondents | 18
*  Multiple answers permitted.
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APPENDIX D .9
Distribution of the Labour Court members 
according to th e ir report as to the issues 
frequently adjudicated in the public sector industries
Issues frequently adjudicated Number of Responses*
Percentage | 
of Responses j
1 1. Disciplinary cases (discharges,! 
dismissals e tc .) j 24 33.8 * J
1 2. Termination for trade union | 
ac tiv ities  j 15 21.1 !
1 3. Arrear dues j 4 5.6 J
1 4. Post service benefits | 3 4.2 J
1 5. Criminal cases - implementation! 
of Labour Court decisions, j 
agreements etc. j , 8 11.3 J
1 6. Cancellation of registration of j 
trade unions I 4 5.6 J
1 7. Compensation for accidents j 3 4.2 I
1 3. Wage anomalies | 1 1.4 I
1 9. Charter of demands ! 9 12.7 J
TOTAL !' """71" lOO.O J
Total number of respondents J 24
*  Multiple answers permitted.
APPENDIX D.10
Percentage distribution of the labour court members 
classified according to how financial issues in the 
public sector industries are adjudicated
| Method of Adjudication
! 1 
percentage!
j As per guidelines of the Government ! 78.3 J 
1 |
j Do not come to the court I 21.7 J
I ' iuu;o i
| Total number of respondents ! 24 J 
! 1
APPENDIX D .11
Court-w ise percentage d is t r ib u t io n  o f the labour co u rt members c la s s if ie d  according to
the problems they reported to  have faced w h ile  conducting a d jud ica tion
Reported Problems ;
F i r s t
Labour
Court*
Second
Labour
Court*
Third
Labour
Court*
T o ta l*  |
1 1. Created by part ies : 39.2 38.6 25.0 36.5 1
(a) Parties can not produce documents, 
evidences and witnesses in support 
of th e ir  claims 17.5 19.3 8.3 1 6 .8  1
(b) Parties are ignorant about legal provisions - 6.4 8.3 4.6  |
(c) Parties take resort to fa lse  statements 8.8 3.2 8.3 6.0 1
(d) Parties frequently pray fo r  time 8.8 3.2 - 4.6 |
(e) Parties frequently absent from the court 4.2 3.2 - 3.1 I
( f ) Management frequently tends to be 
uncooperative - 3.2 - 1.4 1
1 2- Created by lawyers: 30.5 32.1 50.0 35.1 I
(a) Lawyers do not come well prepared 21.7 12.9 16.7 16.8 j
■(b) Lawyers try  to prolong the cases 8.8 12.9 25.0 13.7 i
(c) Lawyers make the cases d istorted - 6.4 - 3.1 |
(d) Lawyers frequently absent - - 8.3 1.4 |
1 3. Created by Chairmen: 8.8 19.6 8.3 13.7 |
Chairmen are au thor ita r ian . Members' 
feelings do not count; chairmen do not go 
through the w r it ten  opinion of members nor 
do they mention members opinion in the f ina l  
judgement 8.8 19.6 8.3 13.7 |
1 4. Created by law: 13.0 - 8.3 6 .0  |
(a) The High Court's award against the s p i r i t  of 
IRO, 1969 that the labour court can not give 
i t s  decision in the absence of e i th e r  of the 
parties 4.2 1.4 |
(b) D ef in it io n  i f  worker in law is  not c le a r  and 
on that account Management in some cases t r ie s  
to get r id  of the cases i n i t i a l l y 8.8 8.3 4 .6  |
1 5. Created by other objective factors: 8.4 9.6 8.3 8.8  |
(a) Outside interference (From the Government, fo r  
example) - 3.2 - 1.4 !
(b) Lack of any f a c i l i t y  fo r  spot v e r i f ic a t io n  of 
the peculiar circumstances with  which the 
members of the court are not f a m i l ia r 4.2 1.4 |
(c) Lengthy process of the a jud ication  system 4.2 6.4 8.3 6.0  1
' TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 I
Total number o f  responses 23 ’ 3"4 12 69 1
Total number o f respondents 8 '  12 4 24 |
*  M u lt ip le  answers permitted. Percentages based on tota l number o f  responses.
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APPENDIX D .12
C ourt-w ise percentage d is t r ib u t io n  o f  the labour co u rt members c la s s if ie d  according to
th e ir  reported a d m in is tra tiv e  problems o f th e ir  courts
Reported Administrative Problems
Fi rs t
Labour
Court
Second
Labour
Court
Third
Labour
Court
T o ta l*  1
1 1. S t a f f  Problems: 12.4 19.6 18.3 16.8 1
(a) S ta f f  shortage of the courts 6.3 13.1 18.3 11.1 |
(b) Court's s t a f f  are in e f f ic ie n t 3.0 4.4 - 3 .3  |
(c) Corruption and bribery  practices taken 
resort to by the s ta f f 3.0 2.1 - 2.3 |
i 2. Physical conditions problems: 40.7 52.4 45.6 47.3 |
(a) Shortage of space in the court fo r  the 
c l ie n ts ,  witnesses, and other v is i to rs 3.0 11.0 - 6.7 |
(b) No separate room/arrangement is there  
for members to discuss, read and see 
f i l e s  and w r i te  w/o 18.9 17.5 18.3 18.1 |
(c) The court is not w ell- fu rn ished  or w e l l -  
equipped 9.3 8.6 9.0 9.0  I
(d) D ir ty  and unhygienic working environment 
within the court 9.3 15.2 18.3 13.4 1
I 3. Problems of o f f ic e  f a c i l i t i e s : 43.9 19.4 36.1 30.2 |
(a) Office  supplies are inadequate 9.3 6.5 9.0 7.7 |
(b) Separate f i l e s  for members are not 
provided 6.3 2.1 9.0 4.4  I
(c) Inadequate budgeting a llo c a t io n  to meet 
minor contingency expenses 3.0 2.1 - 2.3  1
(d) No transport f a c i l i t y  is there for  
o f f i c ia l  use 12.6 6.5 9.0 9 .0  1
(e) No o ff ic e  f a c i l i t i e s  are there fo r  
members 12.6 2.1 9.0 6 .7  j
! 4 . Other problems: 3.0 8.6 - 5.7 I
(a) Poor honorarium is  given to the 
members - 2.1 - 1.0  |
(b) There is no f ixed  venue fo r  the court - 4.4 - 2 .3  j
(c) Chairman's post sometimes remain 
vacant 3.0 2.1 2 .3  J
TOTAL T O O  ' 100.0 100.0 100.0 j
Total number o f  responses 32 46 11 89 |
Total number o f respondents 8 12 3 23 . 1
*  M u lt ip le  answers permitted. Percentages based on to ta l number o f  responses.
APPENDIX D .13
Court-w ise percentage d is t r ib u t io n  o f the labour co u rt members c la s s if ie d  acording to
th e ir  reported reasons fo r  fo r  delay in  d isposing o f the cases
Reported Reasons fo r Delay
1 F ir s t  
j Labour 
| Court*
Second
Labour
Court*
Third
Labour
Court*
T o ta l*  |
1 . Due to  p arties 1 15.7 29.8 12.5 22.1 I
(a ) Frequent time p e tit io n  by the p arties I 12.6 21.2 12.5 17.0 I
(b) Frequent absence o f the p a rtie s  from 
the court ! 3 .0 4 .3 - 3 .0  1
(c ) Workers lose in te re s t and do not 
fo llow  up I 4 .3 - 2 .0  |
2 . Due to members o f the court: | 18.7 14.8 12.5 15.8 1
(a) Frequent absence of the members | 15.7 14.8 12.5 14.8 1
(b) Delay in  submitting the w r itte n  
opinion by the members 1 3.0 - - 1 .0  |
3 . Due to Chairmen o f the court: j 6 .3 8 .7 18.7 9 .7  |
(a) Absence o f the chairmen from the court 1 4 .3 12.5 4 .3  1
(b) Apathy of the chairmen due to  old age I 6.3 4 .3 6.2 5.3  I
4 . Due to lawyers: 1 15.7 8.4 25.0 13.7 J
(a) Lawyers do not a rr iv e  on time I 6.3 - 12.5 4 .3  |
(b) Prolonging a tt itu d e  of the lawyers 1 9.3 8 .4 12.5 9 .4  |
5. Due to court: | 12.4 19.1 25.0 17.8 |
(a) D eta iled  procedures followed by the 
courts j 4 .3 6.2 3 .0  I
(b) Negligence o f the court I 3.0 6.4 12.5 6.4  I
(c) Time allowed very l ib e r a l ly  whenever 
prayed (in  terms of frequency) I 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.4  |
(d) Very long time allowed before the next 
hearing | 3 .0 2 .0 - 2 .0  I
6 . Due to other o b jective  conditions: | 31.3 19.1 6.2 20.9  i
(a ) Huge number o f cases are being f i le d  
w ell over the usual capacity o f the 
courts to handle I 18.9 12.7 6.2 13.7 |
‘ (b) Shortage o f s ta f f  in  the courts | 6.3 2 .0 - 3 .0  I
(c) Cases are f i le d  on t r i f l i n g  issues I 3 .0 4 .3 - 3 .0  |
(d) Because of the la t itu d e  given by the law, 
workers o f the same p lan t and having the  
same complaint f i l e  cases in d iv id u a lly , 
and thus increasing the number o f cases I 3 .0 1 .0  |
TOTAL i roo.o TO070" 1 0 0 .0 " '" 10070 |
Total number of responses 1 31 47 16 94 I
Total number o f respondents 1 8 12 4 24 I
*  M u ltip le  answers perm itted. Percentages based on the to ta l number o f responses.
APPENDIX 0.14
Percentage distribution of the labour court members* classified according to the
extent of their agreement with certain statements about the operation of the labour courts.
j S ta tem ents
Agree
S tro n g ly
Agree
S l ig h t l y N e u tra l
D isa g re e  
S I ig h t ly
D isag ree
S tro n g ly T o ta l |
| (a ) We canno t be n e u tra l due to  c e r ta in  
| e x te rn a l in f lu e n c e s 16.7 25 .0 4 .2 8 .3 45 .8 100.0  |
| (b )  Labour c o u r ts  a re  o v e r-lo a d e d  w ith  
| cases 58 .3 12.5 4 .2 4 .2 20 .8 100.0  |
| (c )  Number o f  la b o u r c o u r ts  sh o u ld  be 
| in c re a se d  to  ensure speedy d is p o s a ls 2 0 .8 16.7 4 .2 4 .2 54.2 100.0 |
| (d ) In  most cases, laws a re  c le a r ,  b u t 
| th e  p a r t ie s  a re  n o t w e ll aware o f  
| them 70 .8 2 0 .8 4 .2 4 .2 100.0 1
| { e ) Members are n o t ass iduous in  
| a t te n d in g  the  c o u rts 12 .5 58 .3 - 12.5 16.7 100.0 |
| ( f )  Lawyers r a re ly  re p re s e n t th e  p a r t ie s  
I in  th e  h e a rin g  o f  t h e i r  cases - - - 8 .3 91.7 100.0 |
| (g ) D ism issa l o f  cases in  d e fa u lt  o f  the  
| f i r s t  p a r ty  is  ve ry  common in  the 
| la b o u r c o u rts 2 6 .6 41 .6 12.5 12.5 100.0 • |
i (h ) Cases o f  e x -p a r te  d e c is io n  in  the 
| absence o f  the  second p a r ty  is  ve ry  
] common in  ou r la b o u r c o u rts 2 5 .0 8 .3 4 5 .8 20 .8 100.0 |
I ( i )  Labour c o u rts  do n o t c o n s t i tu te  o r 
1 s i t  in  sess ions in  the  absence o f 
| e i t h e r  o f  the  members 8 3 .3 12.5 4 .2 100.0 |
1 ( j )  Our la b o u r c o u r ts  u s u a lly  fo l lo w  
| summary procedures in  d e c id in g  the  
| cases re fe r re d  to  them 16.7 29 .2 8 .3 33.3 12.5 100.0 |
| (k )  W orke rs ' in  ou r c o u n try ,  be ing  
| i l l i t e r a t e  and u n tra in e d , d.o n o t 
1 u s u a lly  know what p ro o f is  needed in  
| s u p p o rt o f  t h e i r  cases 70 .8 20 .8 - 4 .2 4 .2 100.0 |
*  NOTE: T o ta l number o f  responden ts  = 24
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APPENDIX D .1 5
D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  th e  L a b o u r C o u r t  c a s e s  by c o u r t  and in d u s t r y
| Industry
F irs t 
Labour Court
Second 
Labour Court Total j
Count
1
I  % 
I
Count %
1 1 
Count | % I 
I 1
| Jute 15
1
I  1 6  
1
81 84
1 I 
96 I 100 |
I Road^  Transport 54
1
1 73 20 27
1 1 
74 j 100 j
1 I
j Water Transport 14
1
J 78 
1
4 22 18 I 100 J
j E le c tric ity 11 | 55 
1
9 45 20 | 100 J
| TOTAL 94
I
| 45 
1
114 55
1 1 
208 | 100 |
1 1
APPENDIX D .1 6
D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  th e  L a b o u r C o u r t  c a s e s  by n a tu r e  o f  th e  c a s e s  and c o u r t
Pi rst 
Labour Court
Second 
Labour Court Total
j Nature of the Cases
Count %
I
Count | %
I
Count J 
I
% |
j Establishment of Legal 
j rights (IRO, Sec. 34) 24 41
1
1
35 I 59 
1
59 | 
1
28.4 |
j Collective cases on fa ilu re  
j of conciliation (IRO, Sec. 
j 32 and IRRO, Sec. 6) 1 100
1
1
1
1 I 
1
0.5 I
j Complaint cases 
| (Sec. 25, SO Act) 52 43
I
70 | 57 
1
I
1
122 1 
1
58.7 |
j Criminal cases/violation 
| cases (Sec. 54-56, IRO) 11 73 4 I 27 
I
1
1
15 I 
1
7.2 I
j Cancellation of registration  
j of trade unions 
| (Sec. 10-11, IRO) 6 55
1
1
5 I 45 
i
1
1
11 I 
1
5.3 1
| TOTAL 94 45
1
114 I 55 
I
1
208 I 
1
100 |
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APPENDIX P . 17
P e rc e n ta g e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  la b o u r  c o u r t  c a s e s *
by i n i t i a t o r  and ty p e  o f  th e  cases
I Type 1 
I In itia to r^v . j
Individual j Group j Collective i Total |
j Individual j 
| worker j 85.6 | | } 85.6 |
j A group of I 
j workers 1 | 5.8 | | 5.8 |
| CBA | j 1.4 I 3.8 | 5.3 I
| Worker's wife | 2.4 I | J 2.4 I
I Other union | | 1.0 j | 1.0 |
| TOTAL I 88.0 | 8.2 | 3.8 | 100.0 |
*  NOTE: Total number of cases = 208
APPENDIX D .1 8
D istribution of the labour court cases by reasons for disputes and courts
F irs t  
Labour Court
Second | 
Labour Courtj Total
Reasons for Disputes
Count
I
1 $ 
1
Count
1 1 
1 % 1 
1 I
1
Count 1 
1
% |
Pay anomalies, increment etc. 4
1
1 25 
1
12
1 1 
1 75 I 
i 1
1
16 j 
1
7.7 |
Incentive bonus 3
1
I 60 
1
2
1 I 
1 40 J
1 1
1
5 I 
1
2.4 |
Fringe benefits 1
1
I 50 
1
1
1 1 
1 50 | 
1 I
1
2 I 
1
1.0 |
Holidays, leaves, hours of 
work and other timing issues 1
1
1
! 25 
1
3
1 I 
I 1 
I 75 J
1 1
1
1
4 I 
1
1.9 I
Dismissal/discharge as a 
disciplinary measure 26
!
I
1 41 
1
38
1 I 
I 59 I 
1 1
1
1
64 | 30.8 !
Other disciplinary measures 
(suspension, prevention order 
on joining, demolition etc .) 28
1
1
1
1 57 
1
21
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
I 43 |
1 1
1
1
1
49 | 
1
23.6 I
Other personnel matters 
recruitment, promotion, con­
tin u ity  of service, perma­
nency of job 6
1
1
1
1
I 22 
I
21
1 I 
1 1 
1 I 
1 1 
I 78 | 
1 1
1
1
1
27 I 
1
13.0 I
Cancellation of registration  
of trade unions 6
1
1
I 55 
1
5
1 1 
1 I 
I 45 I 
1 1
1
I
11 I 
I
5.3 |
Post service benefits 
(gratu ity , CPF, termination 
benefit) 9
1
1
I 69 
1
4
1 1 
1 1 
1 I 
I 31 |
1 1
1
1
1
13 I 
I
6.2 |
Ille g a l deduction from wages 2
1
I 22 
1
7
1 1 
1 78 I 
1 1
1
9 1 4.3 1
Various special allowances 7
1
1100
1
-
1 1 
1 1
7 | 
1
3.4 |
Charter of demands 1
1
|100
1
-
1 1 
1 1
1 ! 
1
0.5 |
TOTAL 94
1
I 45 
1
114
1 1 
| 55 J
I 1
1
208 | 
(
100 I
APPENDIX D .1 9
Distribution of the decided labour court cases 
by courts and outcome to the applicant
. Outcome to the 
. Applicant
F irs t 
Labour Court
Second 
Labour Court Total |
Court % Court % Court 1 % 1
j Successful 1 3.3 12 17.1 13 1 13 I
j Withdrawn 9 30.0 19 27.1 28 1 28 |
j Not proceeded 
| with 4 13.3 1 1.4 5 1 5 |
j Unsuccessful -  
j dismissed on 
j default 12 40.0 29 41.4 41 1 41 !
j Unsuccessful on 
j contest 4 13.3 9 12.9 13 1 13 I
| TOTAL 30 100.0 70 100.0 100 1100 j
APPENDIX D .2 0
P e rc e n ta g e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  la b o u r  c o u r t  c a se s
by le n g th  o f  t i m e *  and c o u r t s .
1 Time Interval
IDecided Cases 
I 1st | 2nd 
ILabourlLabour 
|Court JCourt
Pending Cases I 
1st | 2nd | 
LabourjLabourj 
Court jcourt j
j Within 2 months | 10.0 
1
- 6.2 2.3 |
| Within 3 to 4 months | 3.3 
1
I. '* ' 7.0 2.3 |
| " 5 to 6 *' I 6.7 
I
0.6 4.7 9.1 |
| " 0.5 to 1.0 year f T6V7 
1
2.0 31.2 9.1 |
| 1 1.0 to 1.5 years I 40.0 
1
11.4 10.7 18.2 j
| " 1.5 to 2.0 "
1
lo.o 9.4 13.6 |
| H 2.0 to 2.5 “ | 3.3 F5T T  ' 9.4 11.4 j
| w 2.5 to 3.0
1
1.4 6.2 4.5 |
| " 3.0 to 3.5 “ | 6.7 22.8 3.1 18.2 |
| " 3.5 to 4.0 J 10.0 
1
14.3 1.5 ' '4'.3" J
| " 4.0 to 4.5 “ I 3.3 
1
4.3 1.5 "4". 5" J
I 4.5 to 5.0 "
I
2.8 — 2.3 |
| " 5.0 to 5.5 *'
I
“ 270 “ •  |
| 1 5.5 to 6.0
I
1.4 — “  |
| TOTAL jlOO.O
1
1 0 0 . 0 ioo . o ioo.o i
j Total number of cases 1 ■■ 30 ■ 
1
71T ■ ■ 64' ■" - 4  4-  |
*  Decided cases: Total time from the date of f i l in g  a case
to the date of its  final decision.
Pending cases: Total time for which such a case remains
pending from the date of f il in g  to the 
date of investigation.
APPENDIX D .2 1
Factors explaining the reasons for delay 
in the sample labour court cases*
Factors j
Number 
of times
I Cases 
j involved 
1 %
1 1 
I 1 
| Mean]
1 1 
I 1
1 1. F irs t party prayed for time | 1-19 I 78
1 I 
I 4.10]I I
I 2. Second party prayed for time | 1-23 I 96 | 8.30|I j
1 3. Both parties prayed for time j 1- 8 | 23 1 .41|I i
1 4. F irs t party absented j 1- 8 1 74 I 2.09] ] 1
1 5. Second party absented j 1- 8 I 44 | 1.27]l i
1 6. Both parties absented J 1- 7 I 17 1 .29]I |
I 7. Members of the court absented | 1-17 1 73 1 3.94] 1 |
1 8. Court was busy in hearing other cases] 1-19 1 74 | 3.32]1 I
1 9. Chai rman was absent j 1- 7 | 72 1 1.84]I 1
|10. Sudden Government holidays occurred j 1- 3 I 26
! 1 
1 .32]
i i
111. Enquiries, examination and cross- | 
examination of cases j 1- 8 | 32
1 l
I 1 
| .66] 
| t
|12. Written opinion of members delayed | 1- 6 1 31 1 .85]i i
|13. Revival of cases on ex-parte j 
decisions 1 1 1 9
1 1 
I I 
I .09]
1 t
|14. Legal complexities j 1- 2 I 14 I .15] 1 |
|15. Court shifted I 1 I 12 1 .13]i i
f16. Mistakes done by clerks (hearing \ 
| date misinformed I 1 I 7
I 1 
I 1 
] .07]
■ i
117. No time today; hearing adjourned j 1- 8 I 68 I 2.07]i i
|18. Hearing date shifted for unknown j 
reasons I 1- 7 1 71
1 1
] 2.20] 
1 1
*  NOTE: Total number of cases = 208
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APPENDIX E .4
Extent of agreement of the plant management, corporation management 
CBAs and conciliators with the statement that unions/workers had no 
determination to abide by the agreements that had already been made
(Frequencies in percentage)
| Extent of 
j Agreement
Plant
Mgt.
jCorp'n. 
1 Mgt. CBA
IConci1 - | 
jiators I All I
j Agree strongly 4.2 19.2
1 1 
1 7.7 |I I
9.9 j
j Agree slightly 25.0 | 50.0 30.8 I 23.1 J
i i
29.6 |
j Neutral 1 7.7 | 1.4 |
I Disagree slightly 41.7 | 25.0 15.4 I 23.1 |
1 I
26.8 |
j Disagree strongly 29.2 I 25.0 34.6 I 38.5 | 32.4 I
| TOTAL 100.0 | 100.0 100.0
1 1 
I 100.0 | 100.0 I
j Total number of 
j respondents 24 1 8 26
1 1 
I 13 | 
1 1
71 1
APPENDIX E.5
Extent to which plant management, corporation management,
CBAs and conciliators agreed with the statement that inter-union  
riva lry  stood as a bottleneck in the way of a sensible negotiation.
(Frequencies in percentage)
| Extent of 
| Agreement
Plant
Mgt.
Corp'n.
Mgt. CBA
Concil-| 
iators j A ll |
| Agree strongly 62.5 87.5 84.6 38.5 | 69.0 |
j Agree slightly 29.2 12.5 11.5 30.8 | 21.1 |
| Neutral 4.2 3.8 7.7 | 4.2 |
j Disagree slightly 4.2 7.7 | 2.8 |
| Disagree strongly 15.4 | 2.8 |
| TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 | 100.0 1
| Total number of 
j respondents 24 8 26 13 | 71 1
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APPENDIX E .6
Percentage distribution of plant management, corporation management, 
CBAs and conciliators classified according to the extent to which 
they agreed with the statement that plant management had a very 
limited power to settle collective industrial disputes.
| Extent of 
j Agreement
I Plant 
1 Mgt.
ICorp’n. 
1 Mgt. CBA
IConcil-| 
jiators j All |
| Agree strongly
1
| 100.0 
i
I 100.0 92.3
1 I 
| 84.6 I 
1 |
95.8 1
j Agree slightly
1
I
1
1 7.7 I 15.4 | 4.2 |
| TOTAL
!
| 100.0
1
| 100.0 100.0
1 1 
| 100.0 I 100.0 I
| Total number of 
| respondents
I
| 24 
1
1
I 8 
1
26
1 I 
1 13 I 
1 1
71 1
379
APPENDIX E .7
Percentage distribution of dispute cases which 
fa iled  at the plant level negotiation classified  
according to reasons for fa ilu re
Plant
Level
Cases*
Conciliation 
Level Cases* Tota l*|
1. Financial in ab ility
i—< •
CO 11.9 10.7 |
2. Lack of authority on the part 
of plant managed 33.2 17.1 22.7 |
3. Illeg a l and unreasonable demands, 
i .e .  demands beyond the bargaining 
ju risd iction 21.0 18.6 19.6 |
4. Adamant attitude of management 7.1 16.5 13.5 |
5. Adamant attitude of the union 10.5 6.5 7.9 |
6. Lack of locus-standi of the CBA 2.4 3.1 2.9 I
7. Need to maintain uniformity 
with other plants 5.7 2.4 3.6 I
8. Antagonistic relationship between 
the parties and the ir conflicting  
views about each other, 
communication gap 11.9 8.3 9.6 I
9. No negotiation meeting arranged 
or held - 15.5 9.6 I
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 |
Total number of responses 295 573 868 |
Total number of valid cases 163 190 353 1
*  M ultiple reasons were involved in most of the cases. Percentages 
based on total number of responses (reasons).
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APPENDIX E .8
Percentage distribution of the conciliators and labour court members 
classified according to the extent of the ir agreement with the 
statement that the parties In dispute are not well aware of the
laws of the country.
| Extent of 
j Agreement Conciliators
Labour Court | 
Members j All |
| Agree strongly 76.9
1
70.8 |
i 73.0 I
j Agree slightly 23.1 20.8 ji 21.6 I
j Neutral -
1
I
I Disagree slightly -
I
4.2 | 
1
2.7 |
| Disagree strongly - 4.2 | 2.7 |
| TOTAL 100.0
I
100.0 | 100.0 |
j Total number of 
| respondents 13 24 | 
1
37 |
APPENDIX E. 9
Percentage distribution of the plant management and CBA leaders 
classified according to the extent of the ir agreement with the 
statement that "the conciliators and labour courts should adhere 
to government guidelines and policies.
| Extent of J 
j Agreement |
1
Management I
1
CBA | All |
1 1 
j Agree strongly I
I 1
50.0 | 
1
1
11.5 | 
1
30.0 |
I I 
j Agree s lightly  I
i i
29.2 | 
1
34.6 !
1
32.0 I
1 I 
| Neutral II |
4.2 | 3.8 | 4.0 |
I 1 
j Disagree slightly  |
i i
16.7 | 30.8 | 
1
24.0 I
1 1 
| Disagree strongly | 19.2 | 10.0 |
1 1 
j Total j
1
100.0 |
1
100.0 | 100.0 |
| Total number of | 
j respondents j 
I 1
1
24 | 
I
1
26 | 50 |
APPENDIX F.l
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR PLANT MANAGEMENT
Sample Number { 1
01. Name of the plant:
02. Name of the respondent:
0 3 . Designation:
0*+. Age (in years)
05. Academic qualifications:
06. Work experience (in years)
□
07.a. Total number of workers in the plant:
b. What percentage of your workforce are 
union members ?
c . How many unions are present In the plant 7
OB.a. Does your plant have any written grievance procedure
□Yes ivO
b. If yes, did you consult with the union while establishing 
Yes
c. If the plant does not nave any written grievance procedur
(1) Do you thins that such a procedure should be establis 
Yes
(2) (!) Have you any informal grievance procedure ? 
Yes No
(ii) If yes, how aoc-s it work ?
09-a. is there any Works Council or Participation Committee in 
your plant ?
Yes
b. If yes.
No
(1) How has this committee been constituted ?
Number
Workers* representatives
Management's representatives
Total number of members In 
the committee
(2) What matters does this committee deal with ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(3) Are you satisfied with the working of this committee ?
Very satisfied  Reasonably satisfied ______
Somewhat satisfied  Not satisfied _____
10.a. Who usually initiate collective negotiation ?
CBA ____  J/lanagement   0t'ners( spec ify)
b. Who participate in bipartite negotiation ?
Union’s side :."anagevent's s.ce
(i) (i)
(ii) (ii)
(iii) ( iii)
( iv) (iv)
c. Please mention three issues (in order of rank) you frequer.zly 
have to negotiate with your CBA.
(i)
( ii)
(iii)
d. Do you put any agreement reached in written form ?
Always 
Rarely
e. Please mention three good and three bad points of the CBA 
of your plant.
Good points Bad points
H ) (i)
(ii) ( ii)
(iii) (iii)
Frequently Somet i.mes
Never □
11.a. When a collective issue (A) or an individual grievance (3) 
arises, how is it resolved ? Please mark the appropriate 
boxes with any of the following letter(s):
A, Indicating a collective issue
B, indicating an individual issue 
A.B, indicating both types of issues
Always Frea_uently Sometimes Rarely Never
(1) By informal 
discussion
(2) By grievance 
procedure
(3) 3y works 
council
(4) By formal 
negotiation 
with CBA
b. V.'hat are the issues which you find difficult to settle by 
the above means ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
12. How many strikes too.* place in the last year in your plant ? 
Tlease state them chronologocally with duration.
1 3 *a • Do you think the existing legal provisions for plant level 
negotiation to be adequate ?
Yes No
b. If not, what modifications do you suggest ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
l^ +.a. Approximately what percentage of the dispute cases negotiated 
between you and your CBA ultimately come out successful ?
Percent
b. In unsuccessful cases, what are the usual causes responsible 
for the failure of such negotiations ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
15. Have you any suggestions to make the plant level bipartite 
negotiation more effective ?
(i)
(ii)
( iii)
16. V/ith which of the following statements regarding the public 
report of the conciliation proceedings would you agree ?
(i) A conciliator should be empowered to
make public report at his own initiative.
(ii) He should be empowered to do it at the 
request of both the parties.
(iii) He should be empowered to do it at the 
request of one of the parties.
(iv) He should be empowered to do it in 
important cases.
(v) He should not be empowered to do it.
I?. Why do the individual workers directly ; pply to labour courts 
without going through the unions ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
18. How frequently do you approach each of the following machineries 
for the settlement of industrial disputes ?
Always Frequ­
ently
Some­
times
Rarely Never
(a) Collective 
Bargaining
(b) Conciliation
(c) Arbitration
(d) Labour Court
(e) Labour Appell­
ate Tribunal
19.a. What is your view on the statutory time limits provided for 
each of the following machineries of dispute settlement ?
More than 
adea uate
Reasonably 
adeauate
Less than 
ad ee ua t e
(a) Collective Bargaining
(b) Conciliation
(c) Arbitration
(d) Labour Court
(e) Lab. Appellate Tribuns,1
b. If less than adequate, by how long (In days) do you wish (an) 
extension(s) ?
(a) Collective Bargaining
(b) Conciliation
(c) Arbitration
(d) Labour Court
(e) Labour Appellate Tribunal
20.a. How would you evaluate the effectiveness of each of the follo­
wing dispute settlement machineries ?
Very
effective
Reasonably
effective
Somewhat
effective
Not
effective
(1) Collective 
Bargaining
(2) Conciliation
(3) Arbitration
(k) Labour Court
(5) Labour Appel­
late Tribunal
b. If somewhat or not effective, what might be done to imorove 
its, (their) effectiveness ?
(1) Collective Bargainings
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
JO D
(2) Conciliation:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(3) Arbitration:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(*0 Labour Court:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(5) Labour Appellate Tribunal:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
21. Below x x x x x x t f ^ a x f e ^  ^ e  1** statements with which you may or 
may not agree. Please look at each statement and decide how much 
you agree with it, based on the following scale:
Agree 
strongl«/
Agree 
siightly
Neutral Disagree 
siigh tly
Disagree 
s trongly
1 2 3 k 5
Mark the appropriate box on the right of each statement with 
any of the above scores with which you best agree.
(1) Trade unions are usually unreasonable, 
they have no constructive approach.
(2) Management seldom appreciates unions 
because they do not understand realities 
and practical problems.
(3) Management always meets all reasonable 
requests of the CBA for information 
which are relevant to negotiations.
(*0 * Unions and workers have no determination 
to abide by the agreements which have 
already been mad a.
(5; Inter-union rivalry stands as a bottleneck 
in the way of sensible plant level negotia­
tion.
(6) Conciliators are overloaded with cases-
(7) Conciliators do not always play a neutral 
role; often they are pro-union.
(8) The CBA is usually reluctant to attend 
conciliation meetings.
(9) The compulsory conciliation service has 
significantly reduced the number of strikes 
in our industries.
(10) The union usually views plant level 
negotiation and conciliation as steps 
that it must pass through before any 
strike can be declared and settlements 
at these stages are irrelevant to it.
(11) Labour court decisions are neutral.
(12) Labour courts are overloaded. For speedy 
decisions, the number of courts should 
.be increased.
(1 3 )  The chairmen of the labour courts are
either retired persons or about to retire. 
They.do not take so much interest in 
labour matters.
(3>) Conciliators and labour courts should 
adhere to government policies and 
guidelines.
Name of the investigator _________ Date
APPENDIX F .2
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR COLLECTIVE BURGAINING AGENT
Sample Number
1- Name of the plant:
2. Name of the respondent:
3. Designation: (a) In the union: (b) In the plant:
4. Age (in years):
5. Work experience ( in years ):
6. Academic qualifications:
7. For how long a period of time are you with the trad' 
union?
______  years
(a) How many trade unions are there in this plant 
including your one ?
(b) With which national trade union is your union 
a ff i1iated?
(c) What is the membership strength of your union in chi 
plant?
9. (a) Does this plant have any formal grievance procedure?
Yes _________ No__________
(b) If yes,
•(1) How was it established?
Establised by management on its own________ ____
Established by management in consultation 
with the union ____
(2) Have you approved of this procedure?
Yes ___________  No________
(c) If not,
(1) Do you think that such a procedure should be 
established?
Yes No
(2) Have you any informal grievance procedure?
Yes ________  No_________
(3) If yes, how does it work?
387
10- (a) Is there any Works Council/Participation Committee in 
this plant? Yes   No_________
(b) If yes.
(1) How has this committee been constituted ?
Number
Worker's representative _____
Management's representative  ____
Total number of members
in the commette_______________ ______
(2) What matters does this commeettee deal with?
(i)
( ii)
(iii)
(3) Are you satisfied with the working of this 
committee?
Very satisfied __ Reasonably satisfied______
somewhat satisfied  Not satisfied ____
(c) If not,
(1) Do you think that such a committee should be 
constituted?
Yes ______  No______
(2) Have you requested the management to constitute 
one? Yes   No ______
11. (a) Who usually initiate collective negotiation?
CBA   Management ______
(b) Who participates in bipartite negotiations?
Union s side Managements s side
( i )  CO
(ii) (ii )
(iii) (iii)
(c) Please mention three issues (in order of rank) which
you would frequently have to negotiate with the
management.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(d) Do you put any agreement reached in written form?
Always ______  Frequently ____ _ Sometimes _______
Rarely ______  Never _______
(e) Please mention three good and three bad points of the 
management of this point.
Good points Bad points
(i) (i)
(ii) (ii)
(iii) (iii)
12.(a) When a collective issue (A) or an individual grievance 
(B) arises, how is it resolved? Please mark the 
appropriate boxes with any of the following letter(s):
A, indicating a collective issue
B, indicting an individual issue- 
AB, indicating both types of issues
Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never
(1) By informal
discussion
(2) By grievance
procedure
(3) By works
council
(4) By formal
negotiation
with CBA
(b) What are the issues which you find difficult to 
settle by the above means?
(i)
(ii)
( iii )
13. (a) When did your union organise the last strike?
(b) What was (were) the reasons for that strike?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
■(c) How long did it continue?
(d) How was it settled?
(e) What was its outcome?
14. (a) Do you have any current problem on which your union
wishes negotiation with the management?
Yes No
(b) If yes, would you please mention it?
(c) Are there some issues which management refuses to 
negotiate?
Yes No
(d) If yes, would you please mention these?
( i)
(ii)
( iii )
15. (a) Do you think the existing legal provisions for
dispute settlements to be adequate?
Yes No
(b) If not, what modification do you suggest?
(i)
( i i )
(iii)
16. (a) Approximately what percentage of the dispute cases 
negotiated between you and management ultimately 
come out successful?
______  Percent
(b) In unsuccessful cases, what are the usual causes 
responsible for the failure of such negotiations?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
17.With which of the following statements regarding the 
pubilic reporting of the conciliation proceedings would 
you agree ?
(i) A conciliator should be empowered to make 
public report at his own initiative.
(ii) He should be empowered to do it at the 
request of both the parties.
(iii He should be empowered to do it at the 
request of one of the parties.
(iv) He should be empowered to do it in
important cases.
(v) he should not be empowered to do it.
18. Why do the individual workers directly apply to labour
courts without going through the union ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
19. how frequently do you approach each of the following
machineries for the settlement of industrial disputes?
Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never
(1) Collective
bargaining
(2) ConciIiation
(3) Arbitration
(4 ) Labour court
(5) Labour Appe­
llate Tribunal
20.(a) What is your view on the 
provided for each of the 
dispute selllement ?
statutary 
following
t ime 1imits 
machineries of
More than Reasonab1y Les s than
adequate adequa te adequate
(1) Collective 
bargaining
(2) Conciliation
(3) Arbi trat ion
(4) Labour Court
(5) Labour Appelate 
Tribuna 1
(b) If less than adequate, by how long (in days) do you wish 
(an) extention(s) ?
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Collective bargaining 
Conciliation 
Arbitration 
Labour Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal
21. (a) 
the
How would you evaluate the effectiveness 
following dispute settlement machineries ?
of each of
Very Reasonably Somewahat 
effective effective effective
Not
effective
(1) Collective
Bargaining
(2) Conciliation
(3) Arbitration
(4) Labour Court
(5) Labour Appelate
Tribunal
(b) If somewhat or not effective, what might be done to 
improve its (their) effectiveness ?
(1) Collective Bargaining:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(2) Conciliation:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(3) Arbitration:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(4) Labour Court:
(i)
( i i )
(iii)
(5) Labour Appellate Tribunal:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
22. (a) Do you agree with the allegation that some of our
laws are not democratic ? Yes No
(b) If yes, would you please mention some of these 
undemocratic provisions ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
23. (a) What are the major administrative problems of your
union today ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(b) How are you going to tackle these problems ?
(i)
(ii)
( iii )
24. Bellow are 14 statements with which you may or may not 
agree.Please look at each statement and decide how much 
you agree with it, based on the following scale:
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree disagree
strongly slightly slightly strongly
1 2 3 4 5
Mark the appropriate box on the right of each 
statement with any of the above scores with which you 
best agree.
(1) Management recognises and appreciate the CBA.
(2) Management usually tries to solve any problem 
through negotiation with the CBA.
(3) In most bipartite negotiations management 
behaves unreasonably.
(4) Management is usually reluctant to meet 
reasonable requests of the CBA for information 
which are relevant to negotiations.
(5) Inter-union rivalry stands as a bottleneck in 
the way of making sensible plant level 
negotiations.
(6) Workers have no determination to abide by the 
agreements which have already been made.
(7) The compulsory conciliation service has 
significantly reduced the number of strikes 
in our industries..
(8) Conciliators are overloaded with cases.
(9) Conciliators do not always play a neutral 
role; often they are pro-management.
(10) Management is usually reluctant to attend 
conciliation meetings.
(11) Labour court decisions are neutral.
(12) Labour courts are overloaded. For speedy 
decisions, the number of courts should
(13) The chairman of the labour courts are either 
retired persons or about to retire. They do 
not take so much interest in labour matters.
(14) Conciliators and labour courts should adhere 
to government policies and guidelines.
Date Name of the investigator
APPENDIX F .3
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CORPORATION MANAGEMENT
Sample Number
1. Name of the office:
2. Name of the respondent:
3. Designation:
4. Age (in year ):
5. Academic qualification's:
6. Work exprience ( in years ):
7. (a) Total number of workers in the industry
(b) Approximately what percentage of this work force 
are union members ?
8. (a) Do you have any(iwritten grievance procedure ? Yes/No
(b) If not, do you think taht such a procedure should be 
established ? Yes  ___ No_____
9. Can the plant level CBAS raise any industrial dispute to
the Head Office Management ? Yes ________  No_________
1 0 . (a) How many trade union federations are there in your 
industry ? ______
(b) Would you please mention the names of these
federations ?
(i)
(ii)
’(iii)
(iv)
(c) As per law, only a CBA can raise an industrial 
dispute. But how does a federarion, not being a CBA, 
raise dispute to you ?
(d) Are all federations allowed to submit demands to the 
Head Office Management ? Yes _____  No _____
(e) If not, how do you determine the competence of a 
federation for submitting demands ?
(f) How do you settle collective disputes initiated by the 
federations ?
(g) What happens after the failure of negotiation with the 
federations ?
11.(a) Who participate in Board/Corporation level bipartite 
negotiation ?
Federation1! side Board 's/Corporatiori$ sode
(i) (i)
(ii) (ii)
(iii) (iii)
(iv) (iv)
(v) (v)
(b) Please mention three issues ( in order of rank ) you 
frequently have to negotiate with the federation .
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(c) Do you put any agreement reached in written form ?
Always ____  Frequently ____  Sometimes_____
Rarely ____  Never ___
12.(a) Please mention three issues which are relatively 
harder to negotiate and settle with the federations .
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(b) Why are the above issues harder to settle ?
13. (a) Approximately what percentage of the dispute cases
negotiated between you and the federations ultimately 
come out successful ?
(b) In successful cases, what are the usual causes
responsible for the failure of such negotiations ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
14. What type of industrial dispute cases are referred by the 
plants to the Board/Corporation Management and how do 
you settle them ?
Nature of cases Method of settlement
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
15. Have yo any suggestions to make the plant level dispute 
settlement more effective ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
16- How frequently do you approach each of the following 
machineries for the settlement of industrial dispute ?
Always Frequently Sometimes Never
(a) Collective "
Bargaining
(b) Conciliation
(c) Arbitration
(d) Labour Court .
(e) Labour Appe­
llate Tribunal
17. (a) What is your view on the statutory time limits 
provided for each of the following machineries of 
dispute settlement ?
More than Reasonably Less than
adequate adequate adequate
(a) Collective 
Bargaining
(b) Conciliation
(c) Arbitration
(d) Labour Court
(e) Labour Appellate 
Tribunal
(b) If less than adequate, by how long ( in days ) do you 
wish ( an ) extension(s) ?
(a) Collective Bargaining _______
(b) Conciliation _______
(c) Arbitration _______
(d) Labour Court _______
(e) Labour Appellate Tribunal _______
18.(a) How would you evaluate the effectiveness of each of 
the following dispute settlement machineries ?
Very Reasonably Somewhat Not
effective effective effective effective
(1) Collective 
Bargaining
(2) Conciliation
(3) Arbitration
(4) Labour Court
(5) Labour Appe­
llate Tribunal
(b) If somewhat or not effective, what might be done to 
improve its ( their ) effectiveness ?
19. With which of the following statements regarding the 
public report of the conciliation procedings would you 
agree ?
(i ) A conciliator should be empowered to make 
public report at his own initiative .
(ii) He should be empowered to do it at at the 
request of both the parties.
(iii) He should be empowered to do it at the request of one 
of the parties.
(iv) He should be empowered to do it in important cases.
(v) He should not be empowered to do it.
20. (a) It has been observed that a very small number of
cases have gone to conciliation from your industry, 
what are the reasons behind this ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(b) Why are the parties reluctant to refer disputes to 
arbitration ?
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
21. On the next page there are 15 statements with which you 
maiy or may not agree. Please look at each statement and 
decide how much you agree with it, based on the folowing 
scale:
Agree Agree Neutral 
strongly slightly
Disagree
slightly
Disagree
stongly
1 2  3 4 5
Mark the appropriate box on the right of each statement 
with any of the above scores with which you best agree.
(1) Trade' unions/federations are usually unreasonable, they 
have no constructive approach. ____
(2) Management seldom appriciates unions/federations 
because they do not understand realities and practical 
problems. ___
(3) Management always meets all reasonable requests of the 
CBA/federation for information which are relevant to 
negotiations. ___
(4) Unions/Federations and workers have no determination to 
abide by the agreements which have already been made.__
(5) Inter-union/Federation rivalry stands as a bottleneck 
in the way of sensible plant level negotiation. ____
(6) Conciliators are overloaded with cases. ____
(7) Conciliators do not always play a neutral role; often 
they are pro-union.  .
(8) The CBA/Federation is usually reluctant to attend 
conciliation meetings. ____
(9) The compulsory conciliation service has significantly 
reduced the number of strikes in our industries. ____
(10) The union-federation usually views plant level 
negotiation and conciliation as steps that it must pass 
through before any strike can be declared and 
settlements at these stages are irrelevant to it. _____
(11) Labour court decisions are neutral. ____
(12) Labour courts are over-loaded. For speedy decisions, 
the number of courts should be increased.____
(13) The chairman of the labour courts are either retired 
persons or about to retire. They do not take so much 
interest in labour matters._____
(14) Conciliators and labour courts should adhere to 
government policies and guidelines. _______
(15) Plant level management has a very limited power to 
settle collective disputes. _______
Date: Name of the investigator
APPENDIX F.4
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR CONCILIATORS
Sample Number
01. Name of the office:___________
02. Name of the respondent: --------
03. Designation in the Labour Department: ---------
04. Age (in years): ---------
05- Academic qualifications: ________
06. Date of joining as the conciliator: _______
0 7 . Previous job experience (if any): _______
08. Jurisdiction of functions:
(a) Territorial limits:
(b) Number of plants:_________
c;9. When do you start conc.liation within the dispute procedures ?
10. Who usually apply to you for conciliation of disputes ? Tic.-c 
the appropriate box(es):
(a'1 Individual workers I
(b) Collective Bargaining Agent
(c) Management |
(d) Both the CBA & Management
11. Please mention three issues (In order of rank) you frequently 
have to conciliate in the public sector industries-
(a)
(b)
(c)
12.a. Approximately what percentage of the disp-te cases conciliated 
oby you come out successful ? _______
b. In unsuccessfulocases, what are the usual causes responsible 
for such failures ?
(1)
( 2 )
(3)
13-a. Do you find some essues harder to conciliate than others ? 
Y es 1 I No
b. If yes, please state which of the following issues are 
relatively harder and which are relatively easier to 
conciliate ?
(1) General wages issues
(2) Fringe benefits ~
(3) Bon-;s
(*+) Factory ad.r inistrat ion
(5) Work; procedures
(6) Leave & hours of work
(?) Physical working conditions
(6) Personnel matters (transfers 
promo t'ons , dismissals etc.)
Harder to 
cone 11late
Easier to 
cone 11late
•
lL.a,. Do you consider yo-r power under the law to be adequate ? 
Yes NO
b. If not, what extension of po.ver do you wish ?
c. How freq ently you have to use legal power Lr. getting
Information from or compelling the attendence of the parties 
in conciliation proceedings ?
Alaways
Rarely
Frequently 
Nev er
Somet i n.es
d. Do you think that in the absence of your legal power parties 
would have cooperated with you ?
15-a. Do you wish an extension of the statutory conciliation period ? 
Yes 1 1 No 1 ~1
b. If yes. how long (in days) ? □
c. If not, why not ?
l6.a. Do you thinic that your suggestions and recommendations for 
settlement should be made public even If the parties do not 
agree ?
Yes □  NO □
b. If yes, do you thlnx that if you were empowered to issue 
public reports on conciliation proceedings, public opinion 
would act as a lever with which to hasten agreement ?
Yes L 1 No 1 1
If not, why do you think so ?
( 1)
( 2 )
(3)
x/. Mow do you settle financial' issues in the public sector 
industries ?
(a) Do not intervene
(b) Seek settlement as per the 
guidelines of the I.W.W.P.C.
(c) Seek settlement regardless of 
the Government guidelines
18.a. When conciliation turns unsuccessful, do you try to encourage 
the parties to agree to refer the dispute to arbitration ?
Yes 1 1 NO □
b. If yes, how frequently do you become successful in such a 
reference ?
•Alaways
Rarely
Free ue.itly Somet imes
Neve:
c. If rarely or never successful, why are the parties so reluctant 
to refer to arbitration ?
( 2 )
(3)
1 9 . Inuu.isucc essful cases, what hap-.ens after the failure of 
conciliation ? Do you follow them up ?
20.a. Have you ever experienced any wildcat strikes in the public 
industries ?
Yes □ No
b. If yes, how do you conciliate in such stri.ces ?
21. Do you informally entertain any individual disputes for 
conciliation ?
22. what problems do you usually face while conducting conciliation ?
(1'
( 2 )
(3)
(*0
2 3 . Have you any suggesions to n2a.ce the cor.clllat.on machinery 
more effective ?
( 1)
( 2 )
(3)
2 1* . What are the major administrative problems of your office 
today ?
(1)
( 2 )
(3)
W .
What are your views on the following statements ? Please give 
your views based on the following^ scalei
Agree
strongly
Agree
slightly
Neutral Disagree
Slightly
Disagree
Strongly
1 2 3 4 5
Mark the appropriate box on the right of each statement with
of the above scores with which you best agree.
a. Management does not try to solve problems through 
negotiation with the unions at the plant level.
b. Unions do not try to solve problems through nego­
tiation with the management at the plant level.
c. Interunion rivalry stands as a bottleneck in the 
way of a sensible conciliation.
d. Sometimes we can not play a neutral role a^e to 
some external constraints.
e. I a.n not able to Co :r.y job as effectively as 1 
could possibly because I am overloaded.
f. Existing legal provisions for conciliation are 
adequate for the purpose.
g. Management is usually reluctant to attend m e  
conciliation meetings..
h. Union is usually reluctamt to attend tne 
conciliation meetings.
i. Because the la.-, aoes not give any specific 
guidelines regarding the process or content 
of settlement, we act on our nersof:; 1 v'e.-.s.
j. On some points the law s qiite clear, cut m e  
parties are not .veJ-tw-re of the.:.
k. The very presence of the cor.c i 1 .a tor helps to 
promote a settlement.
m. Strikes would have increased signl f . Ccf.tly 
without compulsory conciliation.
n. Part.es v ew cone' 1 latlor. as a step that they
must compulsorily pass through before ar.y strixe 
(lockout) can be declared and to them settle .er.t 
is irrelevant.
o. In some cases, lac.-c of specialised & experienced 
conciliators is one reason for the failure of 
conciliation.
p. Both union and management need much better training.
q. Compulsory conciliation has more advantages than 
disadvantages.
any
□
□
□
□
□
□
□□
□
Name of the investigator Date
APPENDIX F.5
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR LABOUR COURT MEMBERS
Sample No. _____  Serial No.
1. Name of the court:
2. Name of the respondent:
3. Designation:
(1) Member __  (2) Chairman
4. Age (in years):
5. Academic qualifications:
6. Date of joining the labour court:
7. Previous job experience:
8. Whom do you represent?
9. (a) Does the court decide all the cases referred to it?
(1) Workers _____(2) Employers _____ (3) Not negotiable ___
(b) If not, how does the court decide which cases to hear?
(c) What happens to cases not decided?
(d) How does the court select cases to be heard first?
(1) First come first served basis:
(2) Collective disputes get preference to the 
individual ones:
(3) Considering the urgency of the cases:
(4) Considering other factors (please specify):
10. Who apply/refer to the court for adjudication?
Always Frequently Sometimes Rarely Never
(1) Ind ividua 1 
worker
(2) C.B.A.
(3) Other 
un ions
(4) Management
(5) Government
11. Please mention three issues (in order of rank) which you 
frequently have to adjudicate in the public sector 
industries?
(a )
(b)
(c)
12. (a) Do you find some issues harder to adjudicate than 
others?
Yes No
(b) If yes, please mention some issues which are relatively 
harder and which are relatively easier to adjudicate 
Harder to adjudicate Easier to adjudicate.
(1) (1)
( 2 )  ( 2 )
(3) (3)
(4) (4)
13. (a) Do you consider the powers of the court under the law 
to be adequate?
Yes _________  No__________
(b) If yes, what extension of power do you think necessary?
(a) Do you wish an extension of statutory adjudication 
period?
Yes ___  No
( b) If yes, how long (in days)? _______
(c) If not, why not?
(a) How do you in adjudicate financial financial issues in 
the public sector industries?
(a) Seek settlement as per the guidelines of the
I.W.W.P.C.
(b) Seek settlement regardless of the Government 
guidelines.
(c) Other ways (please specify):
What problems do you usually face while conducting 
ad judication?
(a) Why are so many cases pending with the labour court?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(b) What would you suggest to reduce such a large number of 
cases either from the viewpoint of their initiation or 
from the viewpoint of their quick disposal?
(a)
(b)
(c)
Have you any other specific suggestions to make the 
adjudication machinery of the country to settle industrial 
disputes more effective?
(a)
. (b)
( c )
How were you selected and appointed to be a chairman/member 
of this court?
What are the major administrative problems of your court at 
present?
(a )
(b)
( c )
What are your views on the following statements? Please 
give your views based on the following scale:
Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Disagree
strongly slightly strongly slightly
1 2 3 4 5
Mark the appropriate box on the right of each statement 
with any of the above scores with which you best agree.
a. Management does not try to solve problems through 
negotiation with the union at the plant level. ____
b. Workers (unions) do not try to solve problems through 
negotiation with the management at the plant level.____
c. More could be done to resolve cases at the stage of 
compulsory conciliation.____
d. Sometimes we cannot play a neutral role due to some external 
constraints. ____
e. The court is flooded with cases. We are overloaded. More 
courts should be constituted. ____
f. Because the law does not give any specific guidelines 
regarding the process of adjudication, we act on our 
personal views. ____
g. On some points the law is quite clear, but;the parties are 
not we11-aware of them. ____
h. In comparison with those of many other countries, our labour 
laws are fair; but they are not properly implemented- ----
i. Labour court is different from ordinary courts- It has some 
conciliatory obligations also. ----
j. Workers and unions are usually untrained. They do not know 
what proofs are required to substantiate the case. They 
often fail to produce evidence(s). ----
k. Parties are indifferent in attending hearings. ----
1. Dilatory attitude of the rival parties delays court's 
decision. ____
m. Members of the court are not always assiduous in attending 
meetings of the court. ----
n. "Justice delayed is justice denied". Cases pending for a 
great length of time creates frustration-----
o. There is a lack of uniform body of decisions, principles and
precedents for the guidance of the labour court. _____
p. Labour courts do not have well-equipped libraries. _____
q. Members of the court very often support their parties' case
and deprive the Chairman of objective advice._____
r. It requires more than law to solve and adjudicate labour 
disputes. It involves complex problems of production 
analysis, financial analysis and such other matters._____
Name of the investigator: 
Date:
APPENDIX F .6  
CONTENT ANALYSIS SHEET FOR PLANT LEVEL CASES
For data processing
purpose only.
Col. Nos. Code Nos.
01. Name of the plant:
02. Serial number of the case examined: j
0 3 . Type of the case:
Individual
Group
Collective
0*f. Who initiated the negotiation ?
Collective Bargaining Agent
Management
Others (specify)
For data processing 
purpose only.
Col. Nos. Code Nos.
05. What was(were) the reason(s) for 
the dispute ?
Pay
Bonus
Fringe benefits
Physical working conditions
Holidays, leaves, hours of work 
and other timine; issues
Disciplinary matters (e.g. suspen­
sion, dismissal etc.)
Work allocation / organisation
Labour welfare
Others (specify)
06. What was the result of negotiation?
Successful
1
Partly successful
Unsuccessful:
Not proceeded further 
Referred to corporation
Referred to conciliator 
Referred to labour court
07. If the negotiation was successful
or partly successful, main contents 
of the collective agreement:
( 1 )
( 2 )
( 3 )
(*0
(5)
08. Binding period for the agreed terms:
0 9 . If the negotiation turned unsuccessful, 
what were the causes responsible for the 
failure of the negotiation ?
( 1)
( 2 )
(3)
10. How long did it take to conclude the 
negotiation ?□ days
11.(a) If-the case was referred to the corpora­
tion, was it settled.at the corporation 
level ?
Yes
No B
(b) If not, how was it settled ?
403
12.(a) If referred to the conciliator, was the 
case settled through conciliation ?
Yes ___
NO ___
(b) If not, how was it settled ?
l3-=lf referred to the labour court, what was 
the outcome ?
Successful for the worker( union)
Successful for management
For data processing 
purpose only.
Col. Nos. Code Nos.
Name of the investugator Date
APPENDIX F .7
CONTENT ANALYSIS SHEET FOR C O N C IL IA T IO N  LEVEL CASES
Serial Ho.
01. Name of the conciliation offices
(2) Tongi(1) Dhaka
(3) Narayangonj I 1 (4) Others(specify)
02. The industry involveds
(1) Jute * 1 1 (2) B.R.T.C.. 1 1
(3) B.I.W.T.C. I I (4) B.I.W.T.A.
(5) Electricity 1 1
0 3 . Who applied for the conciliation ?
(1) Union 1 1 (2) Management £
(3) Both
□
□
□
0^. What was(were) the reason(s) for the
dispute ?
(1 ) Pay
(2) Bonus
(3) Fringe benefits
(k) Physical working conditions
(5) Holidays, leaves, hours 
of work etc.
(6 ) Disciplinary matters (e.g. 
suspension, dismissal etc.)
(7) Other personnel matters (e.g. 
recruitment, promotion, transfer 
etc.)
(8 ) Work allocation/organisation
(9) Labour welfare
(1 0) Others(specify)
05. Why did the direct negotiation (at 
the plant level) fail ?
(D
( 2 )
(3)
0 6 . (a) Time taken in the direct negotiation: 
days
(b) Time (from the date of application) 
within which conciliation proceedings
irtea:
days
(c) Extended period of conciliation 
(if so agreed by the parties):□ days
(d) Time taken to conclude the conciliation: 
f 1 days
0 7 . Whether power(s) had to be invoked to get 
information from or compel the attendence 
of the parties:
(1) Yes f 1 (2) No r )
(3) Not available | 1
08. Outcome of the conciliation proceedings:
(1) Successful | j
( 2 ) Partially successful | j
(3) Unsuccessful j ~|
(*f) Not proceeded with m
□
□
09* Binding period, if the case is successful 
or partially successful:
(1) One year
( 2 )
10. If the case is partially successful, what 
is(are) the point(s) on which agreement 
could not be made ?
( 1 )
( 2 )
(3)
11. If the case is unsuccessful or partially 
unsuccessful, what was(were) the reason(s) 
for the failure of the conciliation ?
( 1 )
( 2 )
(3)
12. What happened after the failure of the 
conciliation ?
(1) Referred to arbitration
(2) Referred to labour court
(3) Referred back: to parties 
(*0 Not available
Na me  of the i n v e s t i g a t o r  "Jate
CONTENT ANALYSIS SHEET FOR LABOUR COURT CASES
Serial No. j J
For all cases:
01. Name of the court*
(1) First Labour Court, Dhaka
(2) Second Labour Court, Dhaka
A PPENDIX F .8
(1) Decided 1 1 (2) Undecided | . )
0 3 . The law(s) and section(s) involved in 
the cases
(a) Law(s):
(1) The I.R.0..1969
(2) The Employment of Labour 
(Standing Orders) Act,1965
(3 ) Others(specify)
(b) Section(s) 1
(1)
( 2 )
(3)
Oh. The industry involved:
(1) Jute (public sector)
(2) Road "transport (public sector)
(3 ) v/ater transport (public sector) 
(h) Electricity
□
□
05- Type of the case:
(1) Individual I 1 ( 2 ) G r o u p
(3) Collective
0 6 . Y/ho initiated the case ?
(1) An individual worker
(2) A group of workers
(3) An union / C.B.A.
(h) Management
(5) Referred by the Government
(6) Others (specify)
07- What was(were) the reason(s) for the cas
(1) Pay
(2) Borius
(3) Fringe benefits 
(h) physical working conditions
(5) Holidays, leaves, hours of 
work and other timing issues
(6 ) Disciplinary matters (e.g. 
suspension, dismissal etc.)
(7) Other personnel matters (e.g. . 
recruitment, promotion, trans­
fer etc •)
(8) Work allocation/organisation
(9) Labour welfare 
(10) Others (specify)
□
□
08. What enforcement was(has been) sought ? 
(X) Legal rights
(2) Previous award(s) of the 
labour court
(3) Terms of the existing collec­
tive agreement(s)
(4) New demands not based on 
existing agreement(s)
If the case is a decided onet
0 9 . What was the outcome (to the initiator 
or first party) of the case ?
(1) Successful
(2) Partially successful
(3) Unsuccessful
10. Who attended the hearing ?
(1) Plaintiff □  (2) Defendant
(3) Both
11. How long (in days) did it take to 
decide the case ?
days
12. Was there an appeal against the decision 
of the court ?
(1) Yes (2) No
(3) Not available
If the case is an undecided one:
13* Why is the case remaining undecided ? 
( 1 )
( 2 )
(3)
14. For how long (in days) is the case 
remaining pending ?□ days
15« What happened to the case ?
(1) Will be decided in the future
(2) Withdrawn
(3) Not proceeded with
(4) Referred back to parties
□
□
Name of the investigator Date
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